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NORTHERN IRELAND: IS THERE A SOLUTION?
Hugh Munro

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BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN UNION
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ROSALIND WADE
Associate Editor:
BETTY ABEL
Editorial Advisers:
PROFESSOR SIR HERBERT BUTTERFIELD
PROFESSOR ESMOND WRIGHT
Fine Arts Correspondent:
ERNLE MONEY
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DAVID FINGLETON

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NORTHERN IRELAND: IS THERE A SOLUTION?

by Hugh Munro

WE have seen that the manifestations and slogans of Protestant Unionism are defensive and negative, a matter of organising against the imposition of what is deemed to be Rome Rule on the Protestant people of the North of Ireland. It has, of course, its positive side, in the sense that Protestant Unionists must be expected to have a positive wish to advance Protestant values and the welfare of Protestant people. Its trouble is that these desires, while positive, are unfashionable. Its leaders are having to make concessions to the secular trend of the times. Forty years ago, Lord Craigavon, who was by no means the greatest of bigots, was happy to proclaim that Stormont was 'A Protestant Parliament for a Protestant People'. Now, even Mr. Paisley disclaims the title Protestant; he has long since abandoned the title 'Protestant Unionist' for his party and renamed it the Democratic Unionist Party. Yet Protestantism remains at the core of the movement. Can a loyalty which is ashamed to admit to its real nature provide the basis for coherent government?

Currently, when asked to say what they stand for (as opposed to what they stand against) Unionists tend to make a sudden ideological shift, to switch to asserting their alternative British persona. In their negative role, they can wear their Protestant hats and inveigh against the reactionary obscurantism of the South; but when they wish to be positive the sectarian headgear must be discarded, and the British hat put on. They proclaim their loyalty to British values and the Monarchy. (Their loyalty is, however,

a conditional one; the Orange Order promises loyalty to the Monarch for as long as the Monarch is Protestant.)

But what happens if Britain decides that she can no longer stand over a necessarily Protestant Northern Ireland regional government and will not integrate the province in the UK? Protestant Unionism must go for independence (William Craig has indeed for long been flirting with the idea) or perish. This will not be done without a great deal of heart-searching. It seems clear that Northern Irish Unionists are well aware, and more than a little afraid, of the ugly passions which lie behind Unionism. They never asked for the province to have a regional government in the first place; fifty years later, in a BBC/NOP opinion poll in 1974, the status most favoured by Unionists was integration. It is fashionable to blame Unionists for their discriminatory government up to 1969; yet it is clear that the situation which most of them would prefer—integration—is one where they would have no local powers to discriminate with at all. In August 1969, when the Bogside riots were at their height, Major Chichester-Clark could have cleaned them up in an hour—if he had let slip what was in effect the Army of Protestant Unionism, the B Specials. He did not, preferring to call in the British Army instead.

Are indeed the Unionists to be particularly blamed for discriminating against Catholics? They can plead in their favour that they never asked for a local government, but that once the British had imposed it on them, they had no option but to invoke the only local patriotism—Protestant Unionism. In 1922, with Michael Collins organising a force of several thousand IRA men to invade Fermanagh, a Northern Irish government which laid stress on reconciliation between Catholic and Protestant would not have lasted long. The walls had to be manned to keep the enemy out, and Protestant Unionism was the only loyalty which could inspire the besieged garrison. To try and organise the defence of the Border in the name of pro-British non-sectarian Unionism would have been to invoke disaster, seeing that the pro-British Unionists of the South were calling for all-Ireland Dominion Home Rule. Unionists can say that if they practised discrimination, they were put by Britain in a position where they had to; that they would have preferred to have been accepted as British through and through, with no necessarily-Protestant discriminatory local government.

By and large, the influence of Britain on Stormont was always in the direction of tolerance and a fairer deal for Nationalists. Yet the discrimination remained and the explosion of 1968-69 occurred. Britain is now in a very delicate position. The refusal to integrate means that some degree of necessarily discriminatory Protestant Unionist government must be tolerated if the province is to remain in the United Kingdom; and Britain must accept responsibility for that discrimination, since she is the sovereign power. And if she is unwilling to accept this responsibility, and as a result an independent Ulster is set up, the result must be worse discrimination still.

An independent Ulster with its Unionist population conscious of having been rejected by Britain, must be expected to turn towards Protestant Unionism, which alone can serve as the essential cement for the fabric of

an independent state. And the Northern Catholics, the local representatives of the chief enemy of that state, must be treated as the enemy within the gates. And, just as Israel is supported by American money, is it altogether fanciful to speculate whether fundamentalist Protestants in the States would be forthcoming with aid to a Protestant Ulster, and that these interests would make it clear that the more sectarian Protestant Ulster was, the more aid it would get?

An independent Ulster seems an ugly prospect. Is it not wise to devote some attention to the alternative future for the province outside the United Kingdom—as part of a united Ireland? On the face of it, there is much to be said for it. To most moderate people in Britain and Ireland, the need for the people of Northern Ireland to have a peaceful future comes before questions of sovereignty. And peace can surely best be built on the foundation of the one thing Nationalist and Unionist share in common—their common Irishness. Put Irish Nationalist and Unionist together in any situation where the existence of Northern Ireland is not in question and they cooperate happily. Their sporting organisations, their churches, are organised in an all-Ireland basis with few or no troubles. But put them into a Northern Ireland institution and there is trouble immediately; for the very existence of such institutions is visible evidence of defeat for Nationalists and of triumph for Protestant Unionists. Conceivably, perhaps, a Northern Ireland institution might serve as a forum for reconciliation—but only for as long as it tried to exercise no power. A Northern Ireland political institution cannot serve simultaneously as a forum for reconciliation and a means of effective government.

Irish unity at an early date is, of course, something Dublin would not like at all. 'Lord, give us unity—but not yet' is Dublin's preferred slogan. Yet is there not something improbable and rather shameful in Dublin's attitude? If unity is the ultimate cure, why is it not the cure now, when a cure is most needed? The priest and the levite at least walked by on the other side; they did not go up to the man who had fallen among thieves and explain to him how they had the very medicine for him, except that it couldn't be applied till he got better. Dublin has, of course, put forward the notion of a gradual movement of Northern Ireland towards Irish unity, but this is surely an unreal scenario. A monolithic Unionist movement, firm in its refusal to have anything to do with unity, offers the best hope of a stable regional government in the province. The Dublin scenario envisages a gradual break-up of this monolith, with some Protestants beginning to come out in the open and say 'Maybe Irish unity would be a good idea'. But if this happened, there would be an immediate growth of hard-line Unionist militancy, of turmoil on the streets. This turmoil would grow and the scenario envisages that at the time of maximum disorder, when the matter is in the balance, some presumably moderate, peaceable Protestants would be expected to come bravely out in the open and say 'We feel Northern Ireland should be abolished'. Could anything be more absurd and cruel?

Northern Ireland cannot heal itself. It can only be itself, be what it was set up to be—a Protestant province. It cannot say it wants to cease to exist.

All it can ever say, all it has ever said, is 'No' to the South, 'No' to unity. It can never heal sectarian strife, for sectarianism is in its nature, and it must be true to its nature.

But all this is not to say that reconciliation is impossible, that progress towards unity can never be made or that Protestants must always object to such progress. It is merely to say that once you ask Unionists to speak with a voice which is representative of Northern Ireland, they must always speak in sectarian terms. Although the need to make a success of Northern Ireland has caused Northern Protestants to appear very sectarian, the non-sectarian, fair-minded pro-British strain in Unionism remains latent underneath. Create a solution where Northern Protestants have to speak in other than Northern Irish terms and it will emerge; and when it emerges, it will be easier to deal with than Protestant Unionism ever was, or could be.

Historically, this separation of the two strains in Irish Unionism has at least twice been achieved. From 1912 to 1921, Irish Unionists were split between the Protestant Unionists who predominated in the North and the non-sectarian Unionists, led by Lord Midleton, who predominated in the South, but were by no means non-existent in the North. Indeed, in the only electoral contest between the two sides in those years, in a by-election in the East Antrim Unionist heartland in 1919, the moderate Unionist won rather easily. The same division in Unionism reappeared in 1969, when Unionism divided between pro- and anti-O'Neill candidates. Here again the moderates predominated; and it was only when the power-sharing policy pushed these moderates into a situation where they were backing a policy which must make nonsense of Northern Ireland institutions, that the voters turned against them.

There is something topsy-turvey about the whole Dublin policy, a topsy-turvydom best exemplified by Garret Fitzgerald's book *Towards a New Ireland*. This policy envisaged a two-pronged advance towards Irish unity. One prong was to be the power-sharing policy, according to which moderate Unionist and moderate Nationalist, working together in Northern Irish Institutions, would make progress towards reconciliation. The second prong involved the Dublin Government which, by moving from an overtly Catholic to a secular-liberal stance, would calm the fears of the extreme Protestants.

It is the contention of this article that this policy has got matters the wrong way round. In that policy, the role given to moderate Unionists, who are the Unionists most likely to acquiesce in a united Ireland, is to operate inside Northern Irish institutions, although such institutions make no particular sense to them, and only serve as a vehicle for sectarianism. And Dublin's active endeavours in the direction of unity are aimed, not at the moderates, but at the extremists, the people whose whole political existence is bound up with resisting unity. Secularising the Southern state is of no particular interest to moderates—their objections to unity are more political than sectarian. It is links with Britain they wish to retain; they know, being balanced men, that the South is a reasonably attractive place for Protestants to live. And what difference can attempts to secularise the Southern state

make to extreme Protestants, whose view of the South is a matter of irrational hatred in the first place? One almost feels that Dublin, in its anxiety not to get embroiled, has created a policy which is guaranteed not to make any progress at all.

Indeed, it is doing harm. The practical effect of the Sunningdale power-sharing policy has been to destroy the moderate Faulknerite Unionist party; to change from a situation where Messrs. Paisley, Craig and West were regarded by Unionists as dangerous extremists to one where they are seen as the acceptable leaders of Unionism; to build up the Provos at the expense of the SDLP. As power-sharing comes to be seen as an unrealistic aim, the credibility of those politicians who backed it—which means every moderate politician in these islands—is weakened. Worst of all, we have had three years—with all their attendant bloodshed—during which all hope of constructive policy development was arrested because all those politicians had their eyes riveted on a mirage.

Let us at least hope that the most important lesson of the whole sad story is learnt—that progress will not be made by arm-twisting moderate Unionists into promoting policies their voters will not accept. Three Prime Ministers—O'Neill, Chichester-Clark, Faulkner—have been destroyed that way. Unionists must be offered something more than Henry Ford's choice—any system of government they want, provided it has power-sharing and an Irish dimension. They are hardly going to get what (barring integration) they would most wish—a restoration of the pre-1969 Stormont; but they must at least be given a real choice between at least two alternatives which London is prepared to see them accept. If London wishes them to incline towards one choice more than another, London will have to use her leverage over them.

The economic lever—the subsidy of about £300m. a year to the province—is the most obvious one; but its use is risky—it might be counter-productive. More important is the security lever—the military support Britain gives to Unionism. Most important of all is her psychological leverage—the respectability conferred by the British connection, without which Unionism would be a noisy, sectarian, negative loyalty operating purely in the turbulent politics of the island of Ireland. The trouble is that the military and the respectability levers cannot be used until Britain brings herself around to the idea of withdrawing from Ireland, and can convince Unionists that she might. Currently Britain is waging Unionism's war against Nationalism, and she dare not stop for fear of the way the loyalists might wage it if she did. To fight another man's battle humanely, lest left to himself he might wage it inhumanely, is a quixotic policy surely unique in history; it cannot last much longer.

But these realities at this stage have not worked through to the minds of policy-makers. We cannot say at this stage just how much, if any, of her leverage over Unionism Britain will use, and so the immediate future cannot easily be predicted. We can usefully, however, speculate on the form of policy which has good hopes of bringing about peace from the Nationalist side and which at the same time demands the exercise of the minimum

leverage on the Unionists.

This policy envisages a recreated Stormont, with powers rather more limited than the old one but still substantial. Elections to it would be by PR, to ensure maximum participation of moderate men, but otherwise there would be no constraints on the government's operation. Unionists could pursue Unionist policies as hard as they would like. Nationalists could be as nationalist as they please; moderate men of either side would not be under constraint to enter into alliances with their opponents and so expose themselves, as Brian Faulkner in particular did, to accusations of treason to their basic political faith.

As a counter-balance to what must, initially at least, be expected to be an essentially Unionist-dominated Stormont there would also be created a political arena in which Nationalists could have power. This would take advantage of the fact that you have at the moment in the North and South of Ireland two virtually identical electoral systems, each with virtually the same number of electors per seat. Put together the Northern Ireland Assembly (78 members) and the Dail (148 members) and you could have, if you wished, the Parliament of Ireland. That it should be asked to sit is not suggested; rather that the 226 members act as an electorate to nominate and choose (using PR) a Council of Ireland with, say, 60 members. The Council here proposed would make absolutely no difference between North and South. An Assemblyman can propose and vote for a Southerner; a TD can help to elect a Northerner. It will not be possible to say of any member which side he represents. The Council will, in other words, be Ireland made manifest in political terms. This fact alone should do untold good to cool Irish passions. It will no longer be possible for loyalists to paint horrifying pictures of the terrors in store if Ireland were united; the (probably quite ordinary) reality will be visible down the road in Armagh or wherever. And Nationalists too will no longer be able to paint excessively rosy pictures—the Council may come up against real difficulties.

The Council would be set in being and have its powers (which might be quite small) delegated to it by London and Dublin direct, without consulting Belfast. No Unionist politician would be put in the position of being accused that he had consented to its establishment. In its day-to-day working it would not have to consult Stormont, and so Unionists speaking as Unionists in Stormont would never have to come to a view on its activities. The Council's powers, whatever they would be, would relate to the whole island, without distinction between North and South.

Paradoxically, the establishment of a non-power-sharing Stormont and the complete divorce of that Stormont from all-Ireland politics would make for a more tolerant Stormont than forced power-sharing could ever secure. Because Stormont would have nothing directly to do with all-Ireland politics, its politics would be less controversial, and moderate Unionists would be more likely to be elected to it.

And those moderate Unionists would be more likely to work actively for conciliation and fair play towards Nationalists than they would in a power-sharing Stormont which was involved in a Council of Ireland. The place

where decisions were taken about all-Ireland politics, so far as Unionists are concerned, would be Westminster, where further accessions of power to the Council of Ireland would be decided. And it so happens that the straight-vote system in use for Westminster elections ensures that Unionists elected to Westminster tend to be of the extreme, rather than the moderate variety. If the moderates in Stormont then were denounced by the extreme men for their tolerant attitude towards Nationalists, they could reply by saying: 'The place where constitutional issues affecting Northern Ireland are decided is Westminster, not Stormont. What happens in Stormont is not important. The task of defending the Border falls on you, the loyalist MPs at Westminster, not us'. In other words, the heat will tend to be taken out of Stormont politics and the task of defending the Border will fall to those who most want to defend it. And, most important, they will have to defend it in a parliament where prejudice and rant and flag-waving cut no ice. Sloganising will not serve; they will have to appear as reasonable, reasoning men if they are to forward their cause.

For Nationalists the big gain is that there has been a constitutional concession. After the long struggle for unity, Ireland, all-Ireland, has been made manifest in political terms, even if with minor powers; and that fact would almost certainly end the IRA for good, and start a slow organic movement towards permanent peace.

But would this scheme work? Would the loyalists, by strikes or violence, not prevent the Council from exercising its functions in Northern Ireland? This is, of course, a real difficulty, and there would be a strong case for confining the Council's functions, initially at least, to the giving out of money—grants for industrial development, agricultural grants, etc. No Irish Republican, however fanatical, refused to draw his British Social Security money; and no loyalist, however extreme, is likely to refuse a Council of Ireland grant. But there is also proposed a more effective means of ensuring that the Council of Ireland is worked. Let the Council and the Stormont Assembly be given a mutual veto, with either being able at any time to pass by a simple majority a resolution which would have the effect of proroguing both for, say, a year. If, then, the loyalists refuse to work the Council, they will have to face the fact that the Nationalist majority on the Council can at any time close Stormont down. With this sword over their heads, both bodies are likely to behave reasonably; and the fact that pay for Council and Assembly members would be stopped during prorogation periods would also help.

There is, then, something in this scheme for London, extreme loyalists, moderate Unionists and Nationalists—everyone, that is, except Dublin. Dublin, it is abundantly clear, is terrified of active involvement in the Northern Irish situation. Yet her spokesmen incessantly speak about the problem and write books offering solutions to it. The solutions, curiously enough, are ones which call for sacrifices from other people, but hardly any from Dublin politicians. Ireland, it appears, will be saved if the Unionists will share power in Stormont, or if the Catholic bishops encourage mixed marriages; but when Mr. Wilson makes so innocuous a suggestion as that the Republic

should rejoin the Commonwealth, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael instantly reject the idea. It is time that Dublin was told that a policy of overwhelming all concerned with offers of all aid short of help will not do. Dublin must get used to the idea of making sacrifices for Irish peace; to the idea that her bureaucracy might lose some of its powers, or that, for instance, her nominee to the European Commission would be appointed by the Council of Ireland. But she cannot be allowed to stand in the way. Concessions of some kind towards nationalism are vital for permanent peace; Dublin will not propose them so London will have to. And, if and when she does, she will find that Dublin quietly toes the line.

The only basis on which the writer can envisage Britain retaining her presence in Northern Ireland is a return to a sectarian Stormont or an organic solution of the kind outlined above. If these fail, Dublin is going to have even harder questions to answer. The only solutions left will be either an independent Ulster or immediate Irish unity. In these circumstances, the possibility of getting a majority for unity will immediately emerge; for given that one third of the population is Catholic, to get that majority it would need only a quarter of the Protestants to prefer unity, with all its defects, to an inevitably Protestant extremist state with the UDA for an army. Now the spotlight turns on Dublin. Will she, at last, turn her mind to political sacrifices? Will she accept Commonwealth membership, joint citizenship, open recruiting for the British forces?

Will London, for her part, make it clear that she prefers a united Ireland to an independent Ulster, and that while the people in the North must choose their own future, they must accept that a free Ulster would have no links with Britain, and would be excluded from the EEC, and that those Northern Irish people who want links with Britain will have to accept that those links in future must come via Dublin, and that in an independent Ulster/Irish unity poll they must vote accordingly?

The problem, in short, is not being solved, and will not be solved, by assuming it is sectarian. It is fundamentally political, and London, and above all Dublin, must face up to that fact.

[Hugh Munro has recently contributed a number of articles to *The Times*. 'Northern Ireland: Background to the Crisis' was published in the June 1975 issue (No. 1313, Vol. 226) of the *Contemporary Review*.]

THE BRITISH REFERENDUM AND THE EEC

At the Referendum held in Great Britain on Thursday, June 5th, 1975 the voting was as follows:

For remaining in the Community	17,378,581	(67.0%)
Against remaining in the Community	8,470,073	(32.8%)

In the August issue of the *Contemporary Review* Paul Rose, M.P. will write on the results of the Referendum, some of its lessons and implications.

TURKEY MOVES RIGHT—AND EAST

by Stephen Oren

SULEYMAN DEMIREL'S new Turkish coalition government, which was installed at the start of April, marks a return to a right of centre regime after the reformist hopes raised by the government of Prime Minister Ecevit. It also testifies to the growing strength of Islamic forces in Turkey as Turks, half a century after Ataturk's reforms which were designed to make Turkey a European state, again identify themselves as Middle Easterners. Finally, in the context of US-Turkish relations, the new government reflects the ways in which a superpower may alienate a small, if important, ally.

Since Turkish democracy began in 1950, its pattern has been simple. On one side, a party, called the Democratic Party until the 1960 military coup and the Justice Party (AP—Adalet Partisi) since then, which represents the Turkish business and farming classes. On the other, the Republican People's Party (CHP—Cumhuriat Halk Partisi), the party of Ataturk which dictatorially ruled Turkey until 1950 and inherited Ataturk's zeal for secularism and committment to state intervention in the economy. Over the past generation, the CHP has striven to transform itself from a cadre of modernising bureaucrats to a mass party along European Social Democratic lines. The gradual displacement in the 1960s and early 1970s of the late Ismet Inonu, Ataturk's collaborator and successor, by Bulent Ecevit was the symbol of this change. But, while transforming, the CHP has been unable to win elections.

The real antagonist of the Democratic Party or the AP was the Turkish Army, another product of Ataturk, which insisted that Turkish governments, whatever the election results, be democratic, secular and reform-minded. The 1960 military coup and the 1971 military intervention which led to the passing of Turkey's first land reform act, were products of this military thinking. But senior army officers, antagonistic to the AP, were less than enthusiastic about the transformed CHP. They favoured the small centrist Reliance Party (GP—Guven Partisi), a tiny, high-minded group of civil servants and professors who left the CHP as it moved left.

Elections in October 1973 broke this pattern. For the AP had two splits: a revived 'Democratic Party' (DP) had been erected over personality disputes and out of a dispute between large landowners and the more pragmatic businessmen and farmers of the AP; and N. Erbakan had created the National Salvation Party (MSP—Milli Selamet Partisi). While the AP had traditionally been sympathetic to 'Islamic' demands (for more religious education in the schools, for building and repairing more village mosques), Erbakan's followers called for a return to Islamic values, closer ties with the rest of the Islamic world, and a rejection of both 'international capitalism' (the MSP is opposed to Turkish association with the European Economic Community) and socialism. These right-wing splits, combined with the 1971 decision of the military to outlaw the Marxist Turkish Labour Party (thus

freeing the CHP from any competition on its left) produced a Parliament in which no party held a majority of the 450 Chamber of Deputies seats (see Table I) but the CHP had a decided plurality.

CHP leader Ecevit put together a coalition with the MSP. This seemed surprising if one looked at the contrasting images of the two parties and their stands on religious issues. But on social or economic issues, such as the wish that the Turkish economy be planned and that its benefits not go merely to a small business class, the MSP was not far from the CHP position. After all, the MSP was hardly a bunch of ignorant fanatics. Necmittin Erbakan himself is a former Professor of Mechanical Engineering at Istanbul Technical University. Engineers and lawyers (generally from peasant backgrounds) are important sources of MSP deputies. Ecevit felt that by concessions on 'Islamic' issues (e.g. the censorship of what the MSP felt were immoral books) he could forge a working reformist alliance perhaps similar to Israel's generation-long coalition between the Israel Labour and National Religious Parties.

The July coup on Cyprus doomed Ecevit's government. Quite clearly, no Turkish government could have accepted the installation in Nicosia of a Greek Cypriot regime committed to union with, and dominated by Athens. Nor could any elected Turkish government toss away the chance to avenge the decade-long humiliation of more than 100,000 Turkish Cypriots. To a large extent, the currents that had pulled the CHP 'left of centre' and which had permitted the MSP to emerge as an openly Islamic party had their origins in Cyprus—particularly in Ankara's 1964 humiliation when the USSR ordered Turkey not to invade Cyprus in reaction to Greek Cypriot attacks on Turkish Cypriots and the US declined to support the Turks.

But what were Turkish intervention's positive aims? No doubt Ankara's victories during the summer of 1974 increased Turkish demands. But Ecevit, after the fighting, called for a confederal Cyprus consisting of a Turkish Cypriot entity in the north and a Greek Cypriot entity in the south of Cyprus. Erbakan, as well as the opposition parties, demanded the annexation of all Cyprus to Turkey or at least the annexation of the 40% of Cyprus held by the Turkish Army. For Ecevit, already grimly aware that the fighting on Cyprus had already cost Turkey a year's GNP and that the economy of the Turkish held areas of Cyprus must be rebuilt from scratch, this was unacceptable. In September 1974, the Ecevit government fell: ostensibly because Ecevit refused to allow Erbakan to act as Prime Minister (and thus be able to give orders to the Turkish Army) while Ecevit attended a Social-Democratic conclave in Scandinavia, but really because hawk and dove could no longer coexist.

Nor was Ecevit sorry to see his government fall. Without the CHP, there was little chance of a stable coalition. Thus there would have to be new elections in which Ecevit and the CHP could use the Turkish Army's successes on Cyprus to achieve electoral victory. Besides, the Turkish Army, or at least its senior officers, tended to support Ecevit. Aside from the historic Army-AP feud, the Army was moderate on the Cyprus issue as its

main worry continued to be Turkey's northern neighbours. Turkish control over Cyprus's northern coast (achieved by the summer 1974 victory) was desirable but so was a Cyprus whose southern portion was not tied to Greece in order to limit the extent to which Turkey's southern and western coasts are surrounded by a Greece which may be hostile in the future. That meant Cyprus confederation. But as long as Greece was not hostile, the Turkish Army wished to cooperate with Greece in NATO. Under these conditions, hawkish AP and MSP rhetoric was not a good omen for a coalition that the Army would support.

Ecevit miscalculated. The other parties in the Turkish Parliament refused to support dissolution of the Chamber and new elections. The Army, having no wish for the internal agitation that elections would bring and remembering Ecevit's virulent criticism of army rule in 1971-73, did not press them. A government of civil servants, headed by Sadi Irmak, an independent close to the GP, came into being. But Ecevit waited for the day on which Greek-Turkish negotiations over Cyprus would begin in earnest and a strong, popularly-backed but moderate cabinet would be needed in Ankara.

At this point, US pressure came into the picture. The US Congress decided that Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus violated US law as to the uses which could be made of US weapons: laws which the Turks note have not been applied to some other US clients (i.e. India or Israel). Accordingly, Congress decreed that US aid to Turkey (about $65 million per year) and US arms shipments there should be first restricted and then, from February 1973 onward, cut off.

For Turkish politics, the implications of US Congressional action were stark. There could be no meaningful negotiations on Cyprus. With the US openly backing the Greek Cypriot position, how could any Greek government, even one as strong as that of Prime Minister Karamanlis, justify making confessions or putting pressure on Greek Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios to make concessions in return. The irony here is that Karamanlis dislikes Makarios and the Cypriots. He would probably be willing enough to settle on Ecevit's terms.

Nor could Turkey afford to make concessions while under US Congressional embargo. No doubt Ankara's tune would have been different had the boycott really hurt. But the main shock was to Turkish pride. Turks felt that despite their adherence to and support of NATO (in which they were more important than Greece), they were regarded as of little account by the US, partly because the Greeks are Christians while they, the Turks, are Muslims.

This mood of Islamic identity is given point by the aid which Iran and a number of oil-rich Arab states (Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia) have been extending to Turkey. Saudi Arabia promised Turkey it would have no difficulty in obtaining oil at less than world prices, while the Iraqis are now constructing an oil pipeline from their Mosul fields to the Turkish port of Iskanderoun. One reason for this aid is Turkey's refusal, in October 1973, to allow US planes to overfly or use Turkish facilities on their way to Israel

while Soviet planes were permitted to overfly Turkey in order to bring arms to Egypt and Syria. This Arab aid helps to make it possible for Turkey to obtain arms and spare parts from West Germany and other European states to replace US supplies. The MSP's role in Turkish politics will certainly be enhanced by this aid.

Ostensibly, the Demirel cabinet was formed because ten of the DP's 45 Deputies split with their party and decided to support Demirel. But the glue holding its five parties (AP, GP, MSP, MHP and ex-DPP) together is opposition to Ecevit (which means no elections until the memory of who was Prime Minister during the summer 1974 victories fades) and insistence upon a tough stand on Cyprus. Under the Irmak caretaker government, the Turkish response to US pressure was the February proclamation of the 'Turkish Cypriot Federated State'. A logical next step would be to settle mainland Turks in northern Cyprus both to revitalise that area and increase the ratio of Turks to Greeks on the island.

Nor is it only on Cyprus that the Demirel government inherits economic problems which it may well tie to political solutions. Apart from the long-standing demand for economic changes in Turkey (for instance, land reform laws which the AP and ex-DP will surely *not* pass) which Ecevit wished to meet, Demirel must deal with slowdown in Western European economies; the return of Turkish migrant workers to Turkey and the growth of shanty-towns around the main Turkish cities. It is hard to imagine the free enterprise AP and ex-DP forming a common economic policy with the basically etatist MSP and MHP.

In the early 1950s, the then Prime Minister Adnan Menderes of the Democratic Party, faced serious economic problems of his own, which he attempted to 'solve' by diverting Turkish popular attention to Cyprus. It was precisely then that modern Turkey first became involved in Cypriot affairs. Nor is Cyprus the only bone of contention between Greece and Turkey. The discovery of oil near the island of Thasos has revived a smouldering Greek-Turkish dispute over demarcation of the Aegean Sea-bed especially as Greece, with Greek islands a literal stone's throw from the Turkish mainland, claims the entire sea-bed and its oil.

For Demirel and Erbakan, the new government represents a special victory. Four years ago, the Army ousted the AP and Demirel as 'insufficiently reformist'. He has now returned with Army consent. Four years ago, the Army outlawed Erbakan's first effort to organise an Islamic party. Now, the MSP has become something of a balance wheel in Turkish politics, as Turkey reconsiders the extent to which it is a Muslim rather than a European state.

There is another coalition partner whose presence in a Turkish cabinet is a source of concern—the MHP or Nationalist Action Party. Colonel Alparslan Turkes is the leader of this party. He was one of those responsible for the 1960 military coup but was purged from the Army when more conservative officers realised that he saw the coup not as a means for moving back to democracy but as a way of destroying party politics (which he rejects as 'divisive') and instituting speedy, if vague reforms on a

nationalistic and dictatorial basis. The MHP is emphatically secular but its 'nation' is not the Turkish people in Turkey but the Turkish peoples (Anatolian Turks, Azeris, Qashqais, Turkomans, Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, Kirghiz, Kazakh, Uigher) strung out from Anatolia to Mongolia. Here is a very different kind of rightism and looking east than is found in the MSP.

Many of the clashes between 'left-wing' and 'right-wing' students over the past fifteen years have been connected with Turkes, the MHP, and MHP youth groups equipped with distinctive customs. As Table I shows, Turkes has had little popular appeal, but his new respectability, combined with a civilian government which is unlikely to deal with socio-economic problems, may increase his appeal, especially to junior officers of the Turkish Army.

A stiffening of the Turkish position on Cyprus, a mental turn by many Turks away from Europe and the US toward ties with Arab states that are now seen as heirs of a common Muslim civilisation, the replacement of Ecevit's reformist government with one further to the right,—these were not among the aims of the US Congress when it, for whatever combination of domestic and international policy, cut off aid and arms supplies to Turkey. But these are the results. Much has been said about the 'arrogance of power'. Perhaps the US has another lesson to learn, one about the 'ignorance of power'.

[Dr. Stephen Oren is Assistant Professor in The Political Science Department at Baruch College, The City University, New York.]

TABLE I — TURKISH ELECTION RESULTS

Party (English name)	Turkish initials	1969 Votes (%)	1969 Chamber Seats	1973 Votes (%)	1974 Chamber Seats	Leader
Republican People's Party	CHP	27.4	143	33.3	186*	B. Ecevit
Reliance Party	CGP[1]	6.6	15	5.3	13†	T. Feyzioglu
Justice Party	AP	46.5	256	29.8	149†	S. Demirel
Democratic Party	DP	46.5	256	11.9	45	F. Bozbeyli
National Salvation Party	MSP	46.5	256	11.8	48*†	N. Erbakan
Nationalist Action Party	MHP	3.0	1	3.4	3†	A. Turkes
Nation Party	MP	3.2	6	.6	1	
Union Party	BP	2.8	8	1.1	1	
New Turkey Party	YTP	2.1	6			
Turkish Labour Party	TIP	2.7	2			
Independents		5.7	13	2.8	5	

[1] By 1973 Reliance Party adopted the name Republican Reliance Party (CGP) as it included additional defectors from the CHP.

* In Ecevit Government. † In Demirel government.

BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN UNION

by James Wilkie

THE origins of the European integration movement can be traced back for at least 600 years, although its continuous history dates largely from the second half of the 19th century. However, the real run-up to the Council of Europe, the treaty of Rome and the present developments, although interrupted by World War Two, started after the end of the First World War in 1918 and reached a peak in 1930-31. It is noteworthy for the considerable influence exercised upon it by the British Labour Government of the day, and particularly by the Foreign Secretary, the Scot Arthur Henderson.

Europe had been devastated by the First World War, politically and economically. Among the enormous difficulties of its situation were war debts and reparations, new political units trying to protect their economies with enormously high tariff barriers against imports, resentment by the defeated powers of their post-war losses under the peace treaties, the frantic attempts by France to secure herself against her German arch-enemy, the overshadowing of Europe by the newly-risen great powers such as Japan and the U.S.A., the comparison of European poverty with the unexampled American prosperity, and not least the current U.S. economic aggression—i.e. the short-sighted policy of forcing American exports abroad, while at the same time maintaining high tariff barriers against the manufactures of the rest of the world, which had already caused immense dislocation of international trade.

Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the old idea of European union was given a new lease of life from the autumn of 1923 onwards. Numerous organisations and publications were founded for this purpose, foremost among them being Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-European Union, based in Vienna. This movement was supported by only a handful of people in Britain, notably by a few right-wing Conservatives such as Leo Amery and Winston Churchill, who regarded European union without Britain as a means to counteract the already threatening break-up of the British Empire. The Socialists, on the other hand, had already transferred their support to the new world organisation, the League of Nations, and regarded the European movement as a threat to their brave new world of universally enforced peace.

It was left to the French to adapt the European movement to their own ends. The French economic leaders like Louis Loucheur and Premier Edouard Herriot had advocated European economic co-operation since 1920 or thereabouts, but it was about 1925 that they recognised the possibilities inherent in political integration, especially after the spectacularly successful Pan-European Congress of 1926 in Vienna. All previous attempts to obtain international guarantees of France's military security had failed, and it seems that the French Foreign Minister, the eloquent Breton orator Aristide Briand, then awakened to the realisation that a

European federal structure might prove an acceptable substitute.

Briand decided to jump onto the Pan-European bandwagon as a matter of policy, and set out to support Coudenhove-Kalergi's organisation and propagate the idea of European federation as strongly as he could, even going so far as to accept the honorary presidency in 1927—a personal luxury which could not be afforded by the foreign minister of a major power unless it was in line with the national policies which were his primary concern. He is on record as having remarked enthusiastically to a journalist in 1928 that *'une confédération européenne serait le vrai moyen d'assurer la paix'*, but there is little doubt that for the French 'the maintenance of peace' meant the maintenance of the political status quo in Europe, and with it France's hegemony. He informed Coudenhove-Kalergi in 1927 of his intention to bring forward official proposals to this end at the League of Nations, but procrastinated in this for two years in order to get the Kellogg Pact of Non-Aggression and especially the Young Plan for the regulation of the German reparations out of the way, so that the Germans would not be able to use them as bargaining material in the European business.

In July 1929, after months of diplomatic preparations, Briand finally set matters in motion with a piece of kite-flying in the form of an interview with the political correspondent of the Paris newspaper *l'Oeuvre* in which he indicated his intention of bringing forward concrete proposals for a European union at the League of Nations General Assembly in September. It is clear from his words as reported that his plan was to increase France's military security against Germany, to forestall any union of Austria and Germany in order to deny the Germans the increase in military strength of another six millions of population, to regain some of the economic power which had been lost to America since the war, and to counter the current U.S. economic aggression.

When the British authorities examined his statement, they seized on this last point to the exclusion of all others, which indicates how extremely delicate a subject British-U.S. trading relations represented in London, and how dependent Britain was on the U.S. market. The Foreign Office refused to believe that Briand was serious, while the Board of Trade, in response to questions in Parliament, drew up a secret memorandum for the Cabinet giving dire warning of the dangers involved in European union for the Commonwealth and the trading system on which the entire British foreign trade was based, and in particular about the economic disaster which would inevitably result from any disturbance of British trade with the U.S.A. As it happened, the Foreign Office totally misjudged the American attitude to European integration; far from opposing it, public and official opinion in the U.S. was markedly in favour of this development, then as now.

Consequently, when Briand rose at Geneva to propose his scheme of European union, which he said should be an economic union in the first instance, Arthur Henderson remained tight-lipped and silent in his seat while others replied. Briand promised to circulate a memorandum on the

subject to the European governments and obtain their views on the matter. Meanwhile, the British Foreign Office, which despite the six years' development of the European movement was still taken by surprise and completely baffled by the French move, set on foot a full-scale investigation and reappraisal of the French plans for organising Europe, using the Secret Service and the resources of the Paris, Berlin and Rome embassies. A series of clandestine meetings between Lord Tyrrell, the British Ambassador in Paris, and Daniel Serruys, one of the leading French statesmen, indicated that Briand was not even the author of his own plan, that he was being pushed from behind by powerful business interests who were determined on an economic organisation of Europe, with or without Britain, and against the U.S.A. This was seen rather as a device to entice Britain into Europe to help the French counterbalance Germany's economic power, but it was concluded that they were also out to use a federal system to provide themselves with military security against a combination of Germany and Italy.

It seems that the 'political' lobby in the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs eventually gained the upper hand, for when their long and woolly memorandum on the subject appeared on 17th May 1930 it stated that political security had to take precedence over economic union. This was the exact opposite of what Briand had stated at Geneva, and the implications were not lost on the suspicious European governments. The British Government, anxious not to offend the U.S.A., fearful of the possibly destructive effect of Briand's proposed European organisation on the Commonwealth on the one hand, and on the League of Nations on the other, but equally constrained by the necessity of keeping the moderate Briand firmly in the saddle at the French Foreign Ministry, gave a soft answer, but persuaded Briand to put the matter on the League of Nations agenda in September 1930. Henderson, the confirmed internationalist, was determined that nothing was going to undermine the status of the League, or his prime interest in foreign affairs, disarmament. The answer was to have the matter remitted to a Commission of Enquiry for European Union, where it would no doubt be quietly forgotten—a well-known technique. To the chagrin of the French, Henderson carried the meeting with him on this.

This European Commission (as it became known), formed of representatives of the then twenty-seven European states, appointed Briand its chairman, and Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League, as its Secretary, in order to chain it more firmly to the global organisation as Henderson wanted. After a political uproar over the admission of Turkey and the Soviet Union—both non-members of the League—it was obvious at its second session that Europe was divided into two economic camps—the Western industrialised countries, and the Eastern agricultural bloc. The second group, with a very able and vociferous spokesman in M. Marinkovitch of Jugoslavia, were determined to utilise the new organisation to correct the economic crisis in their own countries, specifically through the introduction of a system of European preferences for their huge unsold stocks of staple agricultural products. This was naturally anathema to the 'free trade' bloc headed by Britain, whose entire foreign trade, together

with all of her forty-two commercial treaties with other powers, was based on the 'most-favoured-nation' system. Somewhere in between stood the French, whose 'cartel' theories demanded international regulation of production and consumption in order to protect French industry and agriculture, and who would in any event have bent their own trading system backwards in order to maintain a political grip on Germany's eastern neighbours, while the Germans would have concluded a commercial treaty with the devil himself if thereby their economic needs and political grievances could have been settled.

The clash between the two European economic systems proved irreconcilable. The British economic 'sacred cow' — the most-favoured-nation system—was concurrently filling the role of bête noir for most of the European states, which were determined to have the creature ritually slaughtered to feed the hungry. After months of acrimonious debate in the European Commission, the Eastern states had their way, with French and German support and against bitter British and Commonwealth opposition, when a system of European preferential arrangements was introduced under League of Nations auspices. The British diplomats retired to lick their wounds and continue the battle, but it was already lost; free trade was a thing of the past, as the British coalition government under Ramsay MacDonald recognised with the institution of its Commonwealth Preference system in 1932.

In the middle of these negotiations the international economic and monetary system was breaking down, with dire political consequences. The Wall Street Crash of October 1929 occurred one month after Briand's 'European' speech at Geneva, in the following year the depression spread to Europe, while by the summer of 1931 there were 2½ millions unemployed in Britain, over 6 millions in Germany, and in Austria, cut off from her former markets in the now dissolved Austro-Hungarian Empire, the poverty and misery were beyond description. Hitler's National Socialist Party won a resounding victory in the Reichstag election of September 1930, which the terrified French blamed on Briand's European policy. In March there was further fuel added to the flames when the now desperate Austrian and German governments drew up a plan to establish a customs union between their countries, which created the worst political crisis since 1918. Hard on this came the failure of the Austrian *Creditanstalt*, the first of a whole series of banking collapses throughout Europe. The danger of social disturbance and even civil war in Germany and elsewhere was now acute.

In the face of this mounting catalogue of disaster, the British Labour leadership experienced a profound conversion on the road to Damascus, their European policy became reversed almost overnight, and Henderson, the confirmed 'universalist', suddenly started talking in 'European' terms. By now convinced that action at European level was required to stave off impending international economic and political catastrophe, Henderson and his assistants, Hugh Dalton and Philip Noel-Baker, with the unanimous approval of the Cabinet and the full support of senior civil servants, set out to make use of the hitherto despised European Commission, and to throw

the full weight of British influence behind its work. The opportunity to do this occurred at its third session, which opened on 15th May 1931, in Geneva.

Henderson and Noel-Baker arrived at the large meeting with no fewer than seven senior civil servants in attendance—an indication of the importance they attached to it. The bristling atmosphere was now aggravated by the fact that Briand had been resoundingly defeated in the French presidential election two days previously. The Hitler election in Germany had damaged his reputation in France, but the news of the Austro-German customs union—to the French only the start of the feared *Anschluss* of the German-speaking peoples against France—finally killed his foreign policy in the eyes of his countrymen. Henderson supported his friend Briand to the best of his ability, but the French Foreign Minister's political days were now numbered. Meantime it was obvious that the crisis had shocked the governments of Europe into a hitherto undemonstrated attitude of co-operation. Even the new Turkish and Soviet delegations seemed anxious to help.

The principle of forming a European economic union was no longer in dispute; the only undecided issue was whether a start was to be made with an all-European organisation, as the French insisted, or with the Austro-German type of smaller regional unions which could later be expanded and combined. Henderson the pacifist, anxious to replace the politically explosive Austro-German project with one which would offer the same economic advantages, was instrumental in having a committee of economic experts set up to consider the whole question, and pressed successfully for this committee to be given carte blanche to approach the problem from any angle they considered appropriate. This step can be considered the formal beginning of the movement which culminated in the Treaty of Rome in 1956.

Henderson insisted that the ten members of this committee should be economists of international standing who would be independent of their own governments, and that 'they should approach their work, not so much from a departmental or even from a national point of view, but rather from the point of view of Europe as a whole', as he put it to his colleague William Graham, President of the Board of Trade. His own nominee as British member was Sir Walter Layton, the Liberal editor of *The Economist* and internationally known economic expert, who had consistently supported the Briand scheme for European union since the day of its inception. One of the other members was Professor Eugene Preobrajensky of the Soviet Union, and in the present circumstances it is intriguing to consider that among the forefathers of the E.E.C. are to be numbered a British Labour Foreign Secretary and the Soviet Government!

Layton was supposed to act independently, but it is evident that some authorities regarded him as being there primarily to safeguard British interests. The expression 'brainwash' had not yet been added to the language, and so Layton was 'acquainted with the views' of the various ministries, especially the Dominions Office, where no fewer than three top officials emphatically impressed on him a minutely detailed case for not

acquiescing in any derogation whatever from the generality of the most-favoured-nation system, which would have seriously weakened the position of the Dominions, and been the start of Britain's coming down on the 'European side of the fence', to the detriment of her Imperial connections. Layton, however, shared Henderson's opinion that the matter was to be approached 'from the point of view of Europe as a whole', and he refused to commit himself along these lines.

Agreement was soon reached among this international group of experts on the causes of the crisis, not least of which was the network of tariff barriers which was strangling Europe. All the proposals for the improvement of the situation had for their objective the removal of these trade barriers and the encouragement of the movement of goods, capital and labour. The trouble lay in the failure to date of all the remedies which had been tried. However, the ice broke when M. Francois-Poncet, one of the French Ministers who was on a visit to Geneva, dropped a hint that France might well enter into a customs union with Germany as part of a general settlement.

The committee took the matter from there, and before their first session broke up there existed the broad outline of a plan for an all-European customs union, or even two or three main groups initially (the Central Group, including France and Germany, the Eastern Group, and Scandinavia). It was agreed that this European union would have the greatest possible number of members, that its external tariffs should be low, that non-members should be no worse off than before, and that transitional measures would be necessary. This was the position at June 1931.

Layton and Dr. Klemens Lammers of Germany, the joint authors of this plan, carried on discussions with European heads of state during the following weeks while the economic and financial situation continued to go from bad to worse, and social unrest increased in step with the soaring unemployment figures. The experts were doubtful whether there was any point in carrying on when the situation was changing almost daily, but Henderson, supported by Briand, the German Government, and even by Mussolini, refused to hear of any postponement, and insisted that the committee should get on with its work and finalise the plan for a European economic community.

On 24th August 1931 Layton and his colleagues met again in Geneva, and so well was their groundwork done that by the afternoon they had agreed, as the only way of preventing a similar crisis from occurring again, that Europe should be converted into a single vast market, accessible on equal terms to the producers of all member countries. Their detailed proposals went even further than the mere removal of tariff barriers, since they involved measures of economic planning on a European basis. The expression 'common European market', or 'European common market' began to be used at this time with reference to this plan. The method of approach which was chosen was that of the Austro-German plan—i.e. to begin with one or more smaller groupings which could later be expanded and combined into the European Union which was the ultimate goal. This

was how it eventually happened after the Second World War. Only minor modifications were made at the request of the Italian and Polish delegates, but otherwise the committee, including the Soviet representative, was unanimous in its opinion.

Unfortunately, Henderson and his colleagues went out of office with the fall of the Labour Government on 24th August, thus removing the principal British source of support for the European plan. While Ramsay MacDonald was trying to form his coalition government, the affairs of the nation were largely in the hands of the civil servants, and it was a senior official of the Board of Trade who represented Britain at the meeting of the European Commission when the common market project was discussed. He managed to have the project circulated to the European governments for their observations, which of course left the door wide open for the Board and the Dominions Office to draw up the official British reply, which was one of unbending opposition to the whole idea. Most of the European governments expressed their support for the idea of a common market, but were of the opinion that that particular stage of the crisis was not the best time to attempt to introduce it.

Unfortunately, by the time the economic crisis was over and conditions were more favourable to the introduction of the European scheme, Hitler had seized power in Germany, and his ideas on the organisation of Europe did not quite coincide with those of France. Attempts were made at intervals to resurrect the European union idea, especially just before the Second World War, when strong British parliamentary support was given to the principle by all of the parties at Westminster. The idea was kept alive by exiles and the resistance movement at the height of the German occupation, and soon after the war steps were taken to found a series of organisations at European level. Briand's Commission of Enquiry for European Union was kept alive, although inactive, only to disappear formally in 1946 along with the League of Nations itself.

Britain, still dreaming of imperial self-sufficiency, drew back from Europe in the fifties, when the E.E.C. was founded to regulate production and consumption internationally, and another European Commission, this time with genuine supranational powers, became the successor to the pioneer of 1930. Forty years on, the far-flung British world empire was asunder, and the 'home empire' in the British Isles showed every sign of following it into the pages of history. Only then did it become possible to consider the return of the Celtic and Anglo-Saxon peoples to a formal association with the European family of nations from which they had emerged, and as a cycle of history closed behind them, another one of unknown outcome opened.

[The above article is based on research undertaken by Dr. Wilkie for his Ph.D. thesis, *Die britische Europapolitik* 1929-1932 (Vienna 1973).]

THE ROC STORY: A PORTRAIT OF MODERN TAIWAN

by Thomas Chen

AS a country, China is one of the oldest on earth. Its recorded history has a duration of more than 4,000 years. This long sweep of dynastic China with one line of emperors after another was ended only in 1911 with the birth of the Republic of China. As a modern Republican state, China is very young. The Founding Father of the Republic, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, had tried again and again to overthrow the tired and decadent dynasty of the Manchus. China was ripe for new ideas but the hold of the traditional was strong. There was no unity. Progress and change cannot be denied, however, and it came to China on October 10 of 1911—called the Double Tenth because it was the 10th day of the 10th month. Ironically, Dr. Sun wasn't even in the country. He was in the United States raising money to continue the struggle. His inspiration was sufficient. Less than three months later—on January 1 of 1912—the Republic of China was proclaimed with Sun Yat-sen as its provisional president. The Manchus of Ch'ing, last of dynasties, was swept from the stage and momentous new forces were set in motion. China had awakened; the shots at Wuchang were to echo round the world.

Dr. Sun was a remarkable man. He had left China as a young boy and acquired a Western education in Hawaii. Then he won his doctorate of medicine in Hongkong and practiced in Macao and Canton. As a man of science and of two worlds, he could see that China had to leave medieval times and enter the 20th century. Yet he was also Chinese to the core. He would not have understood the Mao Tse-tung dictum to destroy the old and usher in the new. He knew that the old can never be destroyed, but he also knew that what had gone before could not be allowed to become a straitjacket. Science had taught him that you build on what you have; you advance on a basis of what you know.

Modern China's Founding Father did not stay at the helm of state for long. He had trouble with the warlords, and especially with those who aspired to return to the ways of empire. In a sense, politician and compromiser he was not. When the politics got too nasty, he retired to the sidelines—there to think of what would be best for China. In time he expressed this in his Three Principles of the People, which is still the lodestar of the Republic of China. These principles are Nationalism, Democracy and the People's Livelihood, which may also be described as social welfare.

For China, Nationalism was an obvious cornerstone. The Middle Kingdom had failed to keep up with military science. China suffered the ignominy of unequal treaties. It was, in fact, nearly carved up by the colonial powers of the 19th century. Dr. Sun described his people as loose grains of sand. Those grains were looking for the beach of a great Chinese nation. China was disintegrating under the Manchus. Chinese culture was intact but the sense of nationhood and national purpose were almost gone. Those who ruled absolutely had not kept up with the times.

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Dr. Sun's concept of nationalism was both old and new. He retained the China of the dynasties and carried it forward into the era of nation-states. As a Republic, the China of antiquity could hold up its head and be proud, yet be as modern as any battleship that came manoeuvring into Chinese waters from the West. The Founding Father was not naive about democracy. He did not expect it to spring full-blown from the head of Confucius or Mencius. Democracy had to be learned and earned. He established the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, as the tutor. As in nationalism, his democracy combined the old with the new. The Republic of China is learning from the guidance he provided.

Sun Yat-sen knew well the ancient Chinese lesson of the mandate of the heavens. This is nothing more complicated than that the ruler who fails his people will not rule for long. People must eat, people must be clothed, people must work. They must be educated in childhood and cared for in old age. They may not be born equal but they must be accorded equal opportunity. This is not a conception of charity but of right. It is not capitalism, nor is it socialism. It is Confucian humanism, certainly, but with a stronger sense of governmental obligation than is to be found in the writings of a sage who lived 2,500 years ago.

The Three Principles of the People is the heritage left by Dr. Sun. These Principles are effective; they do assure the good, the free and the proud life. The Republic of China has proved that on Taiwan. The debt to Sun Yat-sen is acknowledged and the rest of the world will come to appreciate the genius of his teachings in time to come.

The Founding Father died prematurely in 1925. His dream was the unification of China. He did not live to see its realisation. The instrumentality of that accomplishment was Chiang Kai-shek, who was, until his recent death, the Republic of China's president and national leader. From 1926 to 1928, President Chiang marched against the warlords—advancing from Canton to Peiping. These days much is made of the so-called 'long march' of the Chinese Communists. That was a retreat which should have led to defeat. The March Northward of Chiang Kai-shek was one of the greatest victorious offensives in all history. With the warlords beaten, total Chinese unity was challenged only by a handful of Communist dissidents.

The world thinks of China's last war with the Japanese as dating from 1937 to 1945. Actually, the period was 13 years—from 1932 to 1945. And the roots reached back well into the 19th century. The Japanese cannot be blamed for everything; yet it is a fact that they opened the doors for the Communst usurpation. The Japanese war was hard and long. First, China had to pretend not to fight. Then it had to fight alone from 1937 to 1941. Finally, from Pearl Harbour on, China had allies, yet remained at the end of the supply line. The earth was scorched and the government retreated into the hinterland to survive and fight another day. While the Republic of China was devoting itself to the defeat of imperialistic Japan, the Communists were conserving and building up their strength. Their purpose was to overwhelm the Republic, not to fight the Japanese.

No sooner had China celebrated V-J day than the Communists unlimber-

ed their hoarded weapons and struck with all their might at the weakened forces of the Central Government. Russia signed a peace treaty even as it was giving surrendered Japanese weapons to the Communists. This was the bitterest pill China has ever had to swallow. The people didn't want Communism. They were tired of fighting, however, and they wanted peace. The Communists usurped the mainland by default. Always realist as well as idealist, President Chiang had foreseen that victory over Japan might be followed by reversals at the hands of the Communists. He prepared the island of Taiwan as an impenetrable fortress—a bastion where wounds might be healed and weapons mended. In 1949, and again in 1958, the Communists were stopped at the water's edge of the Taiwan Straits. As the French once had said to the Germans, 'Ils ne passeront pas', so the Republic of China said the Communists would never cross the 100-mile channel between the mainland and Taiwan. They have not and will not.

Taiwan is no continent—no vast expanse of land like the nearly 4 million square miles that the government of the Republic of China had to leave behind temporarily. Taiwan could be described as a sort of middle-sized island—not big like Greenland or New Guinea, but not a tiny flyspeck, either. The area is just under 14,000 square miles, which means it is almost the size of Holland. This tobacco-leaf shaped piece of land is about 250 miles long and 90 miles wide at the broadest. The climate is subtropical—although the temperature sometimes falls close to freezing in January and February. In general, nature smiles on the island except for a few typhoons welling up from the depths of the South Pacific, plus an occasional destructive earthquake. The Chinese name Taiwan is not less poetic than the Portuguese Formosa, which refers to the beauty of the island. Taiwan means a kind of dais rising from the sea. The island is aptly described in both languages.

Taiwan bows to no other province of China in the fascination of its historical experience. Peoples of the South Pacific came to the island before the dawn of written records. They are still present—some nine tribes of aboriginal people with their own languages and remnant cultures. Pushed into the mountains by later arrivals, they are now being assimilated but with as much cultural preservation as can be managed. Those who visit Taiwan today have opportunity to see the dances and hear the songs of the *Amis*—a people perfectly named even in French, because they are warm and friendly—as well as some of the other tribes.

Chinese from the mainland began arriving in Taiwan early in the Christian era. Numbers were relatively small until the 17th century, which also brought the Dutch. These Redbeards from Europe encouraged the immigration of Chinese farmers to cultivate sugar cane. Dutch and Spanish fought for the island. The Dutch won but Cheng Ch'eng-kung, also known as Koxinga, expelled them in 1662. Cheng was a Ming loyalist. Had he lived, the Manchus might well have been driven from China and the Ming dynasty restored.

Only the aborigines and the Chinese really settled down in Taiwan. The Japanese, who took the island as a spoil of war in 1895 and held it for 50

years, were exploiters rather than colonisers. All their efforts to settle Japanese farmers on Chinese soil came to nought. Although compelled to speak the Japanese language and adopt Japanese ways, the peoples of Taiwan remained essentially Chinese. Today the thin veneer of Japaneseness has worn off. Members of the younger generation speak the national language, which is generally known as Mandarin. If their parents are island-born, they also speak one of the Taiwan dialects: that of Amoy or of the Hakka people. They are as likely to know some English as Japanese.

Taiwan was retroceded to the Republic of China by the Japanese in 1945. The island was in bad shape. Allied bombings of World War II had destroyed industry and much of the transportation system. At first Taiwan couldn't be given any special reconstruction priority. The mainland had suffered grievously, too, and the conflict with the Communists was raging anew. The island had to shift for itself for a time. But in 1949, Taiwan became the temporary seat of the Central Government and the island province received the full attention of China's best administrators and entrepreneurs.

The modernisation of Taiwan began in the decade of the 1950s. War damage was repaired. Absentee landlords held part of the farmlands and tenants did not have the incentive to produce more and accumulate the surplus capital needed to finance the beginnings of industry. This shortcoming had to be corrected. Defence forces had to be rebuilt. People on Taiwan had no experience with elections and self-government. If the democratic institutions of the Republic of China were to be preserved and nurtured, the people had to learn the uses of power. Children had to be educated. There were four institutions of higher learning in existence when the Japanese departed. Today there are one hundred.

Land reform came first. This is a programme of which the whole free world can be proud. For the first time in history, the land of a sizeable political entity was redistributed peacefully and without uncompensated expropriation.

As of 1975, only about 10 per cent of Taiwan's farmers are still renting their land and tenancy will soon be entirely eliminated. Agricultural output has increased more than five times since the programme began. The farmer has the incentive of land that belongs to him. He is interested in increasing the input so that he can look forward to a bigger output. He is willing to invest in machinery and spend money on fertiliser, pesticides and better seeds. Land reform has given rise to mechanisation, scientific farming and land consolidation. A land reform Institute has been opened near Taipei in cooperation with an American foundation. Interested nations in every part of the world send agronomists to the Institute to learn how the Republic of China succeeded where the Chinese Communists failed. Europeans and Americans often fail to understand that to Asia—until recently a region of peasants—land reform symbolises the ultimate in freedom. Given land of his own, the Asian farmer will overcome almost any difficulty.

As soon as the land reform programme was well along the road to success, Taiwan was ready to develop light industry. Happily, the United

States was on hand to help, just as as the case in postwar Europe. American aid administrators attest that the 1,500 million US dollars contributed to the Taiwan economy was the most effectively spent of all the billions America contributed to free Asian countries. The U.S. aid programme to the Republic of China was begun in 1951 and concluded in mid-1965. In the later stages, almost all of the assistance was in the form of loans. The interest and repayments are continuing to generate about US$50 million a year for projects to stimulate the economy.

At the outset of industrialisation, Taiwan made products to help the farmer and serve its most basic needs. Nothing was fancy and nothing was complicated. The summers in Taiwan are long and hot: so electric fans were manufactured. The winters are chilly and people have to wear warm clothing: so a textile industry was established. Entrepreneurs moved from the pounding of beer cans into simple containers to the fabrication of stainless steel pots, pans and kitchen implements.

There was little thought of exports at the outset. The government was interested in its own people, who were desperately poor and who thought that everything worth having must come from Japan, the United States or Europe. In 1954—and that was a year when the Taiwan reconstruction programme was already well under way—exports were a mere US$93 million. Last year's total was more than US$5,600 million.

From the beginning, the government dedicated itself to the free enterprise system. This wasn't a matter of anti-Communism, or even of anti-socialism. The Republic of China's economic ideas are based on the thinking of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who taught that government would have to do what private interests failed to accomplish. The ROC is not opposed to government participation in the economy. Government corporations are engaged in generating power, refining petroleum products, building ships, producing fertiliser, making aluminium, rolling cigarettes and so on. Taiwan has a mixed economy based on the philosophy that all things being equal, private industry has incentives which may make it more productive than state corporations. The rule is set by the needs and the service of the people. Industry and business are not established for the welfare and profit of private entrepreneurs; they must fulfil the public interest first and their own interest secondarily.

Politics cannot be separated from economics. Taiwan has never had a Communist problem. Any Communists in Taiwan are 'sleepers'—those planted by the enemy between 1945 and 1950—or more recent imports. The people are not fools. They look at what they have and what is in prospect. Why should anyone on Taiwan throw away his full rice bowl for the thin gruel that the Communists have to offer?

The people of Taiwan have been severely buffeted by international developments within this decade. The Republic of China was compelled by appeasement of the Communists to withdraw from the United Nations in 1971, although it was a founder member, one of the five permanent members of the Securty Council and without a single black mark on its escutcheon. When the Republic of China left the U.N., President Chiang

said, 'Don't be disquieted in time of adversity. Be firm with dignity and self-reliant with vigour.' The people have heeded his counsel.

The Communists thought to isolate the ROC and Taiwan but failed completely. Substantive relations are still maintained with more than 120 countries of the free world. In the last year or so there have been contacts and relationships with all states of the world except those in the Communist camp.

Economically, Taiwan was flying high through 1972 and into 1973. The rate of economic growth had exceeded 10 per cent annually for years. The 1973 figure was 12.3 per cent despite the turndown at the end of the year. For that same year, foreign trade was up by more than 50 per cent. Furthermore, and some said almost miraculously, this growth was accomplished with minimal inflation. Prices were rising by annual increments of only 3 and 6 per cent during the 1960s and into the 1970s. Per capita income reached US$467 in 1973. Until the second half of that year, the people's buying power was strong.

The inflation of late 1973 and early 1974 was severe. Everything Taiwan bought—not just oil—cost a good deal more. At the end of 1973, the government decided that the people were willing to bear their full share of the burden and that the most important thing was to stop inflation. That was done with a series of stabilisation measures early in 1974. The government said that increases for services and essential goods would be a one-time proposition and has been able to keep its word. As of the end of 1974, most wholesale and retail prices were lower than those of February or March. This showed what government and people can do together, even in a land where so many raw materials must be imported.

There was a price for this success, naturally. The economy slowed down —not that this was a strange phenomenon in 1974. All economies slowed and the majority of them wound up with zeroes or minuses in the growth column. The Republic of China did a little better than that. Economic growth was about 1.5 per cent in terms of the gross national product. Per capita income reached US$702. Although much of the gain was lost to inflation, the 6 million people of Taiwan were confirmed in their enjoyment of the second highest living standard in East Asia. The Japanese were better off in absolute terms but not in growth. Trade was up by more than 52 per cent in 1974. Imports climbed much faster than exports, but that was only to be expected in a strange and difficult year.

Comparisons may be more revealing than actual figures. The Chinese mainland has an area of more than 3.7 million square miles and a population of over 700 million. Yet in 1974, this vast land and all those people had about the same volume of trade as Taiwan with its 14,000 square miles and 16 million people. Taiwan was outnumbered 50 times, had only 1/264th of the area and still out-traded the Communists in 1972 and 1973 and came close to it again in 1974 despite Peiping's possession of oil for export to Japan at a high price.

Trade is Taiwan's lifeblood. Exports make up more than half of the gross national product. There is concern about a deficit which exceeded US$1,300

million last year after favourable balances in the three preceding years. Efforts are being made to cut down on unnecessary imports and improve terms of trade with Japan, which is Taiwan's biggest supplier. Japan sold more to Taiwan last year than to the Chinese Communists, despite Tokyo's big fuss about the supposedly vast mainland market. Taiwan's biggest customer is the United States. The two-way volume was more than US$3,700 million last year, which meant that Taiwan out-traded the Chinese Communists three to one in the American market.

The degree to which Taiwan's economy has become industrialised is clearly shown in the composition of trade. Exports of industrial products made up nearly 85 per cent of the total in 1974. Even the agricultural exports tended to be processed ones in a ratio of 2 to 1. Imports, on the other hand, were dominated by raw materials at 61 per cent, followed by capital goods at 32 per cent. Consumer goods stood at just under 7 per cent, indicating that Taiwan is now in a position to make most of its necessities and many of its luxuries.

Overseas investors continued to express confidence in the Taiwan economy last year, although the total was down from the US$248 million of 1973. Still, US$189 million is an impressive figure which included 168 new projects and the expansion of 281 existing ones. The current favourites of these external investors are electrical machinery apparatus—mainly home entertainment products—non-metallic manufacturing and chemicals. Japan led the United States by a slight margin as the principal source of investment. In total the Americans are far ahead with a total of about US$450 million.

Industry more or less marked time last year. But not all the news was bad. More than half of important industrial enterprises showed production increases. More air-conditioners and bicycles were made and more cement was produced. Export declines hit the manufacturers of TV sets, plywood and rubber shoes. Textiles, the biggest export, chalked up modest gains. In competition with Japan, Hongkong and South Korea, Taiwan was the only country to record a slight enlargement of its U.S. textile market.

The Republic of China has avoided grandiose projects. In fact, it went a little too far in limiting the scope of public works. With economy growing by more than 10 per cent annually, construction of infrastructure began to fall behind the need. Premier Chiang Ching-kuo and the Cabinet gave the necessary orders in 1973. Projects which should transform Taiwan into a developed land by the 1980s are already well under way at a cost of more than US$6,000 million. Much of the foreign financing is coming from the U.S. Export-Import Bank and U.S. commercial bank loans guaranteed by that institution. The 10 approved projects will require nearly 200,000 workers and use tremendous quantities of steel, cement and timber.

These are the projects:

West Coast railroad electrification.
International airport to serve Taipei.
North-South Freeway linking the northern port of Keelung with the southern port of Kaohsiung by way of Taipei.
Suao-Hualien railroad to open up the sparsely settled east coast.

Taichung port to serve the central area of the heavily populated western plain.

Suao port to supplement Keelung, which is running out of room for expansion.

Kaohsiung shipyard to build tankers of up to 450,000 tons.

Kaohsiung shipyard, which will start with a capacity of 1.5 million metric tons in 1978 and reach 6 million tons in 1983.

Petrochemicals, an industry based on the products of three naphtha crackers.

Nuclear power plants. The first will go on line next year; by 1982, three plants with six generators will be producing 5.1 million kilowatts of electricity.

Taiwan has one industry of which it is inordinately proud. This is tourism. Confucius said that welcoming friends from afar provided one of life's greatest pleasures. Taiwan had 825,000 visitors in 1973, so ranking just behind Hongkong and Japan in the Far East. The number was down to 820,000 in 1974 for the first decline of modern times. But that was nothing to be ashamed of. The island still did comparatively well in an era of inflation, rising travel costs and the inclination of Japanese and Americans to stay at home and save their money.

Tourism earnings amount to several hundred million dollars a year. But the Republic of China's greatest interest is not in making a profit but in making friends. Government and people want visitors to see the educational system—free through nine years and with nearly 300,000 students in a hundred institutions of higher learning. Tourists are urged to sample not only fine Chinese cooking from every province but also a wide variety of Chinese culture. They will find nothing contrived or artificial. The old and the new are inextricably interwoven, and both are welcome.

Taiwan—the island and province of the Republic of China—is alive and well, confident that the future embraces not only further development and prosperity, but also a China which is whole and free once again. The 16 million people of Taiwan believe implicitly that what they have done and what they are doing and what they believe represent both the real China and the China of the future. This is mainstream China, and it is flowing against the Communists and their determination to destroy Chinese culture and put a communal man in its place.

[Mr. Thomas Chen, managing editor of the *Free China Review*, published in Taiwan, Republic of China, is a graduate of the Journalism School of the Thomson Foundation at Cardiff, South Wales.]

The August issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *The Red Cross in Cyprus* by James Avery Joyce, *Britain, the Referendum and the World* by John Loraine, *Cosmonautics '75* by Alexei Gorokhov and *T. S. Eliot's 'Companion' Poems* by Joyce Hamilton Rochat.

THE BARD: A GHOST REFUSES TO BE LAID

by Francis Edwards, S.J.

A CONSTANT preoccupation of the historian researching into the times of Elizabeth I must be to relate the popular history of the period with the surviving documentary evidence. The latter is often surprisingly tenuous. A very weighty superstructure of legend and tradition has sometimes been based on foundations so shallow that the wonder is that eroding time has not already caused a collapse. In no field is that truer, perhaps, than that of Shakespeare studies. It is about half a century, plus and minus, since J. T. Looney and B. M. Ward published works which exploited the absence of real evidence to cast reasonable doubt on William of Stratford as the principal author of the plays going by his name. Since that time the investigation of the case for the seventeenth Earl of Oxford, more particularly, has continued in the pages of the *Shakespearean Authorship Review* and elsewhere.[1]

Perhaps it is the fault of certain less discreet protagonists of the Oxford thesis that it is not as well known as it might be. Some have handled the problem less as the purely intellectual question which it is than as a quasi-religious cause to be pushed with messianic zeal, and with too little regard for the difficulties of the case, the shortness at times of the evidence, and the stretching at other times of arguments, like elastic, to breaking point. But a case undoubtedly remains.

The year 1975 is a minor anniversary for Oxfordians. On January 7, 1575, Edward de Vere, the 17th earl, left England for Paris on a royal licence for one year's travel on the continent. He returned in 1576 with first-hand knowledge of the courts and country of France and north Italy which would certainly explain much in the Shakespeare plays very easily that can only be done with much more difficulty for William of Stratford. For the rest, Francis Meres in his *Palladis Thamia* of 1598 declared in a well-known phrase, 'the best for Comedy among us be Edward Earl of Oxford.' The extraordinary fact is that this best-known name has left no play behind him to be identified without speculation as his. Inevitably, this is a challenge to research and ingenuity which has not been ignored. Miss Katherine Eggar, for example, who died in 1962, made a valiant attempt at identification in her essay, *The lost plays of Edward de Vere*.[2]

If we take Meres's utterance literally, Oxford's name could be immediately linked with *The Two Gentlemen of Verona,* and *The Merchant of Venice,* to name no others. Furthermore, *Love's Labours Lost,* it seems, contains references to customs and usages in the court of France which could not have been culled from printed sources until a later century. More down to earth is an entry in the Revels Office account book for the 1584-85 season at court: *'The history of Agamemnon and Ulisses* presented and enacted before her maiestie by the Earle of Oxenford his boyes on St John's daie [December 27] at night at Greenwich' [1584]. As Feuillerat further observed, 'it is most natural to suppose that [the earl of] Oxford's boys,

both in January, Shrovetide, 1584, and on St John's day following, acted plays written by their own patron. I firmly believe that *Agamemnon and Ulysses,* (though I agree it might have been a "probable subject for Lyly", as indeed it might have been for any other dramatist of that time), is one of Oxford's lost comedies.'[3]

An obvious question arises as to whether Oxford wrote any of the other plays presented at court, not only in this season but in previous seasons and subsequently. It must be said at once that one can answer only speculatively. Unfortunately the Revels Office records are capricious in their attention to detail. Not infrequently plays were not named. Most of the plays before 1578, however, dealt with classical subjects. Many of them are lost. On St. Stephen's Day, 1578, however, 'An Inventyon or playe of the three Systers of Mantua' was presented at Richmond by the Earl of Warwick's company. This seems to be the first recognisably Italian play as such among the court presentations, and it may be significant that it was staged a relatively short time after Oxford's return from his north Italian tour. In 1579, again on St. Stephen's day, *A History of the Duke of Millayn and the Marques of Mantua* was presented by the Lord Chamberlain's company at Whitehall.[4]

It would certainly have been appropriate if Oxford's aristocratic friends and patrons of companies had accepted his plays for their actors, and that Oxford should have written on themes fresh from his Italian experience and interest. He could also have handled the classical themes competently since, apart from his degree and studies at Cambridge, his tutor had been his uncle, Arthur Golding, translator, *inter alia,* of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* into English. On February 1, 1566, Oxford began his legal studies at Gray's Inn according to the formal record. The Gentlemen of Gray's Inn are first recorded in the Revels accounts for Elizabeth's reign as performing 'Showes, Diana.Pallas' at Shrovetide, 1565. The dates are close enough to be suggestive though obviously not conclusive.

None of this, admittedly, establishes beyond controversy the more precise nature of the link between Oxford and the theatre and the exact scope of his work as a playwright. Nevertheless, it is worth remarking that while the name of Oxford occurs recognisably only once in the Revels records, the name of William Shakespeare does not occur at all. It is precisely the scantiness of our exact knowledge of William Shakespeare, in fact, that leaves room for the controversy over authorship. Nor must we allow ourselves to be put off by people, sometimes well-endowed with traditional learning, who refuse to allow that such a question can still be reasonably asked. In an article in *The Times* of April 23, 1974, Dr. A. L. Rowse, for example, reminded us by his answers to certain questions that a very great deal is still unknown about the real identity of Shakespeare. Dr. Rowse assured us, 'It is remarkable how much we do know about this Elizabethan actor-dramatist'. In fact, the manuscript evidence in the case fills little more than a modest and reliable booklet put out by the Public Record Office. There are a few documents to connect William Shakespeare with the stage, but nothing to prove that he wrote plays. Apart from half-a-dozen signatures

suggesting extreme old age, illiteracy or the painful efforts of a copyist, there is no real evidence that he could even write. It is also a matter of faith and inference that he had even Stratford grammar-school education, still less that he went to university, or acquired the training in law which the plays suggest to lawyers. Was there any connection between William of Stratford and the publication of the plays?

W. A. Neilson and A. M. Thorndike attempted to allay our many doubts in an honest and still relevant little book which in fact only served to underline our ignorance.[5] They admitted that there is no record of Shakespeare's education (p.19). It is only conjectured that he came to London about 1586 (p.20). The Treasurer of the Chamber's accounts for March 15, 1594-95, show that a William Shakespeare was summoned with Kempe and Burbage as a member of the Lord Chamberlain's company to present two comedies during the Christmas festivities at Greenwich Palace. For the rest, there is doubt about the identity of the man we are dealing with, quite apart from the further difficulty as to whether the author's name was in fact a pseudonym. Our authors admit that there was 'a multitude of other Shakespeares in the England and especially in the Warwickshire of his time' (p.34). And 'William' was among the commonest of Elizabethan surnames. William Shakespeare, who returned to his native town to buy New Place, certainly prospered, but that his money came from the theatre is another matter for faith and hope and charity to those who may have passed on a legend. Certainly, after his retirement to Stratford in 1604, William took no further interest as far as we know, in the publication of his work, although the sonnets, mentioned by Francis Meres in 1598, were published, in 1609, well before his death.[6] When Shakespeare died in 1616, no one in the literary world seems to have adverted to the fact. It is difficult to account for all the deficiencies and anomalies taken together. Suggestively enough, the year of William's retirement to Stratford is also the year of Edward de Vere's death.

Returning to Dr. Rowse, 'People are apt to think that only a grandee, some earl or other, must have written his plays. Snobbish nonsense: earls are just the people who do not write poems and plays.' This objection, such as it is, is sufficiently answered by looking through *The Oxford Book of Sixteenth Century Verse*. One will encounter poems by Sir Thomas Wyatt, Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey, Thomas Lord Vaux, Thomas Sackville, Earl of Dorset, Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, and many other gentlemen and courtiers. There are also poems by Oxford.

The seventeenth earl remains a shadowy character. In accordance with the historical tradition which might have been dictated to subsequent generations of historians who valued their reputation by the first two Cecils, Oxford has passed into the national mythology as something of a villain. He ill-treated his wife. He wasted his substance, and was guilty of paederasty. Worst of all, he showed no gratitude to the Great Lord Burghley whose ward he had been in youth. Although B. M. Ward made a valiant effort, and provided us with many new facts, it is high time for a new biography. Many characters of the Elizabethan epoch may need to be reinstated when

we arrive at a more sophisticated view of the total truth: Thomas Howard, fourth Duke of Norfolk; Mary, Queen of Scots; perhaps, even the Earl of Leicester; and certainly Edward de Vere, Earl of Oxford. From 1580 until 1583 some attempt seems to have been made to destroy de Vere's reputation as that of others had been destroyed before and would be after him. Certainly, during this time he was in disgrace at court, probably as the result of a fine web of intrigue spun for his feet by politicians who disliked his independence of mind and feared his possible influence with the queen. It says much for the wit and genius of the Earl that he survived even if he did not flourish. And he did not flourish because he had difficulty in accepting *Regnum Cecilianum* for all that he was married to Cecil's daughter.

From 1590 until his death, Oxford retired from court life. His motive is a matter of speculation. It is a tenable hypothesis that during the remaining fourteen years of his life he was polishing, revising and rewriting the plays, later attributed to a man whom he may well have met and known as a friend and whose conversation and country lore he may have drawn on for his own purposes—William Shakespeare. In the absence of authentic play manuscripts from the hand of either de Vere or Shakespeare, the problem remains. Oxford's proven points of contact with the theatre seem to provide clues which establish a far more authoritative role for the earl in theatrical history than for William of Stratford, of whose literary gift of any kind there is, alas, no documentary evidence whatsoever.

What is evident is that the First Folio edition of 1623, presenting about half of the plays in print for the first time, was very determined—one might almost say desperately anxious—that they should be associated for all time with William Shakespeare, not merely a name, but the man behind the name. An obvious question arises as to why, if Shakespeare was not really the author, should his name, seven years after his death, still be attached to them? If Oxford wrote them, why was he not acknowledged, at least posthumously? The difficulty for Oxfordians as for supporters of other candidates is a real one. The answer seems to lie primarily in the content of the plays. These in reality are less court than protest-literature. Elizabethan England may have been merry enough for the privileged few, but for many if not most, it was a police state, rigidly controlled and organised in the interest of a few leading families, notably the Cecils. In these circumstances, there was much to criticise and little chance of criticising with impunity. The obvious way to do it was through drama and literature. Shakespeare was a 16th century Solzhenitsyn. This kind of criticism occurred in the Christmas season of 1582-83 when de Vere was still in disgrace. *A Morall of the Games of the Cards* was presented to the court by the Windsor children of which Sir John Harington said it was 'misliked because somewhat too plain'. One must surely see the court dramatist in some respects continuing the role of court jester part of whose task was to present skilful criticism under the guise of witticism. Contemporary allusion in the Shakespeare plays is a large subject. There can be no doubt that *The Winter's Tale*, for example, contains much in the way of critical allusion to the treason trials of the time, and the cynical abuses of power. Honigmann saw many contemporary parallels in *King John*. The First Folio,

however, was dedicated 'to the most noble and incomparable paire of brethren' the Earls of Pembroke and Montgomery. Montgomery was Oxford's son-in-law, having married his youngest daughter, Susan. Pembroke as a writer himself—his poems were published in 1660—would have been interested in seeing that Oxford's plays were not lost. As a politician, however, William Herbert no less than his brother, Philip, would not have wished to see a spirit of criticism associated with a courtier whose strictures could seem to be based on personal experience. The speculations of a countryman from Stratford on the ways of kings and princes lacked authority to make them cogent or applicable to the living or recently dead. The comments of the Lord Great Chamberlain of England would have struck home too deeply. It must never be forgotten that the principal statesmen who surrounded Elizabeth I and James I were concerned not to establish a regime but confirm a revolution. Even by 1623, the revolution which began in 1558 was not yet so firm that criticism could flow over it harmlessly. It could not yet afford to laugh at itself.

We have a further clue to an aristocratic Shakespeare, perhaps, in *The arte of English poesie*, published anonymously in 1589. 'And in her Majesty's time that now is sprung up another crew of courtly makers, noblemen and gentlemen of her Majesty's own servants, who have written excellently well as it would appear if their doings could be found out and made public with the rest, of which number is first that noble gentleman, Edward, Earl of Oxford'. And again, 'I know very many notable gentlemen in the court that have written very commendably and suppressed it again, or else suffered it to be published without their names to it; as if it were a discredit for a gentleman to seem learned, and to show himself amorous of any good art'.[7]

There is an even more fulsome compliment on Oxford in William Webbe's *A Discourse of English Poetry* (1586). No one ever wrote in these terms of the Swan of Avon. But who was the Swan of Avon? At Bilton Hall in east Warwickshire, very near the Avon, was a quiet retreat admirably adapted to the cultivation of the muses in rural peace. Here the poet Addison retired for most of his latter years to write *Evidences of the Christian Religion*.[8] This quiet retreat once belonged to the seventeenth earl of Oxford.[9]

[1] *The Bard* will appear shortly, it is hoped, as an enlarged and more ambitious continuation of this journal.

[2] Eggar MSS, London University, box XX: I am indebted to Miss Joan Gibbs of the Palaeography Room, Senate House, for making these MSS available to me. Unfortunately Miss Eggar was sometimes inaccurate in dates and references and it is impossible to use her material without reserve.

[3] A. Feuillerat, *Documents relating to the office of the Revels in the time of Queen Elizabeth . . .*, Louvain, Leipzig, London, 1908, p. 471.

[4] Feuillerat, pp. XV, XVI.

[5] *The Facts about Shakespeare*, New York, 1961.

[6] See Russell and Thorndike, p. 87.

[7] Quoted in Craig Huston, *The Shakespeare Authorship Question*, Philadelphia, 1971, p. 31.

[8] See Lewis, *Topography*, 7th edition, vol. A-C, p. 245.

[9] Dugdale, *Warwickshire*, I, p. 26; Victoria County History, *Warwickshire*, vol. 6, p. 32.

KING ARTHUR AND HIS ROLE IN EARLY BRITAIN—A SUMMARY

by Elizabeth Smith

ARTHURIAN legends have formed the basis for extended debate between historians and scholars for over twelve centuries. Ten years ago many historians might have been inclined to state that Arthur never existed; but recent archaeological finds at Cadbury Castle, Glastonbury, Tintagel Castle and other sites in England have strengthened the beliefs of those scholars who have supported the existence of Arthur.

Arthur has been idealised as the champion of the Britons versus the sixth century invasions of Saxons. He has also even been credited with conquering Scandinavia, Denmark and Gaul by the romanticised versions of the legend. The conditions in Britannia which led to the rise of Arthur began with the Britons' involvement with Rome.

At the beginning of the fifth century A.D., Roman legions stationed in Britain were withdrawn to check serious threats against Roman supremacy and were then sent closer to the heart of the Empire. As the military organisation of the island broke down, its governmental system deteriorated as well.[1] For many generations Britain had been under heavy recurrent attack from three 'barbaric nations';[2] the Saxons, the Picts, and the Scots.

From across the North Sea, c. 376, invading tribes of Saxons ravaged and pillaged the British countryside. They were fierce Teutonic warriors who originated in the Schleswig-Holstein area of Northern Europe and were armed with swords, bows, lances and wooden shields. They were joined by Picts from the north who, armed with slings, filtered in through Hadrian's Wall. The Scots were composed of tribes who sailed from Ireland and were well known for the enormous curled war horns they used to terrify their enemies.[3]

In 429 A.D., Bishop Germanus of Auxerre (Gaul) arrived in England to combat Pelagianism—a new heresy. The British, whose defences had completely collapsed due to the 'barbarian' invasions and who had been deserted by Roman military protection, were instructed by Germanus on better methods of defence against invaders and raiders.[4] As a result, Britain in 429 was much the same way it had been before the Roman legions departed.

The numbers of invaders were rapidly increasing for they had learned effectively how to besiege and storm a stone-walled city. They were settling down in England in increasing numbers.[5]

In 446, the British made a final appeal to Rome for aid, ultimately denied because Rome could do nothing to help them. The English finally turned to Vortigern, an important Welsh leader, for support. Vortigern devised an arrangement by which a group of Saxons were admitted to the island and given specified amounts of land on the condition that they would help turn back the invading Scots and Picts. Vortigern's plan succeeded at first, but

the Saxons soon spread beyond the original limits and called for reinforcements from the continent. In the resulting war, Vortigern's army was crushed.[6]

Consequently, new leadership was needed to rally British defences. Ambrosius Aurelianus, a young man of Roman descent, another powerful ruler of Britain, controlled the western kingdom of Dumnonia. His army was Roman in organisation and his government was also Roman in origin. All those who desired his protection, or were willing to fight in defence of their homeland, flocked to his kingdom. They came, said Gildas, the monk who chronicled the history of this era, 'with the urgency of bees seeking the hive when a storm is imminent'.[7] In Dumnonia, under Ambrosius' leadership, those willing to fight were given the shelter they sought. Under Ambrosius, whom they had accepted as King, the Britons fought many battles and suffered many defeats, but also gained several important victories.

The forty years of British victories and defeats culminated in a British triumph at the 'siege of Mons Badonicus'[8] or Mount Badon. This battle brought about a generation of peace and relative order, broken only by British feuds, not 'barbarian' invasion. This battle is dated by the *Annales Cambraie,* an early Welsh source, dated between 516 and 518 A.D.[9]

The identity of the general is questionable because the battle came too late for Ambrosius Aurelianus who had died several years before the battle. It is possible that Arthur was the general, although Gildas stresses the battle and its results rather than the personalities of the commanders. Perhaps his omission of Arthur by name was due to the fact that Arthur fell short of the monk's strict ideals both in religion and morals. Gildas referred instead to a British leader whom he called the 'Bear'. Celtic for 'bear' is Artos.[10]

The legend of King Arthur has been written in many forms, but mainly in those of historical works and those of a more literary nature. Both fact and fiction concerning Arthur tend to intertwine and are often difficult, if not impossible, to separate.

The beginnings of the many and varied versions of the legend of King Arthur are found among the medleys of popular Celtic lore written in the twelfth century. He was said to have led the sixth century Britons against the Saxons and Angles who invaded Britain from across the North Sea. He was victorious for his entire reign and was killed at the battle of Camlaun, where a British foe, Medraut, was also slain. Conversely, contemporaries believed him still to be alive.[11]

William of Malmesbury, England's first notable historian after the Norman Conquest, visited Glastonbury Abbey in Somerset between 1130 and 1225. It was there that he first learned of the legends of Arthur told to him by the monks at the Abbey. He wrote of a 'fairly credible Arthur: a Christian warrior who, it seemed, had temporarily broken the Saxons and the "siege of Mount Badon", whatever that was. This warrior . . . must be the person of whom the Cornish and others talked such nonsense; "a man clearly worthy to be proclaimed in true histories" instead of fables'.[12]

Geoffrey of Monmouth produced a *History of the Kings of Britain* in Latin, the climax of which concerned the reign of Arthur. His history draws as sources Welsh monastic writing, poems, legends and British folklore.

On the whole, however, much of his literary creation is not credible. He begins with a complicated genealogical progression of the royal line, which leaves Ambrosius and Arthur's father, Uther Pendragon, as brothers. Arthur succeeds to the throne as a youth, successfully battling the Saxons with a sword (Caliburn) forged in the 'land of Avalon'.[13] Arthur marries Ganhumara and twelve years of peace follow. He then conquers Norway and Gaul with the aid of Kay, Bedevere and Lot. Arthur's court is located at Caerleon-upon-Usk. An order of knighthood is established but there is no Round Table. Threatened by Rome, Arthur advances through Gaul only to be called back to England by the rebellion of his nephew, Mordred. Both are mortally wounded and Arthur disappears to Avalon to be cured.[14]

Henry II and other Plantagenets claimed they were the heirs of Arthur, because it supplied 'the mystique they needed'.[15] Henry II's grandson was even named Arthur II. Due to the popularisation of the legends by the royalty, Arthurian lore spread as far as Italy and a literary explosion was a partial result of the royal sponsorship.

Chretien de Troyes romanticised the legends in long French verse-romances and introduced the love theme between Sir Lancelot and Guinevere (Arthur's Queen) and the love theme between Sir Tristram and Iseult.[16]

Arthur's kingdom was given a religious aura by the inclusion of a quest for the Holy Grail. Sir Galahad, the perfect model of Christian celibacy, succeeded in finding the Grail. The Holy Grail seems to have begun as a sacred vessel in Celtic myth. Other writers, such as Robert de Borron, determined that it was a dish or chalice of the Last Supper, conveyed to Britain by Joseph of Arimathea in 44 A.D. This chalice was thought to contain drops of the Saviour's blood. In the German *Parzifal* by Wolfram von Eschenbach, the Holy Grail is an oracular stone, not a vessel. In other places it appears with a dish, a sword, and a lance. The Catholic Church frowned upon these ideas because of their connection with pagan mythology.[17]

Sir Thomas Malory wrote a famous series of romances concerning King Arthur's career. The Morte d'Arthur was his major production in novel form. He 'gave the legend a coherence it had never previously attained. . . . He reworks the element of magic and marvel, generally cutting it down. That cutting heightens the effect of what he retains, giving it more point, and helping to integrate romance and supposed history'.[18] He stresses the peaceful interval of Arthur's reign, the development of Knighthood and the Round Table, and the influence Merlin had as the major sponsor of Arthurian ideals. He tends to believe that Lancelot's affair with Guinevere was a failure to live up to the ideal of chivalric life and a failure which dooms the Table.[19]

One major mystery within all the romances and legends concerns Arthur's death. Some authors refer to his sudden disappearance as having been taken to Avalon to be cured of his wound after his battle against Mordred. Many sources state that King Arthur and Merlin are only sleeping and will return to aid Britain in her greatest hour of need. Henry VII and the Tudor family all strove to prove that they were linked ancestrally with King Arthur. Another Arthur was born, the son of Henry VII who, like the grandson of Henry II, failed to succeed to the throne. The Tudor myth, supported by contemporary authors, continued to survive past the death of the last Tudor. As the age of Reason evolved in England, scepticism grew as to the truth of the several Arthurian legends.[20] However, the Romantic movement began to reverse 18th century scepticism in respect of Arthur's career.

The rebirth and re-interest in Arthurian Britain came with the publication of Alfred Tennyson's *Idylls of the King*, begun in 1855. Tennyson's work was influenced greatly by the Franco-Prussian War, contemporary politics in England, and an idealised concept of the personalities of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert. He often incorporated royal personalities into the traditional characters in the Arthurian legends. 'Tennyson's purpose in the *Idylls of the Kings* was moral and didactic. The supernatural and uncertain origins of Arthur are stressed in keeping with this purpose'.[21]

Along with Tennyson's view of the Arthurian legend is the possibility that the military Arthur was a Celt, born during the 470s. This is a very realistic possibility because his name, Artorius, belongs to the same family of words as Custennin and Tegid, which are both Celticised Roman names. Also, before the sixth century, none of the men named Artorius was a native of Britain. However, after 550, according to what few records there are, several Artorii are listed. Perhaps these Arthurs were named after a British hero of slightly earlier fame.[22]

Arthur's status as a leader with an 'intelligible career',[23] rests mainly upon the works of a ninth century cleric, Nennius, who wrote a *History of the Britons*. Nennius compiled all the information he found among ancient parchments and documents, translated old Welsh stories into Latin and without much organisation wrote his history. The stories contained few embellishments, and can be regarded as fairly authentic. Nennius described Arthur as a man without dynastic rank who led the Britons against the Saxons in twelve battles, concluding with the battle of Mount Badon where Arthur single-handedly slew nine hundred and sixty of his enemies and won the war. The magnitude of this last battle was greatly exaggerated, but is reflective of the belief that Arthur was the greatest warrior of his time. Arthur was the commander-in-chief rather than the King, according to Nennius.[24]

Along with Nennius, other historical records mention a British leader who was the commander at Badon, and who also was mortally wounded at Camlaun. Welsh poetry mentions Arthur often, but never explains exactly who he is. It was undoubtedly understood that their audiences knew who he was. He is not referred to as a 'king' except in a collection of

early poems called the *Black Book of Carmarthen*. One poem in *Carmarthen* refers to him as *amberawdyr* or the Latin *imperator*, both meaning the English equivalent—emperor.

As a result, Arthur became the symbol of British retaliation against sixth century invaders. He became the victor after the death or retirement of Ambrosius.

> We may picture him as a rustic noble, born in the 470s or thereabouts, of still dimly-Romanised stock. Hence his name, Artorius. His youth was spent in raiding and feuding. By an unusual flair for leadership he attracted a following. His personal corps—the knights, if we care to use that word—aided British kings against Anglo-Saxon encroachments. He made himself indispensable over the whole zone of his operations, becoming Ambrosius's successor and, in a crude way, a statesman. But despite victory, his standing was never quite secure. Quarrels with the monks, probably over levies in kind, deprived him of proper recognition in the writings of the only people who wrote. He met his end fighting an enemy to whom there is no reason not to give the name Mordred.[25]

One vital question that has puzzled historians for years is the location of Arthur's home territory. If tradition is to be believed, the West Country was his homeland. Place-name and local legends support this theory. There are no places outside the West Country which correspond to the traditional names associated with Arthurian legend. There are other historians, however, who maintain that Arthur ruled in the north. Prince Arthur of Argyll (northern Britain) was one of the first and most important men to be named after the legendary King Arthur.[26]

Another basic question concerning Arthur is what the extent of his actual rule or leadership really was. Was he merely a local resistance leader or a nationally recognised hero? Both historical and archaeological evidence support the theory that he remained in the south-west of England. On the basis of purely literary evidence the case for the North appears much stronger. If one looks at the saga, it appears much more probable that he originated in the north and his influence spread to the south. This possibility, however, suggests that communications in Britain were far superior than they actually could have been.[27]

Arthur has been classified in rank from a warrior chief[28] to an *imperator* or *dux bellorum*. The Latin *imperator* could refer to a commander-in-chief or the remaining influence of the Roman imperial government. This title tends to imply that Arthur was a big, rather than a small leader. The title *dux bellorum* is thought to be the title of some military office. This title could perhaps be a carry over from the Roman occupation of the early fifth century. The Romans developed the title of *Comes Britanniarum*, Count of the British Provinces—though the position was never fully effective. Perhaps this title was later applied to Arthur.[29]

The Anglo-Saxon military ventures were carried out solely by foot-soldiers and by hand-to-hand combat. R. G. Collingwood, in the first volume of the *Oxford History of England*, proposed that Arthur's success was due to a change in military procedure. It was suggested that Arthur developed a cavalry section in his army based on Roman mailed horsemen, the *Cataphractarii* and the *Clibanarii*. This would enable Arthur's military campaigns to be more widespread and would allow for swifter means of

communication between the British.[30] This whole theory, however, assumes that Roman culture remained more influential than many historians believe. It has been questioned whether or not this influence could survive until the time of Arthur. There is no historical or archaeological evidence to support the development of a cavalry under Arthur.[31]

According to legend, Arthur has been associated with large numbers of unknown warriors and nobility. Geoffrey Ashe, in his book *The Quest for Arthur's Britain*, has narrowed the number of Arthur's real friends to Kay, Bedevere, Mordred, Tristram, probably Guinevere and possibly Mark, Gawain and Iseult. These names correspond to the earlier Celtic names of Cei, Bedwyr, Medraut, Trystan, Gwenhwyvaer, March, Gwalchmei and Essylt. Kay and Bedevere were Arthur's lieutenants or assistants. Medraut was never friendly to Arthur and was always plotting against him. Tristram was a Cornish nobleman of possible Pictish origin, since his name was originally Drustans. Guinevere, Arthur's wife, is only briefly mentioned and not much is known about her. Gwalchmei is only briefly referred to before the works of Geoffrey of Monmouth.

Merlin, according to Geoffrey Ashe, was invented by Geoffrey of Monmouth, but the character does have some factual basis. There was a British lord named Myrddin from northern England whose name was changed by Geoffrey of Monmouth. However, he would have been only a small boy when Arthur was 'King'. Therefore, the role of Merlin as a tutor to Arthur would have been impossible.

These characters are important because one must admit that Arthur was probably an important leader in Britain, and because his friends 'would never have been immortalised for their own sake'.[32] Arthur and the following military efforts in expelling unwanted invaders brought these characters into national focus. Yet, the British rally failed and these people were still immortalised. Geoffrey Ashe attributes their immortalisation to early Welsh and Cornish poetry and to the stubborn pride of the Welsh and Cornish inhabitants. In conclusion, Arthur and his friends are important because they enabled the British to expel foreign invaders and for a short time to live in peace.[33]

NOTES

1 Christopher Hibbert, "The Search for King Arthur". *Horizon* X (1968), 8.
2 Geoffrey Ashe, *The Quest for Arthur's Britain* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969), p. 42.
3 *Ibid.*, p. 44.
4 Hibbert, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
5 *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.
6 *Ibid.*, p. 10.
7 *Ibid.*, p. 10.
8 Ashe, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
9 *Ibid.*, p. 54.
10 Hibbert, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
11 Ashe, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-3.
12 *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[13] Geoffrey of Monmouth, *History of the Kings of Britain* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1958), p. 188.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 170-236.
[15] Ashe, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 13.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 17.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 27-31.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 36.
[22] Ashe, *op. cit.*, p. 55.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 55.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 65.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 65.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 66.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 69.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 69.
[30] R. G. Collingwood, *Oxford History of England—Roman Britain and the English Settlements* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 231-234.
[31] Ashe, *op. cit.*, p. 70.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 72.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 72

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AN IMPERIALIST IN THE THIRTIES

by Edwin Samuel

HAVING been a member of H.M.'s Colonial Service all through the thirties, I was presumably an imperialist: but that was not by intention. I served only in one small corner of the vast Colonial Empire—Palestine—where I had originally been sent as an artillery subaltern in World War One. I was untypical in that I never applied for—or was offered—transfer elsewhere on promotion to some other colonial territory and spent all my 28 years of service in Palestine, but in five different departments.

Palestine itself was not really typical either. It was a Mandated Territory and not a Crown Colony or even a Protectorate. It was governed, however, as if it had been a Crown Colony, even though the British Governor was called a High Commissioner and an annual report had to be submitted by him to the League of Nations Mandate Commission. The 'A' Mandate in force in Palestine (as also in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq) was declared, from the outset, to be only a temporary measure until such time as independence was accorded. None of these Mandates lasted thirty years, compared with the centuries needed by some of the British West Indies, for example, to attain complete self-government.

Progress in Palestine was rapid but never smooth. From the outset, in 1920, British civilian administration was bedevilled by a series of armed conflicts between rival Jewish and Arab nationalisms. This rivalry prevented the gradual development of self-governing institutions as in most Crown Colonies. It ended in 1948 in a bloody civil war involving not only the two parties but also the neighbouring Arab countries. As a result, Palestine was split into three—a Jewish State named Israel, the Gaza Strip which was occupied by Egypt, and the West Bank which went to Jordan.

In 1967, Israel gained the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which included half Jerusalem.

Right up to the end of the thirties, life in Palestine was marred by a prolonged Arab rebellion against British authority. In essence, this was the Arab protest against the flood of Jewish immigrants into Palestine following Hitler's rise to power in Germany in 1933. Additional divisions of British troops had to be despatched to Palestine to maintain order in an area of critical importance to Great Britain should a Second World War break out.

In British imperial eyes, Palestine guarded the eastern approaches to the Suez Canal against a possible attack across the Levant by Russia, Germany, Turkey, France or Italy. Before World War II, the Canal was regarded as the lifeline of the British Empire. It enabled Britain to keep open the shortest sea communications with its Indian Empire and its other Asian dependencies, as well as with Australia and New Zealand. It was these territories that provided Britain and its Empire with some of its much-needed reserves of foodstuffs and raw materials, as well as manpower for its armies.

World War II broke out in 1939. Curiously enough, the period of the Second World War was one of the quietest in the history of Mandated Palestine. Jews and Arabs called a truce, at least until 1943, when the danger of a German and Italian invasion was checked at El Alamein in North Africa, while the danger of a German invasion was halted at Stalingrad in Russia. Palestine was never in fact invaded by any enemy force during the whole six years of World War II. In consequence, it was full of base camps, military hospitals and factories for the local production of military supplies for the Middle East.

Although I never moved from Palestine to other British dependencies, I travelled around at frequent intervals within Palestine, both geographically and departmentally. I was one of the few British administrators there who came in at the beginning of the Mandate in 1920 and went out at the end, in 1948, still on my feet! Alas, many of my colleagues were killed during those years. For the first fourteen years I was 'political' (district administration and the High Commissioner's secretariat): for the second half departmental (immigration, wartime censorship and broadcasting).

The beginning of the Thirties found me in the Secretariat: I hated it. By disposition I am a 'field' man: I disliked being behind a desk, seeing life solely at second-hand. The volume of work in the Secretariat was enormous: I felt that I was at the bottom of some gigantic pillar-box, swamped continually by new batches of letters poured in from the top. Finally, in late 1930, after three years' servitude, I escaped and reverted to the district administration as number two in the Jerusalem district.

Shortly after my return to Palestine in 1932, I managed to get sent to the Galilee division as assistant district commissioner in charge of four sub-districts and responsible to the district commissioner for northern Palestine at Haifa. My colleague and neighbour in the Samaria division to the south was Hugh Foot, who went on to a magnificent career as governor of Cyprus and other territories, ending with a peerage as Lord Caradon, with a ministerial post at the U.N.

Having been myself a district officer at Ramallah (near Jerusalem) in the 1920s, looking after sixty Arab hill villages (five Christian and the rest Moslem), I did not find it too difficult to manage the four sub-districts of Galilee with 300 villages and the four towns of Nazareth, Beisan, Safad and Tiberias, governed respectively by two Christian Arab district officers, one Palestinian Jew and a Bahai. The 300 villagers were mostly Arab, but some were Jewish. These included a number of Kibbutzim (Jewish communal villages), both old and new.

Leonard Woolf and George Orwell have both tried to describe life in the British colonial service. But I find it hard to give the sense of exhilaration one felt as a British district officer and assistant district commissioner in Palestine in the 1920s and 1939s. To get such posts, we had to pass examinations in written Arabic. As we all held magistrates' warrants, we also had to pass administrative law examinations. (As a matter of fact, I ran my court in Arabic.) The law then in force was a strange amalgam of Ottoman law (based on the *Code Napoleon*), British military regulations and Pales-

tine ordinances. But once these linguistic and legal hurdles were over we were left largely to our own devices. At Ramallah, I had spent most of my time touring distant villages on horseback, accompanied by Arab police officers and an Arab medical officer. We would spend our nights in village rest houses or, occasionally, in local monasteries. A few villages were accessible by car over rough tracks that had been made by the British away in 1917 and 1918. My second-hand T-model Ford, with its high clearance, was ideal for this kind of travelling.

As a district official, I had little time or inclination for a theoretical analysis of imperialism. That came a quarter of a century later when the Empire was disintegrating and I was lecturing about it at universities in the United States and Jerusalem. But, in the 1930s, I was too busy governing my own little Empire. Communications with Jerusalem were poor and Galilee was then a long way from the seat of government. One could do more or less what one liked. There was little risk of my being called to court by a complainant. Assassination was a more likely fate: my successor, Lewis Andrews, was shot dead in Nazareth by Arab terrorists. In the 40s, I, too, was being hunted by Arab terrorists; but, in the 30s, I was on the run from Jewish terrorists, who considered me 'soft' on the Arab question. The then head of the political department of the Jewish Agency, Dr. Chaim Arlosoroff, whose views on the Arab question I shared, was killed by Jewish terrorists on the beach at Tel Aviv. I had been warned by M.I.5 to be careful and had, in fact, passed on the warning to Arlosoroff. He took no notice; but my own secretive and evasive manner of living proved successful and, after six months, the Jewish terrorists called off the chase.

By then I had begun reading widely on British colonial history and noted the wide gap between the governors and most of the governed. In Palestine, this gap was much narrower than in the African colonies, for example. The Middle East (and India) had rich cultural pasts. The Arabs, once freed from Ottoman suppression, caught up very quickly. The Jews, mostly immigrants from Europe, were already highly advanced. While I could do something to help Arab villages, there was little I could do to help—or harm—the Jewish villages. They were largely self-governing, especially the *Kibbutzim*.

The aim of the Mandate was to make Palestine self-governing as quickly as possible. That depended largely on the development of its economy. While I was in Galilee, the High Commissioner in Jerusalem was that remarkable soldier, Sir Arthur Wauchope. He had soon realised that increased production, especially in agriculture, was the key to everything. He toured Galilee almost weekly, and I went with him. The results of his many schemes (some of which he financed out of his own pocket) are still visible.

In 1934, to my intense indignation, I was suddenly withdrawn from Galilee to be second-in-command of a re-organised department of immigration for which a new senior Jewish official was considered to be essential. I returned to Jerusalem but lived by preference in the eastern (Arab) part of the city up to the Arab rebellion of 1936-38 when that became too unsafe.

In the department of immigration, most of my clients were Jews and, at the age of 36, I had to sit down and begin to master modern Hebrew. This I found—and still find—extremely difficult. In the department of immigration I served under another remarkable man—Eric Mills. He was a first-class mathematician (he was also Commissioner for Statistics) and he headed the only Palestine census ever taken. Having been gassed in France in World War I, he was posted to the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration at Gaza. I worked with him from 1934 till 1939, during which year nearly a quarter of a million Jews flooded into Palestine—legally or illegally—from Germany, Austria, Poland and the Balkans. Those who applied for visas were handled by the regular British passport control officers at Berlin (Major Foley) and Warsaw (Hamilton-Stokes) and other capitals. Their devotion, courage and humanity resulted in the saving of thousands of lives.

In 1934, shortly after the re-organisation of the immigration department, I myself was deputed to visit Foley and Hamilton-Stokes and many of the other immigration control offices in central Europe, in order to speed up the handling of applications for visas to Palestine. Mills had widely decentralised his authority and the average time taken to get an immigration permit had been reduced from nine months to two weeks.

With the outbreak of the war in 1939, I was shifted once more, this time to be censor for civilian mail in Jerusalem under a chief censor for Palestine (whom later I succeeded). The censorship plans in the event of war had been revised after Munich and I had known of them. We got off the mark in Jerusalem more quickly than anyone else and soon became the major censorship training centre for the Middle East. We were fortunate in having had at our disposal former Moslem pilgrims from all over the Moslem world who had settled in the Moslem holy city of Jerusalem;—Christian missionaries who had served in Africa and Asia and knew many languages and dialects; British colonial civil servants with knowledge of rare languages such as Kurdish; and, of course, Jews from all over the world speaking a multitude of tongues. In consequence, the Jerusalem censorship could read letters in over 120 languages whereas the central Imperial Censorship head office in London could only do seventy. Palestinian Jews, Arabs and our British trainees were posted all over the Middle East from Aleppo to Teheran to Eritrea.

Again I had the good fortune to serve under a remarkable man—H. C. Willbourn. Pre-war, he had been deputy Postmaster-General in Palestine and was familiar with the railway, postal and telegraphic routes all over the world. I accompanied him on some of his trips, especially after the reconquest of Syria and Lebanon from Vichy France in 1941, in order to set up new censorship offices in Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo in collaboration with the Free French.

As with many other assignments, these journeys involved considerable personal risk. Looking back to my twenty-eight years of service in the Colonial services, I can be thankful that I managed to remain alive;—the first duty of an Imperialist!

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

Look at the Harlequins! Vladimir Nabokov. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. £3.25. *First Love, Last Rites.* Ian McEwan. Jonathan Cape. £2.50. *The Incident is Closed.* Boris Kidel. Heinemann. £3.25. *See the Old Lady Decently.* B. S. Johnson. Hutchinson. £3.25. *Checkmate.* Dorothy Dunnett. Cassell. £3.25. *Heiro's Journey.* Sterling E. Lanier. Sidgwick & Jackson. £3.50. *The Last Days of the American Empire.* Bruce Powe. Macdonald & Janes. £3.75. *The Invisible Cord.* Catherine Cookson. Heinemann. £3.10.

Sometimes a veteran novelist proves to be more scintillating and perceptive than the most talented newcomer to the literary scene. True, his technique will be familiar, yet he may well retain the ability to shine a bright light of tolerance and insight. Such a writer is Vladimir Nabakov, ever able and determined to break free from his image as the author of the notorious *Lolita.* His new novel, *Look at the Harlequins!,* offers no such sensational situation as a precocious adolescent's 'affair' with her young step-father. Less purposeful and closely plotted than some of the earlier novels, it hangs nonetheless on an original idea —the life story of a supposedly real author, Vladim Vadimovitch, whose imaginary novels are listed and copiously described. The basic theme is a retrospective study of Vladim's four wives: how they drifted into his life, died or went their separate ways until he himself ends up in a forgotten limbo for the mentally deranged. From the first glimpse of Vladim as a neurotic child, he is seen to be suffering from unspecified psychological aberrations. Yet he is by no means an unattractive personality to those around him. Quite the reverse, for his inherent honesty, sometimes a characteristic of the partially insane, has an endearing quality. The tragedy is that his wives, with their intellectual limitations, fail him as consistently as he disappoints them. As a result they are all doomed and trapped by circumstances over which they have no control. Moving uneasily through Switzerland, Paris and the United States, they seem to epitomise the restless and uncertain thirties and forties, periods which Vladimir Nabokov revives with an adroit selectivity.

To turn from this accomplished *rapportage* to the vigorous if sometimes vicious outpourings of Ian McEwan is like plunging into an icy pool. In his first collection of short stories, *First Love, Last Rites,* he displays an acute awareness of basic impulses and reactions not often so uncompromisingly transmitted to the printed page. Predictably, he will be accused of having an obsession about the sexual act in all its forms and deviations. Take, for example, incipient incest in *Homemade,* a grubby tale of sexual initiation in which a small boy attempts to seduce his little sister; or *Cocker at the Theatre,* a sordid cameo describing the dilemma of two members of a mixed chorus rehearsing for a nude musical. Physical congress apart, the overall *motif* of the stories is the fear and frustration of people who are defenceless against the pressure of more powerful egos. What causes the reader to hesitate before either condemning or saluting Ian McEwan is uncertainty as to how far his undoubted talent will carry him towards justifying the recent award of an Arts Council grant.

People of a very different kind, yet labouring under much the same psychological handicaps are presented in *The Incident is Closed*; although the author,

Boris Kidell, has displayed them against a far more conventional backcloth—the little known Greek holiday island of Livida. The well tried technical device of isolating a number of ill assorted people for a limited period of time is exploited in all its permutations. The host, Piers Radley, is a foreign office official who has gravely offended the diplomatic code by lining up against official American policy in Vietnam. He is likely to be demoted and so arrives at his idyllic villa burdened by apprehensions.

Comfort and support are withheld by Imogen, his second wife, who sees the island retreat as hopelessly incompatible with her career as a professional pianist. Nor is this her only problem. Over the years, she has been the occasional mistress of her impresario, who continually assures her that her work can only prosper if she leaves Piers. Fortunately—or unfortunately—another of Imogen's former lovers descends upon Livida, Etienne, an ageing, embittered former Resistance worker who is facing charges of collaboration. Elaborate complications follow his arrival and the unexpected appearance of several other guests. *The Incident is Closed,* with its interplay of emotional attachments, could be just another 'group' novel but for the interest of the numerous flash-backs which run, rather confusingly, in and out of the contemporary scene. The beginning of Imogen's musical career in Vienna, the suicide of Piers' first wife and Etienne's involvement with the Resistance movement all demonstrate Boris Kiddell's ability to convey dramatic tension in a wide variety of situations far more interesting than the rather dreary uncertainty of who is going to sleep with who.

It is always sad to consider the posthumous work of a talented author, particularly one as original and accomplished as B. S. Johnson. In this case there is an added problem. *See the Old Lady Decently* was intended to be the first of a trilogy called *The Matrix Tragedy,* inspired by the death of B. S. Johnson's own mother, the downgrading of the British Empire or 'Mother Country', and the re-emergence of the life-force as demonstrated by the Mother's act of giving birth. Since, alas, it will not be possible to see how this ambitious plan might have developed, the reader has no alternative but to judge the present work on its merits. Without Michael Blakewell's Introduction it would have been difficult to follow up the various clues to the elaborate 'puzzle' game, which seems to be a quite unnecessary gimmick. For some years past, B. S. Johnson has been widely acclaimed as one of the foremost of the 'new' writers, absorbing and tailoring to his own needs much that was best in post-war French and American fiction. But, as so often happens with ultra-modern literature, the parts which are not experimental tend to steal the thunder. The vast middle strata of readers who demand slices of recognisable life for their fictional diet will find these in the touching saga of Mrs. Johnson's career as a café waitress and domestic worker. Backed up by letters and snap-shots, B. S. Johnson has built up a convincing portrait of this courageous, undemanding woman who married in the year of the General Strike.

The merciless debunking of all forms of hypocrisy and graft in scenes which are sometimes riotously funny and resemble a surrealist charade combine to make *See the Old Lady Decently* one of the season's most stimulating publications, and the only pity is that we shall never know what follows.

By contrast, Dorothy Dunnett's *Checkmate,* the last of a series of five, provides the reader with ample opportunity to consider the author's long-term intentions. These closely-documented, action-packed novels concerning the professional and personal life of Francis Crawford, Master of Lymond, have sold in enormous numbers, despite involved plots and dialogue which, with its

alien rhythm and syntax, is often hard to follow. Francis Crawford is a Scottish rebel whose traffickings between France and Scotland bring him constantly within an inch of capture and certain death. One of the central threads of *Checkmate* concerns the long awaited marriage between Mary of Scotland and the French Dauphin. Francis Crawford longs to return to Russia, in which country he sees his best chance of personal advancement.

Instead, in deference to the young Queen's wishes, he has no alternative but to remain in France, carrying on an existence of guerilla warfare against and around the various fighting factions. Between some hair-raising escapes and roamings in the lush, semi-agriculturalised countryside, the uncertainty surrounding the origins and birth of Francis Lymond are dangled tantalisingly. These can be verified only by the recovery of a long lost anagram, which mission assumes for Francis Lymond the importance of a Quest. Yet these concessions to the reader's appetite for mystery are never permitted to obtrude unduly into what is intended to be a serious survey of a particularly complex period in French and Scottish history and one which has maintained a consistently high standard.

One of the main requirements of the historical novel is that the characters shall not appear to possess information or experience which would have been unavailable to them at the time. The writer of science fiction, on the other hand, suffers no such inhibition. The present publishing season has produced a number of fantasies of the future, two of which merit special attention. *Heiro's Journey* is a weird and fantastic story concerning the travels of a warrior and former priest, Per Heiro Destin, through the marshy unreclaimed territory which was once North America and Canada.

What has led up to the deterioration remains a mystery. But whatever the cause, the result is a desert of tedium. 'Mind-tracing' and telepathy take the place of sophisticated means of communication as well as a curious form of speech between human and animal. The bear and the deer who journey with Per Heiro Destin have sufficient sensitivity to tend their Master's wounds and watch out for his safety. Inevitably, conflict breaks out between Man and beast on the long trek; the purpose of which is to salvage some lingering nucleus of the old civilisation. Revolting, slimy creatures which are in reality some species of plant life, promote an impression of filth and decay. A spoof Glossary explaining the origins of the various animals and the meaning of the few recognisable words which remain in Per's vocabulary makes the whole venture seem authentic. The trouble is that with so little variety in the habits and activities of the protagonists the story has few opportunities to stimulate or surprise and becomes at times deadeningly repetitive and slow moving, despite a considerable display of inventive imagination and Sterling E. Lanier's always impeccable style.

As a glimpse into the future, there could be no greater contrast than the strident over-populated world displayed by Bruce Powe, nor is there, in the startling events depicted in *The Last Days of the American Empire,* anything intrinsically impossible. Instead of slimy, slow moving reptiles and intellectually starved human beings, we see the results of nuclear and other technologies run riot; of drought following in the wake of interference with the natural sequence of the seasons and men intoxicated by power they can no longer wield with any sense of moral obligation.

Most of the action is set in Africa, about a century from the present time, when, as the end-paper maps indicate, famine and dissolution have followed the breakdown of agriculture in France and Scandinavia. All that is left of the

famous 'Western Union' is part of America and the British Isles. Shortages of food and accommodation encourage migration, 'squatting' and the resulting deterioration of standards. And over all, while the Africans conduct their own internal vendettas with obscene brutality, hangs the threat of a nuclear bomb attack from the United States. On this fertile soil germinates the African plan to invade and conquer an effete and rapidly disintegrating America.

Tagging along on the apparently hopeless venture is an African poet, Kwesi Ofuro, who, as narrator, provides a witty and objective commentary on the general turmoil and confusion of the campaign. Throughout the long voyage to the USA from Africa, and the infantry attacks on Washington and New York, he struggles to detach himself from the squalor and cruelty in order to maintain his ability to write. Unfortunately, in the midst of the triumphant marches and klaxon wagging he succumbs to fatal wounds, while observing, in accordance with African mythology, the departure of his three separate souls. One of the best features of this novel is the reliving by Orfuro of his childhood in an African village community. Within these beautifully written passages lies the clue to many of the current problems which beset the recently emerging nations.

And finally, to the rough, crude though by comparison secure world of Catherine Cookson. The reason for the phenomenal success of her North country family chronicles is hard to determine. Broken sentences littered with expletives is the only kind of conversation of which the characters are capable. Few intelligent people would wish to exchange even platitudes with any of them, and yet under Catherine Cookson's direction they acquire a curiously insidious appeal. In *The Invisible Cord,* Annie Cooper meets, on her wedding day, a boy half her age who is destined to become the ruling passion in her later life. But before they become lovers she must weather a distasteful marriage, bear a number of children and watch her first born deteriorate into a common crook. Determined, ambitious for social prestige and yet somehow frowsty and unsmart, Annie is never an attractive or even interesting personality, yet the reader follows her willingly through her tribulations until the moment of her death at the hands of the adored, though utterly reprehensible son.

Also Received:

Powerpoint. Christopher Hansen. Peter Davies. £2.60. The author, writing here under a pseudonym, clearly has extensive knowledge of the intrigues and convolutions which beset those who attempt to hurry along the 'corridors of power' towards high governmental office. The chief character, James Michaelson, is probably a personality misfit in any case, obsessed by embarrassment over his humble origins and a sterile marriage which leaves him a ready prey to any transient attraction. Consistently brisk and readable, this insight into the world of Ministries and Administration is far more than just another story of cut-and-thrust in high places.

The Ghost Stories of Edith Wharton. Constable. £3.50. The reissue of these accomplished ghost stories is welcome at a time when the supernatural has a mounting appeal. Tastefully presented, they have lost none of their compulsion. Specially notable are *The Lady's Maid*—reminiscent of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's *The Copper Beeches*—and *Pomegranite,* with its parallel to the mythological Persephone.

The Decay of the Angel. Yukio Mishima. Secker and Warburg. £3.00. (Translated by G. Seidensticker.) Readers of this accomplished Japanese writer's earlier novels will appreciate this posthumous volume, the last of an ambitious

plan, fortunately completed before his death at the age of forty-five a few years ago. The inevitable conflict between youth and age dominates *The Decay of the Angel,* but it is more for Yukio Mishma's blend of satire and imagery than for the mere exploration of human relationships that he will be remembered and mourned.

The Brother. F. D. Reeve. Aidan Ellis. £3.80. As in an earlier novel, *White Colours,* F. D. Reeve presents his young hero in a series of connected vignettes; in the classroom, selecting books from the library, on holiday and in contact with a tolerant and affectionate father. Sometimes hard to follow, on occasion burdened by simile and metaphor, the general awareness and freshness of outlook of this talented American writer is never in doubt.

NON-FICTION

DIVIDED KIPLING

Kipling: The Glass, the Shadow and the Fire. Philip Mason. Cape. £6.

Modern reassessments of popular authors of the recent past are inclined to deal with their subjects—I had almost written 'victims'—in facile terms of split-personality. The present book cannot be accused of that fault. Philip Mason, like many of us, was a great admirer of Kipling when he was young; then suffered a revulsion of feeling, which lasted for many years. Now he has come back to Kipling with a fresh mind, has re-read him in the light of his own experience of life—including twenty years in the Indian Civil Service—and has come to realise that the best of Kipling is indeed to be admired, the worst to be written off perhaps as among the cheaper products of a blatantly imperialist age.

A split-personality *does* inhabit Mr. Mason's pages, but it is a split inherent in the subject and the period, not imposed by the author to raise a knowing smile. Kipling himself must have been well aware of the divergent forces that went to shape his upbringing and early development. Consider the plain facts. Both his grandfathers were Methodist ministers; his father was a teacher of art and curator of the museum at Lahore, a gentle, kindly artist and scholar whom Rudyard revered all his life; two of his aunts married members of the Pre-Raphaelite circle and the young Rudyard was dangled on the knees of some of the leading artists and writers of the late Victorian age; he attended a tough boarding school for the sons of army officers—the original of the school in *Stalky & Co.*—but the headmaster was a scholar, an enthusiast for French literature, and a personal friend of the Rudyard parents and the Pre-Raphaelite aunts; the myopic youth, tame poet of the school magazine, was debarred from the army career of most of his contemporaries and became assistant editor on the *Civil and Military Gazette* at Lahore, subsequently graduating from journalism, like a colonial Dickens, to write those tales and verses which won him a world-wide reputation while he was still in his twenties. He was for years the unofficial Poet Laureate of the British Empire, but though he accepted the Nobel Prize for Literature and numerous honorary degrees at the Sorbonne and elsewhere, he steadfastly refused not only the Laureateship but all official honours like a knighthood or a baronetcy, even the O.M. and the C.H. He must have been the only man of his time who was the intimate friend of both Cecil Rhodes and Henry James, who was best man at his wedding to Caroline Balestier of Vermont. He shared and propagated Rhodes's imperial convictions, but also shared, if he did not propagate, some of Henry James's ideas about the lofty, impartial status of the literary artist.

A pretty problem for the conscientious critic and biographer! Mr. Mason solves it in a novel way, by virtually ignoring both fame and notoriety and treating Kipling as a whole, applying standards of art and humanity to the later as much as the earlier work. His own experience of India does not lead him to over-estimate the early writing. It was truly original, but it varied immensely in quality, not all of it by any means attaining the high standard of *Kim*. Mr. Mason is inclined to agree with Edmund Wilson in stressing the importance of the best of the later work, the work of the post-war Kipling, saddened by the death of his son in action and by his own physical disabilities, who in his Sussex retreat could again ponder those artistic principles of Balzac, Maupassant and the other French writers he had read in the original in his enthusiastic youth before most of them were translated and whose influence had once led him to contemplate writing a colonial *Comédie Humaine*. Kipling *could* be callous, perhaps initially as the over-reaction of a sensitive youth brought up in tough-talking surroundings of school and club; but he had always the example of a kindly, scholarly father, a father he must have known in his heart to be more worthy of admiration than some of the ruthless men of action he glorified in his early stories. Mr. Mason gives grounds for believing that some of the later stories—for instance, in *Debits and Credits* (1926)—are the compassionate reverse of what we might have expected from the Kipling of the more notorious public utterances. The lap of the gods, as it were, may have nursed the more public Kipling; the knees of the Pre-Raphaelites were not wholly forgotten.

R. C. CHURCHILL

WHAT IS RIGHT WITH THE WORLD

The Novels of G. K. Chesterton. A Study in Art and Propaganda. Ian Boyd. Paul Elek. £4.95.

The Apostle and the Wild Ducks and Other Essays. G. K. Chesterton. Edited by Dorothy E. Collins. Paul Elek. £3.95.

The Company of Paul Elek have followed up their Chesterton centenary volume (1974) with a newly collected set of belles-lettres, and with what is, perhaps surprisingly, the first full-scale analysis of Chesterton's novels. This latter confirms the impression that only a scholarly approach such as, indeed, this of Dr. Boyd's, can do full justice to the allegory, symbolism, imagery and plain allusion by means of which Chesterton pursues his social, political and religious ideas. Chesterton himself warns against the intentional fallacy, but, unless Dr. Boyd is mistaken (and he is most convincing), scarcely legions of his devoted readers can have understood his full meaning. Chesterton insisted that none were true novels, but that they represented good ideas which had been spoiled—'I could not help being a controversalist'. H. G. Wells provides a contemporary touchstone as to the success of the interfusion of fiction and ideology. Dr. Boyd will not separate the literary identity and value of each novel from its propagandist content. Nor will he accept the common view that Chesterton's social philosophy expresses a longing for a literal return to the middle ages. In *The Napoleon of Notting Hill,* neo-medievalism brings back poetry and pageantry to modern life, but it also creates an oppressive neo-Imperialism. In *The Ball and the Cross,* a dream of a medieval theocracy turns out to be a nightmare of authoritarian terror. At most, the medievalism is a myth, an ideal, which poses a valuable model by which to understand and judge the modern world and the irrational subterfuges of our politics. Moreover, Dr. Boyd shows very well how Chesterton's world-view embraces the

eternally dynamic concept of the contrast between the madness of a world which claims to be sane, and the sanity of those whom the world thinks to be mad.

There is absolutely no doubt that these essays, originally published almost entirely in newspapers and periodicals, must be regarded not as journalism but as literature. How Johnsonian the fierce and deeply-felt dogmatism sounds, with each effortless turn of phrase—'For at present we all tend to one mistake; we tend to make politics too important. We tend to forget how huge a part of a man's life is the same under a Sultan and a Senate, under Nero or St. Louis'. He is not suave: he is too impassioned for that. How subtle, discerning and surprising he is; none other could have appreciated Ruskin as a humorist, so that, 'Like a woman, he saw the humour of his own prejudices, did not sophisticate them by logic, but deliberately exaggerated them by rhetoric. One-tenth of his paradoxes would have made the fortune of a modern young man with gloves of an art yellow'. He writes of the condition of man in Brownesque prose; when invited by the editor of *T.P.'s Weekly* to expatiate on 'What is Right with the World', his range of vision far outstrips the most ambitious of that editor's desires—'You can use poppies to drug people, or birch trees to beat them, or stones to make an idol, or corn to make a corner; but it remains true that, in the abstract, before you have done anything, each of these four things is in strict truth a glory, a beneficent speciality and variety'. Aphorisms, of course, abound, but are always intrinsic to the argument—'Nothing nowadays is so conservative as a revolution', or 'The most dangerous thing in the world is to be alive'. This is how he sees New York—'those starry heights, those palaces riding the air like rainbows, those pale opalescent spears piercing the sky . . . and a man . . . grown dizzy with that dance of towers, may somewhere against the blinding sun, see suddenly the unblinded eagle'. And this is how he sees man: honesty 'remembers that the very bones of our heads are grinning'.

MOLLY TIBBS

HENRI-ALBAN FOURNIER

The Land Without A Name. Robert Gibson. Eleh. £7.50.

In some respects, Henri-Alban Fournier, better known as Alain-Fournier, was similar to H. H. Munro (Saki). Both were born in late 19th Century. Both died in the First World War and both were profoundly influenced by their childhood. Neither attained the full height of his literary powers. Saki is remembered for his engaging short sarcastic stories. Fournier for one novel, *Le Grand Meaulnes*. Perhaps both were fortunate in their deaths. Saki would have hated post-war London. Fournier, on the other hand, would not have found France so changed, but whether he would have produced another book of the same stature is questionable. The similarity between the men ends there. Saki loathed his childhood, brought up by a series of spinster aunts; his stories are beset with their unpleasant literary incarnations who normally get their come-uppance; Fournier, at least in retrospect, adored his. His life was one long look back into the glow of the mists and colour of the French countryside and in his short life he developed a total romanticism and retreat into the past and might have been.

He was born, the son of a village schoolmaster, at La Chapelle on the 3rd October, 1886. His sister Isabelle, with whom he maintained a close relationship throughout his life, was three years younger. He received more or less a standard French education, eventually serving in the pre-war army. Always attracted to the inaccessible, he met by chance, on the 1st June, 1905, 'a tall,

slim, fair-headed girl, so lovely and elegant that he at once took her to be an actress.' This was on the steps of the stoneway going down to the Seine outside the Grand Palais. The girl was Yvonne de Quiévrecourt. He followed her to Mass 10 days later after keeping a vigil outside the house to which he had traced her. He spoke to her as she came out of the church and for a time they walked by the banks of the Seine in the Parisian sunlight. His first words to her were 'Vous êtes belle' and her last to him 'Nous sommes des enfants. Nous avons fait une folie.' He did not see her again for eight years. She had married the man to whom she had been engaged when Fournier met her. When he did see her once more there was the possibility she would leave her husband for him, but for reasons which are infinitely complex, romanticism, fear of disturbing an image, a general unwillingness to embody a memory, he let the opportunity pass. Yvonne became the unlucky heroine of *Le Grand Meaulnes*. Fournier became that heroine's brother and two lovers.

Much of his literary output is contained in his letters to his childhood friend Jacques Rivette, who married Isabelle, and it is from this correspondence that Robert Gibson has drawn extensively in *The Land Without A Name,* his second and comprehensive biography of *Alain-Fournier*. The title itself is the draft title for *Le Grand Meaulnes* and Gibson traces in the later chapters the effect it has had on the subsequent generations of French writers and their readers. It is difficult for the English to assess the importance this book has had on a complete chain of writers from Radiguet onwards. Clearly, Gibson is affected by it. He purposes a book on his own Lost Domain and he communicates the affection he had for the book as opposed to the man who sadly comes through as a professional poseur as well as a genuine romantic. To Fournier, as for so many, the past was always better than the present, the unattainable more acceptable than the concrete. His whines creep through into the text. *Le Grand Meaulnes* lives on in the English pronunciation as a phrase to describe its author. The book itself lives on, as it always will, for its complex interlocking of recollection, fantasy, allegory and, at its simplest level, a really good story.

JAMES MORTON

RONALD TREE'S MEMOIRS

When the Moon was High—Memoirs of Peace and War. Ronald Tree. Macmillan. £4.95.

In essence, this is a slight book, adding little to the stream of memoirs prompted by World War II. Now that private letters and Cabinet papers have been carefully inspected by Martin Gilbert and other professional historians, there is a tendency for private memoirs to recapitulate well-known facts. This short book contains no bibliography; it does, however, contain in an Appendix the names enscribed in the Ditchley Visitors' Book, where Winston Churchill spent a dozen week-ends between November 9th and 11th, 1940 and September 26th-28th, 1942 at Ronald Tree's palatial home in Oxfordshire 'when the moon was high' and Chequers was a possible target for enemy aircraft. This Appendix and the more intimate account of Churchill's manner of living must be of some interest to any student of history.

Ronald Tree was born rich and had a unique entrée into Anglo-American Society. He married a niece of Lady Astor, Nancy Langhorne (another Virginian) later Nancy Field, widow of his first cousin, who was not only elegant, but a brilliant interior decorator and gardener. His step-father was Lord Beatty. His relations included Marshall Field, American Ambassadors, etc. He was elected for the safe seat of Market Harborough in 1934. I remember all too well, because having recently won a difficult by-election in Kilmarnock (1933),

I assisted him, speaking from a lovely Georgian house called Kelmarsh in Northamptonshire, 'an admirable vantage point from which to hunt the Pytchley'. He mentions that his supporters included Lord 'Bobbety' Cranborne, Duff Cooper, Nancy Astor and that even one of his Liberal opponents, Lord Lothian, also stayed at Kelmarsh. So much for Ronnie Tree, the Anglo-American, the disciple of Eden, the permanent host to the anti-Chamberlain, Conservative rebels of the 1930s.

Apart from this personal aspect of the book, there are two more important considerations. Ronald Tree served as Parliamentary Private Secretary to all four Ministers of Information, Lord Macmillan, Sir John Reith, Duff Cooper and finally to Brendan Bracken. Here he is on firmer ground and his personal experience confirms in general the evidence of other observers, namely the monumental history of the B.B.C. by Asa Briggs, the life of Sir Walter Monckton by Lord Birkenhead and the recent biography of Brendan Bracken by Andrew Boyle and many other witnesses. The basic fact is that the Ministry of Information was a mess; once again nothing had been learned from World War I. Macmillan was inept, Reith was frustrated and Duff Cooper indecisive. Brendan Bracken, with all his idiosyncracies, was a success, fortified by Sir Cyril Radcliffe's brilliance as Director-General. But Bracken had always behind him his old chief Winston Churchill. I note that Bracken alone, apart from Churchill's family, appeared on every occasion in the Ditchley Visitors' Book. In the quarrels with the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Warfare (Hugh Dalton), Bracken had a reliable base—the Prime Minister.

The second consideration is the development in the United States of the British Information Service (B.I.S.) Here again Mr. Tree played a limited role. The root question was this: how discreetly could a British propaganda body be seen to influence American opinion on the progress of the war? Our Ambassador, Lord Lothian, was at first highly critical. Here again there are scores of books which bear on the subject. I select one—'Britain Alone' by Herbert Agar, who, as a real American, played an influential part in persuading his fellow countrymen and President Roosevelt to identify themselves with the Allied cause and who later became the Special Assistant to the American Ambassador, Mr. Winant. It is correct to state that Ronnie Tree was involved in the early days of B.I.S. which later became an efficient and acceptable body, performing a useful service in furthering good Anglo-American relations. I have known it intimately from its early days.

I have tried to decipher the two more rewarding and serious considerations, namely the Ministry of Information in Britain and the British Information Service in America. But in both cases it has all been said before.

KENNETH LINDSAY

THE MANSON MURDERS

The Manson Murders. Vincent Bugliosi. Bodley Head. £3.95.

In the year 1969, something must have gone awry with the occult calendar. It was Walpurgis Night in August. Never, on the eeriest May Eve, prowling through the mountain passes of Transylvania, nor flitting about the Brocken or the Hextansplatz, were such things abroad as came stalking out of the desert dust of Death Valley, California, to descend on the Tate and La Bianca residences, stabbing, rending, tearing demoniacally, and scrawling their credo in daubings of blood. The identities of the creatures are no longer secret. The detailed catalogue of their atrocities has become absorbed into the arcane folklore of the pathologically horrendous.

The architect who blueprinted the carnage was one Charles Manson, an itinerant sociopath who had spent seventeen of his thirty-three years holed up in various American jails, there availing himself of his enforced leisure time to concoct a zany philosophy, compounded of hunks of Scientology and sci-fiction and distorted subjective interpretations of the Bible and the lyrics of the Beatles' songs. He emerged from his latest penitentiary think-in in 1967 to become the all-powerful Sage of Death Valley—a dune buggy commando, bilaterally Jesus Christ God or Satan, according to the preferred profile selected by his adherents. Casting about him for fledgling neophytes, he found no difficulty in recruiting from the flower-power belt of Los Angeles. His hippie-style commune, calling itself 'The Family', settled in on a disused movie lot, and started to do its own thing. Or rather, Charlie's thing, which escalated crazily in all-too-easy stages from robbery, drug freak-outs and lesser mayhem to grand slam murder trips.

The climacteric was achieved on August 8th, 1969, the night of the short knives, when four of Manson's disciples — a man and three girls — swooped hell-bent upon the Cielo Drive home of 26-year-old film starlet, Sharon Tate, pig-stuck her and otherwise disposed of—by gun, knife or rope—four other innocents. The following night, still unsated, they forayed forth once more. This time the marauders' target was a handsome piece of real estate on Waverly Drive. Swiftly and efficiently they eliminated all life from it, leaving Leno and Rosemary La Bianca's hacked corpses in spreading pools of blood.

Then it was that the seismograph of public shock began to judder mightily, and a panic reaction set in among the Angelenos. The story of the slayings, the investigation, the arrest and ultimate trial of the killers is massively documented by Vincent Bugliosi, chief prosecutor at the trial, in his definitive and magnificently presented account. The miracle is that the murderers were ever caught, for there was an appalling lack of vital connections in the police work. Due to internecine politics, the officers of the Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office nurtured an innate inability to co-operate, and it fell to the chief prosecutor—as it traditionally does in America apparently—to assume the personal responsibility of investigation.

Mr. Bugliosi valiantly attempts an untangling of the Manson motivation, which, rather unexpectedly, seems to fine down to a morbid pre-occupation with black power rather than black magic, and contrives a terrifyingly rewarding study in pathological ideation.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

BOROUGH OF THE TALENTS

Kensington and Chelsea. William Gaunt. Batsford. £5.50.

More writers and artists have lived in London's Chelsea and Kensington than in any other borough, so they figure prominently in this combined issue of two separate volumes long unobtainable. Following Addison and Steele, the irate Jonathan Swift came to Chelsea in 1711, paying—he said—'six shillings a week for one silly room with confounded coarse sheets' and calling the local haymaking nymphs 'perfect drabs.' Smollett, ex-naval surgeon turned writer, settled there hoping the air would benefit an ailing daughter, but she died at fifteen. Author of *Roderick Random* and *Peregrine Pickle,* he spent ten years there, he complained, 'in the shade of obscurity, neglecting and neglected'—except by the law, which imposed £100 fine and three months' imprisonment for libel.

Carlyle set up house in Cheyne Row in 1834, arriving from Craigenputtock in hackney coach with wife Jane and canary Chico, noting 'the cheerful gipsy

life we had among the litter and the carpenters for three incipient days', also the tragic loss of the MS. of Volume 1 of *The French Revolution,* carelessly burnt by a maid of J. S. Mill, to whom he had lent it. For seven of his forty-six years there, a near neighbour was Leigh Hunt, whose chaotic, crowded household disclosed, he said, 'hugger-mugger, unthrift and sordid collapse'. Hunt called him one of the kindest, best, most eloquent of men, who disliked shams, enjoyed fault-finding. Other celebrities emerge from the book's packed pages.

Mr. Gaunt certainly had an eye for intimate detail. A poignant memory is of George Eliot—sixty-one and ailing, seven months married to John Cross, moving to Cheyne Walk at the end of 1880, two years after G. H. Lewes's death, and within three weeks dying of a chill. For eleven years, until the 1895 trial, Oscar Wilde lived in nearby Tite Street, where his wife, Constance, might receive guests in the modified form of Greek dress that reflected his views on dress reform. A stormy visitor here—to be thrown out—was the Marquess of Queensberry, raging about Wilde's friendship with his son, Lord Alfred Douglas.

A Cheyney Walk arrival in 1911 was Henry James—sixty-eight, gouty, dyspeptic, short-sighted—in two small rooms 'for quiet and concentration' that duly produced his autobiographical *A Small Boy and Others* and its two successors. When he had moved to Carlyle Mansions and lay dying, his friend Edmund Gosse whispered in his ear: 'Henry, they've given you the O.M.' He made no sign, but when Gosse had gone, murmured: 'Nurse, take away the candle and spare my blushes.'

In Kensington, Gaunt's chief concern is with Thackeray, pegging away at *Vanity Fair* and *Esmond* in the squat bow-fronted house in Young Street, with an invalid wife absent and young daughters to care for; and the arrival one day of 'a tiny, delicate little person' in mittens on her first visit to London: Charlotte Brontë on the crest of *Jane Eyre*. He enlarges, too, on Macaulay, Andrew Lang, Galsworthy, G. K. Chesterton, who found the germ of *The Napoleon of Notting Hill* in a row of little lighted shops that should be defended 'like a hamlet in the desert'. Gaunt has comparable stories of the artists of both former boroughs, and topographically records their history, traditions, outstanding features with a thoroughness unexcelled before or since, aided by a pageant of photographs and period prints.

TREVOR ALLEN

SHORTER REVIEWS

Prisoners of Honour, the Dreyfus Affair (Cassell. £3.95). This study by Dr. David L. Lewis is now published in Great Britain after its original publication in America in 1973. There has been, of course, a great quantity of literature on the scandal which rocked France after the false accusations which led to the conviction of Captain Alfred Dreyfus for military espionage in December, 1894. It was followed by a monstrous cover up, nourished on fraud, trickery and ruthless intrigue, in a desperate attempt to sustain the reputation of the French General Staff and their political allies. Watergate has been mild in comparison. Dr. Lewis has probed deeply into the documentary sources and published books, as well as interviewing persons indirectly concerned, such as Dreyfus's daughter and also the daughter of his campaigning brother, Mathieu. Dr. Lewis's aim has been to 'synthesise what is interesting and important, add to it a certain amount of new material' and present it in an objective contemporary perspective. The story is dramatically told and the author

handles well the web of intrigue. Although the main character of the scandal has long been known, there still remain important problems to be unravelled. Who, for example, initiated and wrote the torn *petit bleu* letter removed by a French agent from the German Military Attache's waste-paper basket, addressed to the notorious Major Ferdinand Estahazy and which became a leading clue to the innocence of Dreyfus. The text of the book, unfortunately, is not annotated.

The National Gallery of Art of Washington and Its Paintings (John Bartholomew & Son. £2.60). This is the sixth volume to be published in the *Great Galleries of the World series* and is to be greatly welcomed. It is superbly produced and is invaluable in providing a comprehensive account of this great institution with its world-famous collection. It is edited by Mia Cinotti, with a Foreword by the Director, J. Carter Brown. The National Gallery was set up by Congress in 1937, being made possible by Andrew Mellon's gift of his collection to the nation. The present buildings were opened in 1941. Together with the Mellon collection, those of Widener, Kress and Chester Dale form the nucleus of the Gallery, added to by many other donors. The main features of this volume consist of over 170 colour reproductions of the Gallery's great masterpieces, together with brief commentaries, black and white photographs of other important paintings and a complete catalogue of all paintings in the Gallery's possession.

There are Giants in the Earth. (Sidgwick & Jackson. £3.50.) Michael Grumley, naturalist and graphic artist, has written this most entertaining book of potted anthropology in search of the various giants, the myths and semi-myths of which circle the world. The Yeti of Asia, the Mono Grande of South America and the reasonably well documented Sasquatch of North America. All feature here, together with a quick look at the giant in Norse and other mythology thrown in as a *bonne bouche*. Perhaps because it is of the same nationality as the author, or perhaps because it does exist, the Sasquatch is best dealt with. This engaging quasi-monster has been sighted in North West America over the past decade and from the photograph of it resting amongst pine looks like an amiable but masked heavyweight wrestler. There are a number of other photographs which don't take things much further and indeed the whole concept depends on the level of one's disbelief. Nevertheless, with a bit of luck, the book might turn out to become a cult such as *The Bermuda Triangle*.

Selected Papers of Ludwig Binswanger. (Souvenir Press. Hardback £5.00. Paperback £2.50.) Ludwig Binswanger is the founding father of *Daseinanalyse*, or existential psychiatry, which has inspired some of the most fertile work in Europe and America, both in the field of psychoanalysis and in more general thinking about man's relation with his society. Souvenir Press has now issued a reprint of his major writings, translated and with a book-length critical introduction by Professor Jacob Needleman, who regards his theories not as an alternative to orthodox Freudian methodoloy, but rather as an extension and a correction. Above all, his viewpoint is ontological and Heideggerean. The term Dasein refers to a being whose essence is to be in the world. Whereas meanings and experiences that are the subject matter of psychoanalysis are conceived by psychoanalysis as, for example, instinctual urges which are being thwarted by external conditions, Binswanger's Dasein is *already* in the world, and this Dasein is thus the background upon which the 'self' emerges.

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AUGUST 1975

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Alexei Gorokhov

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James Avery Joyce

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

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

COSMONAUTICS '75

by Alexei Gorokhov

NINETY-four spacecraft of different designs were launched by the Soviet Union last year.

Three Soyuz-type manned craft, the landing of the crew on the Salyut 3 orbiting research station, the Luna 22 and 23 automatic probes, the Intercosmos 12 joint satellite of the socialist countries, the landing of the descent module of the Mars 6 automatic interplanetary probe on the surface of the 'red planet', a series of the automatic Cosmos satellites—these were just some of the events of the space chronicle in 1974.

The combination of manned and unmanned flights, the study of near-space environment and of the far regions of the solar system, the realisation of the national programme and an active international cooperation—are the main features of the Soviet space effort in the mid-70s.

The plans for this year are also formidable. In January the Soyuz 17 shuttle vehicle delivered Alexei Gubarev and Georgy Grechko on board the Salyut 4 orbiting research station in which the cosmonauts spent a month. In February, Project Arax, one of the most ambitious Soviet-French experiments in the so-called magnetically conjugated points of the earth, became a success. On May 24, Soyuz 18 delivered Pyotr Klymuk and Vitaly Sevastyanov to Salyut 4, making a record Soviet duration flight. In short, space activities got off to a confident start.

ASTP (Apollo-Soyuz Test Project) was undoubtedly one of the most exciting events, the preparations for which were closely watched by the world. According to the Soviet specialists, it is more than simply a joint space experiment of two countries. ASTP will be a virtually new stage in the development of space exploration, of much importance for its future. The joint flight more clearly delineates cooperation of the leading space powers in the conquest of near space.

ASTP was scheduled to start on July 15 at 15.20 Moscow time, when a Soyuz-type spacecraft was launched from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan for a rendezvous with the Apollo spacecraft. The preparations for this launch reached completion on schedule.

The dress rehearsal of the forthcoming joint venture of the Soviet and

US space vehicles took place with the flight of the Soyuz 16 spacecraft piloted by Anatoly Filipchenko and Nikolai Rukavishnikov, who made up the second Soviet crew under this programme. All most important technical questions were solved. The final training session of the Soviet and US crews was planned for April. It took place in the Stellar township near Moscow. Furthermore, the training of the ground control personnel had been scheduled for March, May and June. The results of these joint measures helped to make final adjustments in space mission documents, after which they were printed. The main attention during the weeks before the flight was paid to the direct preparation of the space vehicles.

Konstantin Bushuyev, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Hero of Socialist Labour, who is the Soviet technical director of the project, said:

> As an engineer, I am, of course, interested in the technical results. The development of compatible docking devices on spacecraft which are based on different principles is, in many respects, a challenge for the engineer. But if we take a broader view of the joint Soviet-US experiment, we may confidently say that this cooperation in space exploration will serve the cause of world peace.

Research using long-duration manned orbiting stations is a major trend in space in the Soviet Union. This research will be continued.

The interest in orbiting stations is due to the vast possibilities of these space objects. A promising space system for the near future is the Salyut series of space stations. The large size and weight of long-duration orbiting stations (25 tons in Salyut 4) permit them to be rigged with diverse scientific equipment.

Suffice it to say that tens of Soviet research and design organisations have placed their technical and scientific 'orders' on Salyut 4. Among them, the Space Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Crimean Astrophysical Observatory, the Lebedev Physical Institute, Leningrad University, and the Low-Temperature Engineering Physics Institute of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The scientific facilities on Salyut 4 weigh 2.5 tons. According to Academician Boris Petrov, the eminent Soviet scientist and chairman of the Intercosmos Board, this makes it possible to pass over from the solution of isolated and specific scientific and technical problems to all-round investigations of the sun and the stars, of the depths of the universe, the upper atmosphere of the earth and near space.

Scientists are interested not only in the neighbourhood of the earth but also in the earth itself. The Salyut 4 missions have once again demonstrated the good prospects of space facilities for the study of the earth's natural resources in the interests of the national economy. In this respect, orbiting stations can be very useful. It is a question of making space research one of the profitable economies.

The Salyut 4 station, like its predecessors, has such an important quality as the capacity to operate in the automatic mode and to execute an intense research programme without a crew. The high degree of automation of control processes in the manned version makes it possible for a two-man crew to perform a vast complex of important experiments and investigations. During their month stay on board Salyut 4, Alexei Gubarev and Georgy Grechko reaped a record scientific 'harvest' in the history of Soviet

space exploration and a new crew continued the work.

The first Intercosmos research package was put into an earth satellite orbit in October 1969 under a programme of cooperation of the socialist countries in the peaceful studies and uses of outer space. The programme has to its credit 12 satellites, two geophysical rockets of the Vertical type and scores of meteorological rockets.

The Intercosmos 13 satellite has been launched. The satellite is designed for the study of the so-called unstationary processes in the lower magnetosphere and the earth's polar regions. In particular research is being undertaken to study the relationships between dynamic processes in the behaviour of charged particles and in low-frequency electromagnetic radiations.

Soviet space rocketry has permitted the scientists and engineers of the socialist countries to take their instruments right out into outer space. For example, Intercosmos 13 can be called a Soviet-Czechoslovak venture with regard to the participating countries and their equipment. Participating in the study of the structure and dynamics of charged-particle streams in the lower magnetosphere and the earth's polar cap during the different periods of solar and geomagnetic activity are specialists of the Space Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Nuclear Physics Research Institute of Moscow University and scientists of the Institute of Astronomy of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and the Karlova University in Prague. Investigations of the spectrum and temporary behaviour of low-frequency electromagnetic oscillations and signals are carried out by specialists of the Institute of Terrestrial Magnetism, Ionosphere and Radio-wave Propagation of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Czechoslovak scientists of the Geophysical Institute.

The Soviet specialists maintain successful cooperation not only with scientists of socialist countries. For example, Soviet-French scientific contacts are developing fruitfully. The French 'Stereo' equipment designed for the study of solar radio emission in the meter bands has been mounted on several Soviet automatic interplanetary probes of the Mars type. Joint experiments in the laser location of the moon were undertaken on Lunokhods. Soviet-French experiments under the Arcade programme were carried by the Oreol and Oreol 2 satellites. During the experiments, physical phenomena in the upper atmosphere of the earth and the nature of auroral displays were studied. The Soviet Prognos 2 automatic station has helped to fulfil two joint projects—Snow and Calypso. A Soviet rocket delivered the French technological package MAS (minor automatic satellite) into a high near-earth orbit. Scientists checked up with this package the possibility of prolonged operation of solar batteries under strong radiation.

The beginning of 1975 was marked by the Arax experiment within the framework of cooperation between the National Space Research Centre of France and the Intercosmos Board of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The experiment continued investigations in the magnetically conjugated points of the world.

Another Soviet-French experiment was carried out in June, the launching

of a new French 'minor autonomic satellite' (MAS) by a Soviet rocket. This time the experiment is designed to check up the effectiveness of the satellite's radiation cooling system which can be used in building different kinds of space objects.

According to Jean Claude Husson, head of the Scientific Programme Department of the French National Space Research Centre, the French scientists were guided in their work on the cooperation programmes by the desire to take part in investigations of the planets, the moon and interplanetary space, extensively carried on by the Soviet Union, which has excellent equipment and abundant experience. This is natural, the scientist noted, because France has equipment only for investigations at low altitudes.

In 1975, the first Indian research satellite was launched under an agreement between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Indian Space Research Organisation. The satellite was orbited by a Soviet carrier rocket from a Soviet cosmodrome. The objectives of this experiment are the study of solar and space radiations and the earth's ionosphere.

Professor Y. P. Rao, director of the satellite project, has emphasised the tremendous importance of this work for developing India. He said that space research will help Indian scientists not only to advance their science and technology but also to solve a number of vital problems.

The first Soviet-Swedish space experiment will also be held in 1975. Soviet and Swedish specialists are going to study the polarisation of the sun's shortwave radiation using a satellite.

Thirteen years ago, the Soviet Union launched a space research programme based on satellites of the Cosmos series. They number over 700 today. The launchings of Cosmos satellites will be continued this year. Widely different problems are investigated with their aid: from the study of outlying regions of the universe to the solution of purely design and technological problems. One satellite of this series to be launched this year will carry a biological experiment designed under an agreement between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration; biological samples prepared by American scientists will be mounted on the Soviet satellite.

Such are some of the points in the plan for 1975. Besides, Soviet specialists will have to fulfil the orders of the national economy. In the first place, this refers to communications and weather forecasting. Accordingly, the launchings will be continued of Meteor weather satellites and Molnia communications satellites.

[A physicist by training, Dr. Gorokhov is one of the leading Soviet science correspondents and specialises in the study of astronautics.]

On July 15th, 1975 the joint space mission of Soyuz and Apollo was launched successfully. Two days later, on July 17th, exchange visits between the two space-craft took place according to plan, with mutual expressions of confidence and good-will. *Editor.*

THE RED CROSS IN CYPRUS

by James Avery Joyce

SO much attention has been devoted in the general press and the mass media to the military and political aspects of the current struggle in Cyprus that the extraordinary operation which has been maintained since the conflict erupted, to protect and succour its immediate victims—refugees and 'prisoners-of-war'—has received only casual notice or recognition. An overall review of the humanitarian programmes involved in this quiet work of mercy, which has itself a direct bearing on the future peace and rehabilitation of the unhappy island, may surprise many readers because of their thoroughness and comprehensiveness.

The need for such an appraisal was emphasised by Paul Martin in a *Times* article recently, when he described the 'slow death' of the island because of the economic and social disintegration of its people, split across the middle, as unemployment mounted, deserted homes were looted, office buildings gutted, farms abandoned, and trade and shipping was disappearing, while a quarter of a million destitute refugees had crossed each other's trails, North and South, during the physical partition of the island dictated by the invading Turkish army.

It should be recalled that, last November, the General Assembly adopted unanimously a resolution which not only reaffirmed respect for 'the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus', but called on the representatives of the two communities, under the good offices of the Secretary-General, to undertake 'contacts and negotiations' so that they could 'reach freely a mutually acceptable political settlement'. The Assembly also insisted that 'all the refugees should return to their homes' and that 'all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel' should be 'speedily withdrawn' from the island.

The Security Council not only endorsed without dissent this Assembly resolution (for which Turkey itself voted) last December, but obliged the Secretary-General to report progress on its implementation. Mr. Waldheim has continued his good offices through the early months of this year, but without too obvious an effect on the political confrontation. However, the U.N. Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) has continued to patrol the no-man's land between and around the edges of the occupied territories.[1]

When I was last in Nicosia in 1971, I recall its soft-speaking Indian Commander, General D. Prem Chand, remarking to me that the limited peacekeeping role of UNFICYP rested on two basic principles: (1) To avoid publicising its activities at all costs, and (2) to anticipate as far as possible what local disturbances might need its immediate presence. The sparse coverage given in the press to its operations is itself evidence that those principles are being skilfully adhered to, for there can be little doubt that the human situation for most of the island's inhabitants has been nothing short of chaotic.

It is within this unstable political framework that the International Red

Cross has been conducting, since the Turkish invasion in July 1974, a major relief programme which can already be assessed as an outstanding humanitarian achievement. As will become apparent, the total endeavour bears witness to its close relationships and interlocking co-operation with the United Nations system of peacekeeping and its High Commission for Refugees.

Fighting broke out abruptly and violently in Cyprus on 20 July, 1974. Within the first few hours following the outbreak, the International Red Cross Committee called upon the Parties to the conflict to respect the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and, in conformity with them, to permit the Red Cross to act on behalf of prisoners-of-war and the civilian population. The belligerents promptly notified the Red Cross of their intention to abide by the Conventions.

The Red Cross immediately launched an emergency action and by the end of 1974 some fifty delegates were at work on behalf of victims of the conflict. Thanks to their efforts, some 5,980 prisoners-of-war were visited and subsequently repatriated and over 140,000 family messages had been transmitted to displaced persons. Through the rapid support of national Red Cross Societies, Red Crescent and Red Lion and Sun Societies, and also governments and organisations such as the European Economic Community, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations specialised agencies, the International Committee was able to distribute more than 5 million dollars' worth of foodstuffs, medical equipment and other relief. Incidentally, the Turkish Red Crescent, which has been active in the island for several years now, provided direct assistance, to a value of about a million dollars, to the Turkish community.

When hostilities were resumed in August, the Committee set up three neutral zones in Nicosia in which several hundred civilians found haven and security. In the course of the fighting, more than a quarter of a million persons abandoned their homes and fled, most of them into the southern part of the country. Many Turkish and Greek Cypriots were isolated in their villages; and, on both sides, the number of prisoners practically doubled.

The Committee has also been associated with the talks, under the auspices of the United Nations, between Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash at Nicosia and has put forward concrete proposals on humanitarian issues, which for the most part have been accepted and led to the release of prisoners. The Committee's Tracing Agency prepared lists, filled in capture cards, transmitted Red Cross messages between prisoners and their families, and finally issued the repatriation cards as the prisoners were freed.

Two Red Cross doctors arrived in Cyprus with the first group of delegates and made an initial survey of medical needs. They visited hospitals and, with the assistance of the authorities, drew up lists of urgently needed medicines. But it was soon found essential to bring medical teams into some areas. So an appeal to the national Societies brought more teams from the Red Cross Societies of Denmark, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland.

These teams, each consisting of a doctor and a nurse, provided care for the civilians in isolated Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Four of the teams were soon at work in Turkish communities in the Limassol and Paphos districts. In the north, by October last, five teams were providing regular assistance to Greek communities, treating scores of patients every day.

From the very beginning, of course, the Committee concerned itself chiefly with the fate of the civilian populations who have suffered so bitterly from the hostilities. Both the Greek Cypriots who fled southward and those who remained isolated in the north, as well as the Turkish Cypriot communities isolated by the fighting, needed protection and material help. The Committee supplied these displaced persons with some 150,000 blankets, 10,000 tents, 10,000 camp beds, several hundred tons of foodstuffs, including baby food and powdered milk, and twenty tons of medicines. As a neutral intermediary, the Committee was able to deliver relief to the isolated Greek and Turkish communities, but some of this was delivered with the assistance of the United Nations Peace Forces.

To sum up, since last August, after hostilities flared up again, the Committee set in train the following additional activities in favour of the victims of the conflict:

(a) visits to prisoners of war and civilian detainees on both sides;
(b) drawing up and forwarding lists and capture cards for prisoners and detainees;
(d) distribution of about 12,000 family message forms and 1,500 positive replies to enquiries for missing persons;
(e) distribution of material relief to wounded persons, detainees, displaced persons, and Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities cut off in their villages.

By the winter, it was apparent that an overall estimate of needs was urgent. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was therefore appointed by the Secretary-General as co-ordinator for all aid supplied by the United Nations and other sources. In co-operation with all those engaged in relief activities, he drew up an inventory of needs which were evaluated at about 22 million dollars.

When the main fighting ceased, there were about sixty isolated Turkish communities in southern Cyprus. Their situation was rapidly deteriorating, necessitating regular visits by delegates and medical teams. Close co-operation was established between the Red Cross and UNFICYP; the latter distributed relief and also evacuated the wounded and sick.

About 15,000 persons who had remained in their homes came under the control of the Turkish armed forces. In addition to bringing aid to these people, the delegates sought out and listed several thousand Greek Cypriots —most of them old people—who were living under conditions of extreme hardship. After having been moved by the Turkish Army to other places, the Red Cross mobile teams provided them with medical assistance and set up a supplementary feeding programme with a monthly distribution of some 70 tons of protein-rich food.

As instability still prevails in Cyprus, the Red Cross maintains a delega-

tion of some forty persons, including ten Swiss delegates, two doctors and five mobile medical teams provided by national Red Cross Societies. In the area controlled by the Greek Cypriot authorities, the Red Cross has continued to provide care for the Turkish Cypriot population, paying regular visits to some 70 villages in which they are gathered. It has intervened with the authorities to bring about better living conditions, and made sure that relief supplies are distributed regularly and that people have freedom of movement.

The isolated Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities left in the wake of the Turkish invasion, continue to be in constant need of medical services. Sick and aged people in these communities have long been depending on Red Cross mobile medical teams. Mobile teams providing general medical services in the south have been progressively replaced by a system of clinical medicine, with emphasis on caring for old people. Two such medical teams provide weekly consultations in the hospitals at Limassol, Larnaca, Polis and Paphos. The Red Cross is working in close co-operation with Turkish Cypriot doctors who remained in the south, who have complete freedom of movement within their respective districts, since the Red Cross has worked out with them a programme of visits to all the Turkish villages.

In the north, still under the rigid control of the Turkish Army, the Red Cross maintains contact with isolated communities and has continued assisting Greek Cypriots cut off in some 50 villages and two cities. An important agreement had been concluded between Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash, representing the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities respectively, for the transfer from the north to the south, and vice versa, of certain categories of persons, which the Red Cross supervised, namely: wounded, sick and elderly persons, children and pregnant women. But, following the unilateral proclamation of a separate Turkish Cypriot State, these transfers were halted by the Greek Cypriot authorities, who have permitted only transfers urgently requested by the Red Cross for medical reasons.

The Tracing Agency, which did an invaluable work of mercy in the track of the invasion, has continued to play a major role. The Red Cross maintains a central bureau in Nicosia and, in co-operation with the Cypriot Red Cross, runs four regional Agency bureaus in Limassol, Larnaca, Ormidhia and Paphos. This search for missing persons calls for skilful efforts, as the Agency receives every day a large number of persons seeking information. Five Agency delegates are still tracing missing persons, forwarding family messages, and arranging transfers of civilians.

As postal communications have still not been restored between the two 'zones', Red Cross family messages remain the only means of correspondence within the island, as well as abroad. By March this year, the Agency had despatched three-quarters of a million messages; an average of 6,000 messages a day are still being handed to delegates.

Lack of space prevents adequate mention of the magnificent efforts of the other agencies. Especially in the south, assistance to displaced Greek

Cypriots is being provided by the legal Government and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. The Red Cross has nevertheless made regular deliveries of large quantities of supplementary foodstuffs—meat, baby foods and powdered milk. In the north, similar relief distributions are carried out through the whole United Nations family, but the Red Cross makes emergency distributions in case of need.

It cannot be stressed too often that, like other relief agencies, the modern Red Cross carries on its traditional and highly specialised activities within the ever expanding ambit of the U.N. system. In Cyprus—just as twenty years of invasion and desolation is now at an end in Viet Nam—each new challenge of human need finds the United Nations system available and capable of acting as an integrated emergency organisation. What is always surprising about this universal quality of mercy is how much is done on so little. As regards the Red Cross in Cyprus, the voluntary contributions of the national Societies have been without stint, while the Swiss Committee's overall budget for the first six months of 1975 amounts to barely five million Swiss francs (less than a million pounds sterling). But, in view of the continued need for its protection and assistance, the Red Cross can be confident that the required resources will be forthcoming.

Thus, we have witnessed, yet again, in this tormented little island, with its inhabitants trapped and helpless under the onslaught of today's ruthless military politics from across the seas, a rescue operation carried out speedily, discreetly, and efficiently under the Red Cross motto: 'Above all nations, humanity.'

---

[1] See Alfred Joachim Fischer's article on Cyprus in The *Contemporary Review* (No. 1304) for September 1974, *Background to the Crisis.*

[Dr. Joyce is the author of *Red Cross International, The Strategy of Peace,* published by Hodder and Stoughton.]

REFERENDUM IN RETROSPECT

by Paul Rose, M.P.

THE phoney political war which marked the pre-referendum Parliament has given way so quickly to the sound of heavy economic artillery that the great Referendum now seems an unreal interlude.

Those who most wanted a referendum were crying 'foul' upon the publication of the White Paper, and *Labour Weekly* still echoes the sentiment that 'We wus robbed by the newspaper and the media'. On the other hand, those who strongly opposed the referendum as a pernicious and dangerous precedent were beginning to have second thoughts. Indeed, the relatively low key campaign with local counting became something of an anti-climax after the sound and fury which the referendum generated.

The referendum has in some countries been an instrument of despotism or personal rule. In others, it is a well entrenched method of consultative or participatory democracy and it is true that, whatever one's misgivings, the decisive result in Britain put an end to a decade and more of uncertainty in a way that nothing else could have done, given the curious history of the period since the Labour Government's application.

Nevertheless the instrument remains an unsatisfactory method of ascertaining political view within the context of a system based upon the supremacy of Parliament. The problem is that Parliament decides the timing and the question posed. Timing can be the essence. It is a matter of speculation what would have been the result of a referendum on hanging the day after the execution of Ruth Ellis as compared with the period following the horrific revelations of the Moors murders. The same is equally true if less starkly apparent, in relation to the European issue.

M.P.s would have been in an intolerable dilemma if the result had been close, since they must still ultimately decide whether it has to be acknowledged that a predilection for opting in favour of the *status quo* must have assisted the European cause. Further, it was apparent that, after all, the Queen had not been turned into a President and the Eurocrats had not annexed Number Ten. Life had gone on much as before and some quite tangible benefits had emerged from membership. The Conservative Party, which formerly contained and maintained many irreconcillables, had, during the Heath era, become so identified with Europe that, for most Conservatives, a 'Yes' vote became an act of political identification.

More serious, as the campaign developed, was the absence of 'respectable' Conservative sentiment against EEC. A very passionate, honourable and sincere voice was Neil Marten, but he was almost in splendid isolation as Willie Whitelaw and Ted Heath set the tone. Enoch Powell, shorn of his Midland's power base and increasingly idiosyncratic, lacked credibility as a spokesman for national revival. The National Front, with a leadership battle between the former Nazi and the populist elements, had so little time and weight that the only value was to reassure Labour Europeans that, with enemies like that, they were justified in presenting themselves as the true

heirs to the socialist tradition.

Indeed, more than once I heard the sentiment expressed that with the Communist Party and National Front ranged on the 'No' side—to say nothing of the IRA, Ian Paisley and the Nationalists—even the least enthusiastic were going to vote 'Yes'.

And by a remarkable and perhaps significant quirk of fate the ultimate result reflected, almost exactly, the proportions voting in Parliament. If anything, the referendum demonstrated that Parliament is more representative than populist demagogues would have one believe. With all its manifest faults, it is still a pretty good barometer of the pressures within the nation.

As the campaign progressed, a rather curious if not altogether unexpected phenomenon became increasingly discernible to those of us speaking around the country. Personalities were taking over from issues. The battle was becoming one of goodies and baddies, moderates and extremists. Tony Wedgwood Benn became the man they loved and hated while Peter Shore sincerely, but increasingly stridently, emerged as the most effective champion of an almost chauvinist insularity which would have been appropriate to a different age and climate of opinion. This final appeal for a community of English speaking peoples was awesome in its Churchillian vision but entirely rejected by the grandson of the war-time leader who, like so many others of his generation, saw Britain's destiny in a Union of European Nations.

It was a sad spectacle to see Barbara Castle out of her depth at the Oxford Union while Michael Foot seemed less than enthusiastic in his opposition. It was as if they were reiterating slogans from the age of Adenauer and de Gaulle when their fears would have been justified. There had been a time when the left had led European sentiment. Some had remained faithful to the concept until 1971 but had capitulated by reason of 'Tory terms' or pressures from Trade Unions or Labour Party interests in the constituencies.

Thus, Mr. Prentice, who had once spoken against a free vote when in opposition, now joined the European camp as chief convert at the head of the traditional right of the Party. Together, with the committed Europeans led by Shirley Williams and Roy Jenkins, they presented a broad appeal to the electorate.

However, Prentice's hint of coalition politics hardly helped him or his cause with Party militants, although it warmed the hearts of many moderates who were tired of the Parliamentary infighting and backbiting. The spectacle of Roy, Ted and Jeremy sharing platforms with remarkable bonhomie was probably equally harmful to Labour Europeans trying to win over the constituencies, but in terms of the referendum it was a winning team.

My own view is that few reputations were made by the referendum. Shirley Williams, heading the Labour campaign, emerged as the most consistent, calm and credible of the Labour protagonists. Liberals and bright young things in the suburbs prayed for the day when Roy Jenkins would be Prime Minister.

Later, in a fit of pique, Judith Hart destroyed herself after a very useful term as Minister for Overseas Development while Benn became so much a

bogeyman that the C.B.I. were able to force the watering down of the Industry Bill as he weakened his own authority. During a display of intelligent and impressive debate, Benn's outrageous remarks about the 500,000 jobs lost to British industry, echoed and exaggerated in Falstaffian fashion by his protégé Michael Meacher, destroyed his former credibility so completely that he became a liability. Meanwhile, the quietly spoken Eric Varley remained so silent that he was able to slip almost unobserved into Benn's shoes.

Like Frank Judd and Gerald Kauffman, Eric Varley had been part of the Kitchen Cabinet that had benefited from the patronage of the Party leader to a remarkable degree and yet all asserted their independence by defying the Cabinet's non-collective decision on Europe. Conversely, Ministers of State Ennals and Fowler who re-emerged from outside Parliament into these elevated positions, remained faithful. John Silkin, nominally of the Tribune group, was also muted in opposition. All showed their political acuteness and skill.

The tragedy is that they demonstrated equally that honesty and consistency in politics are no longer regarded as admirable traits in the Labour Party. Perhaps, as one of the seven pro-European Frontbenchers, collectively dismissed without a murmur of protest following the vote on entry, I may be jaundiced but the Common Market issue has weakened and divided the Labour Party, sapping the idealism and energy.

The legacy is that divisiveness in one field is likely to break out more openly in the wake of the Government's economic measures. On Europe itself it seems that the rather poor calibre delegation to Europe, which only direct elections can remedy, contains some who still insist on fighting the referendum battle over again. As against this the referendum demonstrated that those who shout loudest and arrogate to themselves the right to speak for the majority, are frequently deluding themselves and in consequence others.

At the beginning of the campaign Europeans expected a 55-45 victory and anticipated defeat in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Optimistic forecasts were 60-40 but few dared expect the overwhelming 67% that crushed their opponents.

Harold Wilson and Jim Callaghan ran coolly but effectively at the end of the relay giving the race a final impetus as the finishing line approached. The happy coincidence of a favourable Commonwealth conference superbly stage-managed by Jim destroyed yet another strand of opposition. Harold rounded up the doubters and a majority of Labour voters clearly followed the Cabinet lead.

A naughty thought now comes into the head of those who do not like referenda. Some 80% of the electorate undoubtedly favour a tough but firm incomes policy. A referendum would scuttle Scargill and Scanlon. The weapon boomeranged over Europe, although it held Labour Party conference and Parliamentary Party and Cabinet together. It could yet be used to quell an incipient revolt from the left over prices and incomes. Its enthusiastic supporters may regret the day that Benn's brainchild was adopted by the Labour Party Manifesto.

BRITAIN, THE REFERENDUM AND THE WORLD

by John A. Loraine

ON June 5th, Britain gave a massive Yes to the EEC. As the Prime Minister remarked, the pro-Market majority (67.2 per cent of the electorate) was a wider one than had ever swept any Government to power since democratic institutions were established. With the result of the referendum, 15 years of national controversy had come to an end.

During the referendum campaign there was much talk of Britain's destiny and of registering a vote for one's 'children's children'. Such phrases slip easily from the lips of professional politicians. Yet, in spite of the justifiable euphoria of the pro-Marketeers at the outcome of the campaign, it is essential to keep the result in perspective. For irrespective of the fact that Britain has decided to remain within the EEC, global issues will inevitably dominate the history of the last quarter of the 20th century. Three of the most important of these are overpopulation, the depletion of finite resources and the threat of armed conflict.

By the end of 1974, world population was pressing close to the 4,000 million mark. During that year, some 80 million people had been added to the planet—a figure comparable with the current population of Bangladesh, the world's most crowded country, and considerably in excess of the combined dead in the First and Second World Wars. An 'iron curtain of demography' was firmly interposed between the developed nations and the developing countries of the Third World. The rich nations—of which Britain is a good example—underwent their demographic transition from high birth rates and death rates to low birth rates and death rates many years ago. They have become industrialised, largely secularised and prosperous in the material sense; many of them have now reached or are close to replacement levels of reproduction. From the global point of view the main danger of procreative activity in the developed world lies in the disproportionate strain which each birth in the area puts on the planet's finite and fast diminishing resources.

The situation of the Third World countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America is vastly different. Over 70 per cent of the world's population live there; birth rates remain high; death rates and infantile mortality rates are falling progressively as hygiene and medical care improve. A demographic transition on Western lines has yet to take place; indeed, in some countries numbers are rising so rapidly that the populations could double in a mere 30 years. There is massive urbanisation as peasants abandon the countryside and trek to squalid and overcrowded shanty towns on the outskirts of big cities; illiteracy is rife as educational facilities fail to keep pace with the juggernaut of population growth. Unemployment and underemployment are rampant. The great army of the unwanted, termed by Robert S. McNamara, President of the World Bank, the 'marginal men', are on the march. Indonesia, the world's fifth largest nation, is adding over one million people each year to its labour force. In India, 100,000 people per week are

attempting to enter the labour market. Youth dominate the population scene much more than in the West and make heavy economic demands in terms of housing, schools and medical care.

Predictions about population are notoriously unreliable; yet two conclusions seem inescapable. The first is that the world of the year 2000 will contain many more people than that of 1975. The second is that during the last quarter of this century much the greatest increase in numbers—estimated by some authorities to be as much as 90 per cent—will take place in the Third World countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. By the early years of the 21st century, world population could be nearing the 7,000 million mark. By then 1 in 6 people will be Chinese; a similar proportion will be Indian; 1 in 8 will be African and 1 in 10 Latin American. On the other hand, fewer than 1 in 100 is likely to be of British nationality, and the EEC, including Britain, will house no more than 5 per cent of the earth's people. Population-wise, therefore, the hinge of history will move progressively and inexorably away from Europe towards the developing world. In the comity of nations, the role of Britain, and of the EEC as a whole, will at best be circumscribed.

Overpopulation together with policies of unrestricted economic growth have combined to produce the syndrome of resource depletion. The latter is a global malady and will be little affected by the result of the EEC referendum. Vital raw materials such as metals are now becoming scarce. For instance, at current rates of consumption, supplies of mercury, lead, platinum, zinc, gold and silver could be exhausted before the end of the present century, while reserves of tin, tungsten and copper are unlikely to last far into the 21st century.

The availability of certain fuels can no longer be guaranteed. Gas is a finite resource; so is oil. The ultimate world production of natural gas has been estimated as 12,000 trillion cubic feet and of natural gas liquids as 420 billion barrels; supplies are likely to be in jeopardy within 25 years. Ultimately recoverable reserves of oil, believed to be in the region of 2,000 billion barrels, are being rapidly depleted, and stocks will be scarce well before the end of the century. At current rates of economic growth, inexpensive sources of fissile uranium cannot last long. Soon, costs of uranium production will rise dramatically making nuclear power generated by the 'burner' reactors, in use today, unable to compete economically with energy derived from other sources such as coal and water.

In addition to resource scarcity the uneven distribution of resources throughout the world is likely to have profound repercussions. It will alter the balance of power; it will move the epicentre of authority away from the nations controlling capital and technology to those endowed with raw materials. The OPEC cartel which has successfully operated since the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, is the outstanding example of this change of emphasis. But, in the future, collective bargaining by suppliers of other raw materials, particularly metals, is a distinct possibility. For example, it must be remembered that four developing countries—Chile, Peru, Zambia and Zaire—supply most of the world's copper, and that 70

per cent of all the tin entering international trading channels is provided by Malaysia, Bolivia and Thailand.

Overpopulation has the propensity to predispose to armed conflict. It will do so in spite of the fact that Britain has opted for EEC membership. At the World Population Conference held in Bucharest in August 1974 a session was devoted to population and international violence, and it was stated that in 45 conflicts in Asia, Africa and Latin America between 1945 and 1969, population factors had played a role in 38. Two examples from recent history—one from Central America and the other from the Indian subcontinent—will serve to illustrate this point.

During 1969, hostilities erupted between El Salvador and Honduras. The population density of the former is relatively high (176 persons per square kilometre) and of the latter quite low (24 persons per square kilometre). The fighting was on a relatively small scale and rapidly subsided as a result of the intervention of the Organisation of American States. The OAS deliberated on the causes of the war, and in its final assessment cited rapid population growth and particularly the imbalance of population between the neighbouring states as a major predisposing factor to the hostilities.

In 1971, the area then known as East Pakistan wished to break away from the Western segment of that country. There was a bloody civil war, in the course of which large numbers of refugees—estimated in press reports to exceed 10 million—crossed the Indian frontier into West Bengal and settled in ramshackle and insanitary refugee camps. The Indian Government could not tolerate this crisis of overpopulation in a highly vulnerable area of their country. Military intervention ensued, and as a result the new state of Bangladesh came into existence.

It is another lesson of history that individual nation states often react violently and convulsively when they perceive that a vital resource is lacking. This reaction has come to be known as the philosophy of the 'preemptive seizure', and a good example of it was provided in 1956 when Britain and France believed that their access to oil supplies was being denied. The Suez crisis erupted; Egypt was invaded; the US dissociated itself from the Anglo-French intervention; the USSR made threatening noises and for a time a Third World War seemed imminent.

In the last quarter of the 20th century, wars concerned with the redistribution of resources between rich and poor countries are a distinct possibility. The demand by the poor countries for a larger share of the earth's wealth may become irresistible. To political leaders in the Third World, armed conflict may appear the only method available to ameliorate their condition and to compel the rich nations to redistribute global wealth and to jettison trading practices discriminating against them. Such wars will become more and more perilous as an increasing number of Third World countries possess the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. Such wars bear no relationship to the outcome of the referendum.

Viewed in the global context, therefore, the referendum result cannot be regarded as a great watershed of human history. Indeed, to chroniclers of

the future, the rhetoric of politicians during the campaign advocating or opposing closer British association with Europe, may be vested with a strange aura of unreality.

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[Dr. John A. Loraine is Chairman of the Doctors and Overpopulation Group and Vice-Chairman of the Conservation Society. Publications include *Sex and the Population Crisis* and *The Death of Tomorrow*.]

T. S. ELIOT'S 'COMPANION' POEMS: ETERNAL QUESTION, TEMPORAL RESPONSE

by Joyce Hamilton Rochat

THE Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock and *Gerontion* are counterpart poems in which T. S. Eliot presents two views in a before-and-after sequence of human experience. In philosophy and perspective, Prufrock and Gerontion are the same character at different stages of development. Prufrock is a character in process, making the choices that will decide a destiny. Gerontion, at the point of death, reviews those choices and the factors that governed them and evaluates their importance.

Both Prufrock and Gerontion serve in a dual capacity. They function as symbol and image of a society that will not have 'dull roots' stirred, that is as apathetic and unaware as the yellow fog that sleeps over the Prufrockian landscape. But they are also individuals with personal histories and each sees himself as within and very much a part of the world that he represents, the world of the modern wastelanders who refuse to look beneath the surface of their lives and who deliberately conspire to submerge thought. The protagonists portray themselves as the product of the age, as typical and yet focal in their exposition of a civilisation that is off-balance, involved with external appearances rather than inward realities, with minutiae rather than human destinies, with trivia rather than eternal concerns.

Prufrock, lamenting his lost youth and opportunities, sees that he has never attained the mastery of his existence which now appears to him to be affirmed only by other people's awareness of his presence. He is therefore absurdly and totally at the mercy of the stares and the whispers of those around him. His concern, however, is superficial; he worries about his looks, about the bald spot in his hair, that people will say, 'But how his arms and legs are thin', and he debates within himself as to what he dares eat and how he dares dress.

His entire life revolves around such matters and the only mention of 'firmness' and 'assertion' in the poem are in connection with appearance, not character. He is intimidated by his 'universe' in which the regard of others exposes and shrinks his ego. He is filled with self-conscious dread of the gossips whose voices die 'with a dying fall/Beneath the music'. And it is this dread that sweeps out the support from under his world and rocks it with irresolution. Prufrock's decisions revert 'in a minute' to indecisions and his 'visions', ethereal and insubstantial to start with, are instantly subject to 'revisions'. He is, in short, a case study in existential futility.

Gerontion's world has not, of course, been kinder to him than Prufrock's has. Gerontion is 'blistered' and 'patched' and 'peeled' from his contact with a hostile universe and a hostile society. He describes himself as living in a 'decayed house', personal and private, but by extension the plight of all men. He traces the history of man's sterility through the centuries to become what he now is, and it is Gerontion in the capacity of generic man-

kind as well as Gerontion the individual, who sees himself as physically ruined, as morally and ethically unconcerned, as spiritually destroyed.

Gerontion has, however, passed beyond the concerns that so utterly beset Prufrock. He is no longer aware of other people or social problems, involved only with the 'small deliberations' of senility. He says, 'I have lost my sight, smell, hearing, taste, and touch', and he complains that his head is 'dull' and his brain is 'dry'. If there ever was a flicker of zest in his life, it has long since spluttered out. He is also through with dreams and fantasies, with visions and decisions; they, too, are long unremembered. And he tells us that all that is left of 'passion' is what he is able to 'reconsider'. On the brink of death, he sees that trying to 'Excite the membrane . . ./With pungent sauces' and adorning himself with 'variety' before a 'wilderness of mirrors' are meaningless exercises. But even more terrible is that he perceives they were always so. Having gone the way of Prufrock, he knows that it all adds up to futility and that it is of no consequence what one wears or what one eats or what judgement is passed, since all one's life he is being driven by dark and inexorable winds that will eventually claim him. Nothing is important now to Gerontion except the presence of the winds and the fact that they have swept him 'to a sleepy corner' from which there is no retreat.

Both Prufrock and Gerontion suggest the possibility of deeper significance to man's existence, however, than that experienced by the characters in the poems. Prufrock implies it imagistically in his view of the half-hidden land and the inanities of its inhabitants, while Gerontion is more intent upon probing into explanations and history. In both cases the conclusion is that active commitment to universal issues is the key to a fruitful, productive life, but Prufrock's grasp of this principle is hazy and half-formed and he fails to act. Gerontion's insight comes too late, when he no longer has sufficient moral or physical energy to profit from it.

Prufrock in his indecision and Gerontion in his lethargy represent the living dead who do not and cannot act, and yet there is a sense of expectant waiting that hangs heavy over both poems. Prufrock writes of a people whose sensitivities are drugged and whose existence is a perpetual evening 'spread out against the sky/Like a patient etherised upon a table'. They dwell in a vacuum of no-space and no-time. The 'room' in the poem is dimensionless, without locale, where the women come and go in an aimless but endless procession. The aimlessness is reflected in the 'talk' of Michelangelo. Theirs is not a serious discussion but the trivial and polite chit-chat of people who appear to wait for something of importance to occur, for some external force to invade their world and transform it. But the event never does happen and every minute is like the minute that came before and the minute that will follow. Prufrock, speaking for all of his kind, says, 'I have measured out my life with coffee spoons', in little, uneventful portions of non-meaning.

The waiting and watching speak of undefined want and a vague longing for something that will appease it. The drawing room society has apparently tried to satisfy the want with a surfeit of erotic love. Prufrock says, 'And I

have known the arms already, known them all—/Arms that are braceleted and white and bare/(But in the lamplight, downed with light brown hair!)' And the knowing has been empty. The want lingers, jaded. The women interpret it as hunger which they attempt to assuage with toast and marmalade. But there is lack of substance to such food just as there is lack of substance to the conversation. So the women wait and nibble, wait and chat, and the unnamed hunger gnaws unsatisfied.

The wasteland is not limited to the pseudo-culture of the drawing-room. It is the true homeland of all human beings. To get to the 'room', Prufrock has wound his way through streets that are, like the lives of the people who live there, 'tedious' and 'insidious' and 'narrow', where the time of day is always 'dusk'. There he has seen the 'lonely men in shirt-sleeves, leaning out of windows', as aimless as the smoke that spirals from their pipes and disseminates into nothingness. Theirs, too, is a world in suspension in which the afternoon, the evening, 'sleeps so peacefully', and time is not proof of existence. The men turn vacant eyes up the street that never varies. Like the elite women, they wait for their peculiar and specific Godots, for the cataclysmic event that will make of their wasteland experience something that is fruitful and meaningful and significant.

Gerontion begins his monologue with the picture of waiting in a sterile environment. He says, 'Here I am, an old man in a dry month,/Being read to by a boy, waiting for rain'. But his span of years has been a large void a nothingness, and he waits for grace that he knows will not come to him. He waits without belief simply because he does not know how to believe. Unlike Prufrock, Gerontion seems to have had no inclinations toward commitment of any kind, however beset with irresolution. In imagistic terms he sketches in for us the picture of an existence devoid of any positive act. He says, 'I was neither at the hot gates/Nor fought in the warm rain'. He has never fought for the cause of God up to the gates of hell, never known the upsurging experience of fighting in grace. Nor has he given himself to the cause of man, for if 'warm rain' symbolises God's grace, the salt marshes symbolise the arena in which one fights for human kind. He has lived a life of spiritual and moral non-commitment. He says, 'I have no ghosts', no memories of heroic endeavour to enrich the barren ground of the heart and the mind, no sense of accomplishment and certainly no hope. Even this last 'waiting' is passive; it is the boy who performs the act of reading. Gerontion is sunk in his habitual apathy, looking toward the final nothingness of the graceless grave.

There are characters in Gerontion's world who do have ghosts. But they are lean and hollow ghosts that do nothing to enrich the hearts of these wastelanders who, like the half-expectant Prufrock society, and like Gerontion himself, simply kill the time between birth and death. But these people have 'progressed' a step beyond the Prufrockian characters in that they have resigned themselves to the fact that their Godots will not come. To appease the burdensome soul-wants, they devise substitutes. In an attempt to superimpose meaning upon their stifled existence, they make arbitrary commitments.

Unfortunately, though their choices are deliberate and purposeful, they are not outward-flowing but inward-tending and they are 'wrong' choices because they are all-consuming. They are false gods that intensify and magnify preoccupation with self to the exclusion of man and God. Mr. Silvero has turned to a search for man-made beauty in the products of Limoges, but it is beauty corrupted with materialism. While it occupies his mind, it also forges wrinkles on his soul and he walks 'all night in the next room', worrying about his investments. Mr. Hakagawa fills in the niches and chinks of his soul with the creative arts, '*bowing* among the Titians' (emphasis mine). Mme. de Tornquist, tormented, in search of her soul's balm, turns to darkness instead of light and worships evil in the place of good. Fraulein von Kulp, the prostitute or adulteress as the case may be, tries to satisfy her longings with a furtive substitute for love.

These efforts to fill in time are the 'ghosts', the pale shades of life. Where Gerontion has lived a non-committed life, that of the wastelanders is self-committed and therefore as sterile, as fruitless, as his. They do not fight in the cause of right or of humanity any more than he did, and so while they have not openly recognised it as Gerontion has, their lives are as empty of 'rain' as his own. Where he chose not to be involved, they chose to be involved, but because they made the 'wrong' choices, their existence is as meaningless as Gerontion's. For him and for them equally, life's experiences are nothing more than 'Vacant shuttles' that 'weave the wind'.

Both Prufrock and his aged counterpart are different from the characters in their worlds in that they dare to scratch the surface of existence which the others resolutely refuse to do. Both Prufrock and Gerontion evaluate the inane, aimless, confused human element, both search out the reasons for its 'condition', and come up with the same conclusion: that the fundamental lack is spiritual. But where Prufrock seizes upon the answer and quickly backs away, Gerontion examines it at length and in detail.

Prufrock's reluctance is in keeping with the conspiracy of his peers who recognise that there must be truth concealed somewhere in their universe but who refuse to 'see' what they prefer to keep hidden. Symbolically the yellow fog and the yellow smoke 'muzzle' the windowpanes, obscuring the view, and the soot drifts down from the chimneys, blotting out the world. Prufrock dares, briefly, to peer through the smog, to consider the meaning of time and its implications of eternity. And what he sees is the 'eternal Footman' holding his coat and snickering and he says, 'In short, I was afraid'. It is then that he understands that the people of his world must remain superficial. They must not pierce the obscurity because behind the fog lurks the unwelcomed presence that renders all experience vain and useless.

Prufrock ponders this non-meaning and concludes that the reason for the lack of substance in his universe is due to the lack of substance in his religion. Man has turned to the church for answers, expecting that she will make clear the purpose for his being. But rather than clarifying his state, the church confirms his fears. Where he expects his spirit to be raised with the Eucharistic host, he finds that the sacred ritual has become just another

secular activity involved with time but not eternity. Where he expects his hunger to be nourished by the church, by the assurance that existence is not in vain, that his want will be satisfied by the living God in the bread and wine, he sees only the '*hands/That lift and drop a question on your plate*' (emphasis mine); where she should say to man 'The flesh and the blood', the church merely confesses its own lack of conviction. Man is worse off than before because now he knows that the church questions even as he does, that she is as bewildered, as uncertain, as frightened by the eternal Footman as he is himself. The existential questions compound, become acute. The yellow fog grows heavy and the yellow smoke thickens and the soot blacks out the reality, the understanding, and the ensuing pain.

Gerontion's world, on the other hand, is one of stark clarity. The poem is set in a harsh and unproductive landscape of 'Rocks, moss, stonecrop, iron, merds', unrelieved by sun or light or warmth. There are only 'windy spaces' and 'snow' and 'salt marshes' and darkness and depravity and decay. There is no yellow fog nor yellow smoke to soften this reality. Gerontion sees in naked relief the barren land and he knows that the sky over his head is bronze and the earth under his feet is iron and that there is no heaven nor any hell. He has sounded the church and he knows that there are no answers there and that organised religion is a huge and hideous deception.

Deliberately and in depth, Gerontion traces the history of the failure of the church and demonstrates that it is a false structure made up of 'cunning passages' and 'contrived corridors/And issues', or outlets. But 'passages' are also Biblical texts leading to 'issues', or points of disagreement, that have fragmented truth into a thousand doctrines. The pure 'Word' has also been polluted with substitutes to satisfy 'whispering ambitions' and 'vanities'. Again, the church has denied grace and promoted works until she has become an empty tabernacle and 'impudent crimes' in her name are taken for 'virtues'. And, finally, even when well-intentioned, the church has blundered by giving 'when our attention is distracted', or by giving 'too late', or 'too soon'. In these various ways the church has deliberately or unintentionally deceived the people and in so doing, religion has brought to itself confusion and forfeited its own belief.

But while the church has failed of its original purpose by 'adulterating' its 'passion', she has retained traces of spiritual credibility that inflame man's longing. Thus while he cannot fully believe, neither can he disbelieve. Though Prufrock complained that they merely 'drop a question', the hands still perform the ritual and the plate is intact and in its place. Gerontion, repeating Prufrock's indictment, says that the church '*gives with such supple confusions/That the giving famishes the craving*' (emphasis mine). Like Prufrock, Gerontion is accusing the church of provoking questions where it should be providing ultimate answers.

Thus Prufrock and Gerontion both conclude that the church has failed and that man's only recourse is to work out the solutions to his problematic existence himself. Over Prufrock's life there hangs, like weighted air, the 'overwhelming question'. It is the ultimate question made up of all

questions, and, in the end, comes down to a matter of courage. Prufrock is disturbed by his own vision. He hungers for life to be whole, to be complete, to be meaningful, and he sees that it is not any of these things. He senses that he has been given a command (though by whom it was given he is not sure) and he knows that he should shake himself loose from half-hope and half-belief and that his primary duty is to himself. He must answer for himself first the overwhelming question: Can I, with dilated vision, focus upon the wasteland of my life and examine it? Do I have the courage to sweep away the fog, to see the human condition for what it is—that there is neither fullness of hope nor half-hope? Can I in bitter honesty place before my consciousness the possibility that there is no God and that beyond this existence there is nothing? And having faced the reality of eternal nothingness, can I formulate a commitment to replace lost hope, and will it bear fruit in direction and purpose or will it simply plunge me even deeper into insignificance and meaninglessness?

Though Prufrock has only seen darkly, he knows what lies beyond the fog and soot, and he understands that though the vision is uniquely his, the message is not. He is aware of the waiting people. He is conscious of all the questions they have not known how to ask and he comprehends that he is the prophet who has been selected to give them the wasteland message. But again it becomes a matter of courage. Even if he does recognise the human condition in all its nakedness, is he able to bring the message of nothingness to the rest of society? Can he say that what they wait for is not a reality, that Godot will never arrive? Can he explain that they must abandon their aimlessness and make deliberate efforts to salvage the remnants of significance? Can he be a John the Baptist, fearlessly delivering his message to a desert society that doesn't want to hear it, that will condemn him and mock him and who in the end cannot profit from it? Can he carry out his commission simply because it is a commission?

True to form, Prufrock concludes indecisively. All through the poem he has shown us the image of himself as a man intimidated by society, a man who does not dare to 'disturb the universe', and now he concludes that he will probably be unable to fulfil his destiny. He recognises that he is not a true prophet. He says, 'I have seen the moment of my greatness flicker'. He doubts that the moment will ever be recalled, for though he still hears the voices rising out of the sea, they are the voices of an alien environment and he does not understand their secret. Mermaid sings only to mermaid. Prufrock says they do not call to him. The poet is leaving us with his own message: the secrets of the earth are for the earth alone. She has no knowledge to impart to Prufrock, no solution for mankind's problems, no balm for the human condition. The message rising out of the sea remains meaningless.

The voice that calls to Gerontion is the voice of 'Christ the Tiger', come to destroy the darkness and the obscurity. The message is clear and decisive: the voice commands Gerontion to 'Think', and it offers him the balm, the solution, the key, that the earth failed to give Prufrock. The answer that 'Christ the Tiger' gives is simple and it is spiritual: 'We have

not reached conclusion when I/Stiffen in a rented house'. But Gerontion does not deliberate. He immediately rejects the answer and the commission. He replies, 'I have lost my passion', and sinks back into the 'chilled delirium' that is the habit of a lifetime.

Thus if the Prufrock poem remains a question mark writ large, 'Gerontion' is a declarative statement. The questions that Prufrock poses for himself are answered by Gerontion. Where Prufrock sees the human condition obscurely, Gerontion sees it in stark relief. Prufrock wonders if he is able to face up to the overwhelming question, to accept his 'commission' and carry it out. Gerontion makes it clear that he has not confronted the human problem with the intention of fulfilling his commission which, as in the case of Prufrock, binds him by virtue of the fact that the insight is uniquely his. Like Prufrock, Gerontion is no prophet. To change his philosophy would require not only courage, but effort, and Gerontion prefers to go along with his undemanding concept of body and soul dissolving into 'fractured atoms' and disappearing into the sea. So he fails God and he fails mankind for whom the message was also given. And he fails himself. Having rejected the promise of the voice and having refused to make the commitment, his life and his death are equally meaningless; his 'brain' and his 'season' remain 'dry', unrelieved by 'warm rain'.

[Dr. Joyce Hamilton Rochat, Associate Professor of English at Andrews University, Bernen Springs, U.S.A., is the author of *Dark Sunrise* (published by Review and Herald, 1959) and *Curse of the Voodoo Gods* (published by Southern Publishing Co., 1960).]

RHODESIA, FUTURE IMPERFECT

by Michael Hart

ONE would have to have a crystal ball to write an article on the future of Rhodesia. Or else to have second sight. However, one thing one can say and that is the future for the Rhodesians looks a lot brighter from Salisbury than it does from London.

Your correspondent has three times visited that country since UDI, and has, on each occasion, interviewed the Prime Minister for a regional daily newspaper. He has also spoken to most of the political leaders in Salisbury, black and white. While it is not easy to guess the future of Rhodesia it is not difficult to advance a view on what the future ought to be.

Already the regime which made the famous unilateral declaration of independence rather than submit to the dictates of Westminster can lay claim to be the most liberal government in Africa today. Admittedly this is not saying a great deal, but it is saying something. Neither north of the Zambezi nor south of the Limpopo is there any state which could be said to practice democracy, law and liberty as effectively as the embattled republic. And most Rhodesians, of all colours, would prefer to keep it that way. The great problem is how to effect this. The demand of the Africans for political advancement and universal suffrage does not run very deep but, nevertheless, there is the belief, held by most Rhodesians, that Africans should be accorded a greater share in the political life of the State.

As an earnest of their good intentions, the Rhodesia Front Government in 1969 appointed a Commission to examine the constitutions of most of the other countries of the world. But the one constitution they did not examine was the proposed constitution of the envisaged United States of Europe.

This constitution has one undeniable advantage over all others in that it provides for the semblance of power, one man one vote, with the real power elsewhere. Paradoxically, what is an anathema to anti-Marketeers in Britain could be the salvation of Rhodesia.

I put this to Ian Smith in January 1971 and he replied 'I don't think the Europeans here would stand for it.' His reaction was the same as those of us in Britain who have no wish to remain in the European Economic Community as it slowly evolves into a unitary state. But for Rhodesians who are already living in a sort of United States of Central Africa—Mashonaland, Matabeleland, Midlands and Manicaland, the advantages are obvious. In short, the constitution is only fit for a combination of diverse cultures, primitive and advanced, as in Rhodesia, or traditionally antipathetic, as in Europe.

For Britain there is the real alternative of self-government under the most successful unwritten constitution the world has yet seen. For Rhodesians of European origin, presently exercising an effective Anglo-Saxon ascendancy, there are only two unenviable alternatives: white paternalism with perpetual sanctions or black government and the almost inevitable

trek south, penniless, to the Cape, leaving the majority of their black fellow-countrymen to endure the same sort of despotic one-party state that is the lot of all Africa, Arab and Negro, from the Zambezi to the Mediterranean. For the Europeans the advantages and disadvantages are immediately apparent, for the African there is only advantage.

The disadvantages for the European lie mostly in the irritating loss of their traditional parliamentary democracy; which to us in the United Kingdom, without any compensating factors, will be devastating. To the white Rhodesian, as an alternative to ruin or life in a fortress economy, there are some attractions. They would have to start with the usual self-perpetuating Commission exercising, as in the EEC, the functions of an executive President. The choice of the initial Commission and its Commissioners would be all important. It would consist of the best brains in Rhodesia today and since, as in the EEC, the Commissioners would be forbidden to take instructions from their sources of ethnic origin, there need be no objection if the first Commission were mostly white.

Then there would be a Constitutional Court, again self-perpetuating. This is where all the real sovereignty would reside. There would be a Council of Ministers, virtually the inner Cabinet, and this would soon, or in due course, be black, unless under the stimulation of security, racial loyalties were reduced to the proportions of the advanced economies, and multi-racial political parties became fully acceptable.

The Parliament, as in the case of the European Assembly, would be virtually powerless, except that they would have the privilege of electing the Council of Ministers, and the right to ask questions.

The Police and the Army would, in theory, be under the control of all three, Commission, Council and Parliament, but as the Commission, again as in Europe, would alone institute action and promote legislation, the forces of law and order would be in responsible hands. It would, admittedly, be a 'sludgy amalgam', as in the E.E.C., but half a loaf is better than no bread.

For the African, the advantages would be immediate and immense. He would have his pride, his Ministers in sleek limousines, his protection from despotism and tyranny and, above all, industrial efficiency would continue because, under this system, the Europeans could remain. The Rhodesian Africans would, in a generation, become the richest and most prosperous indigenous population in the black Continent, generating wealth and exporting aid and assistance to their neighbours. The Shona, the European, the Indian, and the Nebele of Rhodesia—all of whom know no other home, would work in partnership and, perhaps, be the envy of less happy lands.

It would be a great pity if the latent liberalism of this British-African state were to die because of fear. This fear is the great stumbling block of political advance everywhere, and particularly so in a country which has seen democracy strangled at birth, before their very eyes as it were, all over the African continent.

There is another advantage for Rhodesia in adopting the form of institutional government which is proposed for Western Europe. In theory,

and that is as far as the writer would be prepared to go, there could be no objections to it from Westminster or Whitehall. What is sauce for the goose should be sauce for the gander.

But you never know. There is, of course, a death wish in the Establishment today. They, at one, seem to desire the demise of the British nation state and at the same time to destroy the basis for support for this country in the British world overseas. One wonders if the Rhodesians could ever do anything right other than surrender and capitulate, without any preliminaries, to the prescription which has failed in every real sense over and over again in every African State.

But, of course, the Rhodesian African leaders may see through this plan and reject it out of hand. And yet, why should they do so when the French are quite willing to accept it? And the Dutch and the Belgians and the Germans and the Italians and the Danes; and all, with hardly a murmur of protest, willing to pass permanently to unelected and unrepresentative Commissioners the very government of their lives and fortunes. And, probably, not one in ten thousand has realised until too late, if at all, the loss of their hard-won liberty. Only the British were suspiciously scenting the wind with distended nostrils as the day of their national referendum approached. But then, we Anglo-Saxons are not Continentals, not ethnic Germans, as many, including Adolf Hitler, would have had us believe. We have a pronounced native Celtic underlay and it is interesting to note that where that underlay is thickest, there the opposition to the Rome Treaty and this novel form of unrepresentative government is strongest.

But to return to Central Africa. Institutional government, half-way between democracy and autocracy, would probably suit the temperament and historical background of the Matabele very well, and the Shona too. The Westminster type of constitution, which we have vainly tried to graft on to the African stem, while preparing to abandon it ourselves, is not really suitable for anyone but the British. And for the British in Rhodesia, despite their natural misgivings, institutional government is better than any of the available alternatives. There would need to be a long, detailed and very carefully drafted constitution, virtually unchangeable, zealously guarded by the Commission and policed by an incorruptible Court of Justice. Parliament would be a 'talking shop', a sounding board with a number of important rights, but not much power. One of its rights, of course, as with the European Assembly, would be the right to ask questions and to require an answer. The right to dismiss the Commission *en bloc* would have to be very heavily hedged with safeguards. In the European Community the requirement is for a two-thirds majority and three days' notice of motion. Probably the best plan for Rhodesia would be to make the Commission inviolate unless the Europeans and Africans, both voting together, resolved, by a two-thirds majority of both Communities, to dismiss them. The need for this to happen (it has never happened in the 17 years' existence of the EEC) would be unlikely to arise except in the most serious circumstances.

After all, the Commissioners would only be glorified civil servants, faceless and impersonal men dedicated to the public service. In the event of the

misconduct of any one of them, the others could be relied upon to dismiss him themselves. And the same would apply to the Court of Justice. There the judges would have one duty only and that would be to see the constitution was obeyed and that in its interpretation and application the law was observed with the same rigidity of purpose as it is in the EEC.

All this would suit Africa very well. One man one vote. Elections every five years. All the trappings but little of the substance of power. African dignity would be respected and supported. European fears would be assuaged. And it would be more democratic than the government of Zambia, for instance, with its single list voting and a one-party state.

Then there could be a second echelon of administration. Here, in safety, pure democracy or traditional African custom could hold sway according to the taste and inclination.

It could be that the British in the United Kingdom, in questioning this form of government for themselves, as many still do, have chanced upon the very system that would bloom and prosper in their self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia (as they see it) and at least serve to end the long and dreary conflict between Salisbury and London.

Then *de jure* recognition could be accorded to the *de facto* Republic of Rhodesia and common sense prevail once more. Otherwise, for the British, the dispute will drag on for ever. The white Rhodesians have not got the slightest intention of giving in to any arrangement which they think unjust, unwise or unworkable.

It is, of course, possible that Institutional government is unworkable in Africa, although it works well enough in Europe to satisfy the Europeans. Nevertheless, although its obvious drawback is its lack of liberty, if it holds the germ of a new idea it is worth examining and, perhaps, worth trying.

The paramount requirement for Rhodesia today is an end to the brutal killings and rapes by Africans of Africans in the frontier regions of the North-East. Peace is what Africa needs and peace is indivisible.

DJAWLAN—TOO LITTLE, BUT MAYBE IN TIME

by David Nicolle

'YES, this is Saasa.'

'It doesn't look very damaged.'

'They were only here a short time. You know, we drove them out again, before the final cease-fire.'

Our slate grey, Ministry of Information Mercedes picked up speed as we drove out of Saasa towards Kunaytra, past a huge fortified caravansery built by the Mamluks in 1440.

'That hill', said our interpreter-guide, pointing to a stark and stony outcrop, 'was taken by the Israelis. Now we are in the area they captured in '73.'

The scars of war became more obvious. During the first part of our drive from Damascus to Kunaytra there was little evidence of the military; some abandoned artillery pits, a few preoccupied soldiers, one lonely looking machine-gun nest and a Syrian Army checkpoint. Overhead an Israeli Phantom at high altitude sped across the area in a long fast curve, disappearing behind the ever-present, all-dominating heights of Mount Hermon.

Beyond Saasa, each isolated farmstead had its doors and windows neatly outlined with the pock-marks of small arms' fire. Many had a wall or one corner of the house missing. By the side of the road teams of men were digging a ditch.

'They destroyed all the water pipelines, electricity and everything', our interpreter explained. 'These men are laying new ones.' No one needed to describe what had happened to Kunaytra's telephone links. Crazily angled telegraph poles and wires dangling like Christmas decorations were their own witness.

Just short of Kunaytra the road forks and, shattered and rusting along the banked up roadway, was a line of trucks.

'Ours, I'm afraid.' This had been a convoy caught by the Israeli Air Force during the October War. 'Kunaytra,' the interpreter added in a flat voice as he pointed ahead. At first, one was inclined to ask where. Yet this was the capital of Syria's Djawlān province all right, a large area of what looked like concrete tea-trays lying on the ground, some twisted steel reinforcement sprouting from a rubble rockery, and a huddle of battered buildings dominated by a Christian church with a bent cross.

A couple of policemen stared at us as we drove past a burnt out Volkswagen van, negotiated a maze of debris and pulled up outside a shop that was resplendent with piles of canned food, bottles of arak, fresh fruit and a pair of gleaming scales.

We had come to Kunaytra to meet the inhabitants, though at present there are few people in the town itself. Sixty-two year old Abd al Aziz Harduf is one of them. He was born in Kunaytra when it was still the centre

of an Ottoman kāda, an administrative unit similar to a parish, and he has seen a lot happen since then.

First the Ottomans were forced out only to be replaced by the French. Then there was friction between the local communities, Druze, Circassians (Cerkes) and Turkomans, not to mention the original Banu Murra Arabs, Sunni Muslims, Shi'i Muslims and Christians. Next came the British who drove out the Vichy forces. France tried to return after the Second World War, but soon left.

Kunaytra had hardly settled down as part of an independent Syrian Republic before thousands of weary Palestinians passed through, evicted from their homes in Galilee. For the next twenty years, guns and bombs rumbled intermittently away to the west on the Golan Heights. Abd al Aziz Harduf got used to it all—but June 1967 was something quite different. First the town and its surroundings were attacked from the air. Abd al Aziz, together with practically the entire population of Kunaytra, moved out to camp in fields and orchards nearby.

When the shooting stopped they went back to their town which had only suffered superficial damage. But the Israelis were now in occupation. Kunaytra's people were turned back and had to join thousands of other homeless villagers walking towards Damascus. At first these refugees found shelter in mosques and schools. The government gave them food but could rarely find them work, particularly work for elderly men like Abd al Aziz Harduf. For six long years he lived on the 20 lira per month government allowance, plus such casual labour as he could find.

Then came the October War. Kunaytra was liberated, hopes soared—but soon the town was lost again. The shock was terrible but somehow, even then, everyone knew that this time things were going to be different. This was not June 1967. In 1974 the Israelis withdrew, and when President Assad of Syria invited the people of Kunaytra to accompany him to their liberated town on June 26th, they came with a feeling more of relief than surprise.

'Kunaytra has been destroyed—the damage is very great.' Thus the Syrian authorities warned the people as they prepared to return to their homes.

'We thought it would be all right. The government told us about the destruction but we didn't believe it could be so bad. It was terrible.' Abd al Aziz Harduf's reaction on re-entering his home town was typical of all those who accompanied President Assad on his triumphal procession from Damascus.

'My own shop is completely destroyed,' he explained. 'This place is my cousin's shop. I work here and he works in Damascus.' Although the old stone-built houses and a few of the newer concrete ones still stand along Kunaytra's main street, the pavements are lined with rubble. Here and there, buildings have collapsed, leaving gaps like an old man's teeth. Windows are shutterless and frameless, houses doorless, rooms doorless and with all their electrical fittings ripped out. Even the street lamps have gone, leaving cables sticking up from the road like so many raw nerve ends.

'They took everything, of course,' the guide explained. The rooms above Harduf's shop are still a shambles, so he sleeps in a store-room at the back. As the old man prepares the inevitable sweet black coffee for his guests, he explains how he keeps the business going..

'I sell to a few people who still live here. Also to the policemen. The United Nations men, no, they don't come. People come from Damascus to see Kunaytra. People come to look at their houses. They buy things. I came back to Kunaytra at once. I was one of the first. We are very hopeful. Things will get better now. There will be a new town. Kunaytra is my home, of course.'

Abd al Aziz Harduf believes that the tide has turned, as do most Arabs. Memories are long in this part of the world and people feel close to events that occurred many centuries ago. Nowhere more so than on the Djawlān plateau. This characteristic is found on both sides of the Arab-Israeli dispute, though it is the Jewish preoccupation with their past that tends to get more publicity. While Israelis talk of The Exodus, Solomon's Empire and the epic siege of Masada as if they happened only a few years ago, the Arabs identify with the Saracens' struggle against the Crusaders as if it were going on today.

Israeli archaeologists are still digging feverishly in search of evidence to reinforce their state's claim to the area—Golan, Gaulanitis, Jaulan or Djawlān, depending upon which period of history you base your politics. They have certainly found plenty to indicate early Jewish occupation. The Arabs for their part look with pride on more recent monuments. All over Djawlān there are castles of mixed Saracen and Crusader construction, such as Qalaat Subeibeh above the village of Banyas, plus Arab-Christian sanctuaries and shrines, medieval bridges and those caravanseries, 'motels' of their day, that kept trade flowing. Djawlān was certainly prosperous under classical Islam and even in the 12th century Arab and Crusader could peacefully share the produce that made the region of Banyas famous; lemons, cotton and rice.

In such a situation it comes as no surprise to find Arab and Israeli denigrating the culture of each other, though the reverence with which the reconstructed Dura Europos synagogue is preserved in Syria's National Museum stands in stark contrast to certain Israeli activities.

Kunaytra has suffered particularly badly from this *kulturkampf*, perhaps because its monuments were not considered very important, none being older than the later Middle Ages. Nevertheless, the indignation of old inhabitants like Abd al Aziz Harduf is genuine enough as they tell of the wanton destruction of traditional black-basalt buildings, and the looting of icons and marble wall panels from the local church. Particularly offensive to Kunaytra's Muslims was the removal of the large Khaled ibn Walid mosque's entire roof of old and precious tiles.

Our interpreter put the loss of Kunaytra and Djawlān in more impersonal, economic terms. Before the June War of 1967, the town and five neighbouring hamlets of Kunaytra's municipality had a population of fifty thousand, over a third of the total population of Djawlān province. No

more than twenty-four people remained at the end of 1967. Apart from being an administrative centre, Kunaytra produced building materials, olive oil, carpets, clothing and agricultural tools. Kunaytra has often been described as merely a garrison town, but this is no more true than the description of Djawlān as an uncultivated region of trenches, pillboxes and dugouts.

Some statistics from the years preceding 1967 paint a different picture—107,000 hectares of arable land for cereals, vegetables, orchards, etc., an average annual production of 13,000 tons of wheat and 11,000 tons of vegetables, 2,673,000 soft-fruit trees, approximately two million vines, 200,000 apple trees, 36,000 head of cattle, 180,000 sheep and goats, 15,000 camels and uncounted millions of chickens. Yet it needed a young man of twenty-five to put all these facts and figures into human terms.

His name was Yusef Shehardy and he drove the slate-grey official Mercedes from Damascus. Although Yusef considers himself lucky to have a chauffeur's job in a government department, he is a farmer at heart and, God willing, hopes one day to return to his home in the village of Dabboussiye just south of Fiq on the southernmost spur of the Golan Heights.

Of course, this area is still under Israeli occupation, and seems likely to remain that way for some time, dominating as it does the fertile lowlands around the southern shore of Lake Tiberias. These Syrian hills, long associated with the Gadarene swine of New Testament fame, are in fact one of the most heavily settled areas of occupied territory, with para-military Israeli farmsteads and factories popping up like mushrooms.

Unlike the inhabitants of Kunaytra, Yusef Shehardy spent all his early life in the front-line with Palestinian refugees and the Syrian Army as his neighbours. He, like Abd al Aziz Harduf, got used to the facts of war, though in Yusef's case the rumble of artillery and the screech of jets was somewhat closer to home.

He was eighteen years old and at school in Fiq when the June war burst upon Dabbousiye. This was fortunate for Yusef as he appeared to be of military age. Some of his relatives were not so lucky. When the Israelis arrived they took all the young men to Wasit, blindfolded them and sat them in the village square. Anyone with soft hands was assumed to be an officer and was immediately taken to a POW camp near the Crusader castle of Atlit south of Haifa. Three of Yusef's relatives had the unusual experience of sharing facilities with a number of Egyptian generals in this POW camp.

Yusef himself fled through what he described as a storm of bombs and shells to Kunaytra. The Israelis then turned up here as well; so, with neither friends nor relatives, Yusef Shehardy joined the stream of people walking towards Damascus. For a month or so he slept in the parks and gardens of the capital, and during the day searched for news of his family. They had been dispersed halfway across Syria, but the family was eventually reunited, and for the next year lived in a tent. Yusef was able to supplement the government allowance by working in a sock factory until he was called up for national service. Since the Israeli occupation had interrupted Yusef's

secondary education, he had to spend three and a half years as a private, but he did learn to drive, first lorries, then staff cars.

All seemed to have turned out well for Yusef Shehardy, since his driving experience and good army record led him straight into a job with the Ministry of Information. Unfortunately, there is more to this one man's experience of war than terror, humiliation, an unfinished education and the loss of his home. These he would forgive, assuming that one day he could return to his family's fields on the hills overlooking the Yarmuk valley.

The effect on Yusef's family he will find harder to forget. Israel's Six-Day Victory broke his father's spirit. Once a man of substance and standing in the village, Yusef's father now shames his son. Where he lives, the young man will not say, except that his father now has two wives—which is considered disgraceful in today's Syria. The second is a younger woman with her own house in Damascus, while apparently Yusef's mother still lives in a refugee camp north of the capital and is treated with scant respect by all save her son. For Yusef the struggle between Arab and Israeli has become a matter of personal honour.

Honour and loyalty form a complicated, though not necessarily tangled, skein in the Middle East. True feelings are often hidden, and this is perhaps more true of the Druze community than of most. Centuries of persecution and the struggle to maintain their identity have given this fascinating people a silent resilience that can baffle both their Arab cousins and those Israelis who attempt to woo them away from their Arab loyalties.

Unlike most of the inhabitants of the Djawlān plateau, the Druze were not only permitted to remain by the Israeli conquerors but were actually encouraged to return after the 1967 cease-fire. The inhabitants of the village of Majdal Shams have in particular attracted the attention of Israeli publicists, being patronised as 'stalwart and independent' while contentedly selling hot drinks and the produce of their orchards to Israeli skiers on Mount Hermon.

Perhaps understandably this has made the Druze of Djawlān somewhat suspect to the Syrian authorities. For a while a similar cloud hung over those few inhabitants of Kunaytra who remained in their homes and refused to budge when Israel took over in 1967. Most of those who remained were Muslim Circassians, descendants of those Cerkes who fled from persecution in the Caucasus following Russian victories over Turkey in the late 19th century. Many were settled in Syria by Sultan Abd al Hamid II as a bulwark against both predatory bedouin and turbulent Druze, soon giving Kunaytra its nickname of The Capital of the Circassians.

For some reason the Israelis have made no effort to lure the Circassian community away from their loyalty to Syria, despite the fact that, unlike the Druze, the Circassians are not strictly Arabs nor have as yet been fully assimilated into the Arab world. Perhaps they are too few to be militarily significant.

For whatever reason, among the two dozen Syrians who refused to leave Kunaytra in 1967 were Zahdy Shakay, his mother and brother. They were not welcomed by their new masters. For the first six months of occupation,

Zahdy was obliged to work as a dustman-cum-roadsweeper for no pay, existing only on Israeli food handouts. Subsequently he was paid three lira per day while enduring bullying by the Israeli Army and the patronising behaviour of occasional tourists. Fortunately no children had stayed in Kunaytra so there were no problems with education. The town's twenty-four remaining inhabitants were, however, moved from their own homes into one small back street while the rest of Kunaytra was systematically looted of anything valuable or useful, down to the very garden shrubs and plants.

'I had three lira for a day's work and they made me pay for electricity and water from that,' thirty-eight year old Shakay pointed out, with evident indignation.

'They behaved very badly—but I was allowed to see my family on the 5th July 1973. They came on a visit from Damascus, my wife and my children. Then they went back.'

Certain other visitors did not 'go back', however. From 1967 to 1973 no less than seventeen Israeli settlements were established in Djawlān, one almost within hailing distance of Kunaytra itself. To the people of the town it seemed most unlikely that these newcomers ever intended to leave, nor was there much faith in Syria's ability to force them back.

In Syria, prior to the October War, there was a great deal of cynicism about the country's army and indeed its political leadership. Though the Arabs' confidence in ultimate victory rarely wavered, their short term prospects didn't seem very bright. Most of those Syrians called up to do national service looked forward to three years of tedium and frustration. Those from Djawlān who had lost homes or families might wish to help the Palestinian resistance movement in a more active way, but most others saw themselves as doing no more than laying the military foundations for a later generation to build upon. This was without a doubt how one Corporal Khaled felt when he joined up.

As an inhabitant of Damascus, he still considered the war to be some way off, a personal but not immediate quarrel. As a well educated and fit young man doing his national service, he sought adventure in the Syrian Army commandos, an elite force of shock troops created for especially demanding tasks. So he trained, learned the elements of karate and wore his camouflaged combat suit, then a rarer sight in Damascus than it is today, with self-conscious pride. Khaled and his comrades were often briefed on how they might seize the Israeli-held south-western secondary peak of Mount Hermon, yet they didn't really expect to do the job. While rationally knowing that their foes were not supermen, these Syrian commandos, like almost every Arab fighting man before the October War, felt a nagging suspicion that perhaps the Israelis were inherently superior.

By the 8th October 1973, Corporal Khaled knew for certain that the much vaunted, idolised and feared Israeli soldier was just a man like himself; perhaps a little more committed or a little more fanatical than most, but human nonetheless—and he was defeatable, too.

'They were incredibly brave,' Khaled said of the Israeli garrison on

Mount Hermon, 'not cowards like our newspapers say. But our men suffered as well. We had terrible casualties before it was all over. Two of the privates from my section, I was leading seven men, they were killed. We never found their bodies. Thanks be to God, none of the others was even wounded. When it was over we were very tired.'

Corporal Khaled was nearing the end of his national service when we met in Damascus. His confidence in the Arabs' ability to force a just peace on the Israelis eventually is now unshakeable, though, unlike the bravura expressed by young Syrians before the October War, it is a quiet confidence that allows plenty of respect for the enemy's strength.

This young soldier was to some extent a stranger in the struggle for Djawlān. His home in Damascus was close enough to the Israelis for him to feel personally threatened by Middle Eastern events. Nevertheless, his was the calm approach of the outsider, a reaction totally at odds with the ferocious involvement sensed when one visits refugee camps.

Unlike Abd al Aziz Harduf, who was able to return to Kunaytra, unlike Yusef Shahardy, who has built a new life for himself, and unlike Zahdy Shakay, whose long endurance of occupation has made him something of a celebrity, the people of Duma camp have so far nothing to show for their patience and sacrifice.

Here perhaps lies the real threat to the future of the Middle East. A refugee camp is still a refugee camp, despite the fact that it has permanent houses, a clinic and three schools, as does the Duma camp on the road from Damascus to Homs. Most of the people living here haven't seen their homes since 1967 and Israeli statements offer little hope of their ever returning to their villages. Some are luckier, at least in one respect. The people of Kunaytra who followed President Assad back to their liberated town in the summer of 1974 have at least looked at what remains of their homes.

Among them was a woman named Aziza Shar'a. Like Abd al Aziz Harduf, she had been told of the damage she would see, but Aziza was nonetheless shocked by the extent of the destruction.

'I have been many times to see my house,' she would say, with that woebegone look that Europeans often find so disconcerting in this part of the world. 'But it is gone. There is nothing left. It was a good house, an old house, made of big stones, but it is not there, it is gone.'

Again and again, so her neighbours say, Aziza Shar'a has returned to look at her house or at least at the spot where it once stood, as if unable to believe the evidence of her own eyes. The squared basalt blocks of Aziza's home may now lie among the ruins of Israel's fortress on Mount Hermon, or may be built into the walls of that whitewashed ex-Israeli strongpoint now occupied by UN Observers east of Kunaytra. Perhaps, if some Syrians are to be believed, the stones may now be in Egypt, in the sand-blown remnants of the Bar Lev Line.

'My husband is dead and I have many children. See this one, this is Fathi. He was born in Duma camp. He has not seen Kunaytra. We are seven in the family, my sons are at school and they will be soldiers one day. I have no relatives outside this camp. No one can work for me, my sons are

too young. The government gives me money, but it is very little.'

Such a catalogue of woes leaves the visitor feeling rather overwhelmed. There is in fact a temptation for Europeans to step back, offer condolences as if they were 'backsheesh' and escape as soon as possible. But despair breeds desperation and handouts breed humiliation, and the end result can all too easily become the blind savagery of the terrorist.

Djawlān or Golan is in the balance. Israel was forced to withdraw a little, enabling the Syrians to congratulate themselves on the liberation of some territory. But many of them realise that this was a very limited success and one that can only dampen the fires of bitterness and frustration for a little while. On the other hand, the Israeli Army, ruthlessly and with appalling thoroughness, obliterated most of Kunaytra before pulling back. Israel still holds the hills no more than a couple of miles from the town centre. Meanwhile, more settlements are established, and influential members of the Zionist leadership cry 'No withdrawal!' Yet Israel demands that normal civilian life be returned to Kunaytra, apparently at once.

'How can we rebuild Kunaytra?' asks Nayef Naufal, the prefect of Kunaytra district. 'Banyas and the rest of the town's agricultural hinterland are still occupied. How can we start work when the enemy controls all our movements? How can we ask people to return under such conditions where there are no houses, no drinking water, no electricity, no drains?'

On the other hand, a commission has been set up to study various proposals for the future of Kunaytra—'to raise Kunaytra from the dead', as they put it. These proposals range from a simple rebuilding of the town, to the complete abandonment of the site, leaving its ruins as a memorial while a new Kunaytra rises nearby.

All this must take time, as will, in all probability, efforts to force further withdrawals on Israel. What will come first? Will there be another explosion of pent-up Arab frustration, or a pre-emptive Israeli attack to forestall such an explosion, or those painful but necessary steps towards a settlement that alone can defuse two generations of injustice and fear?

WHY NOT EUTHANASIA?

by Richard Lamerton

NOW that the Anglican report *On Dying Well*[1] has joined its voice with the statements of the Jewish,[2] Catholic[3] and Methodist[4] churches in condemning euthanasia, it is as well to look carefully at the reasons for this united front.

First we must understand clearly the words we are using.

'When I use a word', Humpty Dumpty said (in *Alice Through the Looking Glass*) 'it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less'.

The word euthanasia is itself derived from the Greek for a good death, but whatever it meant to the Ancient Greeks, it nowadays has a much more precise meaning.[5] It refers to doctors killing patients, or telling nurses to do it for them.

The much-canvassed synonym of 'mercy-killing' is not accurate because mercy is a constant quality, which would bring relief and companionship to a sufferer. Euthanasia would just get the problem out of the way. You could call it scientific, economic or easy-way-out killing, but not mercy killing.

We suffer from Humpty Dumpties nowadays as much as Alice did, and one of their favourite words is euthanasia. Some say that it is not murder, and go on to describe just that.[6] Some say it would only be used for those dying in pain, and then go on to advocate its use for lonely old people who are merely depressed.[7] Then there are those who stress that they only want 'voluntary' euthanasia, and go right on to discuss an 'involuntary' variety.

For example, Dr. Henderson Smith, who has several times represented the Voluntary Euthanasia Society on television, said in *Pulse* (28.7.73, p.11) 'If we accept the population problem as dictating birth control, should we deny that it has any connection with voluntary dying?' Now I ask you, if it really did become part of a governmental population policy, how long could it stay voluntary? As it happens, Dr. Henderson Smith has the answer to that, too. In the *Evening News* (London, 16.2.73) he was reported as saying that the term 'voluntary euthanasia' could mean a decision by a patient's relatives, not only his own decision.

In the March 1975 *Freethinker*, Miss Barbara Smoker of the National Secular Society wrote: 'It would be a tragedy if the legislation of voluntary euthanasia were to entail such stringent statutory conditions . . . that it inhibited . . . non-voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide.'

I am not being alarmist; involuntary euthanasia has often been advocated.[8] Defective infants could be killed, Professor Glanville Williams hinted,[9] as did Lord Chorley.[10] So could old people who were in substandard geriatric wards, recommended Lord Ailwyn.[11] That voluntary euthanasia should be only the 'thin end of a wedge' is unquestionably valid—that is the expressed intention of its advocates.[12]

But how voluntary would voluntary be, anyway? How would you

prevent elderly people from signing the form because they felt it was their duty to be out of the way?[13] Neither of the Bills presented to Parliament (1936 and 1969) restricted their applicability to patients with terminal disease. It only had to be incurable in the opinion of two doctors and thought likely by them to cause distress in the future. Psoriasis, arthritis, schizophrenia, diabetes, epilepsy, angina and other non-fatal diseases, would qualify perfectly well. If this never was the intention, why was so serious a Bill not drafted more accurately? It would be impossible to devise a Bill which would ensure that no-one pressurised the elderly into signing away their life, and that no-one signed during a period of depression. As with abortion, families would be presented with a new temptation which nowadays never even crosses their minds: Get Granny off our backs!

In fact, it would never be a free decision. If pain, fear of pain, loneliness or depression drove the elderly or dying to beg for euthanasia, would you not say that they were driven to it, and not free? We would certainly put an end to pain and loneliness by killing the sufferers, but are there not other ways of relieving pain and loneliness?

It is equally important to be clear about what is *not* included under the heading of euthanasia.

If a doctor sedates a dying patient to assuage his suffering, and does so to such an extent that the patient's life is shortened, this is not euthanasia. Neither is it good medicine, incidentally, though it still happens in some places. In fact, pain and other symptoms can be countered to such an extent by modern drugs and techniques of giving them, that people with long-drawn-out terminal illnesses can enjoy life to the last, almost always without any clouding of their consciousness. Euthanasia is not the treating of symptoms, however drastically: it is doctors killing patients.

If a patient's body is being kept alive by artificial means, and the doctor discontinues these techniques because it has become evident that the patient's health or consciousness can never be restored, this is not euthanasia. Patients are put on respirators or given drugs in an attempt to restore them to health. If it is evidently a losing battle, and the trial of therapy has failed, a doctor whose ethics are rational will stop the therapy. Euthanasia is not the withdrawal of medical treatment which is no longer appropriate: once again, it is doctors deliberately killing patients.

If a doctor declines to use some drastic treatment because he decides the most healthy thing the patient could do would be to die in peace, this is not euthanasia. Just because we can do something, it does not mean that we are morally obliged to do it. A case in point is the treatment of pneumonia in a patient dying slowly of widespread cancer. In this case, the correct treatment would be symptomatic only. Antibiotics would probably be inappropriate, and therefore bad medicine. Euthanasia is not the withholding of 'extraordinary means' of maintaining life: it is the deliberate ending of care, of dignity and of mercy.

Obviously, merely opposing euthanasia is not enough. What alternatives can I point to, for the dying or the elderly?

Have we not all seen that senility does not inevitably mean misery? That depends on the care and support given to the old person. I submit that if there are awful geriatric wards, and shameful old folks' homes, so that some of the aged are longing to be dead, then the solution is to improve our services for the elderly, not to kill them off and be done with the problem. It is not as though examples of excellent geriatric care do not abound—particularly in Britain. The overworked phrase 'death with dignity' could only truly apply to this situation of loving care. It is hardly dignified to be reduced to begging for death because no-one will care for you! Of course, this improved care will cost more money. So what? Perhaps we could do without madcap schemes like Concorde, and spend our resources in accord with more self-evident priorities.[15]

The aged can be happy, dignified and beautiful. For it is in the years of the body's decline that a quite different part of the person is coming into full flower. Like infancy, childhood and adolescence, old age and dying are phases of life, each with its own contribution to make to a man's experience and development. To try to avoid them would be as silly as deep-freezing infants until they were past the nappy stage to avoid their being a burden on society.

However, the main thrust of the euthanasia lobby is directed at the dying whose sufferings might be avoided if they were prematurely killed. The tendency to avoid terminally-ill patients, and to repeat the erroneous cliché 'There is nothing more we can do' means that they are treated as socially dead before their time. It is this general attitude to death which leads to a desire to ignore it, get it over with quickly in case suffering is involved. But the worst of the sufferings of the dying—the only ones which cannot be relieved—are fear of death, bereavement, anger at a life cut off, and depression. Euthanasia would not remove any of these. The sense of guiltiness and failure which are often part of bereavement, would be worsened for the surviving family. And for the dying man the despairing cry for instant death would bring, not support and friendship, with symptomatic relief from the doctor, tenderness from the nurse and support from the chaplain, but a dull agreement that he would be better off dead.

Dotted about this country are now some thirty institutions specially concerned (though not exclusively) with Care of the Dying. Such 'Hospices' as they are called, will eventually be found in every community. The medical team in these establishments is particularly skilled at bringing physical and spiritual comfort to the dying patient. Because of their discoveries, it is already inexcusable to leave patients with cancer, for instance, in pain. Neither are vast and lethal doses of morphine needed for this pain control: as I have already explained, the correct use of drugs has enabled pain to be overcome without even clouding the consciousness of most patients, let alone shortening their lives.

Hospices can turn dying from a humiliating defeat into a positive achievement, a great final step forward for a man to take. For dying is not an unfortunate event to be swept under the carpet; it is a part of living. Once unpleasant symptoms are under control, a man can be enabled to make

use of this time of dying to deepen his experience and add a new dimension to his understanding.[16] By teaching this to students, the hospices are feeding their experience back into the general health services, so that their discoveries can be used by hospitals and family doctors everywhere.

Meeting the needs of the dying involves hard work and much caring.[17] It means looking where it is uncomfortable or even painful to look; listening, when you want to get on with your work; it means sharing the burden of someone's sorrow with him; and it leads to bereavement again and again as men die who had become your respected friends. If we evade the difficult problems the dying patient presents by killing him, we have failed. Whether such euthanasia were 'voluntary' or not is irrelevant: we have a duty so to care for these patients that they are never driven to ask for euthanasia. If a patient is longing to die, he is not being treated properly. If we are not treating him properly, the solution is to improve our treatment, not to kill him. Is this not self-evident?

The correct treatment, and not euthanasia—voluntary or involuntary—is the solution worthy of our attention to the problems of old age and death. To agree with a man that he would be better off dead is lazy and always falls far short of what can be done to bring him contentment.

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[Dr. Richard Lamerton, M.R.C.S. Eng., L.R.C.P. London, is Director of Studies at St. Joseph's Hospice, London, E.8. Publications include *Care of the Dying* (1973) and *The Hour of Our Death* (1974).]

SECURITY BY ASSOCIATION: WESTERN EUROPE, THE ARAB WORLD AND THE SUPER POWERS

by A. J. R. Groom

IF we are secure we are, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, 'untroubled by danger or apprehension'. But we can never be absolutely so. There is always the possibility that somewhere, some day, somehow we, as individuals or as a group, can be troubled by danger or apprehension unless we have complete knowledge and control of our environment both actual and potential. Clearly, such knowledge and control is extremely unlikely. We thus have to decide what degree of relative security is acceptable. This acceptability is a function *inter alia* of psychological, social, economic, military and political variables. The question becomes 'security against whom?', or 'security against what?', and 'when?'. The answers to these questions are very different depending on which model of security we adopt—*the strategic or military approach* in which the burden of adjustment is forced on the 'environment', that is, on other actors, or, *the associational approach* which suggests that the totality of goals can best be maximised by adjustment procedures or 'steering' within a cobweb of overlapping systems of transactions of all kinds, which create mutual and, hopefully, acceptable dependencies between the actors. What, then, are these two basic approaches to security?

The first approach to security has usually been associated with the proponents of 'power politics' in academic circles and, more generally, with practitioners, whether military or political, and journalists. The pure military approach is to get as near as possible to absolute security starting from a premise of the worst case of what the potential enemy could do if he had a mind to do. However, such an analysis is self-defeating for it often stimulates the very danger it seeks to avoid. For example, if we were to assume that the United States intends to use its military capability to attack Western Europe and we therefore made plans to parry this threat, the United States might see European preparations as a threat and itself take measures to rebuff a European attack, thus fulfilling the original European premise. Considerations such as these have caused some historians to revise their interpretations of the Cold War. To avoid this unfortunate sequence of events, decision-makers work on a basis of acceptable security rather than absolute worst case analysis. The level of acceptable security is a political judgement based on an estimation of intentions. A high degree of vulnerability to the United States is acceptable for Western Europeans, but this is not true to the same degree with regard to West European attitudes to the Soviet Union. The political judgement of acceptability is itself an amalgam of psychological, social, economic and military factors which are frequently changing separately and in relation to each other.

If absolute security is impossible, if worst case analysis is dangerous, what role does the analysis of intentions play in definitions of security? It

depends on a basic choice. The traditional response of decision-makers who perceive themselves to be in an actual or potential conflict situation is to create an 'armed camp'. The weight of their analysis bears on the adversary's capability rather than on his intentions since, in a conflict situation, what he can do he might well do. The adversary, therefore, must be deterred and, if that fails, there must be adequate provision for actual defence. Negotiations can, in such circumstances, only be from strength. However, this road to security leads only too often to insecurity. The building up of military capability or non-military 'threat systems' leads first to imitation by others and then to a general action-reaction arms race. An increasing circle of actors is involved in an engulfing climate of fear and the arms race finally develops its own self-generating and self-propelling mechanisms as states create bureaucratic war machines with vested interests which gradually slip out of control of the politicians and others who created them. The arms race becomes a way of life to the politicians, the military, the economy and the people, albeit a dangerous and costly one. While this sequence is not inevitable, it is hard to break as the plethora of contemporary arms control negotiations bears eloquent witness. Thus, if a 'negotiation from strength' policy is pursued there is a tendency to much strength and little negotiation. This is hardly surprising since few actors will negotiate from weakness if they see the possibility of either avoiding negotiation or of attempting to redress the balance of strength prior to negotiation.

In this strategic definition of security, fear begets fear. Analysis moves away from the intentions of presumed adversaries to their capabilities and demands grow that an actor strive to get ever nearer the chimera of absolute security. The climate of opinion is such that the argument that 'he who is not with us is against us' is frequently heard. The world is divided into friends and enemies and there is a constant and competitive struggle to persuade or cajole the fence-sitters into one or other of the camps. The worsening situation justifies greater sacrifices and functional links with the adversary, such as trade or sport, are broken. Conflict values are salient and conflict leaders take over. Action generates reaction. Social values change as a war spirit and the militarisation of society erodes humane values, welfare values and toleration of minority values. Guns come before butter. Security becomes ever more tenuous. To seek more security by strategic means will endanger security by forcing an adversary to respond in kind. Not to seek more security may give an adversary the opportunity to attack. Thus, the vicious circle is complete.

The second form of security is not dependent on the creation of an armed camp. It is realised when actors play a role in a multi-dimensional society, which is both acceptable to them and to the other actors in the system. Nor is this acceptability the result of coercion in one form or another, rather, the criteria for judging acceptability are themselves freely acceptable to all the actors in the system. Security then stems from a legitimised role differentiation. It is not so much what is done in the society, and by whom, but the acceptability to all of the criteria for deciding what

should be done, and by whom, both now and for the foreseeable future. In this model, security grows out of mutual dependencies—not the dependencies of imperialism or coercion but those which lead to a system characterised by the maxim of 'one for all and all for one'. Security lies in each actor fulfilling or contributing to generally felt needs in a mutually acceptable way. The range of these activities need not, of course, cover all aspects of human endeavour so that a system of mutually acceptable dependencies may exist for some purposes, such as the economy, but different groupings may exist for others, such as education. A world of this sort is already, to a certain extent, in being, in that OECD, for example, is an important economic grouping, but there is no corresponding educational grouping. In education, England and Scotland are separate and at the international level it makes much more sense to think in terms of a Commonwealth-United States grouping than to include continental countries and Japan, which are members of OECD. As we take each area of human endeavour in turn and organise it as suits it best, we shall find a degree of overlapping with other areas which will create a world-wide network of functional organisations. If each of these is formed on a mutually acceptable basis, both internally and in relation to other organisations, we shall have a system of peace by association.

This view has had its most celebrated expression in David Mitrany's *A Working Peace System*.[1] Mitrany seeks 'to weld together the common interests of all without interfering unduly with the particular ways of each'. Peace is thus associative and results from such a web of dependencies or cross-cutting ties that a threat by one actor to another's security is clearly self-defeating since it will lead to a withdrawal of services that satisfy the felt needs of the threatener by the threatened actor and others. It is based on the premise that few will knowingly cut off the nose to spite the face. It is security through co-operation (but only so long as that co-operation is mutually acceptable and not itself based on coercion). In the 'working peace system', reassurance comes from the fulfilment of felt needs. There is a learning process with co-operative habits in one area giving rise to their extension to other areas. As trust grows, swords are beaten into ploughshares. Separate perceptions of an interest in common become common perceptions of a shared interest. Humane and welfare values flourish. Conflict handling mechanisms operate on a basis of consensus. The greater the co-operation, the greater the security. Security is for all.

Both approaches to security—the strategic and the associational—have a tendency to be self-fulfilling, but in the former case it leads to a lack of security because security is based on the notion that one actor's security rests upon another actor's weakness, while in the latter case it leads to a maximisation both of self-designated values and of security.

Neither of these models exists in practice. They are mere sketches of an ideal type. But they do point to different approaches and it is not difficult to deduce empirical propositions from them for policy. At present, East-West relations are close to the strategic model of security—security through disassociation and the armed camp. The associational approach to security

already underlies Western European and Euro-American relations. We need to give it practical expression in policy towards the rest of the world and not least the Arab world in the context of energy problems, and Eastern Europe in the context of the Conference on European Security and Co-operation. It is easy to be sceptical regarding associational security and to see it as a long term ideal world—a dangerous ideal, since to achieve it we must run the risk of imperilling short term strategic security. But the risks of strategic security are monumental too. Moreover, the Western European and the Atlantic groupings furnish many examples of a 'working peace system' of former enemies—of acceptable dependencies. It should not be beyond our capabilities to start the task of building new ones elsewhere, and it is to a consideration of these possibilities that we now turn.

The relationship between Western Europe, especially Britain, France and Italy, and the Arab World has, in the past, been a close one, but not one which was founded upon mutually acceptable dependencies. To be sure, there were dependencies but they were asymmetrical colonial or neo-colonial ties not acceptable to the Arabs. Such unacceptable ties no longer exist and we find ourselves in a new situation. Western Europe is dependent on Arab oil to a significant extent for its energy requirements and it is also interested in Arab markets and the recycling of petro-dollars. For the Arabs, Western Europe constitutes an important market for their oil investment as well as being a major supplier of goods and services. Each is vulnerable to the other, although with a greater degree of vulnerability for Western Europe. The fundamental question is whether this vulnerability is a threat to the security of Western Europe or a guarantee of the security of Western Europe. Our first model of security would view it as the former and our second as the latter. Since we are beholden to the Arabs, the first argument runs, we must lessen our dependence upon them by whatever means possible in terms of alternative sources of oil and energy, conservation programmes, agreements for sharing in case of an oil embargo and, above all, in consumer solidarity to create a common front in what is likely to become a confrontation with Arab producers. In the end, we must be prepared to use force to guarantee our supplies. A vital prerequisite for security is the restoration of the former dominant position of the consumers over the producers. It is not enough that the Arabs should have every interest in supplying oil under mutually satisfactory financial conditions, the supply of energy must be guaranteed in the worst case. Such is the general thrust of the policy that the United States is urging on Western Europe. But it is also a policy that contains the seeds of a disastrous confrontation and is thus self-defeating. This is not to argue that economy in the use of energy and the search for new energy resources are neither desirable nor prudent, but it does suggest that an alternative approach to the security and energy problems might enable us to have more of both.

Only if the Arabs cannot join us will they try to beat us. If they try to beat us, the consequences for us, whatever the final outcome, will be grim, for one way or another our energy supplies will be at peril. It is, therefore, in our interest that we should endeavour to create a multitude of acceptable

Euro-Arab dependencies. Arab investment in European industry (perhaps even the energy industries) is highly desirable both in itself and for the mutuality of interest it will beget in that both Arabs and Europeans will have a common interest in the prosperity of Europe. Such ties can be made in a variety of formats: government to government, government to enterprise, enterprise to enterprise and the like. Clearly, new rules of the relationship need to be worked out, but they can only be worked out *with* the Arabs, not imposed upon them. If the consumers and producers met on opposite sides of the table, the risk of confrontation, deadlock or even breakdown would be significant, since there are at present no mutually agreed ground rules. We need help to work out such ground rules and the French proposal for a tripartite conference has the merit of including the oil-poor third world consumers who have every interest in assisting the Europeans and Arabs to come to a mutually acceptable agreement which would, at the same time, not be at the expense of third parties. The oil-poor third world countries need a healthy Western Europe as both a supplier and a market and they need energy themselves at a reasonable price. Their interests are maximised by a Euro-Arab agreement and minimised by a Euro-Arab confrontation.

So far we have left out of the argument the Arab-Israeli conflict and the relationship of the United States to the parties in the conflict. The Western European states are linked with the United States in a variety of ways, both in inter-state ties and transnational ties over a wide range of activities. However, the implications of the United States' role in the Arab-Israeli conflict and its lesser dependence on Middle Eastern oil than Western Europe suggests that the security and political ties which bind the United States and Western Europe so closely together may have to be relaxed in the interests of greater Euro-Arab economic co-operation. We have already argued that United States' policy on Arab oil supplies is heading towards confrontation with both the President and the Secretary of State speaking of the possibility of military intervention in the event of an Arab oil embargo. In the normal course of events such an embargo would be highly unlikely, since it would be in nobody's interest. However, in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict it is a very real possibility.

Western Europe could not in any sense withstand an effective Arab oil embargo. The United States could, if necessary and with difficulty, withstand such an embargo. What is necessary for Western Europe is only desirable for the United States. Western Europe must, at all costs, avoid such an embargo. In order to do so, Western Europe must therefore disassociate itself from the United States in its relations with the Arabs, since not only is the United States advocating a policy leading to confrontation on the energy issue, but it is also the ultimate guarantor of Israel. Now that Dr. Kissinger is no longer able to maintain a semblance of progress in his step-by-step negotiations with the parties to the Middle East conflict, a reconvening of the Geneva conference seems likely. But what if that fails? Moreover, failure is likely. It is difficult to conceive of any way in which the United States or anyone else can persuade or coerce the Israelis into

withdrawing to the June 1st, 1967 borders (including Jerusalem) and into accepting a Palestinian entity on the West Bank and in Gaza and repatriation of some Palestinian refugees to Israel. While some Arab states may be willing to settle for less on some of these questions, there is always at least one major actor willing to keep the issue and the conflict open. Progress to peace depends upon the lowest common denominator. These Arab demands are, therefore, minimum demands.

In the present political context any Israeli government that accepted such demands would fall and there would be serious internal dissension in Israel where the conflict masks a delicate political, religious and social balance. Almost any major change in Israeli policy would bring these dissensions to the fore—a factor which the Israeli Government is not likely to neglect. Moreover, the Israelis are very independent in their attitude and tend to react unfavourably to pressure. Furthermore, the Unted States has unilaterally given up a major form of pressure on Israel—its ability to withhold arms supplies. Israel has been supplied with enough advanced United States' weapons systems to enable it to fight a campaign of up to a month's duration (that is, longer than the 1956, 1967 and 1973 campaigns). Thus, the United States has circumvented the problem of the re-supply of Israel in the course of overt hostilities. It has also made a resumption of hostilities more likely.

Israel is unwilling, for internal reasons and for reasons of external security, to make the withdrawals necessary to win Arab acceptance of an end to the conflict. It must also reason that the Arabs are unlikely to give up. They must therefore be deterred or defeated. While Egypt is only slowly being rearmed by the Soviet Union, in the long run, say, two or three years' time, Egypt will have been re-equipped and re-trained. In such circumstances Israel will find its ability to deter or defeat the Arabs seriously compromised. In the meantime, Israel has a clear short term military advantage, thanks to United States' supplies, and the Israeli military must surely be contemplating two options—a pre-emptive conventional strike or the readiness of a nuclear deterrent force. Both policies have their grave drawbacks: a pre-emptive strike would guarantee enduring Arab hostility and it would be costly politically, economically and socially as well as militarily; the revelation of a nuclear capability would alienate the United States, Israel's only ally, and force the Arab states to go nuclear and, while it might deter conventional war, it would do nothing to inhibit a more vigorous prosecution of guerrilla warfare. The main advantage of the nuclear option over a pre-emptive attack is that a nuclear capability need not be revealed until matters deteriorated, thus giving a breathing space, whereas a pre-emptive attack would best be undertaken before Egypt was re-equipped and re-trained.

Our scenario may appear to be the sort of 'worst case' analysis that was deplored above. Unfortunately, it reflects an analysis based on intentions and while the worst need not happen, it seems likely to do so.[2] Israel, which sees itself to be gravely threatened, has been given a blank cheque by the United States, through its rearmament. One is struck by the analogy with

the blank cheque given by a stronger Power (Germany) to a weaker but gravely threatened Power (Austria-Hungary) in 1914. As the Arabs realise that negotiation will not achieve their ends, they will prepare for armed conflict which the Israelis will pre-empt by conventional means or deter through a nuclear capability. Arab retaliation will follow against the United States, as the ally of Israel, in the form of an oil embargo and financial manipulation since the Arabs have no other weapons. In such circumstances the United States has already threatened to intervene militarily. Europe's oil supplies from Arab sources and perhaps from some other non-Arab sources would thus be threatened through our association with the United States, in one instance, and through the disruption following United States military intervention in the other. Thus, given the importance of Arab oil to Western Europe, our policy should be an active effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict along the lines suggested in the paper cited above, and a disassociation from United States' policy, since it involves possible confrontation with the oil producers and possible military intervention in response to an Arab oil embargo.

Since Western Europe and Japan are so dependent on Arab oil, the option of security through the armed camp—traditional security—is not open to us. We have no alternative to security through co-operation with the Arabs. Since we are dependent on the Arabs, our security lies in making them dependent on us both as a source of goods and services and as an area for investment. The more ties the Arabs have with us the less likely they are to place an embargo on oil supplies, especially if we disassociate ourselves from United States' policy in the Middle East.

If such a policy was followed, what would be the reaction of the United States, particularly in relation to security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union? Clearly, the United States Government would be greatly displeased as the United States' reaction to Western Europe's independent stand in the October 1973 war indicated. But to what extent would this displeasure give rise to retaliation? In the economic and social spheres, trans-Atlantic ties are well-balanced, but this is not so evident in the security sphere. While the United States is hardly likely to take offensive action against Western Europe for the sake of Israel, it could possibly consider retaliating by withdrawing its conventional forces in Europe and its nuclear guarantee vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. What would be the situation in such eventualities?

The withdrawal of the United States' forces in Europe would be more of a psychological blow to European governments than a military disaster, since the numbers are not so great that they cannot easily be replaced by European troops. Of greater importance are their weapons systems, and especially their nuclear warheads. Their replacement by weapons systems from European sources would take time and finance and it could well raise the sensitive issue of West Germany and nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the tactical use of nuclear weapons in the European theatre is likely, if it is to be militarily meaningful, to be tantamount in its destructive effects to those of the strategic use of nuclear weapons in Europe. The European Powers thus have every interest in refusing to fight a tactical

nuclear war and either threatening to escalate to the strategic level since its destructive effect is no greater only quicker, or of surrendering when their conventional forces can no longer continue to resist.

The essential purpose of United States' forces in Europe is, however, to act as a token of the resolve of the United States to defend Europe, even at the risk of a nuclear war involving North America. It is to give the United States' nuclear guarantee to Europe greater credibility. The question is, therefore, whether a United States' withdrawal of forces and perhaps even a public disavowal of its nuclear guarantee and obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, would cause the Soviet Union to feel that it had a free hand in making nuclear and conventional threats against Western Europe. The important point is, of course, not whether credibility has declined in United States' or Western European eyes, but whether it has declined in Soviet eyes. Clearly, United States' attempts to extract themselves from their nuclear guarantee to Western Europe would lead to a drastic revision of Soviet perceptions, but it could be that the Soviet Union would consider that Western Europe's independence was so important to the continued well-being of the United States that in the last resort the United States would reactivate its nuclear guarantee. In addition, the Soviet Union would also have to take account of the British and French deterrents, both in terms of the damage that they could do themselves and in their role as a catalytic agent to a general nuclear war. In a sense, therefore, the United States' nuclear guarantee to Western Europe is given, whether the United States likes it or not, since the Soviet Union may well chose to regard it as given.

One further element can be added to the military situation of Western Europe without the United States, namely, that present Western European forces are only partly organised, deployed and equipped to meet a Soviet threat. Other factors involved include domestic political needs for employment and a desire to do just enough to persuade the United States to stay and no more. NATO's military dispositions in Europe are the outcome of a variety of factors, many of which are non-military, but if the United States withdrew and the Soviet threat was perceived as real, then purely military criteria would play a greater role and the same resources could generate a much more efficient defence force than at present.

So far we have assumed there to be a real Soviet threat to Western Europe. Our analysis has been predicated on the notion of security through the armed camp. But if security by association is to be the policy vis-à-vis the Arabs, can it not also be the policy in regard to the Soviet Union? Certainly the omens are good, since Soviet intentions towards Western Europe presently appear to be encouraging and are recognised as such by Western European leaders. Moreover, the co-operative aspects of the Conference on Security and Co-operation are providing a means for increasing mutually acceptable dependencies. The political will to make the Conference work is evident on all sides, and it could mark the beginning of security by association throughout Europe.

Security by association exists within the Western European and Atlantic

areas. The suggestion is that it should be extended to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the Arab world, even at the expense of a degree of political disassociation from the United States. But hopefully, even this degree of disassociation will be greatly limited in its deleterious effects by association in other areas between the United States and Western Europe. A world of mutual dependencies in a variety of domains offers the promise of security and the benefits of co-operation, but it will only be realised if those dependencies are based on criteria that are freely accepted by all. We now have the opportunity of building such a relationship with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the Arab World.

NOTES

1 David Mitrany: *A Working Peace System*, Chicago, Quadrangle, 1966. My own somewhat sceptical views on this approach can be seen in 'Functionalism and World Society' in A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.): *Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations*. University of London Press, 1975: J. W. Burton, A. J. R. Groom, C. R. Mitchell, A. V. S. de Reuck: *The Study of World Society*, Pittsburgh, International Studies Association, 1974; 'The Functionalist Approach and East/West Relations in Europe', *Journal of Common Market Studies*. Vol. III, Nos. 1 and 2, 1975.

2 For an analysis of and proposals for a happier outcome see my *Conflict Analysis and the Middle East Conflict*, Open University, 1975.

[Dr. A. J. R. Groom is a Lecturer at the Faculty of Laws, University College, London.]

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

LLOYD GEORGE FROM THE INSIDE

Life With Lloyd George: The Diary of A. J. Sylvester, 1931–45. Edited by Colin Cross. Macmillan. £7.50.

The author of this very interesting book worked for Lloyd George during the last thirty years of his life—twenty-two of them as his principal personal secretary. He kept a private diary for the year 1923-24 and from 1931 till Lloyd George's death in 1945. The author is now 86 and farms in Wiltshire.

For the whole of this period, Lloyd George was out of office, but still a Member of Parliament. In the last year of his life he was Earl Lloyd George of Dwyfor. (It is customary for former Prime Ministers elevated to the Peerage to receive an Earldom.)

Mr. Sylvester's actual diary ran to a million words, from which passages to a total of 100,000 words have been selected. Each entry is dated and each chapter covers one year. The original diary was kept in shorthand, Mr. Sylvester in his youth having been a champion high-speed stenographer, attaining a speed of 220 words a minute. It was this special skill that led him in 1914 to join the Civil Service (in the Admiralty). He became shorthand writer to three Prime Ministers and was, in fact, the first stenographer to be admitted to Cabinet meetings. In 1920, he received a CBE for his services. He is the author of an earlier book—*The Real Lloyd George.*

Mr. Colin Cross, who prepared the present volume for the press, is on the staff of *The Observer.* He has been a Parliamentary Lobby Correspondent and is well familiar with 'the corridors of power'.

Life With Lloyd George is a fascinating and intimate portrait of Lloyd George, warts and all. It is a savage and occasionally crude portrait, written originally for Mr. Sylvester's own records. To take the negative side first, it is clear that Lloyd George was, as Mr. Sylvester says, 'terribly self-centred'. For thirty years he was, according to Mr. Cross, 'virtually a bigamist', with a wife in Wales and, in London, a mistress—Frances Stevenson—with whom he lived for thirty years. Mr. Sylvester, who was constantly involved in stratagems to prevent the two women from meeting, says that Lloyd George 'lived a life of duplicity'. At the age of eighty (two years before his death) Lloyd George married Frances Stevenson, and she became a Countess.

Other defects of L.G. were his public appearances as a devout churchman whereas, in reality, he was 'essentially a pagan'. He was also very superstitious. He delivered Cabinet papers to the Prime Minister on Thursday night in order to avoid Friday: and he had his name on the Cabinet distribution list changed from No. 13. He also opened letters addressed to other people working with him and admitted it gave him a boyish delight 'to see what was in them'.

But Lloyd George's good qualities far outweighed the bad. He led Britain to victory in World War I. At the beginning of the war he headed the new Ministry of Munitions which he built up out of nothing. He had vision: for example, Kitchener advised that the infantry needed two to four machine-guns per battalion: Lloyd George realised that, with trench warfare, machine guns would dominate the battlefield, and consequently ordered 64 per battalion. It was Lloyd George who, later, introduced the convoy system for transporting munitions to Britain from America to defeat the German submarine menace. Mr. Cross claims that this was 'probably the most significant single act in his

war leadership, without which Britain might have lost the war'. In many ways, Lloyd George's replacement of H. H. Asquith (with his cautious 'wait and see' policy in World War I) by a dynamic policy of his own, was paralleled by Winston Churchill's replacement of Neville Chamberlain in World War II.

Lloyd George had the same tremendous driving power: I met him only once when, as a young man, I called on my father in the House of Commons. I shall never forget L.G.'s piercing blue-grey eyes and the impression that a powerful electric force radiated from him. In this book, Mr. Sylvester says that L.G. claimed that his dynamism was due to his exceptional power of concentration. He also claimed that he could sleep at will.

Lloyd George was in political life for half a century. Although he was a Liberal leader (and a national leader) he was, in fact, a true radical. He became, however, a disaster to the Liberal Party which, as a result of his actions, divided into three sections. That under his own leadership eventually contracted to a group of four, all members of his own family. Yet it was this section that retained control of L.G.'s political fund which, one of his staff said, amounted to a quarter of a million. There were also scandals over its management.

Another section of the Liberal Party was headed by John Simon and the third by my father, Herbert Samuel. L.G. seems to have hated him—and L.G. was a good hater. There are some pretty caustic remarks by L.G. about Herbert Samuel in this book. Yet it was L.G. who had the Welshman's vision and sent out Samuel to Palestine as High Commissioner in 1920. L.G. said in 1931 'my one weakness is small nations'. He gave great support to Zionism in its earlier days.

Yet L.G.'s own political career came to an abrupt end after World War I. In 1931, he refused to enter the National Government under Ramsay MacDonald's leadership. He was equally opposed to any agreement with the Conservatives. He refused to endorse the demand for a general election, which led to his own political isolation for the rest of his life. Even in World War II, when he was invited by Winston Churchill to join the Cabinet, he refused. He also rejected Winston's pressure in 1940 to go to the United States as ambassador and rally American public opinion.

From 1939, L.G. became increasingly defeatist. Winston likened him in 1941 to Marshal Petain. L.G. had considerable admiration for *Mein Kampf* and for Hitler as a man of action. L.G. became personally timorous and, at his country house at Churt, built a huge air-raid shelter for himself sixty feet down. As he grew physically weaker, he ceased to speak at all in the House of Commons. Mr. Sylvester, his private secretary and the author of this book, even had to help him to dress in the morning. But, as Mr. Sylvester rightly says: 'L.G. can be so very big on big things and damned small on small things'.

This book is very carefully edited and has useful biographical footnotes on all the persons mentioned.

EDWIN SAMUEL

A WAR OF MIRACLES

The War of Atonement. Major-General Chaim Herzog. Weidenfeld & Nicholson. £6.00.

No man is better equipped, both from past experience as Director of Israel Military intelligence and as Israel's chief military and political commentator, to write this difficult and at times thrilling book. No book is more timely because the Middle East situation becomes daily more tense. Chaim Herzog is known to every Israeli and to millions outside Israel, because his broadcasts have been reproduced on networks with a world coverage. He writes and speaks in fluent

English, as befits one educated at Cambridge and London, whose father was once Chief Rabbi of Ireland and who himself is an honorary K.B.E.

I have found the book difficult in parts to read, in spite of nine admirable maps and some personal knowledge of the terrain, both in the Sinai Desert and the Golan Heights. The battles for the survival of Israel were fast-moving and furious on two main fronts, in the air and on the sea; they involved the world's most devilish instruments of war, provided by Soviet Russia and the United States of America. For eighteen days thrusts and counter-thrusts between Syrians and Israelis on the Golan Heights and between Egyptians and Israelis on the Suez Canal were unceasing. The fact that Israel drove back both insurgents, although out-numbered in tanks, guns and missiles is a miracle. Herzog recounts scores of individual acts of almost mad bravery.

Moreover there were sinister political overtones. For example, there was always in the background the United Nations Security Council, which could call for a cease-fire either to save Israel and establish new frontier lines or to prevent Syria and Egypt from being demolished. Casualties on both sides were very heavy. To quote Herzog: 'Shortly before the cease-fire was to take effect, the weapon whose introduction to the Middle East had led to the final decision to go to war was activated for the first time anywhere in the world. On that day, according to Sadat, a Scud missile was launched against Israel. It landed in the desert of Sinai.' In spite of the cease-fire order of October 22nd, the war did not end until a second cease-fire on October 24th when 'the Soviet Union moved ominously to the brink and readied its air-borne divisions for a move to the Middle East.' In a word, the Security Council saved the destruction of the Egyptian army owing to Kissinger's pressure on Israel. These facts are as clearly established as is also the fact that both sides technically side-stepped the first cease-fire. There was also the ever-present threat of oil sanctions from the Arab world. There can be no parallel to this combination of political and military pressure made by a world power on a small country about the size of Wales.

It is now well known that Israel was lulled into a false sense of security, partly because its military intelligence failed, but also because it failed to learn the lessons of the SIX DAY WAR and the less known War of Attrition initiated by Egypt in March 1969 before the death of Nasser. It is less well known that the Egyptian Army underwent an intensive political education programme, based on lessons that could be learned from the SIX DAY WAR. Years of careful preparation preceded the crossing of the Suez Canal. The Egyptian planners succeeded in misleading not only Israel and practically all the intelligence services in the West, but the bulk of the Egyptian Army as well.

One interesting though small-scale part of this vast machine war was played by the Israeli Navy, based on a fleet of missile boats, which were not available in previous wars. The battle of Latakia, the first naval missile battle in history was won by Israel without sustaining any casualties; on the night of October 21st-22nd a force of Israeli missile boats sailed with impunity along the coast of the Nile delta, closed in on Aboukir and sank two Egyptian radar boats. Throughout the war the shipping lanes to and from Israel were kept open and the small Israeli navy enjoyed complete command of the seas, both in the Mediterannean approaches and in the Gulf of Suez. Here then was a case where Israeli planners took the Arab navies by surprise. In previous wars the Israeli Air Force did the same thing and reigned supreme. In both cases daring and initiative had been the mainspring of success. It is, of course, true that in this war lone tanks held the vital roads against literally hundreds of Syrian tanks and fought them to a standstill; individual heroism more than once helped to

turn the course of the war. But it was a near thing. One can only hope that negotiations will prevent another Arab-Israeli War and that both sides will halt before exposing their peoples to Middle East suicide.

KENNETH LINDSAY

THE YOUNG THOMAS HARDY

Young Thomas Hardy. Robert Gittings. Heinemann Educational Books. £4.95.

It has been said that more books are written about Jane Austen and D. H. Lawrence than any other authors. Biographies of Thomas Hardy threaten soon to out number these. This is no disadvantage if previously published comment is interpreted in a different way or new material presented. Robert Gittings contrives to accomplish both. By assembling virtually every recorded detail of Thomas Hardy's early years the pace is slowed down sufficiently to reveal an utterly credible if not particularly likeable young man. Under this microscopic treatment certain basic characteristics emerge which remained consistent throughout Hardy's long life, as for instance the dogged determination to achieve literary fame, and embarrassment about the humble origin of his family and forbears.

This closely documented approach makes categorical refutation of the 'illigitimate son' theory superfluous. Obviously, there was no appropriate stretch of time in the lives of Thomas Hardy and his young cousin, Tryphena Sparks, for the birth and subsequent concealment of a child. But Robert Gittings does more than reject the widely publicised fantasy by inference. Through timely good fortune he had the opportunity to study a copious correspondence between members of the Sparks family during the relevant period. Evidence here should convince the most ardent 'pro-son' proselytizer that no such boy ever existed, although an 'engagement' or 'understanding' between the cousins is readily acknowledged.

What then can be deduced of Thomas Hardy's emotional capacity as a young man? It is clear that he found women attractive, even if his reactions were ineffectual until he succumbed to the flamboyant, vigorous personality of Emma Lavinia Gifford, his first wife. Yet lurking beneath an apparently uncomplicated exterior were some strange deviations, such as a youthful preoccupation with public hangings and of women in particular—and there were others. Yet whatever inhibitions may have influenced his approach to marriage, his own oblique references to 'marital inadequacy' are sufficient to emphasise and explain the frustrations of the childless union.

The details of Thomas Hardy's early attempts at authorship are more specific. The wonder is that the gauche, pedantic architect's clerk survived the rejection slips and swingeing criticism to become the Grand Old Man of Literature. But for the stringent 'editing' by Leslie Stephen, *Far From the Madding Crowd* could never have emerged in its final dazzling and evocative form.

The nineteenth century conflict between the literary and social 'establishment' and an emerging author of modest circumstances can never have been more convincingly delineated. This finely researched and reasoned biography will remain on the reference shelf long after the contemporary flights of fancy have been discredited.

ROSALIND WADE

GREEK DRAMA AND MYTH

The Eating of the Gods. Jan Kott. Eyre Methuen.

We have been conditioned to expect an original approach towards dramatic literature from Jan Kott. *Shakespeare Our Contemporary* presented us with his new look at Shakespeare. *The Eating of the Gods* approaches Greek drama in a manner equally iconoclastic and free from cliché.

The central concern of the book is with the relationship between drama and myth, and while acknowledging traditional critics of the classics, he draws also on specialists in the field of anthropology and mythology such as Claude Levi-Strauss and Mircea Eliade. Professor Kott explores the nature of myth, its many manifestations and its relevance both to the Greek and to our own culture.

> Myths have their historic time and their meta-historic time; the time in which they came into being and their universal validity outside of time. They are intelligible in translation—from language to language, from one civilisation to another, from one religious system to another.

Drama in action is considered seriously and it is a pleasure to read a book about drama which treats the plays in terms of theatre, recognising the relationship between understanding and physical interpretation. The fact that plays have an identity which is not fully realised until they are vitalised through performance is one which has often been neglected in the literary criticism of Greek drama. This welcome reminder of the elements that are inherent in drama in the acting space as contrasted to drama on the printed page enhances the value of the book.

The plays discussed are, on the whole, ones which are less known to the non-classicist because they are seldom performed on our stages. For most people, knowledge of Sophocles is limited to the Theban plays, in particular *Oedipus the King*. Passionately concerned as he is with the struggle against tyranny and oppression, this book is illuminating on the plight of the deceived Ajax and the deluded Heracles. In the same manner, Aeschylus is examined not through his masterpiece, *The Oresteia*, but through a most interesting essay on Prometheus, demonstrating the interaction between oppressor and oppressed. Kott makes clear the inescapable parallels between the dark vision of the tragedies and the grim realities of life today.

The most exciting chapter, however, is the one from which the book takes its name; a brilliant comment on Euripides' *The Baccaes*. This well known play is perhaps staged more than any other Greek tragedy. It intrigues and baffles readers and directors with its profound and yet enigmatic statement about the human condition. If we cannot explain, we must at any rate admit, that the deceptively weak young god Dionysus triumphs over the apparently strong young King because he undermines the defences that are psychological, using physical force as an apt metaphor to demonstrate his power, in the destruction of the palace. Willingly, Pentheus succumbs to the onslaught, happily casting off his manhood in acquiring a woman's dress and crowning himself with a woman's wig. His absorption in the set of his curls ironically contrasts with his previous attack on the hair of Dionysus and bitterly foreshadows the mangled tresses on his own severed head.

> When god-man is transformed in the final epiphany into an animal god, his emblem, the 'hair of Dionysus, covers the body of his Surrogate in place of the head. 'My hair is holy. My curls belong to god.' The travels of the wig of long fair tresses must be the most brilliant use of a stage prop in the entire history of drama.

Dionysus comes to Thebes as a stranger to avenge a slur on his origins, a suggestion that he was not fathered by Zeus and therefore lacked authority. Devastatingly does he demonstrate his power. There is no mercy in his religion, no compassion, no forgiveness in this bleakest of all tragedies.

'The god on the roof is in a hurry to depart . . . Thebes is empty. All that remains in it is the unburied body of the King.'

There is much to think over in this lively and readable book.

MARJORIE FRANCES

THE COMMON SENSE OF AN HISTORIAN

Discoveries and Reviews. A. L. Rowse. Macmillan. £6.95.

Dr. Rowse reminds me of his fellow-Cornishman, Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch, who was, however, fortunate enough to live before what Dr. Rowse calls 'the Eng. Lit. industry' got into its full stride. He has the same common sense approach as 'Q' and he lays the same emphasis on the close relation of literature to its social and political background. What 'Q' said in his 1923 lecture on 'The Victorian Background'—published in *Charles Dickens and other Victorians* (1925)—is very similar to what Dr. Rowse says here in regard to the Elizabethan Age and the seventeenth century.

He was originally, he tells us here, an English Literature scholar, but 'the dons at Christ Church thought that English Literature was a soft option and made me do the Modern History School—for which I have been insufficiently grateful.'

We must beware of being insufficiently grateful to Dr. Rowse. When he turned from writing history, mainly on the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods, to writing books on Shakespeare, Marlowe and other writers of the time, he came up against, not only 'the Shakespeare Industry', but also 'the Shakespeare Trade Union'. He answers his critics here, rather too complacently perhaps for all tastes, but with considerable effect. There is no doubt at all of the correctness of his chief point in these rejoinders: that 'much of the nonsense written about Shakespeare comes from people who know nothing of the Elizabethan Age in which he lived'. Dr. Rowse is an expert in this field and we should be grateful that he has turned, or re-turned, his attention from the history to the literature, especially as he insists on the importance of treating Shakespeare and his fellow-dramatists as the working playwrights most of them actually were, not (or not primarily) as the writers of 'dramatic poetry' divorced from the stage conditions of the time. Here Dr. Rowse can count on a good deal of support from current Eng. Lit. scholarship, even within that 'Trade Union' of which he is so emphatically *not* a card-carrying member. The truth surely is that Shakespeare, in the twentieth century, is *both* a playwright to be seen *and* a dramatist to be read: the two experiences reinforce each other. The nearest contemporary comparison is Shaw: so enjoyable on the stage, so readable as literature, the preface and the play together.

I noticed one small slip here (p.56). Delia Bacon was not a Baconian: she was one of those who thought that Shakespeare's plays were written by a group of aristocrats including 'Raleigh the Poet', who did most of the actual writing, aided by 'Bacon the Philosopher', the Earl of Oxford, and others. (See my *Shakespeare and His Betters,* chapter 2.) On the other hand, Dr. Rowse corrects *my* comparative ignorance by pointing out, what I did not know, that knights in Elizabethan-Jacobean times were often referred to as 'Mr.' I knew that 'Mr. W.H.' could not have been a lord; what I did not know, till Dr. Rowse told me here, was that he could very well have been a knight, perhaps (as Dr. Rowse gives cogent reasons for supposing) Sir William Hervey, Southampton's stepfather, who gave (or may have given) the manuscript of the Sonnets to the publisher Thomas Thorp.

Both Dr. Rowse's 'options' are represented in this entertaining and rewarding volume. Just as he emphasises the common sense approach to literature, so in dealing with historical subjects he decries the 'thesis-mongering' of the recent past associated with 'the tedious names of Professor Lawrence Stone, Hexter, Christopher Hill, Uncle Tom Cobleigh and all' and lends his considerable authority to those younger historians in England and America who are return-

ing to the more factual, which is also the more human, approach. (The more *local* approach, too, and we remember Dr. Rowse's own splendid *Tudor Cornwall*.) We have had enough, he says in effect, of sterile discussions on such 'problems' or pseudo-problems as the Rise of the Gentry; it is time to ask fundamental questions, such as (p.214) 'What did the Civil War settle?'. Dr. Rowse stresses the *tragedy* of the War, with the peace-loving majority helpless between the small minority of fanatics on either side. He goes perhaps too far sometimes in understandable reaction to the Whig (and the Marxist) Interpretation of History. 'Johnny Milton' (p.250) seems a somewhat cavalier description of a Puritan poet so much admired by Andy Marvell, Jack Dryden and Joey Addison.

R. C. CHURCHILL

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES

Bermuda Today and Yesterday (1503-1973) (Robert Hale. £3.60. St. Martin's Press, New York). This is a remarkable book by Terry Tucker who is the pre-eminent historian of Bermuda and combines an encyclopedic knowledge of contemporary affairs and conditions in these wonderful islands. In this volume she has brought her erudition and learning to the writing of a short historical introduction to Bermuda which was discovered by the Spanish or possibly Portuguese at the start of the sixteenth century. It was not occupied or colonised until Sir George Somers was shipwrecked on the islands in 1509 on his way to Virginia. Bermuda's Parliament first met in 1620 and has had a continuous existence ever since. It also has the oldest church in the Anglican Communion outside Britain. Although situated in mid Atlantic, Bermuda has always been caught up with the great international events of the last three hundred years. She points to the great highlights, for example the American War of Independence and the American Civil War. Furthermore its internal development and rule form a fascinating example of British colonial policy during this long period. Mrs. Tucker also writes of contemporary Bermuda and its social and political conditions and problems with objectivity and detachment. The main industry of the islands is now tourism and this volume will be particularly valuable to those visiting Bermuda, as well as those who need a brief introduction about the islands. There are many illustrations and much useful information for the visitor.

Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Series 1A Vol. VI (H.M. Stationery Office. £14.50). This series of selected official documents, drawn mainly from the Foreign Office archives, is edited by Professor W. N. Medlicott, Professor Douglas Dakin and Mr. L. E. Lambert. The latter appears to have been principally responsible for this new volume, *The Young Report and the Hague Conference: Security Questions 1928-29*. It deals with British policy on European and security issues from December 21, 1928. It includes the Young Committee of experts on reparations and the negotiations leading to The Hague Conference on August 30-31, 1929. The Editor points out that the successes at the Conference 'were to prove the culmination of six years of skilful diplomacy by Dr. Gustav Streseman, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, to release Germany from the restraints imposed by the Treaty and re-establish her position in the international community'. Already the Nazi movement was rearing its head but its full significance was not fully appreciated. In a despatch dated May 30, 1929, the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Horace

Rumbold, concluded that 'in vital questions German democracy will co-operate in securing the spirit if not the letter of the Versailles stipulations. I do not contend that the pacifist feeling in Germany is an element on which we can count eternally; but I do consider that, unless Germany is unduly provoked, it will last for some ten to fifteen years! Four years later Hitler was in power. This volume also covers naval and disarmament questions with their impact upon Anglo-American relations, up to May 22, 1929. There is a final chapter dealing with the British signature to the Optional Clause providing for compulsory submission of juridical disputes to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Editors have had free access to, and selection of, documents in the archives of the Foreign Office, the British Embassy in Washington, and the British Delegation to the Hague Conference. Private papers of Sir Austen Chamberlain, Arthur Henderson and Sir Orme Sargent have also been used.

Just Within the Law (Hutchinson. £4.00). Inevitably the author of these memoirs and reflexions should describe himself as Henry Cecil, widely known under this name as writer and novelist. *Brothers in Law* is probably the best known of his many works. His novels are mainly concerned with the lighter side of the law and, as such, are written wih a lively sense of humour and an expert knowledge of the legal profession and procedure. This is not surprising for the author's formal mode of address is His Honour Henry Cecil Leon, retired County Court Judge. He enjoyed a large and growing practise at the Bar when in 1948 his first wife became seriously ill, and in 1949 he successfully applied to the Lord Chancellor for appointment as County Court Judge. For many years he sat at the Willesden County Court. In 1950 his first wife died, and after this he spent a great deal of his spare time in writing. By using his first names, as his pen names, he was able most successfully to keep his too professions apart, and has been prominent in both. He retired from the Bench in 1967. While he writes about his second literary string, most of the book is concerned with his early life, his war service, his career at the Bar and his experiences on the Bench. He concludes with some views on legal reforms, which are certainly controversial. He writes frankly, entertainingly and discursively. His many comments on the law and judges are forthright and sometimes highly critical. His own reputation as a judge, in the legal profession, was that of being an excellent lawyer, very talkative with a passion for justice. This is a delightful book which should be enjoyed by the public at large.

Percy Cane, Garden Designer (John Bartholomew. £3.50). Ronald Webber has written a delightful and informative book on the life and work of Percy Cane, the celebrated British garden designer and writer, who only retired in 1973 at the age of 91. It is a delightful volume which includes numerous illustrations and an appendix giving a selection of his gardens both at home and abroad.

The Golden Bough (Macmillan. £1.95). This is the seventh paperback reprint of this classic since 1960. It is, of course, the abridged edition of Sir James Fraser's great work, 'a Study in Magic and Religion' originally published in twelve volumes. The abridged edition is without notes or 'exact references to my authorities'. For these the student must look at the complete work.



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

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110th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

SEPTEMBER 1975

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

SPAIN'S UNCERTAIN PROGRESS

by Richard Comyns Carr

THE revolution in Portugal has had its inevitable impact on feeling in Spain, but the uncertainty and suspense that pervade Spanish politics at the moment derive from the earlier preoccupation with those two unknowns, When will Franco go? and, When will Spain start to move towards constitutional democracy? Domestic events of the past twelve months have simply brought these two questions into sharper focus.

General Franco is now 82 and it is 39 years since he led the uprising against the Republic. Rumours about his health have been current for a long time. In 1961 he suffered a shooting accident that fractured his left hand and this led to further rumours in the following years that the wound had not completely healed. By the late '60s, he was showing marked signs of age in speech and manner and some of the symptoms of Parkinson's disease were detectable. Nevertheless, his doctor regularly assured the Spanish public that his patient was in good health and reports agreed that Franco was in full control of government, though he increasingly left departmental policy to his ministers, with the resultant intrigues and jockeying for position between the rival factions in Madrid. Meanwhile he had made dispositions for the event of his death or retirement. In 1969 he proposed to the Cortes, which duly approved, that Prince Juan Carlos, son of the legitimate Pretender, Don Juan de Bourbon, should be the future King of Spain. In 1973 he appointed his close collaborator of many years, Admiral Carrero Blanco, Prime Minister, himself relinquishing this office, which he had previously combined with that of Chief of State. He gave no indication, however, that he intended to retire. In 1971 he declared that he would 'remain at the helm so long as God gives me strength and clarity' and he has said nothing since to change this.

Then last July it was announced that he had entered a clinic suffering from phlebitis, and subsequent press reports made it clear that he was critically ill. Prince Juan Carlos temporarily assumed the functions of Chief of State, as provided by Franco's Organic Law, and throughout July and August he signed laws and presided at Cabinet meetings. Many people began to feel that they were already living, as it was said, in the 'post-

Franco era'. Meanwhile, however, Franco had recovered sufficiently to go for his usual summer holiday in Galicia. On September 2nd he resumed the office of Chief of State. Ten days later he presided over the Cabinet that approved the Budget for 1975.

Unfortunately his return, which some years ago would have caused heartfelt relief to many worthy people in Spain, today brings comfort to few. The precarious state of his health is now apparent to everyone. It is widely reported that his various ailments leave him more or less incapable much of the time, though he has enough lucid moments to take the essential decisions. His continuance in power now only prolongs the suspense. It means that the balance of political forces will be maintained, but only from day to day, and it does not mean that the country's pressing problems will be effectively handled. It is generally believed that policy and the conduct of state business are now largely influenced by his family, his household staff and those close to the Prado Palace who have a strong vested interest in preventing any change.

The influence of the reactionary Right has become much more evident. Señor Carlos Arias Navarro, the former head of the security police who was appointed Prime Minister after the assassination of Admiral Carrero Blanco in December, 1973, clearly understands the need for the regime to evolve and identified himself from the start with the policy of 'aperturismo' or a cautious opening towards democratic processes. He promised a bill permitting 'associations' as a substitute for political parties, which the regime has always banned. When eventually the bill emerged last December, it was so restricted by conditions of adherence to the Movement, Franco's one-party organisation, as to be politically valueless. The case is similar to the new Labour Bill and its provisions regarding the right to strike, hitherto denied. Last October, the Minister of Information, Señor Pio Cabanillas, known for his liberal policy towards the press, was dismissed and the Minister of Finance, Señor Barrera de Irimo, associated with an austerity programme and plans for tax reform, resigned. While attempting to maintain a reasonably liberal government, Señor Arias is obliged to justify himself to the Right and assert authority by continual acts of repression. There is much press criticism, there are many public protests and there is a never-ending succession of strikes; but at the same time newspapers are arbitrarily suspended; lawyers, intellectuals, housewives fined or imprisoned for attending meetings whether in the street or behind closed doors; striking workers and students are beaten up and arrested—and this apart from the police repression in the Basque provinces under the 'state of exception', the sixth declared there since 1967 in the never-ending attempt to stamp out the ETA.

It is the failure to guarantee freedoms or to provide the citizen with valid defences against arbitrary action by the government and its agents that are the main charges against the regime. It is not a question of Left Wing and Right Wing. The issue between Franco and his opponents is fundamentally one of legal rights. Spain has seen remarkable changes under Franco's rule, and there is much greater freedom—in daily life and culture as well as commerce—than in the early years. To take one example, the use of the

Catalan language. In the '40s, merely speaking it in the street was liable to draw undesirable attention from members of the Falange. Today, books of every kind printed in Catalan are sold all over Barcelona; articles in Catalan appear in the Barcelona press; and notices in Catalan appear on the fronts of shops—many shopkeepers when they go off for lunch, hang up a card 'Tancat' instead of 'Cerrado'. Again, strikes—in one factory or another, not throughout an industry—have been a common occurrence for years, although they have been illegal and would formerly have been suppressed by the police.

But these new-found freedoms do not represent rights granted or won. They are enjoyed by administrative favour. The dictatorship relaxes its grip in such cases in response to social pressures. It may always tighten it again, and does do. Only, the steps back in periods of reaction never quite cancel the previous steps forward and some of the new liberties remain, *de facto*, though not *de jure*. This is best illustrated by the case of the press. In June 1966 Señor Fraga Iribarne, Minister of Information and Tourism, introduced his Press Law, which abolished prior censorship of editorial matter, and at the same time he urged the press to inform more and criticise more. A noticeable improvement in the Spanish press resulted. But the censors still had to see the printed edition of a paper before it was put on sale and could stop the whole issue at the last moment. Moreover, the Ministry could issue 'serious warnings' for offending material and, by a decree of 1967, no editor who received three of these in one year could keep his post. A change in the penal code created offences against the state so vaguely defined as to make almost any published statement actionable and under an Official Secrets Act practically any Cabinet or departmental proceedings or material became classified until it had been officially announced. In the twelve months from April 1968, penalties were imposed on papers in 118 cases for various reasons, in 43 for 'violating the limits of freedom of expression'. Yet the Spanish press has become increasingly critical. It often reflects the power struggle going on in Madrid ruling circles and profits by it, as the paper concerned is assured of support from one or other faction. All the same, Spanish editors live a harassed life.

Franco has always been ready to make some concessions to circumstances, to beat a prudent retreat in face of pressure, and also to adopt new policies when he sees they are necessary. It is because of this pragmatic and flexible attitude that Spain under his dictatorship has been a much more dynamic country, economically and socially, than Portugal was under Salazar. But on one point he has always been adamant: to concede no rights that could in any way limit his personal authority. He wants to run Spain on the lines of a regiment or the traditional English boarding school. In this, he has the strong support of the diehards of the Falange who, together with Franco himself, have kept alive the rancours of the Civil War, and of those who have richly profited by the regime and would like to see it prolonged indefinitely. The so-called 'Opus Dei group', rivals of the Falange and including some able ministers who were largely responsible for steering the economy through the Stabilisation Plan to the Development Plans, offered Franco the alluring promise of a way out: material prosperity

would drown the people's political aspirations. Señor Laureano Lopez Rodó, one-time Planning Minister and the leading figure among the 'Opus Dei' technocrats who did so much to liberalise trade and industry, went out of his way to attack 'liberalism' in politics; but today more and more Spaniards realise that the country has advanced beyond the stage when it can be governed as a personal dictatorship and that to continue to rely on an old and ailing dictator becomes every day more dangerous. This view is now held by members of the government, government officials and influential supporters of the regime, as well as by high officers of the Army, and has spread to the large number of conservative Spaniards who, in the past, looked upon Franco as the bulwark of order. In February, 500 government employees took the unprecedented step of addressing a letter to the Prime Minister, expressing their desire that Spain should become 'a democratic state in which political authority comes from the people'. The signatures included section heads in ministries, diplomats, finance and labour inspectors, architects, economists, and professors in state universities. In June a group of 150 distinguished Spanish intellectuals and professional men and women issued a manifesto calling for freedom of speech, free trade unions, and the right to strike, as well as an amnesty for all political prisoners and the lifting of the state of emergency in the Basque provinces.

Spanish bishops have for some time focussed attention on the question of human rights in Spain. Their sermons and pastorals have in themselves struck a blow for freedom of speech, since they have said things that would not have been allowed in the Spanish press. The Church's conflict with the regime has recently become more pronounced and the government's reaction harsher because the hierarchy is openly siding with the forces of political change and priests are more active than ever in labour agitation and regional movements—Basque and Catalan.

The workers are probably still interested more in wages and working conditions than in politics, though there have been political protest strikes; but then the industrial strikes are largely promoted by the Workers' Commissions (which include Communists and Left Wing Catholics) and by the less publicised, but active, Socialist UGT. What effect these growing labour troubles will have on the political situation remains to be seen.

The political parties and groups that form the illegal Opposition cannot, in present circumstances, enjoy mass support. It is impossible to assess their numerical strength, but the Christian Democrats and the Socialists are believed to be the most powerful, the former including many well known and 'respectable' figures. The Communist following is generally believed to be small. The autonomist movements, Basque and Catalan, have well organised bodies of supporters, the Basque more disciplined, the Catalan more widespread. But these and other groups and movements combined could not attempt a revolution or a rising against the combined forces of the Army and the Civil Guard.

And so, while opinion grows stronger every day that Franco should go and a way be found for democracy, no action is possible without the Army; the Generals, whatever their opinions, are loyal to Franco and do not want to act against his wishes; and Franco, apparently, has no intention of step-

ping aside. There have been rumours that a delegation of generals will call on him and invite him to resign; but Madrid has always been a hotbed of rumours.

The economic recession, which reached Spain later than other countries, is now making itself felt. Industrial output and orders are falling and, above all, investment. The increase in gross national product, which averaged more than 7% over the years 1959 to 1973 and achieved 5% even last year, is expected to amount to between 2% and 3%, at best, this year. Unemployment was officially estimated in April at 2.3%; but official statistics are open to various objections and the influential weekly *Cambio 16* countered with a figure of 4.3%, equivalent to over half a million jobless. In any case, the official figure itself compares with an official monthly average of 1.4% last year. Inflation, which has accompanied Spain's rapid expansion (by the end of 1972 the peseta had lost nearly half its 1963 value) resulted in a rise of 17.2 per cent in the cost of living figure for the twelve months to April last. Opinions differ whether it will slow down this year. The Minister of Finance stated in April that the trend suggested a rise of 19% in the course of 1975; pessimists suggest the figure will be nearer 24%. The depression may pass its worst point after June; but industrialists do not expect a revival until well into 1976 and this may depend on foreign funds being available.

All this is no worse than is being suffered by some other countries; but Spaniards, having comparatively recently started to enjoy a booming economy, are not ready for austerity. The workers have become accustomed to full employment, rising wages in Spain and better paid jobs abroad and now Germany, Switzerland, France, and the Benelux countries no longer want them. In the first three months of this year, government-aided emigrants to European countries (where most of them seek work) numbered 10,000 compared with nearly 24,000 and over 40,000 respectively in the same periods of 1974 and 1973. Emigrants are now believed to be outnumbered by workers returning.

However, trade recovery in Europe should improve things. It is the longer term outlook that causes more concern. The rise in oil prices has completely altered the Spanish balance-of-payments equation. Spain depends on oil for 65% of its energy requirements and has to import 98% of it, and the trade deficit with the oil-producing countries now accounts for two-thirds of the foreign trade deficit as a whole. The hitherto more than adequate foreign exchange reserves built up during the boom, which stood at 6,000 million dollars last December but had fallen to 5,600 million by April, can stand the drain for another two or three years; but after that Spain will largely depend for solvency on an expansion in its export trade and a revival of foreign investment, as tourism, the foundation of the 'Spanish miracle', is not expected to grow, either in Spain or elsewhere, at the rate of recent years. Expanding exports to Arab countries and the East may not be easy in the face of competition from countries that can offer a more advanced technology,—and meanwhile Spain is excluded from the EEC.

The stockbroking firm of Vickers, da Costa & Co., which specialises in overseas stockmarkets, gives the following advice to purchasers of Spanish stocks in a recent circular: 'We have already recommended lightening existing holdings, but we advise keeping a foothold and following developments, as the time for a more positive approach could come later this year'. Perhaps that is as good a comment as any on the Spanish situation at the moment.

[While living and working in Spain over a period of eighteen years, Richard Comyns Carr has been a regular contributor on Spanish subjects to *The Economist*. He has also written articles for the *Times Business News* and the *Daily Telegraph*.]

The October issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *The No-Growth Society: Postscript to an Epilogue* by E. J. Mishan, *Queen Elizabeth and Japan* by Ian Nish, *Exorcism and Religion* by the Rev. B. L. Hebblethwaite and *The Foreign Policy of President Urho Kekkonen* by Keijo Korhonen.

LISBON IS NOT PRAGUE

by Stephen Oren

PORTUGAL'S course since the April 1974 coup which overthrew the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship of forty-eight years' standing has been disquieting. To what extent did the new military dictatorship of Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves substitute for the old? The cooperation of Gonçalves and his government with the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) of Alvaro Cunhal raises further questions as to Portugal's internal and external policies. Yet most of the analogies that have been drawn—particularly those with post-1945 Eastern Europe in which the crucial factor was the physical power of the Soviet Army—by people who seem unaware that much of what has happened in Portugal has taken place in other Iberian societies. And in talking of Iberian societies, the centuries of Muslim occupation of Iberia must be remembered. 'Europe ends at the Pyrennees', Napoleon said. Muslim precedents may also be in order. For these analogies and precedents not only help us to understand what has happened in Portugal, they suggest what may well happen in the future; and their portents are not favourable for the PCP, although they are not necessarily any better for democrats.

Since Brigadier Gonçalves became Prime Minister in July 1974, signs of repression have not been wanting. Since last autumn, when General Antonio de Spinola was ousted as President of the post-coup regime, criticism of the Armed Forces, even if true, has been illegal. In March, following what appeared to be a comic opera attempt by General Spinola to reassume control, the Christian Democratic and Maoist (MRPP) parties were outlawed, while radicals of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) took complete control of the Portuguese Armed Forces. The MFA promptly embarked upon a programme of widespread nationalisation of industry. Even before the April election for the Constituent Assembly, MFA leaders such as Gonçalves, Secret Police (Copcon) head Brigadier Carvalho, and Minister for Information Commander Jesuino, downgraded the election, arguing that Portuguese voters—especially in the conservative north of the country—are 'insufficiently educated'. On the contrary, they announced a 'Portuguese road to Socialism' upon which they proposed to embark whatever the will of the Portuguese people. The six major parties were forced to sign an agreement under which the Constituent Assembly has been reduced to a purely advisory role, with all legislative, executive, and constitution-making powers vested in the MFA, and its 'High Council of the Revolution'.

Is Portugal really going Communist? After all, the MFA has openly contrasted the cooperative attitude of the PCP and its faithful ally the Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP) with the lack of cooperation shown by the Socialist Party (PS), the left of centre Popular Democratic Party (PPD) and the conservative Social Democratic Centre (CDS). Indeed, the PCP and MDP, both represented in the cabinet (as, however, are the PS and PPD), welcomed the military's limitations on the Constituent

Assembly. The MFA has permitted the PCP to control Portuguese media. Since January, the PS and PPD have been forced to abandon efforts at trade union work and allow the PCP's Intersyndical to dominate the labour field. Even more sinister is the unique ability of PCP members to examine and utilise the dossiers of PIDE, the secret police of the Salazar-Caetano regime. Beyond this, opposition leaders such as Major Sanches Osorio, a founder of the MFA, but now an exile because of his post-coup role as Secretary-General of the Christian Democrats, have suggested that Gonçalves and other MFA leaders are in fact secret PCP members.

Yet, there is much counter-evidence. The PCP may or may not eventually remain in the government, as it has been since April 1974, but all important ministries are in MFA hands. While Intersyndical has a monopoly in the labour field, PCP efforts to insist upon the merger of the PS into the PCP were ignored. More telling was Commander Jesuino's advice to the Portuguese voters which was not to vote for the PCP, MDP or any other party but to show their dislike of all the parties and their support for the MFA by casting a blank ballot (although in the event only 7% of all ballots were spoiled, many of them no doubt by misadvertence). Equally, Defence Minister Rear-Admiral Silvano Ribeiro spoke of the inadequacy of all parties—including the PCP—and the utility of a civilian counterpart to the MFA.

In international affairs, despite Brigadier Carvalho's attacks on US Ambassador Carlucci, the MFA proposed to remain within NATO to the evident bewilderment of the US Pentagon. To be sure, US bases on Portugal's Azores will not again be available as a refuelling stop between the United States and Israel. But then, any post-colonial Portuguese government, having given up hopes of energy independence by surrendering Cabinda, was bound to take this position. Even in the April-June 1974 period of moderation, Foreign Minister and PS leader Mario Soares certainly indicated the same point. And, despite alarmist rumours, there are no signs that the USSR has been given any military or naval facilities in Portugal.

When Caetano was overthrown, three forces emerged in Portugal. The overthrow of Caetano was the work of the MFA who, however, had now to share control of the Armed Forces with senior generals such as Spinola and Air Force General Galvao de Medo. The only effective underground during Salazar's and Caetano's rule had been the PCP. But neither MFA nor PCP seemed the main beneficiaries of the April coup, for power was to go to an elected Constituent Assembly. At the same time, the mood of Portuguese voters was far from radical. Public opinion polls put PCP support at about 10% of the population, PS support at over twice that. Even by April 1975 for all the outlawing of right wing parties (except for the CDS for which, however, many Portuguese feared to vote lest a CDS dominated Assembly be summarily dismissed by the MFA) and PCP control of communications, the PCP obtained one-eighth of the popular vote. The Trotskyist and Maoist sects simply disappeared as the votes were counted, while the pro-Communist MDP received only 4% of the votes. A year ago, the PS was Mario Soares' circle of friends, the PPD, Francisco

sa Carneira's, the election gave the PS 38% of the vote and the PPD 26%. It was to PS and PPD (as well as Christian Democratic) unions that workers were flocking until January.

For the MFA, this result was unacceptable. It would mean that Portugal, after sloughing off the less tasteful inheritances of Salazar (the African colonies, PIDE) would become a moderate reformist state. But the MFA consisted of officers of field rank (from Captain to Brigadier or their naval equivalents) who had been radicalised by the African wars and therefore wished a total transformation of Portuguese society. Admittedly, the nature of this transformation was somewhat vague, for the MFA included officers whose political views ranged from Christian Democratic to Maoist.

Such generalised anti-capitalist radicalism is common enough among field rank officers of Iberian and Muslim armies, especially where a defeat or dragged-out war has taken place. Confining ourselves to fairly recent examples, we can substitute for Portugal's African wars, Bolivia's Chaco War of the 1930s (which led, after several coups in the late 1930s and 1940s to the 1952 revolution in that country), Egyptian, Syrian, and (more indirectly) Iraqi experience in the 1948 Palestine War, or the Sudan's efforts, under General Abboud, to subjugate its Black South in the 1959-64 time period. In all these cases, field rank officers (as opposed to more senior men who are tied to the ruling oligarchy) concluded from their experiences that the socio-political structure must change.

These examples also suggest the problems of the MFA. On the one hand, there is the need to coexist with senior officers (and civilian figures of the old regime) in the first stage of the coup and to replace them in the second. For the names of Spinola and Adelino da Palma Costos (first Prime Minister of the post-coup regime) one can substitute General Naguib and Ali Maher (first post-coup Egyptian Prime Minister). Such men will hardly carry out radical plans of any sort. On the other hand, now that the coup-makers actually control the government, previously buried personal and ideological differences become apparent. Recent Syrian and Iraqi history shows vividly enough the dreary cycle of coup and counter-coup which can result.

Nor is it unknown elsewhere for the people to be unwilling to endorse the radical changes that the coup makers wish. In the Sudan, those who overthrew General Abboud in 1964 had taken the course of going to the people. But traditional parties, representing Sudanese religious sects, won thumping victories. By 1966 the Sudanese Communist Party—which had worked closely with the dissident military in 1964—had been outlawed. Nor was the Sudanese regime able to settle the problem of the rebellious south. The consequence was the 1969 coup of Colonel Ja'far Muhammed Numayri whose first act was to retire most senior officers of the Sudanese Army while installing a cabinet in which the Communist Party had an important place.

The MFA's concern was not purely idealistic. One of the first questions a post-colonial democratic Portuguese regime would ask is why Portugal needs a large army. Indeed, even with its present military dominated regime, many of the men, although not the officers, who fought in Africa have been demobilised. Suppose, as General Spinola wished, elections had been

held during the autumn and power turned over to the Constituent Assembly, would it not have maintained the senior generals in control of a small, non-political army? In consequence, many of the MFA's members might now be pounding the streets of Lisbon and Oporto in search of employment in firms which they today control. Again, this situation is not without precedent. The first overt interference by the Indonesian Army in governmental affairs took place when an Indonesian government tried to reduce the Army's size. Some observers have connected the Indonesian Armed Forces commitment to a large army with their 1957-65 alliance with President Sukarno and the Communists (PKI) against Parliament and the party system and for a (verbally) aggressive foreign policy.

And, as in Indonesia, it was not merely the MFA that needed allies. The PCP also did. Despite the comparisons that have been made by both Communists and non-Communists, Portugal is not Chile. The power of the Allende regime came from its electoral merger of Communists, Socialists, Radicals and others under a common banner—although it is worth remembering that the alliance never came close to winning a majority of the Chilean vote. The Army was known to be a conservative force which supported Allende (there were several military ministers in successive Allende cabinets) because he embodied the legal order of the country. In Portugal, however, the prime commitment of the PPD and PS was to the establishment of a democratic system. Hence, Communist efforts to transform the MDP into a left alliance or to achieve a joint PS-PCP slate in the name of socialism were spurned by the PPD and PS. Indeed, even if the PPD and PS had failed to win a majority of the vote (as they well might have if Christian Democrats and other centre and right groups had been able to run), they would probably have gone right rather than left in their search for a coalition partner. Admittedly, a PCP in opposition could have taken advantage of Portugal's economic problems (including the need to integrate Portuguese from Africa and the declining demand for Portuguese migrant workers in the EEC countries) to build support, but nowhere has this proved a road to power for a Communist Party.

Surely, Cunhal and his associates could have done better than one-tenth of the Portuguese Parliament (or even the 16.5% won in the actual election by the PCP-MDP front) sitting in a ghetto on the left and watching PS, PPD, and Christian Democrats (or their CDS remnant) playing their games of *rouge et noir*. Like the Sudanese Communist Party of the 1960s, confined to the urbanised voters of Khartoum, like the Indonesian Communist Party of the 1950s, electorally strong (16.4% of the 1955 vote) but unable, because of the hostility of the other parties, to play any role in governmental affairs, like the Iraqi Communists after the 1958 revolution, the PCP determined upon the headier tactic of supporting the most radical section of the Armed Forces in the hope that by such means, they could obtain power. Such Communist tactics are by no means unprecedented in Latin America, as Robert Alexander's many studies have shown, but there the Communist Parties were mere sects instead of mass movements.

Nor should one assume that it is only Communists who wish to play philosophers to kings. Plato went to Syracuse, Voltaire to Berlin for some-

what the same reasons. As the cooperation of Caballero's Spanish Socialists and trade-union movement with dictator Primo de Rivera in the 1920s, or the involvement of Chilean Socialists in the comic-opera 'Socialist Republic' of the early 1930s, the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the early period of the Nasser regime, or, for that matter, Ba'thist acquiescence in the appropriation of name and symbols by Syrian and Iraqi officers in the 1960s and early 1970s all show that a variety of movements with little chance of gaining power through other methods by virtue of their own strength may turn to the military alternative.

All these precedents, however, allowed us a view of the possible course and probable results of MFA-PCP cooperation. First, it is possible that ultimately the MFA will derive most of the benefit. PCP-led mobs have been allowed to demonstrate against MFA opponents—or, more strictly, against those MFA sections which are not part of the radical wing. They may have had cause to do so for the continued power of President General Costa Gomes or Foreign Minister Major Antunes suggested that Gonçalves had yet to consolidate his control over the military. But when the shouting and demonstrating is over, MFA and not PCP leaders will surely occupy the seats of power. Other PCP leaders can no doubt call for nationalisation, but in the end it may well be the MFA which nationalises such enterprises, thus saving, as in Indonesia after 1957, substantial numbers of officers from redundancy by calling upon them to manage the economy. The PCP control of Intersyndical has little meaning if the only function of the trade union movement is to support the government and persuade workers not to strike. Already, military leaders have indicated that it is 'anti-revolutionary' for workers to demand higher wages from a government-owned enterprise or a firm the government is preparing to nationalise. On the other hand, it is easy enough to see why the MFA does not wish for trade union competition in these conditions.

Second, it is the MFA which will make the decisions. At least some of the moves which the MFA-dominated Portuguese government has made are unlikely to be moves that a PCP regime would have made under existing circumstances. The decision to outlaw the Christian Democrats had, as one consequence, the swelling of the PPD and PS vote totals in Portugal and the decision of the Italian Christian Democrats not to take the long anticipated plunge into alliance, tacit or overt, with the Italian Communist Party. By the same token, PCP pressure on the PS has trained Socialist-Communist relations in France and elsewhere in Europe. It is very doubtful that PCP head Cunhal wished for these easily predictable results, more than doubtful that Moscow (and the PCP has remained quite close to the USSR) desired them. But the pace was set, and will continue to be set by the factional politics of the MFA.

Third, Portugal's foreign and defence policies will not necessarily reflect PCP wishes. Some indication of the way the winds were blowing was the refusal of Cunhal to call for Portugal's withdrawal from NATO and his statement that at present, Portugal continues to need foreign investment. Instead, the PCP stresses that the European Security Conference is to deal with the issues of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In truth, the MFA's leaders

see the West as the only source of the capital needed to revitalise the Portuguese economy. And quite apart from the continued adaption of Portugal's Armed Forces to US arms, there is the ancient Portuguese tradition symbolised by the Anglo-Portuguese alliance of looking to the sea for protection against the spectre of a united Iberia. Such a view is not without implications for US policy-makers since it suggests that a policy of economic and military help to the Lisbon regime may result in continued US ability to use facilities in Portugal and the Azores for NATO and training purposes as well as the denial of similar facilities to the USSR.

Still, Portuguese foreign and defence policy is going to reflect primarily the internal needs of the MFA regime. There are two roads open to the regime. The first would be to realise its own isolation. Before the voting, military sources were suggesting that 40% of the people might, as Commander Jesuino asked, spoil their ballots. 7% did so. 71% of the votes were cast for parties (PS, PPD, CDS) which clearly stand for civilian control. Needless to say, any civilian regime would have to accept the economic and social moves that have already taken place—which would be by no means repugnant to Mario Soares and the PS—and to accept the special and privileged position of the Armed Forces in respect of budgetary allocations. A number of Latin American models come rather easily to mind, as does post-1961 Turkey.

The other alternative is that Gonçalves will move forward, that the isolation of PCP and the MFA will drive them closer together. The gradual suppression of the Constituent Assembly and of the democratic parties—no doubt on the grounds that they do not represent the real feelings of the Portuguese people and are in any case divisive—and the removal from power of moderates such as Costa Gomes and Antunes as well as Gonçalves' radical rivals such as Admiral Coutinho, would form the next act of the drama. A needed player would be the 'outside reactionary threat to the regime' and it appears that the US CIA, possibly together with the Franco regime in Spain, has been cast for that role.

Portuguese democrats would be hurt by such a development. US and UK interests would also be damaged, the extent depending on whether the Portuguese adopted a pro-Soviet or 'third world' position (as Admiral Coutinho and others in the Portuguese Navy seem to wish). In the long run, would it really help the PCP?

Neither the experiences of Communists in Indonesia or the Sudan, nor the Muslim Brotherhood experience with Nasser, nor even (if it comes to that) the adventures of Plato or Voltaire as advisers to Princes suggest that the PCP will benefit in the long run. On the one hand, insofar as Cunhal and his associates confine themselves to acting as a transmission belt for the regime's orders, their popular base and image, epecially among Portuguese workers, is inevitably eroded. If, or more correctly, to the extent that they act to remind the MFA of PCP supporters' demands, they will inevitably awake MFA suspicion. No matter how pro-PCP Gonçalves may be, he intends that he, rather than Cunhal, shall run Portugal. PCP statements—and given the Communist ideological heritage it is most difficult for the PCP to dispense with these especially as it will be trying to assure its

militants that, despite appearances, it has not sold out to the MFA—that it is the 'vanguard' of the revolution will not advance matters.

The alliance between radical army and radical party tends to be a temporary one. Having taken control of all other sources of power, why should not the military directly enter the business of rousing mass enthusiasm and creating a non-governmental means for feeding back information and transmitting instructions? Golkar in Indonesia, the Liberation Rally (since transmuted in several steps into the Arab Socialist Union) in Egypt, the gradual displacement of the civilian leadership of the Ba'th in Syria after 1963 show the way this question has been answered in other lands. The comments of Commander Jesuino and others suggest the same impulse can be found in Lisbon. As against these gloomy portents, the PCP can look only to Havana where the alliance between military chief (who, however, was not the product of an Army but rather the creator of an independent ideologically-motivated force) and Communist Party did work out. Even there, the cost was to enshrine Castro as a genuine, if self-taught, Communist accordingly entitled to give orders to Cuban Communists.

For the PCP there is one fatal temptation—that of speeding up the wheels of history. Both the PKI and the Sudanese Communist Party were drawn into such efforts and both were destroyed. One might say that the Armed Forces as an institution, having become used to determining its own fate, instinctively reacts when an alliance is formed with an outside body the more especially as those officers who are opposed to a Communist effort to take over are aware of the limitations of Communist popular support. Yet the breaks in the Sudan and Indonesia, just as the break in Egypt between Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood, proceeded from the need of the military to eliminate the one force left that was not under their control, however cooperative it may have been, and which because of its own commitments must oppose them on what seemed issues of importance (in Egypt, the treaty with the UK in Sudan, moves to unite with Egypt and Libya) and which might serve as a base for someone who could overthrow them. It may be added that such repressions, when they come, are much less enjoyable for Communist party members than is sitting as a parliamentary opposition. However that may be—and the situation is bound to undergo many changes before it stabilises—anti-Communist demonstrations in Northern and Central Portugal have in the last few weeks been mounted with unprecedented ferocity. Signs are that a de-facto alignment between moderate officers and the 'third world' radicals against Gonçalves and the pro-PCP group, PS and PPD, indicate a willingness to accept non-PCP-influenced Army rule. Eventually, it may be surmised, a new leader—one acceptable to Alvaro Cunhal and his supporters as well as to the many other warring factions—will emerge to take command.

Mao, paraphrasing Trotsky, remarked that 'Political power comes from the barrel of a gun'; an un-Marxist sentiment but one of great importance for the PCP. For in Portugal, unlike Prague, it is not the Communists but the Armed Forces which hold that gun.

the level of ecclesiastical bureaucracy. Many a 'relevant' prayer looks as if its list of politically proper petitions had been compiled by a religious affairs correspondent for *The Guardian*. Thus the Almighty is perpetually assailed by references to American bombing but is kept in discreet ignorance about mass murders of 'collaborators' by the Viet-Cong. The judgements implied by these political prayers can be morally parasitic in the sense that Swedish judgements on the actions of America are frequently parasitic, i.e. they reflect the easy moral superiority of those not directly participating in a bloody and ghastly conflict. Meanwhile, Czechoslovakia disappears from sight since the repression of *its* people is relatively successful. When repression is successful the rest is silence, politically, ecclesiastically and journalistically. This is *not* to provide a blanket defence of America in Vietnam; it *is* to protest against selective and parasitic moral judgements. When the Rev. the Lord Soper proposes to commemorate 'Bloody Sunday' out of all the possible objects of such commemoration in Northern Ireland, one suspects that the usual criteria are operative: all atrocities are 'understandable' *except* those committed by young men in British uniforms. Whatever else may be true in the dense, opaque world of ethical judgements about the political sphere, one can at least rejoice in the certainty that the British *must* be wrong. After all, they have often been wrong in the past, especially in Ireland, so one can't go far wrong in assuming *a priori* that they are wrong in the present.

Another variation on the theme that all sub-cultures are equal can be found in the area of liturgical 'reform'. Here the arguments run parallel to those employed in the sphere of educational 'reform'. In the educational sphere it is widely suggested that because high culture has in the past been so much coextensive with the world of sensitive persons within the privileged classes then we have no right to extend this privilege to those who, up to yesterday, had been deprived of it. It is simultaneously suggested that the relatively disprivileged are in possession of a deep, racy, vital way of life *and* deluged by the corrupt products of the mass media. To listen to some people one would suppose that it was really the cultured segment of the bourgeoisie which was deprived on account of being exposed to the bloodless dictates of organised thinking and the emasculating influence of Beethoven and Shakespeare. To make available, let alone impose, the most profound reach of the European mind, is to engage in an act of intolerance analogous to cultural imperialism. All tastes, like all opinions, are equal and to attempt any refinement of judgement is to engage in ideological superimposition. The effort to propagate high culture more widely than hitherto is mere élitism wrecking the integrity of a way of life founded on the conspicuous vitality of *The Sun, News of the World* and Independent Television. Even to force reading and writing on him, let alone reading Shakespeare, is an offence against the spontaneous preferences of the working-class child.

By the same token, to fill up the minds of the innocent young with mechanically acquired gobbets from sublime achievements like King James's Bible is an act of authoritarian élitism. After all, there are other sacred

scriptures extant, so why should they be expected to know something of their own sacred scriptures? To know it by heart offends against the deeper understanding which comes from vaguely intuiting the general sense of a passage. And, after all, how relevant is the world of shepherds, cups running over and still waters? It would clearly be more to the point to organise a project on contemporary Israel and the amenities of life on the Kibbutzim. (Hence the enormous sales of Bruno Bettelheim.) All cultures are equal except *past* cultures, which are conspicuously less equal than others, especially if they are merely European. One must be tolerant to the restricted speech of the average man, and bear with the flat cadences of bureaucratic prose, but one must *not* tolerate the simplicity and richness of the English language at the highest point of its development. To induct young people into *that* is to offend against the canons of modern communication rather than to extend the range of their experience and power of expression. It appears that the young are too educated to accept the doctrinal teachings of Christianity and too *un*educated to be sensitive to the beauties of the traditional forms in which it has been expressed. The tide of sophistication is rising so fast that the contemporary young are incapable of understanding forms of expression which were mastered with ease by untutored peasants.

Such appear to be the reasonings of ecclesiastical bureaucrats, trendy clergy and liturgical reformers. Faced by what they believed to be the appetite of a creature they labelled 'Modern Man', they laid impious hands on the traditional liturgy. They were further encouraged in this by the politics of ecumenism both within and between churches. Previous attempts at union had proposed that each church should bring its own peculiar inheritance into the common treasury of 'the coming great church'. With the failure of these attempts, contemporary churchmen felt it might be so much easier to unite around some flat and ephemeral creation of their own. In any case, they found references to the unhealthy spiritual condition of mankind rather offensive to humanistic conviction. How could they appeal to men of goodwill when the liturgy suggested that the wills of men were far from good?

It was in this atmosphere that they proposed experiments, knowing that words like experimentation suggested an open approach to innovation. They would also suggest the possibility of spontaneous pieties based on impulse rather than the stable and disciplined devotions of the Book of Common Prayer. Clergy and people would like an opportunity to express themselves.

Just as educational reform is not 'teacher proof', so liturgical reform is not 'clergy proof'. The chaos in education, widely believed to be creative, is merely chaos. The common prayer of the church has dissolved into a mish-mash of local options, sinking to whatever is the level of the participants rather than bringing all up to the level of an accepted standard of dignity and beauty. Those with other standards are inhibited from expressing their revulsion by the rhetoric of equality. The equality of all opinions has resulted in the deprived acting so as to ensure their own deprivation. In education, 'respect' for local culture imprisons people at the level they have

inherited. In the church, respect for democratic option allows a chaotic slide to a liturgy of shreds and patches, varying from area to area. Prayers are sliced, omitted, irrelevantly patched and amended. Enough modern words are inserted to trip up the tongue but not enough to make the prose genuinely contemporary. Extempore effusions dislocate the action and distract the mind. The reformers leave some of the traditional forms at the centre, rather like urban planners isolating the town church in order to prove that they really do understand and respect the past. Yet, if traditional language obstructs understanding and offends the faithful, why is it left at the point where communicating with the communicant is all-important? If the Sanctus demands elevation of language, it is difficult to see why the Prayer for the Church Militant should not embody equivalent dignity of expression.

The arguments for vandalism on this scale have all the persuasiveness of recent arguments for changing the rules of football. In both cases the actual issues are ignored to enable a crackpot activism to initiate and promote its favourite panacea. If falling gates occur at football matches and fewer members appear at parish communion, then the game is to blame in the one case and the form of the liturgy in the other. Happily, the arguments of those anxious to change football are not backed up by a prestigious theory of long-term secularisation pretending to set the decline of gates in the perspective of inevitable decline. In the case of football, it would appear that people on the whole prefer watching 'Match of the Day' by their firesides to standing in the cold on some windy and dangerous terrace. And it would also seem they would not be enticed back by the prospect of scores of 20-12 rather than 2-1. Similarly, in a society where every kind of large-scale participation is running into difficulty, the mass of the population is not to be brought back to mass or holy communion by saying that it is the 'nature' as distinct from the 'property' of God always to have mercy. As 'Songs of Praise' is to liturgy so 'Match of the Day' is to league football. There are large-scale forces at work; they are not the forces which provide the conventional excuses for liturgical vandalism. The hazards of public worship have always been considerable. One never knew when there might be a descent into the grislier reaches of hymnody or an outbreak of 'happy' music or the adoption of some meretricious ditty parasitic on pop or folk or both. But there were consolations available in the disciplined devotion and dignity of the Church's common prayer. Phrase after phrase would illumine without obtrusive particularity or flashy insistence whole ranges of human existence and experience. These consolations have now largely been removed.

Another area of bogus equality is predicated of the relationship between 'the mature' and 'the young'. The older generation is made to bear the whole weight of the consequence of sin and the younger generation claims a redemption wrought not by grace but 'just naturally'. They have a faith in being natural and the older generation is itself enough infected by this faith to lose confidence in its right to socialise and maintain intellectual and moral standards. Clergy cooperate in the myth of youthful innocence

by praising adolescent folly: they see in it a heart-warming idealism or a refreshing 'lack of hypocrisy'. Like social workers, both clergy and parents are infected by a fear of being 'judgemental'. This means in practice that they are incapable of articulating their own moral convictions and leave the young open to the standards of peer-group culture. What began as a proper reluctance to condemn and alienate and as a proper desire to understand this or that vagary or deviance has become an infinite tolerance for every variety of offensive conduct. The doctrines of natural, spontaneous goodness and of the inherent corruption of social institutions paralyse the will of those whose role it is to be guardians of those institutions. To know all may be to forgive all, but it is not to *allow* all. Where everything is allowed, the bully has carte-blanche to lord it over the weak and the conformities of adolescent sub-culture are able to eliminate the promptings of the individual conscience. Egalitarian individualism unchecked by responsible authority concludes in the unchecked domination of collective standards and of fashion. The thrust toward existentialism leads authorities and parents to refrain from the necessity of choice in the belief that 'choice' is a natural attribute of the young. It is, of course, true that moral standards cannot be established as true by fiat of authority; it does not follow that people in positions of authority, whether parents, teachers, clergymen or politicians, should never articulate their own moral convictions. Young people actually desire and respect moral guidance. What they rightly despise is an authority frightened of being called 'authoritarian' and élites who turn tail at the charge of élitism.

In spite of what has just been said, equality *is* a basic Christian doctrine, both as regards the universal implication of the human race in the taint of evil and the universality of the means of redemption. More than that, the deepest probings of the New Testament suggest the equality of God and Man achieved in the human history of salvation: Christ thought it not robbery to be placed on equality with God. Yet the divine transcendence is not destroyed by some notion of the universal immanence of God in all humanity and in nature. God suffers with mankind in human form but he is not coextensive with the ambiguities of human nature or the amoral necessities of the world of nature. God, man and nature are not the co-equal elements in the undifferentiated unity of the All. Perfection suffers imperfection, but is not radically compromised by it. The divine is 'encountered' as what is beyond nature and other than man. He is not merely the ground of an 'encounter group', but the apex of Being. The radical equality of all men in His sight is complemented by their radical inequality before the Divine Majesty. All men are created equal *by* God; they are not created equal *with* Him. No doubt it is right to discern the divine lineaments obscurely present in everybody from Edward Heath to John Lennon, but they are not appropriate objects of worship.

It is here that a sentimental humanism rejects any sense of the universality of sin and compromises transcendence by assimilating it to the ambiguity of the human moral substance and the amorality of nature. Naturalism and pantheism are inherently non-moral: they are permissive in that they

tolerate *equally* the highest saintliness and the grossest wickedness. Yet this is not a sphere where everything is 'equal'. Equality in the taint of evil is a doctrine which safeguards the common condition of humanity without compromising the distinction between good and evil or even between relative good and relative evil. It doesn't allow anyone to believe that Dachau has nothing to do with *his* culture or nothing to do with *him*.

Much contemporary theology attempts to safeguard the equality of men not only by stressing the common elements in human aspiration but by a validation of the human essence. It is this latter form of radical egalitarianism which destroys all discrimination. Where humanity as such is a source of revelation, there is no distinction between truth and falsehood, or good and evil. Hitler or Charles Manson become as much vehicles of divine revelation as Christ. A theology which began as a defence of humanity against the denigrations of theology easily ends in a validation of inhumanity. The Athanasian Creed is not often thought of as an egalitarian manifesto. But it does assert two fundamental forms of equality. First, it gives expression to the idea of the humanity of God. Second, it declares that this involves levelling up not levelling down: 'not by the conversion of the Godhead into flesh but by taking of the manhood into God'.

[Professor David A. Martin is Professor of Sociology at the London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London). Publications include books on pacifism, English religion, the university crisis and the secularisation process. He is a regular contributor to the *Times Higher Education Supplement*, *Encounter* and the *Times Literary Supplement*.]

THE ANCESTRY OF GUILD SOCIALISM

by Lord Sudeley

INTEREST in the various ways that workers might be enabled, not just to negotiate for higher wages, but to participate in all the decisions which might affect their industrial destiny, has been much stimulated by multi-national companies. Much of our industrial unrest, particularly in the motor industry, is due to the remoteness of the control exercised by a multi-national company. In such companies workers resent the way that decisions are made about their lives by men they never see; and it is contrary to the philosophy of the Tories, who are the national party, that such decisions should be reached overseas. The participation of workers in their various industries has also been made more pertinent by our membership of the Common Market. It is something which occurs in most other countries of the EEC: for instance, Holland and France and, to a still greater extent, Germany, which has combined such participation with a very prosperous economy.

Plans for worker participation have been envisaged on both sides of the political spectrum. The TUC have advocated plans, though it is to be suspected that their approach is ambivalent. The raison d'être of the TUC lies in a conflict with the employers, so we may suppose that they are shy of whatever might put harmony and cohesion in its place. It may be, therefore, that whatever plans the TUC may sanction will ensure that the old conflict continues, only it will be brought into the boardroom. The Labour Party, therefore, which depends on the TUC, advocates participation—Harold Wilson has spoken on the subject—though it is to be noted that nothing was said about participation in the Queen's Speech which heralded the present administration. At the other end of the political spectrum the CBI and the Conservative Party welcome participation without that measure of ambivalence. If the Conservatives had remained in power, the subject would by now have been accorded the sanction of an official Green Paper.

It is hard to see in this phenomenon of worker participation, which has become a topical issue over the past few years, more than a mild variant of the old guild socialism which flourished in the First World War and after until about 1924. It was the avowed purpose of that movement to establish economic democracy. Much theory was written on this theme by left-wing intellectuals of the period, particularly G. D. H. Cole, who advocated that the capitalist system as he knew it should be abolished: first, so that the workers might have the control over their industrial destinies placed in their own hands; secondly, so that any enterprise concerned with manufacture might aim at selling well made goods at a fair price, rather than cheap goods with the capitalists' eye solely on profit. Once industry was conducted on these lines society would become divided not horizontally, on a cash or class basis; but vertically, according to what was the character of everyone's work or vocation, and in his book *Self Government in Industry* G. D. H.

Cole envisaged that the various guilds through which such an end might be achieved should be unified in a central Guild Congress, to be accorded the same degree of sovereignty in the state as Parliament. On the practical level, which was much more limited, the National Guilds League was formed in 1915 with the purpose of converting the Trades Unions, and the guild socialist movement gained a large following in railways, coalmining and the building industry, rather than other branches of industry with which the movement ought to have become so much concerned: all the industry, that is, concerned with manufacturing things cheaply rather than well.

The guild socialism of that time, like the worker participation of today, stands out as a political issue which, espoused though it may be by the left, belongs also to the right. Liberal politics may have been the creed of astute men of business, who recognise how most of the power in a democracy lies in the economy, and they do not wish for any political interference in that sphere. Yet we on the far right do not approve of the political liberty which was advocated by the liberals of the last century as a smokescreen behind which to exercise economic oppression. It was that which caused such misery in the last century, and stimulated the growth of a Trade Union movement which has over-reached itself and so threatens Armageddon today. Moreover, the vertical division of society which G. D. H. Cole suggested in his advocacy of guild socialism commends itself to us. Such a division of society was envisaged by Maurras in *Mes Idées Politiques*, and by Dr. Salazar in his dream of a corporative state.

The thinking of the guild socialists, as of Salazar and ourselves, was derived from the order of things as they used to be in the Middle Ages. A book on the restoration of the mediaeval guilds by Arthur J. Penty, architect and mediaevalist, is commonly regarded as the origin of guild socialism. Penty gained much food for his thought from another reformer and a greater student of architecture in the Middle Ages, John Ruskin, who expressed his best ideas on these matters in *The Stones of Venice*. As aesthetes, both Ruskin and Penty reached their position in protest against the unfortunate conditions of their time. During the 19th century, many of the articles manufactured were of a hideous character, as all the work was carried out on machines, and orientated entirely towards the consumer. Unlike their ancestors, the mediaeval craftsmen, the workers who produced these articles were dull mechanical stooges who derived no pleasure from what they had to do.

The decline of any universal practice of artistry or craftsmanship was due not only to the introduction of machinery. Changes in society and of aesthetic convention had likewise decreed a diminishing scope for the artist. By the 19th century, artists were as a rule forced outside the social fabric altogether: poor, isolated, Bohemian figures living in attics, who rebelled against order and morality. Before the 19th century, the scope for art was limited, even though not to the same degree. In the 18th century, and back to the time of the Renaissance, the artist may have enjoyed the sanction and patronage of highest authority. But it was not the principal function of art to give expression to popular taste which, though coarse, is breathing

and vivid: so compared with mediaeval times, little was done by ordinary craftsmen. Art catered principally for the tastes of an aristocracy, and was the creation of a select and brilliant few. During the 18th century, and under the neo-classical revival, the high and noble purity of expression such as exists in Greek sculpture, was praised and overworked to such a degree that it became confused with the lack of any expression at all. Before then, Corneille and Racine had written of noble characters so far removed from the life of the street in so elevated a way as to outstrip the high style of the ancient dramatists they had to set out to imitate. Under the Renaissance, Raphael depicted figures which are so noble in their expression as to be insipid. No other Italian artist of the Renaissance achieved an elevated aristocratic style of painting on the plane of Raphael; and the appeal of Raphael to the popular imagination is remote indeed compared with the mediaeval Giotto, whose frescoes show so singular a gift for telling a simple story.

In the halcyon period of the Middle Ages, however, the unhappy conditions of art and work that I have suggested did not exist. Art had a more popular appeal, the satisfaction of which was the task of many humble, forgotten and anonymous craftsmen, rather than of a celebrated few. And whereas during the 19th century the purpose of work was directed towards the consumer, in the Middle Ages it also satisfied the producer. In the Middle Ages the most ordinary man could gratify his creative or artistic impulse in making articles for everyday use. Penty says: 'When we consider the external life of the Middle Ages what most impresses us is the marvellous and universal beauty of everything that has survived to our own time. The mediaeval period was not only great in its architecture but the very humblest forms of craftsmanship, even the utensils were beautiful'. In ecclesiastical architecture, as the great artistic achievement of the Middle Ages, all were engaged as a great corporate enterprise. Whereas the names of the architects of all the principal buildings of the Renaissance are celebrated, the architects of our cathedrals are for the most park unknown. The beauty of our cathedrals consists in the work of many ordinary craftsmen. And such was the satisfaction that mediaeval craftsmen in cathedrals and elsewhere derived from what they did, so strongly might they feel in this a sense of vocation, that they had little inclination to rebel against the established order, like their posterity in the 19th century. All of the protest against wealth in his time, says Ruskin, arose because work had acquired so degrading a character that wealth might be looked on as the only source of pleasure.

Quite apart from the greater intrinsic satisfaction to be derived from its performance, the organisation of work in the Middle Ages attracted the propagators of guild socialism. In their wish to eliminate the production of anything that was cheap and shoddy, because it had been made merely for the sake of profit, the guild socialists set out to eradicate competition. If, during the Middle Ages, competition had scarcely existed, that was principally because the guilds which controlled the production of goods and made sure of their quality used to impose a mass of restrictions on the free

course of trade. If, as the guild socialists desired, work was to be organised under Trades Unions as powerful self-governing bodies, rather than according to the capitalists' rules of a free market, that implied that all members of a Trades Union should form a much more significant society amongst themselves. Our mediaeval ancestors participated much more in the guilds which regulated their work than workers participate in their Trades Unions today. Apart from their religious character, no longer relevant in a latter day, many of the guilds were social bodies, not unlike friendly societies in which, for instance, men would drink together, and take care of the impoverished members.

As all that I have said about the guilds and their relationship to guild socialism may appeal both to the left and right, I will conclude with one more observation which concerns just the right. Political freedom does not exist where every few years each citizen votes for a centralised government. The link between each of the citizens who votes, and the government itself is too eviscerated—and the real power lies more in the economy than with the electorate. A proper degree of freedom can exist only through membership of some institution or corporate body within the state. Examples of such institutions have been manifold: for instance, the family, the local church and other governing bodies of the region. In the Middle Ages, before government became so over-centralised, such institutions were much more significant than they are today—and the guilds, occupying the essential field of the economy, were perhaps the best of all the institutions under which our ancestors might enjoy so full a degree of their liberty.

[Lord Sudeley, author and journalist, has been President of the Montgomeryshire Society, appeared on television with Bernard Levin, and on 13 June 1973 brought a debate before the House of Lords on the export of MSS. He has also spoken in the House of Lords on the reform of the House, divorce, higher education, parish records (this speech republished in the September 1971 issue of the journal of the Society of Genealogists), overseas aid, political freedom in Greece, the Church of England (Worship and Doctrine) Measure, and literacy.]

THE DEMISE OF THE LODGING HOUSE AND HOSTEL

by Peter Beresford

REDEVELOPMENT, inflation and upgrading are all now responsible for the death of large lodging houses and hostels. Many tears seem to be being shed over their demise, mostly it seems by those who would never have had to stay in them. Few of those who use them seem to mourn their passing. The real problem is, perhaps, not so much that they are disappearing as that there is still a need for them: that men and women are still turning to dosshouses for want of somewhere more suitable to live. Large lodging houses are not all alike. They vary in conditions, facilities and purpose. There are municipal, voluntary and commercial, secular and evangelical, large and smaller undertakings; but a night spent in one is a better guide to them all than generalisations appealing for their preservation.

Such sampling of someone else's life has tended to move in two directions: one, as a journalistic device and, second, dignified with its own rules and discipline as a sociological tool. 'Participant observation', as this has come to be called, can be of value so long as its limitations are recognised and respected. For it cannot put the observer into his subject's skin, or let him see his world as he does or share the same experience, for he comes to it with different expectations and intentions, intellectualises his experience and knows it is merely an interlude. What it can do is allow him the opportunity to observe the people and places with which he is concerned as a fly on the wall and that is how it can help us to see dosshouses.

If this lodging house is not typical, it is perhaps because there is no such thing as one that is. It is worse than some, better than others, but thousands of men live in places little different.

Only the entrance is visible from the street. On one side a hoarding, on the other a tenement. Behind, Victorian storeys filled with more than four hundred beds. Inside, a dirty linoleum floor and a wall of notices telling residents what they must and cannot do. The only clean bit of wall is where the queue rubs its back against it at the booking office. It opens at 6.30 p.m. for newcomers. The queue forms early. The man at the gate is friendly, his swelling stomach divided in two by his thick leather belt.

Suddenly the deputy warden appears, arguing with a diminutive old white-haired Irishman.

'You wet the bed last night.'

'I didn't wet the bed.'

'Why weren't you in till six this morning?'

'The man next bed, clacky clack, all the time, clack clack, so I went out. I didn't inspect the bed. I just lay on top.'

'If you must come back half-cut what do you expect? Now clack clack yourself through that gate.'

'Sir, I didn't wet the bed.'
'Get through that door and don't ever come here again.'

The little Irishman goes through the door. It is too much of a commonplace for anyone to take much notice. The deputy warden reappears later, seeing the chance to buy a watch cheap from a resident, bargains hard and cuts him down.

Then along the long, drab, stone floored corridor that looks like the way to a nineteenth century infirmary mortuary and on into the hostel hall, the only place residents have here other than their bed. Once a factory floor, it seems huge and cavernous, dwarfing the small figures huddled alone or with others round chipped plastic topped tables on hard uneven chairs. They look tatty, sitting there, still in their hats and coats. In the summer there is nowhere safe to put them, except by paying extra for one of the inadequate luggage lockers and in the winter it is too cold without them. The shabby chairs and tables are in long brown rows around the room. The flooring is old, worn and filthy; a picture of discoloured yellow cream paint and high ceilings. Smells of dirt, damp, people and dust are in the air. With unconscious irony a notice on the wall invites residents to a group discussion every Monday at 6.30 p.m. on the subject, 'Do social workers really help?' Some attempt is being made to repaint the hall. So far the ceiling has been done. Someone says it has taken them months to do that much. But with the dirty cream pillars blotched with the fresh paint and the drabness of the rest, it looks as if no amount of repainting in institutional colours could make this any less dingy and depressing a place. During one stay, some effort had been made to show that it was Christmas, with tired looking streamers and lots of little signs up and down the hall with messages of goodwill. But their wishes for a good new year had a hollow ring and 'Fear not, I bring you Tidings of Great Joy' seemed a joke in the poorest taste. If it is the abnormality of residents that commentators have almost always emphasised, it is the abnormality of the institution that most strikes the observer.

Some sit silent, others in conversation. Silence is seen as part of their pathology, but what else is to be expected, set among strangers in such circumstances? Before the hall fills, some sit on their own at tables, but others are definitely together and, when they go, they don't all leave as individuals but in little groups or one man walking with another. At meals it is surprising how much noise there is from conversation. Others sit reading the paper. A group of men who look as though they have been drinking together, sit together. One man is making funny noises and shouting. Another is trying to scrounge a cigarette paper. A third wanders about half-looking for fag ends—as likely to be left here as tips under saucers. Irishmen greet each other with 'Hello, there', and chatting. The Irish never seem alone in a lodging house. They give the impression that being Irish is a passport to having people to talk to. A man who has been going round the tables trying to sell a pair of socks for 3p eventually finds an old man to buy them. Grey hair and grey faces, generally toothless, predominate. Almost every move reveals limps, stiff joints, artificial limbs and bowed out

feet. The old and the crippled sit clutching their sticks, beards hiding their faces: others are unshaven, or half-shaved and bloodied. It is not easy to shave neatly without a proper mirror, especially with an old, unsteady hand. It is a fight to keep clean here. Some carry toothbrushes in their pockets. Unbuttoned overcoats show crumpled suits that don't fit, with patches of different colour, dirt and stains. There is nowhere safe to keep your clothes at night except to sleep on top of them or wear them. Many shoes are in need of repair. One man wears rubber overshoes without any shoes inside, another's are slit at the sides.

Residents are not allowed to remain in the lodging house during the day. They have to leave between 9 and 12, 1.45 and 4. It is said this is to facilitate cleaning, although there is never any sign of this when they return; or that it is against by-laws for them to remain inside, but then so it is perhaps for the beds to be so close together and for there to be no proper fire escape. Wet or dry, cold or warm, users are turned out to wander the streets, fit in the hand-outs or do any of the other free things that offer respite or shelter. A security guard at the nearby covered shopping precinct who, with more conscience, lets them be, says, 'What can you do, you can't chuck the old blokes out with nowhere to go. I've got regulars who've come wandering into here over four or five years. They can stay as long as they move around'. Others cluster in an open space near the hostel entrance, one man feeding pigeons with crumbs from his lunch—more pleasure in the pigeons' enjoyment than in eating it himself.

The residents' day is made up of a few unexceptional and isolated events. Waiting, particularly waiting in queues, joins them together. The lodging house is a waiting room where nothing happens and nothing is worth waiting for. Everything is waiting: waiting, as now, for the canteen shutter to open, then, until told to get out, to be allowed in and to go up to bed. A queue to book in, a queue to get meal tickets, a queue to get a meal and the small number of lavatories means that you must queue there too. The lodging house imposes a harsh stamp on its users, dictating how they spend their day, killing time. Cigarettes and tobacco seem the only mercy. The other residents are perhaps the only comfort this place offers.

The food, at prices little cheaper than in the cafes outside, could hardly be called charity. It is served on plastic plates with a permanent yellow grease stain in the middle. Pre-sweetened tea is served in a cup ingrained with dirt around the rim. And at a quarter to two, it's 'Come on, lads, time to go' from one of the workers, chivvying us along for another of the day's ritual comings and goings, but in a nice way, not hectoring or bullying. The workers are not always so considerate. But please understand and sympathise with them also! This organisation recruits them from its residents to do its dirty work for a few pounds a week, and the rest of us might also slip into such unfeeling ways if our sensibilities were daily subjected to this kind of occupation for this kind of pay.

In the evening, for those returning from work and those who don't go out to drink away their troubles, there is nothing to do in the hostel but sit at a table, watch TV or go up to the dormitory. People go to bed early in

this as in other institutions which, for some reason, insist on their inmates rising early, although there is nothing for them to do all day. Forty or fifty in their hats and coats on rows of hard chairs are watching the TV high on the wall. It seems a grim comedy, but some laugh at the jokes. Every half hour, starting early, comes a yell for those who want to go up to bed and the expanding iron gate barring the green painted staircase is unlocked to slide aside, and so on up the cold stone stairs.

Sixty beds in the dormitory, bed after bed and only separated by the distance of the wooden chairs between them. There is no light in the dormitory. In the morning, we see the walls, brown and yellow, and the yellow ceiling. Jock, in the dark in the next bed, pulls back the cover and runs a lighted match along the bedclothes, 'to see if there's anything alive and moving'. Someone else suggests, 'take off your clothes before you go to bed and brush yourself down in the morning'. Men quietly smoking in bed and talking across the room. The darkness makes for a bit of privacy. There are shouts in the night in the distance. A man two beds along laughs to himself and now says, 'You dirty bastards', with some finality. Jock lies during the night, eyes closed, with dignity, smoking. It's a night of coughing and talking and all the sounds of the body, quiet laughing, moaning, snoring and coughing, coughing, coughing. A night disturbed by others, men padding across the way to the lavatory. And in the morning, the blocked lavatories are awash and the dormitory floor is soaked in places.

Men try to wash and then the queue for breakfast: badly cooked and poor quality sausages and streaky bacon, two thin slices of margarined bread, marmalade extra, and plastic knives and forks. A worker gives a man a left-over breakfast, 'otherwise it would go to waste'.

'Fifty-two weeks a year and only one day a year they give you anything for nothing. A free Christmas dinner and the amount they make they could give you a free meal every day.' This is a problem perpetually perplexing residents, how an organisation which offers such inferior provision at 65p a night or £4.10 a week, can be anything but making a huge profit at the expense of their misfortune. It is a problem that may puzzle others as well. 'What do they do with all their money? They bank it.' Men complain how prices were put up when the freeze was supposed to be on. 'And it's supposed to be charity. Charity and we have to pay for it!' But if the men do pay for it and there is a plain financial transaction, they are nonetheless treated as if it were charity and the organisation campaigns as if it were free. 'They call us every kind of name. They want to do the same for those who run such places.' 'Any person who grows old in this world deserves a medal. The people who think this is a good thing should come and live here and see what it's really like. I've been here too damn long. The National Assistance keeps this place going by paying people only enough to stay here. It's in a rotten state and could be better if they tried. They all want coming down.'

But in the morning at nine o'clock when it is time to empty the building, a harsh bell rings and they wander off, only to return at the permitted time.

REHOUSING, LONDON NORTH...

When they were pulling the houses down,
Pushing them down rather for bulldozers
Are cheaper than fellows with picks and hammers,
There was infinite sadness in the exposed
Flapping wallpapers, the mid-air-suspended fireplaces,
The roofs, half untiled already, like rooks
More ragged than usual, black in the sour wind.

Great piles of broken brickwork whose snapping
Revealed astounding pure yellows and reds
Lay in random catastrophes
Over chrysanthemums and rose bushes, over
Broken cold frames, poor little fences
Green painted half a decade since, over crazy
Pavements once fringed with lobelia and alyssum.

When they were shoving the houses over
Some said, 'A good job too! They were crawling
With bedbugs under the rose-patterned paper,
The floorboards were rotten and the loos were
Collapsing at the rear ends.' But others
Remembering grandfathers, weddings, women in labour,
Children dead of the fever, courtships conducted
Under the pinched porches, gardeners
Sowing their Woolworth's seeds in hope for August or April,
Mourned inarticulately, moved to the shining towers
Heavy of heart, knowing their loss but unable
To tell the council officials why they sensed their deaths
In the new, lifted, uplifted and terrible towns in the sky.

FREDERIC VANSON

WILLIAM COLLINS (1721-1759)

by Christopher Fry

WILLIAM Hayley, Blake's friend, wrote William Collins's epitaph, Flaxman designed the memorial tablet in Chichester Cathedral, and they put the date of his death at three years too early. He was remembered, but inexactly. He lingers in our literature much as he loitered about the Close and the cloisters during those last three forgotten years. But after his death, Coleridge 'fed upon Collins' and Wordsworth wrote a poem to his memory:

> Now let us, as we float along,
> For him suspend the dashing oar;
> And pray that never child of song
> May know the Poet's sorrows more.
> How calm! how still! the only sound
> The dripping of the oar suspended!
> ——The evening darkness gathers round
> By virtue's holiest Powers attended.

In the silence that followed the death of Alexander Pope, the voice of Collins fell like water-drops foretelling the flood of the Romantic Movement to come. He was a reactionary innovator, looking back to Dryden and Spenser, while the spirit of the age used him to make a new beginning. In his poem *The Passions, an Ode to Music,* he looks even further back, to a romanticised ancient Greece:

> When Music, heavenly Maid, was young,
> While yet in early Greece she sung,
> The Passions oft to hear her Shell
> Throng'd round her magic cell . . .
> Why, Goddess, why to us denied?
> Lay'st thou thy ancient lyre aside? . . .
> 'Tis said, and I believe the tale,
> Thy humblest reed could more prevail,
> Had more of strength, diviner rage,
> Than all which charms this laggard age,
> Ev'n all at once together found,
> Cecilia's mingled world of sound.

One of the few things we know about him is that he loved music, and we can gain most pleasure from him now if we forget his passion for the abstract noun and the often sterile artifice of his adjectives and listen to him as we would listen to the sound of a musical instrument. Dr. Johnson, who loved him but thought his poetry odd, accused him of believing that 'not to write prose is certainly to write poetry'. To put it more sympathetically, Collins wanted to make poetry a language of its own, independent of common speech, the very opposite of our aim today. But we can still get an idea of how he sounded to his contemporaries by comparing him with other poets of his generation, with his friends Joseph and Thomas Warton, for instance, or Mark Akenside addressing his Muse:

> Queen of my songs, harmonious maid!
> Ah, why hast thou withdrawn thy aid?
> Ah, why forsaken thus my breast

With inauspicious damps oppress'd?

'Queen of my songs, harmonious maid!'; 'When Music, heavenly Maid, was young'; there is a difference.

Collins was a very belated addition to the family of Alderman Collins, hatter, of 21 East Street, thrice Mayor of Chichester, and his wife, the sister of a Lieutenant-Colonel; and perhaps some of his troubles sprang from being so much younger than his two sisters. There was a gap of sixteen years between him and the second girl. We can imagine the triple mothering he got. He probably went to the Prebendal School before going on to Winchester College, where he wrote some poems which were published in the *Gentleman's Magazine*. When he was twenty, and up at Oxford, his *Persian Eclogues* were published. He referred scoffingly to them later on as his 'Irish Eclogues', but Goldsmith thought highly of them, and they show a nice ear, particularly the first one, which also contains a witty conceit. He addresses the Persian young ladies:

> Self-flattering sex! Your hearts believe in vain
> That Love shall blind when once he fires the swain;
> Or hope a lover by your faults to win,
> As spots on ermine beautify the skin.

Gilbert White of Selborne gives us a pleasant glimpse of him while he was up at Oxford:

> It happened one afternoon, at a tea-visit, that several intelligent friends were assembled at his rooms to enjoy each other's conversation, when in comes a member of a certain college, as remarkable at that time for his brutal disposition as for his good scholarship; who, though he met with a circle of the most peaceable people in the world, was determined to quarrel; and though no man said a word, lifted up his foot and kicked the tea-table, and all its contents, to the other side of the room. Our poet, tho' of a warm temper, was so confounded at the unexpected downfall, and so astonished at the unmerited insult, that he took no notice of the aggressor, but getting up from his chair calmly, he began picking up the slices of bread and butter, and the fragments of his china, repeating very mildly, 'Invenias etiam disjecti membra poetae.'

White also said of him that he 'was always complaining of the dullness of a college life'. He could never settle down to a routine of work. His uncle the Lieutenant-Colonel said he was too lazy even for the Army. His father meant him for the Church, and he even got so far as applying to the Rector of Birdham for a curacy, but a tobacconist in Fleet Street dissuaded him. He spent his time, and his uncle's money, in the London coffee-houses and theatres, making many friendships, which endured, and many plans for work, which came to nothing. He was of middle height, with grey eyes; 'warm in his friendship, visionary in his pursuits'—whatever that may mean, except that he was said to love fairies, genii, giants and monsters—'and, as long as I knew him', writes Gilbert White, 'very temperate in his eating and drinking'. He spoke French, Italian, and Spanish, and his conversation delighted Samuel Johnson. A very pleasant young man who hadn't quite enough decision to find himself. Spasmodically he wrote unfinished poems and burnt them; but when he was twenty-four his twelve Odes were published. Odes by his old Wykehamist friend Joseph Warton came out at the same time. Warton, the inferior poet, had a success; Collins did not. He bought up the unsold copies and burned them. From then on he

was increasingly a prey to depression. When his uncle died, leaving him £2,000, he took himself off to France for a year or two, trying to escape from the mental shadows that were closing in. In his *Ode to Fear* he had written:

> Thou, to whom the world unknown
> With all its shadowy shapes is shown,
> Who see'st appalled the unreal scene . . .
> O Fear, I know thee by my throbbing heart . . .

But the calm and peace of his *Ode to Evening* is what we best remember him by. Reading the familiar opening lines is like hearing the first notes of a Haydn quartet:

> If ought of oaten stop, or pastoral song,
> May hope, O pensive eve, to soothe thine ear,
> Like thy own brawling springs,
> Thy springs, and dying gales . . .

How well that repetition of 'thy springs' works, the unexpected contraction of the tumbling brook in the line before, giving a sweep of *rallentando* to the quietening wind. The music so carries us we scarcely notice that the sentence beginning 'If ought . . . may hope to soothe thine ear' is left incomplete for twelve lines more, until we come to:

> Now teach me, maid composed,
> To breathe some softened strain,
> Whose numbers stealing through the darkening vale
> May not unseemly with its stillness suit,
> As musing slow I hail
> Thy genial loved return . . .

He uses rhyme only once or twice, and then almost accidentally, and yet the play of sound is so skilful the music is complete. A beautiful example is where he imagines himself sitting in a hut in the rain looking out over the view of

> . . . hamlets brown, and dim-discovered spires,
> And hears their simple bell, and marks o'er all
> Thy dewy fingers draw
> The gradual dusky veil . . .

'Bell', 'all', 'gradual', 'veil'. His manuscripts, his friends said, were scribbled over with corrections where he had searched for the exact sound he was after.

He returned to Chichester for the last four brain-sick years of his life, living with the younger of his two sisters, Mrs. Sempill, in her house off the cloisters. One fragment remains of the humour which had made him so companionable, six lines about a Cicestrian quack doctor:

> Seventh son of Doctor John,
> Physician and chirurgeon,
> Who hath travelled wide and far,
> Man-midwife to a Man of War,
> In Chichester hath ta'en a house,
> Hippocrates, Hippocratous.

The brothers Warton visited him in Chichester in September 1754. He was in great spirits the first day, and showed them a poem he had written called *The Bells of Arragon*, but on the second he was too ill to see them. Dr. Johnson, in answer to a letter from Joseph Warton, wrote: 'Poor dear

Collins! Let me know whether you think it would give him pleasure if I should write to him. I have often been near his state, and therefore have it in great commiseration'. Mrs. Sempill would evidently hear no talk of his being removed to an asylum, but after his death she destroyed all his papers, *The Bells of Arragon* among them, as though she blamed the poetry for her brother's distraction.

He was buried in the church where he had been christened thirty-eight years before, St. Andrew's in Oxmarket, not far from the house in East Gate Square where John Keats stayed sixty years later.

When he was at Winchester he told William Smith, another Chichester boy, of a dream in which he was climbing a high tree. He had nearly reached the top when a great bough broke and threw him to the ground. 'That tree was the Tree of Poetry', he said, and years afterwards, meeting Smith again, he said bitterly, 'You remember that dream?' Poetry had broken under him. But at least before he fell he picked some good fruit from the lower branches.

THE SKY'S THE LIMIT FOR NIGERIA

by Karl Lavrencic

DESPITE the upheaval of the civil war, the claim made by Nigerian Radio that the five-year National Development Plan launched by the recently deposed President Yakubu Gowon last March is 'the biggest, boldest and most promising development plan ever started in Black Africa' is no empty boast. With the great wealth coming from sales of oil, amounting to 5.3 billion naira, or over £3.7 billion, in 1974 Nigeria can disregard the matter of money. The plan envisages an investment totalling 30 billion naira, with two-thirds coming from the government sources and one-third from the private sector. The investment is more than ten times as large as in the previous five-year period and is designed to turn what is still largely a backward country of some 80 million into a community with a fair chance of prosperity even when oil wells dry up. Not surprisingly, education is a priority in a country where more than half the population is aged less than 20. One of the plan targets is to achieve compulsory universal primary education, meaning a fourfold increase of the present schooling capacities.

The first glimpse of Nigeria, on the way from the Ikeja airport to the centre of Lagos, made plain to me that this was a developing country in a class of its own. Buildings and projects were going up on both sides of the 12-mile road. Hoardings advertising all manner of consumer articles and cars, now accessible to a growing mass of the Nigerian people, spoke of affluence as well as aggressive expectations that the new riches had aroused. The slow progress of the bus—it took nearly three hours to reach the town as we negotiated our way through the incredible multitude of vehicles, many of them brand-new Mercedes—illustrated the problem of accommodating the new style of life to an infrastructure geared to infinitely more leisurely ways of the bygone colonial era. One felt there was too much money chasing too few goods, or anything that could be paid for, including services and hotel rooms. Ex-President Gowon, the hero of the civil war, whose wounds have largely been healed after five years of peace, presided in a somewhat old-fashioned and paternalistic way over the hustle and bustle of a people aroused to the promise of wealth and impatient at the slow advance. He could not or would not stop the massive pushing that manifested itself in numerous strikes for yet higher wages and student unrest. It was a miracle that with all the tensions and confusing and often contradictory claims of individuals, groups, tribes and regions, the country was kept together and work was done that will in time produce unheard-of improvements. It is perhaps the awareness that being a Nigerian means having a title to a share in the country's growing wealth that now constitutes the most powerful factor in the nation-building process that yet is far from completed.

The city of Lagos, whose population has grown some ten times over the past ten years to reach the present estimated 3 million, shows in a nutshell some of the problems that are faced by a country subjected to such breath-

taking development and changes. For instance, there are said to be about 500 inhabitants per acre in central Lagos, compared with 180 in New York's Manhattan. Mr. Kole Jordanovski, a Yugoslav architect and urban planner, was my first contact in a mission designed to look at some of the projects which the United Nations Development Programme is assisting in Nigeria with vitally needed expertise and equipment geared to the giant development plan. The cost of this intervention to the international organisation will be about 40 million dollars over the next five years. In this way, international technical assistance can be brought to bear on critical, selected areas without any stigma of neo-colonialism that would almost certainly attach to an exercise of this nature if it were done on a bilateral basis. The expatriate is advised to keep a low profile. He is there to fill an important gap, but in a subordinate position, knowing that he will stay for a limited period only and always under the proviso that his Nigerian counterpart will have in the meantime been trained to take over the job. 'Indigenisation' is a cornerstone of government policies.

Mr. Jordanovski won international reputation when he directed the Yugoslav side of the reconstruction of his native Skopje after an earthquake all but obliterated the city in 1963. He won further laurels in 1970, directing the rebuilding of Chimbote, in Peru, following a similar disaster. Yet such problems as he had been facing in his earlier career may have seemed small compared with the giant task of creating a masterplan for Lagos by 1978, his assignment under a UNDP project.

By next year an interim land-use plan should be ready for application, so that at least new constructions in the city are located in a planned manner, to avoid further congestion and chaos. Ultimately, the entire transport system will have to be reshaped. In the meantime, the Army may have to be called in to restore order in emergencies such as are likely to occur when the city will host the Black Arts Festival next November. The city's port, too, will be modernised to prevent the kind of situation that occurred last March when over one hundred ships were waiting to berth for up to forty days each.

In a pilot project centred at Otta, north of Lagos, the Nigerian government and the UNDP, together with FAO, ILO and UNICEF, have been tackling what may well be the hard core of the problem: how to make life in rural areas more enjoyable and stop young people from drifting to towns. The first five years of the project have just been completed, and the British Manager, Mr. Vincent Austin, loaned for the job from his National Agricultural Engineering College at Silsoe in Bedfordshire, told me of the valuable lessons learned from the 4-million dollar scheme. The project covered an area of 728 square miles with a rural and small-town population approaching 150,000. The farmers were helped to improve their working methods and provided with improved seeds, machinery and other material assistance. They were also encouraged to set up co-operatives which had no tradition in the area before. Collective farms, grouping about 50 families and their holdings, were also formed. Yields of such produce as rice, cassava and cocoa were substantially raised and on average the standard of living

of the farming population was about doubled. At the same time, a special effort was made to train young people in industrial skills, including wood and metal work, and job opportunities were provided for them. A highlight of the scheme was that thousands of people were brought in to do voluntary work, whereby appeals were made strictly to their self-interest rather than ideological motives. In this way a total of 77 miles of important rural feeder roads were built entirely by farmers' self-help.

Earlier this year, when the first phase of the operation ended, no appreciable desire could be detected on the part of the young to take on rural employment rather than move into Lagos. Yet this was half-expected. The government rightly refused to be discouraged. There is little doubt that rural life must be improved before there can be any hope of a change of attitude; indeed, before one can talk of progress in Nigeria, where some 70 per cent of the population live by farming. The project certainly proved that life in a rural area can be made very substantially more rewarding. The Nigerian government has now taken over the scheme and will use the experience in a nationwide movement to upgrade agriculture and rural life. Vast areas of land are being reclaimed for cultivation and, when necessary, brought under irrigation and thousands of extension workers are trained to help the farmer with expert advice. Since the oil boom began, farming as a whole declined but now, with the price of food rising rapidly and life in already overcrowded towns becoming distinctly unpleasant, especially for those without work, rural pursuits stand a good chance of rehabilitation and development.

Farming in Nigeria has often been frustrated by diseases to which plants are prone, especially in the humid tropics of the southern part of the country. Over the past few years something like 80 per cent of the staple root crop, cassava, has been affected in southern Nigeria by blight, with annual damage estimated at 25 million naira. At the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture, set up with the help of Ford Foundation and several other agencies and governments at Ibadan, a new strain of cassava has now been developed which is resistant to the disease and steps are being taken to distribute it. But the tragedy has highlighted the importance of preventing diseased plant-propagating material from entering Nigeria and indeed West Africa as a whole. To do this, a post-entry quarantine station is being built at Ibadan with the assistance of the UNDP. Dr. G. H. Berg, an American botanist in charge of the project, told me that the station, when completed by 1979, should be the most advanced in the world. The main features are glasshouses and close-circuit rooms in which plants are grown in isolation from the outside world to establish if any disease is present. A number of glasshouses are already in operation, but the more sophisticated close-circuit rooms have had to wait on account of a delay connected with electricity supplies. Delays in starting a project or operation, especially when sophisticated equipment or expertise are involved, are rather frequent in Nigeria. For this and other reasons it may seem unlikely that all the targets laid down by the five-year development plan will in fact be met and money spent as anticipated. Yet even if only a fair proportion

of the programme was carried out, it would represent a very substantial advance.

Nigeria, the world's seventh producer of oil, now supplies about one third of all US oil imports and about one seventh of the petroleum supplies of the United Kingdom. Crude petroleum accounts for over 90 per cent of the export earnings and dominates both the national income and State revenues. Understandably, Nigeria is looking for other natural riches that can be developed, apart from oil and gas. Iron has already been found in large quantities and will serve as a base for a giant steel complex to be built with Soviet assistance. Limestone provides the raw material for the cement industry developed in co-operation with British interests.

Another resource to whose potential the Nigerians have awakened is that of timber, as the hard wood forest reserve land stretches over some 20,000 square kilometres. Out of 200 million cubic metres of roundwood equivalent capable of industrial use, only 1½ million were taken out of the forest last year. But demand is growing very fast and, if not careful, Nigeria might well use up her timber wealth by the end of the century. A nationwide campaign has now begun to make people aware of the value of the forest, for production, protection and amenity. Meanwhile, FAO experts working under a UNDP project have been advising the government on management of the forest reserve, the establishment of forest-based industries and have been directing a huge operation designed to evaluate in some detail the available timber. For the first time in Africa, NASA-provided satellite imagery, in the visual spectrum and infra-red, is used to survey the forest region. This makes possible a fairly precise drawing of boundaries as between different types of vegetation and enables the observation of progressive changes over the year due to leaf fall or disease or removal of trees. Even more important, is that the encroachment or expansion of certain forest types can be seen from year to year. However, as Mr. Tom Dow, a Scot in charge of the UNDP/FAO scheme, pointed out, the technique has its limitations in a region so often overcast by cloud and haze. To obviate this, the Side-Looking Airborne Radar will be employed to provide microwave pictures which are unaffected by darkness or cloud. On the ground an army of nearly 1,000 men are surveying the forest land, using sophisticated tools. All data is sent to the centre at Ibadan for computerisation. The operation provides a good example of how modern science can speed up a process that might otherwise take many years to complete. Mr. Dow said he expected the entire work to be finished by the end of this year, with an indicative inventory of the high forest reserve in southern Nigeria.

As natural regeneration of the forest is negligible, tracts of available empty space in the reserve land and elsewhere in Nigeria are put under plantations, using soft wood trees for their relatively rapid growth. One of the uses of the wood will be to feed pulp and paper mills that are being erected to meet the expected voracious demand for the product in view of the fast expansion of population, expected to reach 250 million by 2020, and the present vast educational and literacy progress.

In the areas north of the confluence of the Niger and Benue rivers, accounting for the larger part of Nigeria, the planting of trees will help to protect ecology and environment from effects of drought, such as hit the region disastrously two years ago.

The northern part of Nigeria will present special problems to planners as the region has been less developed in the past even than the south. This is particularly the case with the largest and most populated of the 12 States in Nigerian Federation, North East State. But travelling on recently built tarmac roads that now connect the main towns of the region, one will not fail to notice signs of remarkable progress and prosperity. A hard-surfaced road linking the Lake Chad Basin with the capital of North East State, Maiduguri, now means that fish and farm produce from the potentially rich areas can be brought swiftly to the markets down south. A considerable proportion of the 45,000 tons or so of smoked and dried fish from the Basin found its way to Lagos last year, one thousand miles to the south.

An ice-making plant at Baga, on the Lake, will, for the first time, make it possible for the catches to be marketed fresh. The Chad Lake, whose surface shrank during the drought to little over one third of what it had been in the sixties, is now filling up and the water again reaches into Nigerian territory. But larger surface may eventually make fishing more difficult as the fish become less concentrated. This makes the present programme to help 150,000 or so fishermen and their families in the Basin with technical assistance all the more important. People from the four countries sharing the lake engage in fishing, but catches are mostly landed and marketed in Nigeria.

Transport is in many ways the key to progress in Nigeria, which explains why no less than seven billion naira is earmarked in the current five-year plan for the building of new roads, railways and ports and other communications. Nigerian Airways are getting 537 million naira to build 17 airports and for other modernisation. Industrial development receives 800 million naira compared with 2.2 billion that goes for agriculture and rural development and 2.5 billion for education.

In all this gigantic effort, the relatively small contribution made by UNDP funds has been designed to strengthen local capabilities in areas where, by mutual agreement with the Federal Planning Office in Lagos, external help can be employed to the best advantage. Emphasis is given to advisory services and training, while much of the finance for the larger items of equipment is expected to be provided from the country's own resources.

As a UN official said: 'The need is particularly for highly qualified and competent international experts to guide, mobilise and improve the already considerable local expertise rather than for relatively large teams of experts.'

In the huge field of formal and other education and vocational training, Nigerians are helped much by UNDP-supplied fellowships which enable advanced qualifications to be acquired by study abroad. Locally, the foreign expert will concentrate on 'training the trainers' rather than take

over the schooling directly.

A good example of a strikingly successful international intervention was the work of the International Civil Aviation Organisation under a UNDP project whose first phase ended earlier this year. The Centre, established in 1964, has been progressively put under Nigerian administration so that at the end only a small team of international instructors remained. By now, the Centre is supplying all the pilots that the Nigerian Airways needs and many other aeronautical personnel. But the more sophisticated equipment now being installed under the new plan, including navigational and landing aids, has made necessary more advanced training courses at the Centre in Zaria, in northern Nigeria, calling, in its turn, for more expatriate instructors and equipment.

In the sensitive field of industrial management, ILO experts have helped build up the Nigerian Centre for Management Development which now monitors the entire management, supervisory staff and consultancy scene in the country, guiding and helping the institutions concerned with teaching business efficiency rather than doing any direct training itself. But model 'workshop' courses in which trainees are themselves participating in the solution of imaginary business problems, are set up in accord with the latest development of modern managerial sciences for use as models by universities and business schools.

It may well be asked: Are the Nigerians trying to run before they have learnt to walk? The cliché has been used often enough in comments on the distance that must be traversed in Nigeria between the backwardness of the recent past and the ambitious goals of the future. A typically Nigerian sense of humour helps to ease a tension that at times seems intolerable. 'Give us the job and we shall finish the tools'—was one of the jokes I heard from a Nigerian about Nigeria. When people can crack such jokes about themselves, they must be both modest and self-confident.

'We shall do fine if we carry out two thirds of our plan', an official told me in Lagos. Indeed, it would still be a staggering achievement. When I visited Nigeria earlier this year the country was in the grip of strikes and unrest. Several universities were closed owing to student protests. 'Dash', meaning bribe, was a household word. People knew about the oil money and were bent on getting some quickly. Yet, if my story is more about positive achievement and plans for the future than about failures and frustrations of the past, this is not only because one tends to give the benefit of the doubt to a friendly and hospitable country with which one has no personal quarrel. It is also because I was genuinely impressed by the will to succeed in Nigeria and by the almost universal resolve to make the country the first genuine Black Power; a resolve confidently endorsed by the leaders of the new regime.

[Karl Lavrencic, a Yugoslav-born British journalist based in London, is the author of *Living With Communism* and *Tunisia*, both published by Bodley Head. He has recently been travelling in the Caribbean, Africa, the Far East and eastern Europe on behalf of the United Nations Development Programme.]

WHY EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW THAT PROFITS ARE GOOD FOR US

by Frank Broadway

LAST October a new kind of advertising made its first appearance in the mass-circulation press. 'Who Needs Profits?', it asked. It gave the simple, truthful answer in terms that the housewife, the apprentice, the student, the old age pensioner, and the chap on the shop floor could understand. Why, everyone, of course . . . the workers . . . the public . . . the pensioner . . . the country.

Another set of advertisements answered the common question 'Where do all the profits go?'. About a third to the Government in taxes, about a quarter to shareholders, with the rest retained by the company to provide for expansion or modernisation, or to give some security against a downturn in business, or, increasingly, simply to remedy the ravages of inflation.

All the advertisements included a coupon for readers to clip to send for a free booklet, *Why Profits?*. It answers, in straightforward, down-to-earth terms, many of the questions people ask about profits. Making use of simple charts and cartoon-type drawings, it explains what profits are, how they are made, how they go into tax, expansion, and pensions. It explains how companies use profits, and what might happen if British companies were unable to make profits.

Many thousands of people have written in for *Why Profits?*. Apart from innumerable requests from individuals, hundreds of teachers have asked for sets of the booklet for use in classes in current affairs, economics, commerce, and bookkeeping. Many companies have asked for bulk supplies to distribute to employees, or have reproduced all or part of *Why Profits?* in their employee journals.

Taken together, the advertising campaign in national and Sunday newspapers with a combined circulation of over 30 million, plus the large-scale distribution of *Why Profits?* represents a substantial effort to explain some fairly elementary facts about business to the general public.

It is the start of a major effort which needs to be sustained and extended, for a variety of reasons. First, there is astonishingly widespread ignorance of the way business operates, and especially about the size of company profits and what happens to them. In a society almost surfeited with information, the elementary economic facts about industry and commerce, which support nearly all of us, have not been explained, at least in terms which are meaningful to most people.

This failure to communicate was vividly illustrated by a survey carried out by National Opinion Polls for the Confederation of British Industry last summer. It showed that the majority of the sample thought that manufacturers' profit margins were in the 35 to 40 per cent range. Interestingly, most people thought that profit margins of 20 to 25 per cent would be reasonable. Only one respondent in four thought that companies should

earn 10 per cent or less on their sales.

As the *Why Profits?* booklet shows, popular beliefs about the size of profit margins differ vastly from reality. For several successive years, profit on sales for manufacturing companies has averaged 8 to 9 per cent.

Out of each £1 of sales income the average company receives, 57p is spent on materials, components, fuel and transport. Wages and salaries on average account for another 23p in every £1. Another 12p in each £1 is spent on rent, rates, insurance, in interest on borrowed money, in replacing obsolete machinery and other 'overheads'. This leaves just 8p in each £1 as the profit made by the company. These figures are, of course, simply the averages for manufacturing industry. Individual companies have very differing cost structures depending on whether they are labour or capital intensive, or they work with very expensive materials, or have high energy or distribution costs, but at the end of the day, profit margins are fairly closely grouped around the 8p in the £1 level.

Even this profit margin is only the 'book profit'. It does not take into account the tax which will have to be paid upon it, nor does it take into account the effects of inflation. As costs of all kinds have soared during the last two years, companies have had to keep on finding ever larger sums to replace the stocks they use up. Ironically, this increase in the value of stocks a company holds is counted as a profit. Until Mr. Healey's budget in November, this paper profit from stock appreciation was fully liable to tax, so that companies were doubly drained of cash in paying for the extra cost of stocks and then paying tax on profits which were never available to them. In addition, including stock appreciation in the published profits gave the public (and probably the Government, too) a wholly inflated idea of the size of company earnings.

This particular problem of taxation on non-existent profits, picturesquely but aptly called 'the Doomsday Machine' by some economic commentators, has been substantially eased by the Chancellor's subsequent action in exempting around 80% of the stock appreciation profits from corporation tax. While this is valuable relief, it still leaves unremedied the harsh fact that something like four-fifths of the profits reported by British industrial companies last year were simply the effects of inflation. When these are excluded, British industry had a very unprofitable year.

This is serious in its own right, but widespread misconceptions about the scale and nature and value of profit tend to add to the damage. Obviously, if the public thinks companies are making much greater profits than is really the case, it is likely to acquiesce in, or even demand, policies which restrict profits or impose additional tax burdens upon them and thus damage the industry and commerce on which we all depend.

The danger can be clearly seen if we look at what happens to company profits. Needless to say, this is the area in which the greatest misconceptions abound, often added to by hostile propaganda.

It was probably true at the time Karl Marx wrote *das Kapital* that the great bulk of company profits went into the pockets of bosses and shareholders, many of whom were already affluent. As the *Why Profits?* booklet

shows, this simply is not the case today, nor has it been so for a generation.

The first thing a company has to do with its profits is pay tax on them. This takes on average about 37p in each £1 of company profits. It adds up to a huge sum, probably exceeding £4,000 million last year. Since such huge figures are meaningless to most people, it is perhaps worth explaining that a year's company taxation would buy over a quarter of a million new council houses, or pay old-age pensions for twelve months to over five million people.

Once tax has been paid, around 25p in the £1 of the original profit goes in dividend payments. Very few of the recipients are the bloated plutocrats of legend. Around 45% of all quoted company shares are held by insurance companies and pension funds. Almost half of total dividend payment goes to provide private pensions or increase the bonuses on insurance policies. Without dividends the 'kitty' for paying pensions or benefiting policyholders would be very depleted. This would be a matter of widespread concern because 22½ million people are estimated to have an interest in an insurance fund or a pension fund.

The 55% of total dividend payments which does not go to insurance companies and pension funds is very widely distributed. It goes to trusts, charities, and companies, as well as to the 2½ million people who hold company shares in Britain. Most of these people have small shareholdings, believed to average under £1,000 at current Stock Exchange prices.

Both tax and dividend payments by companies are of national significance, but the 38p in the £1 of profits which companies retain is absolutely crucial to the national well-being. This money is used to pay for expansion and modernisation, or as reserves against the possibility of future troubles. In 1972, £2,375 million of the £4,275 million companies spent on plant and machinery, vehicles and ships, and factories and office building came from retained profits. Virtually everyone in Britain benefited from this spending on expansion and modernisation. Capital investment means that Britain produces more, either for us to consume ourselves or to export. Expansion means more jobs, and usually better jobs in up to date, easy to work plant. Conversely, a slow down in the rate of expansion in British industry spells unemployment. It starts in the construction and capital goods industries and then spreads on an increasing scale around the economy.

All the evidence suggests that the crucial significance of profits, and the pattern of taxation, dividends and investment they provide is little known to the general public. Nor can we assume that it is fully appreciated by people who mould and form opinion, by our legislators, or even by all managers in business. Ignorance about the need for profits and what happens to them almost inevitably creates a difficult climate for industry and commerce. Mr. Jack Jones has recently warned trade unionists about pressing for wage increases which will bankrupt their employers. While this is valuable, the problem goes a good deal deeper. Trade unions can gravely jeopardise the prospects for future employment in Britain simply by pressing for wage increases which will not allow sufficient profit to be made to sustain capital investment. Equally, the Government jeopardises employ-

ment if it does not allow companies to retain sufficient profit after tax to keep investment going and to pay dividends which will attract new investment funds into industry.

Failure to understand the vital role of profits, or misconceptions about their size also leads to mistakes in economic policy which can have disastrous future implications. The price control policies followed by both Conservative and Labour Governments, for example, have undoubtedly restricted the flow of funds available for investment, and thus jeopardised exports, jobs, and economic growth.

To point out such consequences of a cavalier attitude towards profits is not to drag the subject into the political arena. While there can be all kinds of party debate about the boundaries of the mixed economy or the distribution of profit, all parties except the extreme Left have now come to recognise that unless there is adequate profit, jobs are immediately at stake. The fact is that 18½ million people, about three-quarters of our working population of 25 million, work in the private sectors of industry, commerce, farming and the professions. Taxes from the incomes and profits generated by the private sector largely pay the wages and salaries of the 6 million people employed in the public sector. None of these private sector enterprises can for long survive if expenditure exceeds income, or even if they are equal. Companies cannot work on a break-even basis for more than a short time because they cannot replace worn out equipment, nor can they survive any turn-down in business. If there are no profits, then, or if profits are falling, the private sector has no alternative but to cut back unprofitable activities and the jobs that go with them.

Realisation of these looming dangers from the absence of genuine profits in British industry has united the larger political parties in at least the recognition that inadequate profits are bad for us all.

The Government effectively acknowledged this when, in Mr. Healey's November budget, the price controls which have seriously damaged industrial profitability were partially relaxed. We should not, however, make the mistake of believing that all is now well with profits. If Britain is to prosper in the future, companies will need to make increasing real profits. This implies, among other things, a much more enlightened and knowledgable attitude among the public towards profitability.

There can be little doubt that business itself bears much of the responsibility for the misconceptions and lack of understanding which have made possible damaging anti-profit economic policies and produced a generally hostile climate for industry and commerce. Companies have simply not made the effort to explain their operations in terms understandable by the general public or, indeed, by many politicians and journalists. The increasing flood of literature reporting and explaining and theorising about business in recent years has been very largely addressed to other businessmen, economists, accountants and the like. Business has made the mistake of assuming that some understanding was getting through to the general public. It was not.

This is the basic reason for the advertising about profits and the appear-

ance of the *Why Profits?* booklet. These attempts to explain profits are the first efforts of a new organisation, Facts About Business. Essentially, the aim is to use modern communication techniques to give information about business to the general public. It is a wholly non-political aim, and Facts About Business is being registered as an educational trust.

The immediate programme is to continue to advertise explaining profits, then further advertising campaigns will explain such fundamental matters as capital investment and exports.

Such a programme is inevitably expensive, and Facts About Business expects to be supported by companies of all sizes in making a sustained effort to explain to the public what business is all about. This kind of general explanation does not, of course, absolve companies from explaining their own activities and problems to the public, particularly to employees and customers. What is required, if misunderstanding of the basic truth about business is ever to be dispelled, is vastly more explanation, and more simple explanation than ever before.

[Frank Broadway is Director of Facts About Business.]

A GRASS-ROOTS VIEW OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

by Cyril Bracegirdle

ONE of the easiest of all human activities is to get yourself elected onto a committee. Join an organisation, show a bit of interest, and at the next AGM you are sure to be asked to stand for election. So it was with myself and the relevant union branch at a large factory. I became Branch Secretary and soon began to understand some of the realities of union/management relations and the complex forces which result in newspaper headlines about industrial strife.

One of the first questions to which I began to seek an answer was why people volunteer for union work? I had done so because I am a compulsive committee joiner who likes to be on the inside where it's all happening, but we compulsives are a rare breed. There are, of course, the inevitable communists and various elements of the New Left who join to get their clutches on the levers of power and work in order to overthrow the System, but this still leaves a very large body of union workers at the grass-roots level of the branch committee who fit into neither category. For instance, most of the staff reps. (on the shop floor they are called stewards but the function is the same) in my branch were Labour supporters with a couple of Liberals for good measure.

Are there any common denominators which characterise those who volunteer to be reps. and committee members? There is at least one and it can be described as a general feeling of antagonism towards management. This may be due to low pay, bad conditions in a particular department or unjust treatment from a boss. Any of these can create resentment which seeks an outlet in union activity. The more unfair management is, or indifferent to what goes on in various departments, the stronger will be this feeling of 'agin' em.' It can fairly be said that management often gets the union committee that it deserves.

The task of negotiating with management and trying to put right the many complaints which members bring to their staff reps. is by no means as easy as the vociferous loud-mouthed critics among the members believe. I suspect that that same principle applies to government itself. To be a critic, to tell others what you cannot do yourself, is by far the easiest of occupations. More than once I have seen a staff rep. pushed into exasperated resignation because he could do nothing right for the shouters. Needless to say, none of them volunteered to take his place.

Often a member's complaint will be unjustified, but as a staff rep. you are obliged to take it up with management—and thereby increase management's suspicion that you are spending too much time on union affairs instead of on the job for which you are paid—otherwise they won't be voting for you next time, and that, after all, is one of the essentials of democracy, that your elected rep. does what he was elected for or else——. Often, of course, a plethora of complaints can be due to faulty management

—and they will still complain because you are spending too much time on union affairs instead of . . . etc.

All too often today the branch committee member has to fight on two fronts—the management in front and the communist conspirators busy manufacturing troubles behind him.

Union/management relations are enmeshed in a tight web of procedures and regulations and one has to be very careful not to say or put into writing so much as a wrong word which the other side might use against you. Mutual trust and a genuine desire to work together to iron out problems are ideals which exist in few firms—if any.

Before becoming involved in the trade union business I had always resented the idea of anyone being forced to join a union, and I still believe in the right not to do so; but I now understand the bitterness felt by union members about colleagues who refuse to join but nevertheless hold out their hands for the benefits won by union negotiators. The Agency Shop scheme, provided for in the Industrial Relations Act, would have removed much of this bitterness. Unfortunately, that aspect of the Act was never put into practice because left wing pressure succeeded in rendering almost the whole of the 'IRA', as it was called, useless by maintaining towards it such an atmosphere of hostility that no one in union circles dared say a word in favour of the Act for fear of being called a traitor to the cause of working class solidarity.

Many union branches are forced into extremist action by the majority vote of those who attend the monthly branch meetings, which means on average rarely more than 10% of the members and usually less. The overwhelming majority of members much prefer to go home to their 'tea and telly' rather than stay for an hour or two to look after their own interests. Galloping apathy is an endemic disease of the so-called silent majority. But, of course, that is the whole story of human history; of the 90% being pulled, pushed or bullied along by the articulate and politically conscious 10%.

Sometimes a branch committee can be impelled into action which they do not want because of the totally undemocratic procedure that a decision made by a tiny majority of members at a branch meeting is binding upon everyone else. Sometimes, if it is a course of action which they favour, the committee will go around parrotting that 'our members have instructed us to do this . . . ' Really, all that may have happened is that perhaps 50 out of 500 members attended the meeting and 30 of those carried the vote for that particular action. One reflection of this is the annual farce at the TUC when delegates rise to their feet and brandish a million or so votes for or against this or that motion. No delegate has ever yet had a million 'real' votes behind him.

One major reform that is vitally necessary, and to which most unions are opposed, is that no strike or industrial action of any kind should ever be undertaken without a secret ballot of all members, and certainly it should never be allowed in the confusion and excitement which always marks the open air meeting so popular with leftists. For centuries we have

fought in Britain for the right to a secret ballot, and today it is not the establishment that denies us that right but the very unions which we created for our own defence.

Much that happens in union affairs is a reflection of the quality and psychological attitudes of committee members. Some get pushed into office and are not strong enough personalities to stand up to either management or their own militants. Others let power go to their heads and have bright visions of themselves leading a great army of workers out through the factory gates—to be interviewed by a TV reporter outside.

Militancy is not—despite newspaper headlines—the prerogative exclusively of communist agitators. There are characters for whom sensible, procedural negotiation is just too slow and too tame. Action, action is their cry. Often I have sat in committee or branch meetings and listened to the well-known cry: 'Get 'em all out there, Mr. Chairman; get 'em all out!'

During a strike by members of another union in my firm, I had occasion to observe the considerable difference between the facts as I knew them and the reports in the local press. This was not due to any evil distortions by the capitalist press as the Left prefer to believe, but to the fact that reporters have to depend for their information upon what management and union tell them, and both have a vested interest in presenting the best case for their side. Distortions, exaggerations and sometimes outright lies are commonplace.

In this strike the pickets were talking to incoming lorry drivers and trying to persuade them to take their loads away. The firm's security officers were present and making daily reports on the percentage of vehicles that did turn away. At the end of the first week the management told a local paper that 90% were ignoring the pickets and coming in. The pickets told another paper that they were turning back 80%. The true figure, as I knew from having access to the security reports, was an average of 50% to 60% daily. What the public believed depended on which paper they read.

What the general (non-union) public does not realise is that industrial disputes are often far from simple; they may concern complicated arguments about increments, merit rating schemes, grading bands, productivity bonuses, etc. which can get incredibly involved and need a Solomon to sort out. Attempts by reporters to describe such a situation all too often cause the reader to mutter impatiently 'What a lot of nonsense! Why don't they get back to work?'

Some managements make the great mistake of leaving all union negotiations to a professional negotiator, usually the personnel manager, director, supervisor or whatever title they may give him. One harmful result of this is that board directors live in ivory towers above the battle, dependent for information upon how much the professional negotiator—their knight champion in the lists of industrial jousting—chooses to tell them. All that such directors know of trade unions is what they read in the press, and most of that is not exactly favourable.

Communist activity as an aggravating factor in any establishment could be reduced very easily if management had the intelligence to arrange for

the branch AGM to be held on the premises in working hours, and encourage every union member to down tools and attend. The firm would lose about an hour and a half or so of production per year and no extremist would ever again be elected. The conservatism (with a small 'c') of the silent majority can be relied upon. Until this is done, and until the unions themselves abandon opposition to the strike ballot, there is unlikely to be any chance of peace breaking out on the industrial front.

The full extent of inter-union rivalry is little understood by the public. The employers do not need to divide and rule, the workers' organisations themselves carry out the dividing very effectively. The historical craft basis of unionism is partly responsible for the feeling of independence which they all share, plus the old-fashioned sense of class which divides manual workers from all the rest. Most large firms help to perpetuate this particular aspect of division by having separate canteen facilities for the 'dirty hands' and the 'clean hands'.

In recent years, however, the Communist element has deepened the divisions still further so that now the unions which are Communist dominated get little cooperation from the more democratic unions, usually and mistakenly referred to by the press as 'right wing', a description which they find politically unhelpful.

My personal experience of the battlefield of industrial relations has taught me that the following four reforms are essential:

1. More facilities for important union meetings in working hours.
2. Directors to come down into the arena where it's all happening.
3. No strike action without a secret ballot.
4. An element of compulsory arbitration to be enforced by Government.

With regard to the last suggestion: there is hardly any arbitration available in Britain today. Both sides have to agree to it and this very rarely happens for the reason that in any dispute there is usually one side which knows that its case is not good and may not stand up to impartial enquiry. Arbitration should be made compulsory even if only one side demands it. That side will be the one that knows its case is good.

Managements must be made to realise that profit can no longer be the sole excuse for being in business, that if our industrial civilisation is to be saved from its present slide towards anarchy and chaos the businessman must develop a conscience; and unions must realise that the strike as a means of settling disputes is out of date.

Until these changes in attitude are made, both management and labour will remain locked in their antiquated mental strait-jackets, victims of the historical forces that created them.

[Cyril Bracegirdle, author and journalist, is a participating member of his local union.]

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

VERDI: THE PLAYWRIGHT

The Dramatic Genius of Verdi: Studies of Selected Operas. Volume 1: Nabucco to La Traviata. Vincent Godefroy. Gollancz. £6.00.

Above all composers, Verdi's work is made for the enthusiast; one needs not to be a musicologist to appreciate the drive, the passion, the atmosphere of a Verdi opera. There is no need for a thorough grounding in musical theory to recognise connecting themes in one opera, or even between one opera and another. There is no science required in applauding the skill with which he combines vocal, orchestral and harmonic colours to draw maximum impact from a libretto. Thus the fact that Mr. Godefroy is a lifelong enthusiast, and a retired headmaster, in no way debars him from writing this book—indeed, it was my own housemaster at school who first guided me beneath the surface of opera in general and Verdi in particular, something for which I am eternally grateful.

What the author attempts here is 'an examination of the methods of Verdi the dramatist, the playwright with music as his language', and in so doing he has seleced ten operas from the composer's earlier period, from *Nabucco* to *La Traviata,* by way of *I Due Foscari, Attila, Macbeth, Luisa Miller, Rigoletto* and *Il Trovatore.* Inevitably in examining operas in this fashion, from the dramatic standpoint, the seat in the stalls rather than the score in the library (though there are musical examples, not all of them especially helpful or necessary), the stageworthiness of the work in question is of paramount importance. Thus his chapters on the *Foscari, Joan of Arc* and *I Masnadieri* are less compelling. Fine music these operas all contain, but their dramatic structure is deficient, hence the infrequency of their production, and one suspects the author may not have in fact seen them performed, for his writing here lacks the immediacy and flair so agreeably present in the better known works. Verdi, unlike Wagner and, so some extent, Mozart, is *not* a gramophone composer in that the totality of the experience is only obtainable in the opera house.

Where he succeeds most tellingly is in his analysis of *Macbeth, Rigoletto* and *La Traviata.* Not perhaps surprisingly, for all three began in the theatre and the author has done his homework not merely on the operas but, most impressively, on the plays as well. It is fascinating to read his assessment of how Verdi and his librettists condensed Shakespeare, turned Victor Hugo to musical effect, and developed Dumas. The Godefroy approach may be idiosyncratic, a rather exhilarating blend of pedantry and schoolboy humour, and sometimes there are appraisals and explorations of the more arcane byways. Thus he would have us believe that the orchestra in Act 2 of *Rigoletto* depicts Gilda's seduction by the Duke, in eight minutes flat, with Carlo Bergonzi taking 35 seconds less (on the gramophone) over Renata Scotto, than does Renato Cioni with Joan Sutherland. Naive, perhaps, but fun. Likewise in *La Traviata* it is stimulating to have revealed the thinking behind the camellia given by Violetta to Alfredo in the play—red there, and when it is faded she will be available: such finesse!

Traviata is indeed perhaps predictably the most successful chapter. It is in many ways the most approachable opera Verdi wrote, and in Mr. Godefroy's fascinatingly sensitive, alert analysis it comes alive in the mind's eye. Of Father Germont's arrival at Violetta's deathbed in the final act, he writes: 'But how different is his opening *"Ah Violetta"* from that first cold *"Madamigella Valery!"* Finding the bitter truth, he is overwhelmed with remorse and after a

forceful outburst, he observes quietly, and solely on the note B, *"Oh malcauto vegliardo! il mal ch'io feci ora solo vedo!"* It is high time he knew it, we may think.' If only more opera house synopses were written at this level.

Happily, a second volume is planned; one hopes it will contain an index to both books, which is irritatingly absent from this first one.

DAVID FINGLETON

THE CONQUEST OF THE REDSKINS

Bluecoats and Redskins: the United States Army and the Indian, 1866–1891. Robert M. Utley. Cassell. £5.25.

This is essentially the story of the role played by the U.S. army in the conquest of the West during the two decades following the end of the Civil War. The author is at pains to point out that the frontier army was neither the heroic vanguard of civilisation crushing savages, as some saw it, nor a body of butchers constantly waging war against unoffending Indians, as 19th century humanitarian literature described it. The army was only one of many groups that pushed the frontier westward. Frontiersmen such as trappers, traders, miners, stockmen, railroad workers were largely responsible for depriving the Indian of the land and sustenance that left him no alternative but to submit. 'The army's particular contribution was to precipitate a final collapse that had been ordained by other forces. In this perspective the frontier army finds its true significance.'

Between 1866 and 1890 the army is recorded as having engaged in more than 1,000 combat actions, but these battle statistics are by no means the final answer to the subjugation of the Indians; other figures could be more meaningful. For example, four railroads crossed the West in 1890 where in 1866 there had been none; settlers occupying the Indian hunting grounds had increased from less than 2 million to 8.5 million in the same period; and finally, the buffalo herds that roamed the Great Plains with perhaps 13 million animals in 1866, satisfying almost all the Indians' needs, had vanished by 1880 before the rifles of professional hunters.

Only a handful of tribes possessed the power to contest the westward movement of the whites in 1866; the Sioux, Cheyenne, Kiowa, and Comanche on the Great Plains; the Nez Percé, Ute, and Bannock in the Rockies; the Paiute and Modoc in the Northwest; the Apache in the Southwest. These hostile Indians totalled fewer than 100,000 and engaged the U.S.A. in the final struggle for the American West. In 1867 the U.S. government adopted the 'concentration policy', establishing reservations on which all roving tribes would be persuaded to gather; here they could be 'civilised' and in due course admitted to American citizenship.

The book gives a detailed analysis of the situation created by the Indian barrier to white advance westwards. There is an excellent description of the U.S. army, its organisation, weapons, accoutrements, and way of life, followed by graphic accounts of the important campaigns needful to overcome Indian resistance. The Indians were superb warriors and battled fiercely for their homeland, sometimes brilliantly. But the outcome was inevitable and by 1883 it was all over; the Indians had been conquered, their territory appropriated, their traditional food sources destroyed; they had no option but to accept the only substitute—reservations and government dole.

Character sketches of leading personalities, both American and Indian, are abundant, campaign maps are finely drawn, and there are numerous illustrations. Mr. Utley has given us an unbiassed assessment of the Bluecoats' achieve-

ments during those eventful years. 'In the process, the U.S. army wrote a dramatic and stirring chapter of American history, one that need not be diminished by today's recognition of the monstrous wrong inflicted on the Indian.' The depth of Indian feeling may be gathered from the remarks of Joseph, Chief of the Nez Percé, on surrendering to General Miles in 1877 after his tribe's gallant attempt to cross the boundary into Canada in a bid for freedom from reservation life: 'Hear me, my chiefs. I am tired. My heart is sick and sad. From where the sun now stands I will fight no more forever.'

S. F. WOOLLEY

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LILLIE LANGTRY

The Prince and the Lily. The Story of Edward VII and Lillie Langtry. James Brough. Hodder & Stoughton. £4.95.

'In life, I have had all that I really wanted very much—a yacht, a racing stable, a theatre of my own, lovely gardens', said Lillie Langtry in her seventies. She might have added the Prince of Wales to her list but, from James Brough's book, it appears that material possessions gave her the most pleasure. Her first love affair was with a yacht: 'To become mistress of the yacht, I married the owner.'

She selected Edward Langtry partly for his yacht and partly as an escape route from the provincialism of Jersey. Langtry proved to be a mixed blessing as far as London Society was concerned but, fortunately, she was spotted by artist Frank Miles, whose gentle pencil sketches of her launched her as a professional beauty, and Millais, who converted her heavy, sensuous good looks into the wistful 'Jersey Lily' in a stunning Royal Academy portrait. As word of her beauty spread, so invitations increased (Edward Langtry tagging along to add respectability) until the fateful supper party when she was introduced to the Prince.

Quite what, apart from her beauty, attracted the Prince to her is uncertain. Mr. Brough suggests her reputation may have intrigued him sufficiently for a liaison to be inevitable, but his account of the kernel of the affair is rather sketchy. Apart from the gossip (the house the Prince bought for Lillie bore the legend 'They say—what say they? Let them say'), hints of intimacy slip almost surreptitiously in and out of the pages. Nor are we quite sure how it ended. Was Sarah Bernhardt instrumental? Lillie was certainly initially very jealous of her. Or was Daisy Warwick more in evidence than Mr. Brough reveals? Maybe Lillie's shipboard affair with Louis Mountbatten, to whom she bore a daughter, was the major factor and, if so, was it perhaps engineered by the Prince as a way of loosening ties? In any event, only some hundred or so pages after her meeting with the Prince we find a change in the romantic climate and Lillie sets sail for America and her new career as an actress.

'Mrs. Langtry', observed an American impresario, 'is as tough a businesswoman as she is a lovely lady. She may smell of delicious perfume, but nothing creases her hide except dollar bills.' And it seems to have been as a businesswoman that she found her métier. She first obtained millionaire Freddie Gebhard, then an objectional jockey, 'Squire Abingdon', whose blows she took stoically, saying, 'every time he does it, he gives me a cheque for five thousand pounds'. But separation from the Prince had removed the protection of his status and it was not until poor Edward Langtry died in a lunatic asylum that she could eventually marry respectability and become Lady de Bathe.

Despite its title, Mr. Brough's book is less an account of Lillie's affair with Edward than a blend of period flavours and personalities and, as such, it works

well. A few more dates would have provided a welcome time scale and occasionally Mr. Brough is obliged to rely rather heavily on his imagination, but there are interesting anecdotes and many delicious pictures. Anyone hoping to chart the progress of the Royal affair will be disappointed, but should enjoy the striking portrait that emerges of Millais' gentle Jersey Lily—imperious, callous, vain and viciously flirtatious. Was it, one wonders, a defence against the vicissitudes of a life ruled by beauty and selfishness? Possessions could be relied upon; people could not.

GILLIAN VINCENT

MAN IN HIS TIME . . .

The End of Philosophy. Martin Heidegger. Souvenir Press. Hardback £3.50. Paperback £1.75.

In her courageous selection and translation of Heidegger's 'most explicit attempt to show the history of Being as metaphysics', Joan Stambaugh has produced for English readers an accessible guide to the German text of the philosopher's two-volume work on Nietzshe and an essay, taken from *Vorträge und Aufsätze,* on 'Overcoming Metaphysics'. The volume contains both a highly condensed history and a critique of metaphysics, the first three chapters tracing the history of Being as viewed by Plato and Aristotle, by Schelling and Kierkegaard and by Heidegger himself, in his *Being and Time*. The concept of 'history' is here explicitly not one in which there are occurrences, for a history of ideas is not one of events. It is rather an interpretation of the gradual building up, through many centuries, of philosophic insight into the nature of being and therefore of man's being in relation to both Being and time. The final chapter, included at Heidegger's own request, presents his reflections on the transcending of metaphysics and foreshadows his most difficult concept, that of the 'Appropriation of the essential nature of Being'. The book's title, *The End of Philosophy,* means 'that philosophy as *metaphysics* has come to a completion which now offers the possibility of a more original way of thinking', not that philosophy itself has no further work to do.

The mere possibility of seeing the 'end' of man in a new light has obvious attractions and, expressed in the eloquent prose of so skilled a speculative thinker, the final chapter displays a visionary quality which Heidegger would perhaps deny. But the reader is swept along by a series of images comparable with some of the most memorable in the Christian bible,—and this characteristic is, again, not one which the author would regard as necessary to his purpose. Examples are: 'The still hidden truth of Being is withheld from metaphysical humanity. The labouring animal is left to the giddy whirl of its products so that it may tear itself to pieces and annihilate itself in empty nothingness' and 'Shepherds live invisibly and outside of the desert of the desolated earth. . . . The unnoticeable law of the earth preserves the earth. . . . The birch tree never oversteps its possibility. The colony of bees dwells in its possibility'. His ultimate purpose seems to be to show a necessary transformation in man's thinking about his sterile use of his planet's natural resources, a transformation which could come about only when he realises the meaninglessness of human action. It comes about partly through suffering, through the desolation of the earth, begun as a 'process which is willed', but finally when 'Appropriation opens out which, calling, needing, envisions human being . . . sees and in this seeing brings mortals to the path of thinking poetizing building'.

Between such visionary passages there is much hard philosophical argument, often difficult to understand. The main problem facing a translator of Heidegger is that he uses language in an idiosyncratic, though logical way. A

characteristic of his style is that the deliberate and sometimes even stipulative use of a term precedes a lengthy explication of the concept under discussion. The complicated web of knitting thus devised gives the reader an uneasy feeling that somewhere a stitch has been dropped, although it is usually possible to find it and get the pattern clear. Miss Stambaugh has taken pains to clarify many of the most important ideas contained in the argument; but in one or two places the reader is misled. There could, for instance, be serious misunderstanding of a sentence near the beginning of the crucial final chapter, thus translated: 'Metaphysically represented, man is constituted with faculties as a being among others'. Literal translation reveals the quite different meaning, 'Man, as something which exists, is gifted with the capacity to do something, as well as with other qualities'. Another sentence is shown, rather obscurely, as reading, 'For Descartes the *ego cogito* is . . . what is present without question, what is indubitable and *always standing within knowledge,* what is truly certain . . . ', whereas the text says simply 'what is indubitable and always has been known'. Heidegger's 'delusion about' the oblivion of being becomes 'blindness to . . . ' and, more misleadingly, the subject of a sentence gets lost in 'Man wills himself as the volunteer of the will to will, for *whom* all truth becomes that error which *he* needs. . . . ' It is translated ' . . . for *which* all truth becomes that error which *it* needs. . . . ' The translation could well be placed alongside the German original for readier comparison.

Unfortunately, no index is provided. It is a strange omission, particularly at a time when mutual understanding between European and British and American philosophers is greatly to be desired.

BETTY ABEL

PRESIDENTS AND OTHERS

Friends and Memories. Fleur Cowles. Cape. £6.

In memoirs of contacts with a host of high-ups in two continents it is likely that few will be in depth. Within this limitation, Fleur Cowles, U.S. journalist, is both entertaining and revealing. With the whoop of a skilled head-hunter she brandishes her trophies, which range from Presidents to politicos, painters to film stars.

She once asked Mr. Truman to name his most important single act as President. 'My decision to go into Korea,' he replied. 'Because we had not included South Korea in the written list of Asian areas we would defend. So the North Koreans moved in. We had to get them out!' He defended the use of A-Bombs, she adds, as *an essential artillery tactic* to save the lives of a hundred thousand men who would otherwise have been mown down as they stormed the Japanese beach-heads. 'I have no qualms. Never lost any sleep over it since.'

She assisted ex-President Hoover as consultant to the Famine Emergency Committee, and quotes with relish his quip on Senator Taft, once a presidential candidate: "He has the most brilliant mind in Congress—until he makes it up.' Apropos the Warren Report on President Kennedy's assassination, she asked Lyndon Johnson what his brief was to Warren: to do a 'Sherlock Holmes' on the murder, or principally to pacify a hysterical public? 'Now that's one question, little lady, I won't answer,' he replied; and she wonders if, in fact, he had not thereby given it. In Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, she discerned a love of words, a rare way of learning new ones—by going to her dictionary last thing every night, finding a new one at random, studying it, using it in a sentence the next day. 'Once you've used the word, it remains a part of your vocabulary.'

Some of Mrs. Cowles' memories revive the already familiar, like her detailed account of the Queen's coronation, which she covered as President Eisenhower's

ambassador. A painter herself, she has known eminent artists, and reproduces a taped talk with a modestly tolerant Graham Sutherland about the Winston Churchill portrait, done for a joint Parliamentary Committee but unapproved by the family, which has 'since disappeared'. Incidentally, Winston once burst in on her, clad only in a towel, when she was talking with friend Bernard Baruch in his New York drawing-room.

She writes of her work for *Look*, the launching and demise of the U.S. *Flair*, started to 'prove that artistic effort *can* be commercial—which for good or bad reasons it wasn't, *and may never be.*' Since 1955 she has lived in Piccadilly's Albany, and attended doyen William Stone's centenary party there. Visiting the office of the London evening *Star*, she asked to see her cuttings file and promptly tore it to shreds, wincing over phrases, things said in jest, that could be misconstrued. I have not wanted to rip up her 'capsule close-ups' or 'anecdotal carousel' for like reasons; they will interest and divert all who enjoy frank memoirs.

TREVOR ALLEN

BEWITCHING FEMALE PANTHEON

The Goddesses of Chaldaea, Syria and Egypt. Laurence Durdin-Robertson. Cesara Publications, Eire. £1.50.

This modest paperback, a cheap popular guide, especially for anyone with occultist tastes, is one of a series 'in honour of the Irish Great Mother, Cesara'. By its very range the subject would daunt the hardiest of polymath experts. Durdin-Robertson, not bent on a work of deep original research, makes free use of what scholars have written on an important but neglected aspect of early religions.

Sources are scrupulously named and often extensively quoted. Thus Graves' translation of Apuleius takes up six pages. In an unashamedly scissors-and-paste compilation like this, the dangers are imbalance and failure to bring in fresh knowledge instead of what is stale. After all, research means selection and digestion of suitable facts. We could have done with less Blavatski or even Frazer and more of Anthes, with E. O. James thrown in as well. Nor is the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (once wrongly spelt) in itself the scholar's unquestioned canonical gospel.

What redeems the work is the writer's faith in the abiding value of his goddesses. He amasses out-of-the-way information with meticulous care over mythological detail. His camera is panoramic. What does it matter that the Carthaginians rub shoulders with the Irish (p.138) or that the Old Testament Cainites and Ireland's traditional queens are closely linked (p.224) or that Sophia-B.V.M. can be paralleled by Tara of Tibet (p.205)? All the references to that typically Levantine *congeries*, the Bible, with which the author is well acquainted, will amply repay study. As an introduction to the bewitching female pantheon of the nations in and around the Levant, this little book can be recommended, even if the scholarship and editing here and there need taking with some caution.

R. E. WITT

NEGLECTED EDWARDIAN POET

Olive Custance: Her Life and Work. Brocard Sewell. The Eighteen Nineties Society. £1.60.

This is the first volume in the newly initiated 'Makers of the Nineties' series, which, under the general editorship of Dr. G. Krishnamurti, has been estab-

lished for the purpose of publishing a collection of monographs on the neglected writers and book-illustrators of the 1890s. Certainly, Olive Custance admirably fulfils the criteria for inclusion, and Father Brocard Sewell's text sets a highly satisfactory standard.

Olive Custance died in Hove in 1944, predeceasing her husband, Lord Alfred Douglas, by one year, but her published works—*Opals* (1897), *Rainbows* (1902), *The Blue Bird* (1905), and *The Inn of Dreams* (1911)—have all been out of print for sixty years. Olive Eleanor Custance was born in 1874 into a distinguished Norfolk family. Distinguished, that is to say, socially. There was no literary tradition in the family, although her father, Colonel Frederic Hambledon Custance, was the author of a chapter on the breeding of trout in the volume on 'Trout' in Longman's 'Fur, Feather and Fin' series. When she was sixteen, 'Wild Olive', as she called herself, met and fell in love with the 25-year-old John Gray, the author of *Silverpoints,* a confirmed celibate who was later to become the close friend of André Raffalovich and the Roman Catholic pastor of a parish in Edinburgh. They corresponded for a time, and there is no doubt that he exercised a strong and early influence upon her. After a passing and experimental flirtation with the American-Parisian poet-novelist, Natalie Clifford Barney, and a broken engagement to the Honourable George Montagu, afterwards ninth Earl of Sandwich, Olive eloped with Lord Alfred Douglas. They were married clandestinely at St. George's, Hanover Square, in March 1902, and before the end of the year she had borne him a son, Raymond. The marriage was not a success, and in 1913 Olive left Bosie.

I think that there is, perhaps, a tendency here to overvalue Olive Custance's poetry, but since she has for so long been undervalued, there is an equity about it with which I would not quarrel, although I would regard another neglected poetess of the nineties, Dolly Radford, as her lyric superior. Father Sewell has performed a most useful service in bringing together what meagre biographical data survives, and in reprinting a representative half-dozen of her poems as a supplement to the text. Especially charming, and absolutely in period, is Steven Sinatra's sensitive and effective cover design on, of course, an olive background.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

SHORTER REVIEWS

Peacetime History Series (H.M.) Stationery Office). This is a new series concerned mainly with public policies and developments following upon the Second World War. The first to be published is *The Nationalisation of British Industry* 1945-51 (£21), a massive work of over 1,000 pages by Sir Norman Chester. In 1945 the Labour Government was returned to power committed to nationalisation on a large scale, and this book 'is primarily a study of how a major part of a Party's electoral programme was translated into legislation and executive action.' It deals with the nationalisation of coal, transport, iron and steel, the Bank of England, Cable and Wireless, electricity and gas, and civil aviation during the six years to 1951 that the Labour Government was in office. The creation of the National Health Service is not included, presumably because it is not an industry and had its own special problems. The study is 'based almost entirely on Cabinet and Departmental records and Parliamentary debates. The records of the nationalised industries, other than their Annual Reports and other published material, have not been used.' Sir Norman's approach is

comparative, dealing in turn with the various major issues which arose in relation to all the concerns. These include the scope of powers to be conferred, the nature of the compensation offered, structure, financial provisions, the consumer, the employee, ministers and Parliament. The government felt its way in many respects. There was, for example, the conception of the Board or Authority instead of direct departmental control. The advantage of making the industry independent in its day-to-day running from government interference has had obvious advantages. On the other hand, Parliament still has insufficient control and power of investigation in relation to these industries. However, this volume is basically concerned with the whole process of their establishment rather than with their subsequent history.

Familiar To All (Jonathan Cape. £5.50). 'William Lilly and Astrology in the Seventeenth Century' is the subtitle of this studious and fascinating book by Derek Parker. He is interested in contemporary practice of astrology and he has been helped by his wife, Julia Parker, who is President of the Faculty of Astrological Studies. His general theme is that in the mid-seventeenth century, astrology still played a widespread part in the lives of people in all sections of the community, high and low, illiterate and educated. Astrology still found its way into the profession of medicine and among astronomers. On the other hand, in the second half of the century, astrology was on the wane, to become rejected as a science and appealing only to the ignorant and superstitious, without any rational foundation. Against this background, Mr. Parker writes the life of William Lilly, probably the most notorious but undoubtedly sincere astrologer of this period. Born in 1602, he took serious lessons in astrology at the age of thirty and acquired a widespread reputation both in private practice and in charting the course of future public events. In 1644, Lilly published his first annual Almanack, *Merlinus Anglicus Junior,* and his predictions favoured the Parliamentarians. Later that year, his *Prophecy of the White King* made quite clear where his political inclinations lay. On the other hand, he was asked for advice by one of Charles' supporters anxious to effect his escape. He was clever enough not to commit himself too far, and could turn to the planets when attacked. He was certainly fortunate to survive the Commonwealth almost unscathed, in spite of professional royalist astrologers who hated him. He was in some little trouble about a forecast of plague and the Great Fire in 1666. All in all, Lilly survived remarkably well until his natural death in 1681. Mr. Parker has relied upon Lilly's autobiography published after his death, as well as other contemporary sources. The question remains: how far, if at all, did astrological predictions have any effect upon policy and decisions in public affairs? There is no cogent evidence that they did.

The Pelican History of the United States (Pelican Books). Two recent volumes in this eight volume series covering American history from colonial times to the present day are welcomed. Volume 3, *Conflict and Transformation* (90p) by Professor William R. Brock covers the period 1844-1877 and including more particularly, of course, the Civil War, and the start of the new era that followed. Professor Donald R. McCoy is responsible for Volume 6, *Coming of Age* (85p) which deals with the inter-war years, in the twenties and thirties. Both books have very useful bibliographies and should attract a wide readership among those looking for concise but scholarly accounts of these periods.



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EUROPEAN UNION
James Scott-Hopkins, M.P.

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E. J. Mishan

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

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

THE NO-GROWTH SOCIETY — POSTSCRIPT TO AN EPILOGUE

by E. J. Mishan

IT is hard to believe that, only ten years ago, doubts about the benefits of continuing economic growth would have been regarded as tantamount to doubts about the ultimate beneficence of progress itself. After all, the continued expansion of our productive powers was generally believed to be an essential pre-condition of progress toward the good life of leisure and abundance toward which, presumably, all civilised people aspired. Today, this presumption in favour of economic growth has all but vanished. Indeed, casual reflection suggests that the reaction has gone too far. Writing my *Costs of Economic Growth* in 1965, I had to weigh my arguments carefully in the expectation that my colleagues in the economics profession would be quick to seize on the weak links and the implicit judgements. No need to be so cautious today! One can rail indiscriminately against the spread of industry and the depredations of technology without fear of being taken to task. There is, if anything, a need for an intelligent *anti*-anti-growth movement, if only to compel the anti-growth bandwagon to examine their arguments more carefully.

Among economists and other social scientists, sporadic debate on the issues raised by the concept of sustained or sustainable economic growth began about six years ago. To the interested reader, the essays brought together in the recently published volume, *The No-Growth Society*, edited by Mancur Olson and Hans H. Landsberg (Woburn Press, £2.25) can be recommended as a fair sample of the uneven style and quality of the contributions to the ongoing debate. If he is not *au courant* with the writings, pro and con, on the growth topic, the reader will be glad to know that the short Epilogue written by Joseph Fisher, along with the editors, Mancur Olson and Hans Landsberg, offers not only a summary but also a good starting point. At any rate, I propose to paraphrase their observations there before appraising them.

Although the authors of the Epilogue are determined to be fair to the anti-growth movement, their partiality is revealed by too ready a recourse

often alleged, would imply a slower rate of increase in the total amount of residuals.[1] Since the 'treatment' of a pollutant entails displacing its location, or transforming it into another supposedly less harmful substance, the total residuals continue to accumulate until, in one form or another, they cause damage or disaster.

And we are not talking simply about a doubling or trebling of the existing amount of residuals in the biosphere. An average 3 per cent per capita growth—modest in the light of the post-war performance of the industrialised countries—maintained, say, for 500 years, would produce a per capita income one *million* times as great as that enjoyed by today's affluent citizens. The attempt to imagine just what form the pattern of expenditure of this future citizen will take—he will not surely own a million cars and a million houses!—and the space needed to accommodate the resulting plethora of goods and gadgetry is enough to make the most hopeful growthman sceptical of ever attaining so fantastic a standard. But once we contemplate the rate of depletion of the earth's finite resources, and the weight of residuals involved in maintaining such a standard,[2] to say nothing of the waste heat from the energy needed to produce the goods, the possibility has to be dismissed as absurd.

In the light of these considerations it seems more sensible to regard a prolonged period of economic growth as an abnormality. We have had, at most, 200 years of it. Prior to that episode, there were millennia during which per capita growth rose and fell many times as civilisations coexisted and alternated with periods of barbarism, but without establishing any perceptible trend.

Returning now to the three conditions posited above, it is hardly necessary to remark that their fulfilment is in any case impossible. The world's population is, indeed, increasing. All indications point to a world population of between 6 and 7 billion before the end of the century—if not checked by famine or internecine warfare. What is more, the environmental damage caused by population growth alone necessarily reduces per capita welfare no matter how well resources are reallocated.

As for man's ability to foresee the consequences of his innovative activity, the authors themselves agree that it is, in the nature of things, quite impossible. Each year, for example, hundreds of new chemicals—drugs, pesticides, synthetics, food-additives—come onto the market, adding themselves to the inventory of those having (singly or in combination) possible ecological or genetic consequences that we can only discover with the passage of time. The probability that one single chemical substance, alone or in combination with others, could result in some irreparable disaster may be slight, as often alleged. But as the number continues to grow year by year, the probability of some disaster occurring approaches closer to a virtual certainty.

Turning to the last condition mentioned, we observe, again, that the authors are openly sceptical of the likelihood of a really effective response from a democratic society to the problems of environmental pollution. Indeed, Mancur Olson's own classic work, *The Logic of Collective Action*,

develops the necessary economic theory that explains so nicely just why the concerted interests of small groups tend to prevail over the diffused interests of society at large. And some evidence of particular relevance is provided in a recent article, *Clean Rhetoric: Dirty Water*, by two economists,[3] who were forced to the conclusion that the widespread antagonism of industry which defeated the proposed 'effluent tax' in the U.S. was attributable, in the last resort, to its anticipated efficacy in the control of industrial pollution.

In view, then, of the increasing risk to which humanity is exposed, the idea of curbing our growth ambitions may not be so eccentric after all, even though it still runs counter to official views and to entrenched interests, material and intellectual. Certainly, some social gains could be realised by successful adjustment to a steady-state society. For those 'extreme' or 'eccentric' values imputed by the authors to the sociofreak and psychofreak —their emphasis on the sense of mystery, on the family, on respect for elders; their deep want of a settled way of life, and their belief in the importance of friendship and trust arising therefrom—are surely no more and no less than *traditional* values. Indeed, it is hard to discover any other set of values that are so widespread or so deeply ingrained even in affluent societies.

Perhaps what the authors meant to convey was that the pursuit of current social aims—such as an expansion of educational and economic opportunities; an increase in mobility, geographical and social; continuing improvements in efficiency and in the production of material conveniences—generates unanticipated social effects, among which are an increasing preoccupation with material status, a growing restlessness and discontent with one's lot, and, therefore, unavoidably, a frustration of those aspects of life expressed in traditional values. In other words, a conflict currently exists between the *actual effects* on our communal character and style of life arising from pursuit of objectives associated with continued economic growth, on the one hand, and, on the other, the *desired* communal character and style of life that reflect our deeper humanity and which is, I believe, expressed in our traditional values.

Let us, finally, consider the conclusion reached by the authors, in the last two paragraphs of the *Epilogue,* since its intent is to come down (albeit marginally) in favour of continued economic growth. As they so disarmingly phrase it, the aim should be 'to reform rather than prohibit growth' as this is far better for 'the great majority who eschew extreme values'. This terminology is, of course, the stuff out of which good presidential addresses are fashioned. But since they offer no instruction on just how growth is to be reformed, other than a remark about 'making the composition of output more attractive',—a benign proposal that, incidentally, evades all the chief problems associated with an economic growth that is fuelled, principally, by technological innovation—we have, perforce, to move on and examine the only two arguments that can be culled from these last paragraphs.

Their first argument is that continued economic growth is still desirable for 'those whose poverty leaves them with an intense need for additional

market goods'.

Now this sounds eminently reasonable until we pose the question: how much more economic growth in already affluent societies[4] is necessary to alleviate the indigenous 'hard core' poverty? The average annual increase of national product in the U.S. is currently about $50 billion, an amount that would surely suffice to remove the physical want of the really destitute. Indeed, a few years of such economic growth would suffice to remove not only all degrading poverty (however defined) in that country, but should be more than enough to provide also all the 'merit' goods—those museums, art galleries, symphony orchestras, high institutes of learning, better clinics, and the like, that so easily trip off the tongue of our ingenuous growthmen who are eager to spread the impression that the sustained economic growth objective is really a sort of unending charity ball.

But is it *politically* feasible? Hardly! Therefore, conclude our growthmen, economic growth has to continue—which is tantamount to saying that we can, in reality, do a little more for the really poor, and for all other worthy causes, only by continuing to do a lot more for ourselves.

The logic of this example of 'enlightened self interest' is particularly revealing. The fact that even when there is everywhere manifest evidence of over-indulgence, absurd ostentation, and almost criminal waste, the citizens of the affluent society cannot collectively agree to curb their extravagant expenditures by a small fraction so as to alleviate the wretched poverty of a tiny minority of their countrymen, is itself directly connected with the process of economic growth. For this institutional or political constraint springs directly from an ethos that is favourable, indeed essential, to economic growth, an ethos that is simultaneously promoted by economic growth. To be more explicit, the pursuit of economic growth over the years has been maintained, and will continue to be maintained, only by the priority given by citizens to self-seeking and self-promotion. And if that self-seeking and self-promotion is aggravated by the discontent and ambition generated by the system, then the resulting 'institutional' or 'political constraints' that make such 'ethical transfers' unfeasible are among the more shameful products of economic growth.

The second argument deployed by the authors, one related to the first, is that of the risk of *not* continuing growth. So long as economic growth can be maintained, they observe, net material gains will accrue to society which can be used to mitigate conflict. In a no-growth society, in contrast, one group's gain must be some other groups' loss. And so, they conclude, 'the fights, presumably, would be mighty rough'.

Inasmuch as the fighting between different segments of the community today already look 'mighty rough', the risk of yet more intense conflict should, indeed, give us pause. But then, we need not pause long before recognising the argument to be bogus.

Examples of the difficulties that arise in an economy that does not grow are always taken, by growthmen, from the short-lived periods of economic stagnation suffered by Western countries. They include such unhappy features as a rise in the number of unemployed workers, a decline in the

share of labour's income (except perhaps during the more prolonged depression of the early 1930s), acute hardship among the poorest section of the populace, a general frustration of people's expectations, and increased conflicts within the working class. Yet these recessional features are not, as it happens, at all pertinent to the issue. They are peculiar to a growth-bound economy, one in which a period of no growth, or a decline in growth, arises from 'market failures' or inadequate monetary and fiscal policies and, therefore, necessarily entail unemployment and 'stagnation'.

Now, the no-growth movement is concerned primarily with the quality of life. Its proponents have never advocated the creation of unemployment *within the growth economy* as a means of realising a steady-state or no-growth economy. Rather, they seek to persuade the public to abandon altogether the pursuit of economic growth in favour of the steady-state economy, within which there are to be institutions for the explicit and prolonged consideration of ways of reducing material input while enhancing the enjoyment of life. The detailed measures whereby a steady-state low-energy economy can be brought into being (the rationing of raw matrials, the controls on technology and on the marketing of its products, the level of affluence to be aimed at, and so forth) are important subjects of discussion. But they are premature. Immediate concern is with the revolution in thought and feeling that is necessary if men's aspirations toward the good life are ever to be realised.

Thus, the aim of the no-growthman is not a no-growth economy *per se*. His aim is the *acceptance*, by the public at large, of a no-growth or steady-state economy. Once the ethics of a no-growth economy are accepted by the public at large, and the notion of a competitive striving for more, ever more, becomes a thing of the past, it will be that much easier, incidentally, to remove that wretched poverty that still lingers in Western countries, and to maintain a more equitable distribution of income.

In conclusion, let me advance an alternative framework around which we can organise our reflections on the problems raised by continued economic growth. There is, of course, an obvious division between the problems relevant to population growth and those relevant to per capita growth, even though some problems, chiefly environmental and ecological, may be common to both.

Those problems pertaining to per capita growth are, I believe, the more intellectually challenging ones, and I suggest a classification of the issues they raise under three main headings: (1) The growth of the commercial spirit, (2) the cult of efficiency, and (3) the shape of technology.

In connection with the first heading, we tend to think of the 'mixed' economies of the Western democracies, and of the institutionalised discontent that is the mainspring of the system. The post-war emphasis on material expectations, and the mass of invidious statistics provided by modern media, are among the more salient consequences. They have culminated today in a national obsession with position in the pay structure. In the last five years, the British people seem to have transformed themselves into corps of pay vigilantes. The struggle for position in the pay queue, and the

envy it inflames, seem to suggest that only an egalitarian society would be regarded by the nation at large as tolerable.

In contrast, among the factors to be subsumed under the second heading, is the trend toward a meritocracy. The social and political struggle in the West arising from the clash of these opposing currents—the egalitarian and the meritocratic—is a thesis in itself, though one that we cannot pursue here. Under the same broad heading we place the extreme division of labour and the fragmentation of skills into further specialisations in the cause of that perpetual search for improved efficiency and goods innovation, accompanied as they are by the unavoidable lengthening of vocational training periods needed to maintain the scientific and technological momentum. The importance of these factors on the human psyche has been emphasised by many writers, including economists, since the beginning of the 'industrial revolution'. Although their scientific analysis is difficult, there can be little doubt that they act to cramp spontaneity of feeling, to dull the sensuous perception of life and are generally corrosive of a sense of well-being.

The growth of secular education, moreover, fosters an eclectic scepticism that erodes belief in the great myths and drains the foundations of a moral consensus. In this way it dissipates those sources of hope and faith that, since the dawn of history, have sustained ordinary people in their trials and misfortunes. In the circumstances, it would be extraordinary if there were no connection between sustained economic growth in the West and the incipient disintegration of its civilisation since World War II, as revealed by the relentless climb of the official indices of divorce, drug-taking, suicide, vandalism, theft, homicide, and crimes of increasing violence, especially among the young. It is far from certain that in the scale of human welfare, the accumulation of material conveniences outweighs the growing sense of insecurity and the consequent fear and anxiety.

It is, under the third heading, however, that the most interesting material will be found, material which, until very recently, has been almost entirely neglected by economists. For by training they are concerned more with the conditions under which goods are produced, and the means whereby they are distributed, than with the actual sort of goods themselves, both capital and consumer goods, and their far-reaching effects on our environment, on our character, and on our chances of survival. Despite the increased powers they have conferred on ordinary mortals, most of the popular innovations of the last fifty years, from the motor car to the television set, from domestic labour-saving gadgetry to recreational toys, have turned out also, perhaps inevitably, to be the elegant instruments of our continuing mutual estrangement. And despite 'miracle drugs', 'wonder flights' into space, and other 'exciting possibilities' eagerly anticipated, the human race is being impelled by an irresistible tide of scientific discovery into an ocean mined thick with new perils. If we survive at all, it will only be in consequence of a vast extension of government controls and a concomitant decline of personal freedom.

The charitable reader will pardon me if I do not end on a note of hope—

or a suggestion, at least, of some means whereby the human race might escape the ignominious fate which appears to be its destiny. This omission is not, however, to be attributed to lack of space or of imagination, but simply to lack of faith. The kind of wisdom and will that is needed to move humanity away from its current obsession with forcing open the secrets of the universe, in a supreme bid for god-like power, just cannot be mustered within the institutions of the modern world.

NOTES

[1] So far as I know there have been no studies to indicate that the production of services rather than products is less wasteful of materials and energy. The sort of services that come to mind in this connection, travel and tourism, catering commerce, education, recreation, medical services, all happen to absorb exorbitant amounts of capital equipment.

As for that part of economic growth that would be described as an increase in leisure, it is an important ingredient of social welfare that is disregarded by the conventional indices of 'real' per capita growth. Of course, if all future growth were taken out in the form of leisure, the remaining physical product (the aggregate amount of materials and energy used) being a constant through time, there would be no immediate problem. We are, however, concerned here with the aspirations of growthmen and technocrats who, although they anticipate a continuing trend toward a shorter working week, envisage a sustained growth also of man's productive power and material resources.

[2] Technological progress does, of course, comprehend innovations that reduce the resources required to produce outputs yielding equal consumer satisfaction. But judging by the experience of the last 200 years, an x per cent increase of per capita 'real' input entails an increase in energy and material resources not much less than x per cent. Thus, if a mere hundredfold increase in our productive powers (as conventionally measured) were obtainable for a fractional increase of energy and material resources—say, one-quarter, or even one-tenth—the magnitude of the resulting residuals would still be virtually unmanageable.

[3] A. M. Freeman and R. H. Haveman, in *The Public Interest*, Summer 1972.

[4] The debate that interests many of the contributors to this volume of essays, and many economists today, turns on the possibility and the desirability of continued economic growth in the already prosperous countries of the West. None, of course, would deny the pressing problems of the poorer countries of the so-called Third World; nor that some improvement in their living standards is desirable. What improvement, if any, is possible given their continued population growth, is a question I do not consider here. But whatever the answer, it does not qualify any of the observations made above on the problems that must arise in the endeavour to continue economic growth for a prolonged period at rates anything like those currently regarded as feasible.

[Ezra J. Mishan is a Professor of economics at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Publications include 21 *Popular Economic Fallacies* (1969), *Cost-Benefit Analysis* (1971) and *The Costs of Economic Growth* (1967).]

EUROPEAN UNION

by James Scott-Hopkins, M.P.

> The Heads of State or Government have set themselves the major objective of transforming, before the end of the present decade, and with the fullest respect for the Treaties already signed, the whole complex of the relations of Member States into a European Union. . . .

WITH that decision of the 1972 Paris Summit Conference, the European statesmen undoubtedly took a decisive step towards the political unification of Europe. They set themselves a goal—partly in implementation of the existing Treaties, and partly by breaking new ground—which is of critical importance to the future of the European Economic Community.

Although little real progress has been made since that date, and European Union has still not been precisely defined, that Summit decision, reaffirmed at two later meetings, aroused great hopes for a successful culmination of a new effort to re-shape and improve the structure of the Community.

The main stumbling block has been a reluctance by each of the Nine Member States to commit itself to total political integration. There has been no lack of attempts at co-operation in the political sphere, but in contrast to the economic integration process, which started from a functional basis and is moving fairly quickly despite the magnitude of the undertaking, political unification has proved for the European countries an extremely delicate and controversial process.

The Member States of an economically strong European Community have always felt that they ought to maintain a sharp distinction between the economic and political integration processes. Despite the recognised difficulty of continuing to distinguish and isolate the political aspect from the other aspects of integration, and despite the clearly artificial nature of any such differentiation, the Member States have still not managed to find a way of bridging the gap. This is one of the reasons why the Community has not yet been able to create a true identity and, because it has never spoken with a single voice, has found it difficult to make itself heard on major world issues, for example, during the recent world energy crisis.

From its earliest days, the Community has concerned itself with Union, but despite the efforts made in 1960 and 1962 with the Fouchet plan, it was not until 1969 that the Hague Summit re-opened discussion on political co-operation. The subsequent Summit Conferences in Paris in 1972 and Copenhagen in 1973 continued to pursue this aim. The decision of the Paris Summit on the increasing need to achieve European Union, and the involvement of the existing Community institutions in defining that Union, offered not only the chance to start talking again, with more resolution, and with an enlarged Community of Nine, but also seemed to indicate that the will for political integration had strengthened.

The Heads of State therefore asked the institutions of the Community—the Commission and the Parliament—to prepare reports, putting forward

their proposals for European Union, and to submit these reports by the end of 1975 for consideration at a later Summit Conference. A year later, at the Copenhagen Summit, it was decided to accelerate the work necessary to define the Union. In their declaration on European Identity, the Nine again confirmed their intention to transform relations between them into a Union before the end of the present decade. On this occasion, they appointed Mr. Tindemans, the Belgian Prime Minister, to collate the various reports which had been called for, and to present coherent proposals to a later Summit.

I am not in a position here to deal with the proposals being put forward by the Commission—these have not yet been made public. I can deal only with the Report of the Parliament, of which I am a member. The European Parliament appointed Mr. Bertrand, a Belgian Christian Democrat, as Rapporteur, or presenter of its Report on Union. In September, 1973, Mr. Bertrand submitted his first Draft Report to the Political Affairs Committee of the Parliament for consideration. This document gave an exhaustive and detailed description of the goal, the content, the powers and the institutional structure of the future European Union. Very briefly, it can be summarised in three parts:

a) the development towards Union was to take place in three stages. In the first stage, without any amendments to the existing Treaties, improvements were to be made in the present institutional structure—including majority decisions in the Council.

b) after a second phase for which some minor Treaty amendments would have to be made, a major amendment to the Treaties, perhaps about 1980, would set up the new institutions of the Union, lay down their powers and bring the Union itself into existence.

c) eventually, a European Government, comprised of 21 ministers, who should not hold any national office, would prepare European framework laws for implementation by the national governments. The legislative power would rest with a directly elected European Parliament and a Chamber of States in which national ministers or Secretaries of State would represent the justified interests of each Member State.

The document was not received with enthusiasm. The criticism voiced by many members of the Political Affairs Committee concerned not only the powers and the structure, but also the very principle of a European Union. Although the Report continued to appear on the Agenda of the Committee, it was rarely if ever discussed and it was clear that there was no readiness to devote a detailed political debate to the Rapporteur's proposals at any early date, let alone fully support them.

Furthermore, events at international level at that time, and the grave difficulties they were causing for the EEC certainly contributed to the sudden lack of interest by the representatives in the high political theme of European Union.

December 1974 arrived and with it the Paris Summit Conference. This Summit gave fresh impetus to the establishment of European Union, placing particular emphasis on the need to have direct elections to the European Parliament by universal suffrage by 1978, and accepting the need for a changed organisational approach.

Following the Paris Summit, therefore, in January, 1975, Mr. Bertrand presented the Political Affairs Committee with a new working document in

the form of a questionnaire on the fundamental political options from which the members of the Committee would have to choose. After a very short period of discussion, it became obvious that not only was there still deep division between members of the Committee as to how the evolution should take place, but also the suggested date of 1978 was quite unrealistic in view of the practical problems which had already become evident.

The principal argument with which the Committee was occupied during the whole of the spring and summer of this year, was what kind of State did we all really want. On the one hand, there was a strong lobby wishing to move as quickly as possible towards a Federal State, with the existing Parliamentary Assembly becoming the Lower Chamber, and the Commissioners or the Council of Ministers becoming the Second or Revising Chamber. This would entail all power being concentrated in the hands of the Parliament, which all agreed would be directly elected, and the Commission would operate purely as the Civil Service, carrying out the policies of the Parliament which, in effect, means the policies of the majority party within the Parliament. This concept, although perhaps the neatest and the tidiest from a Constitutional point of view, and certainly the most familiar to the U.K. representatives, would mean relegating existing national Parliaments virtually to the status of large County Councils, with most of their present powers and functions in respect of revenue and national security being exercised by the new European Assembly—a supra-national Parliament.

It may well be in the year 2000 AD or later that this is how Europe will develop. I do not know. But what I am absolutely sure of is that Europe and her peoples, and certainly the U.K., are not ready for this dramatic advance yet.

The position was further complicated by the imminence of the British Referendum on membership of the EEC. The Political Affairs Committee showed understanding for the wish of some members to hold up further discussion on Union until after the British question had been settled in June. Certainly the concept I have outlined above was never put forward by any of our leaders, nor indeed by any member of the British group in the European Parliament during the course of the referendum campaign, and I repeat that perhaps in 40 or 50 years' time we may be ready for such a total European takeover, but not yet. This feeling was shared by many of our European partners and therefore we had to conceive a different approach to Union, one which would lead the present Community, in acceptable stages, from the basis of the existing institutions to a closer and improved final structure.

The Committee all accepted that direct elections to the Parliament, whatever form this may take or whatever powers it might be asked to assume in the future, are the first essential. This could be achieved by 1980 and I believe that we should strive to ensure that it is. The present arrangement whereby the European Assembly is made up of members of the national Parliaments of the Nine is untenable. Not only do members become exhausted trying to pack two jobs into the time available for one, with many hours

taken up in travelling between the two Chambers, but also they find it impossible to do justice to either occupation. We are all losers because of this and there must be an early move towards direct elections. The Committee felt that a European Member of Parliament should retain the right to speak, though perhaps not to vote, in his own national Parliament. Without this right, he would soon lose touch with political trends and views in his own country, and his value as a European Member would be diminished.

Almost certainly the system of election, which would have to be universally adopted throughout the Nine, would be a simple form of proportional representation, perhaps along the lines at present used in Germany. Probably the ideal size of the new Parliament would be about 500 seats, which would give the U.K. some 80 members.

The second argument which revealed a wide divergence of views in the Committee, concerned the powers which would be shared among the Parliament, the existing Commission, who at present have the right of initiation of legislation, and the national Parliaments. It is accepted that in this field we must move slowly and, at least for the time being, leave the power of initiation in the hands of the Commission, with a deliberate loophole left open for emergencies. It is sufficient that Parliament should concentrate on examining and thereby controlling existing expenditures by all the organs of the Commission, not only those which, at the moment, are called 'non-obligatory'. Gradually, as time goes by, and the European function in the agricultural, social, industrial and financial fields expands, so too will the necessity for closer financial control become vital. For this purpose a Court of Audit, working independently, but submitting its reports to both Parliament and the Commission, will be an essential organ.

For the time being, national Parliaments would still retain their existing rights for control of national budgets, and indeed other national policies in all the important fields which they control today. Obviously, as more funds are generated through the Community organs in all the fields I have already mentioned, in time those funds will be of greater importance than monies administered and controlled by national governments.

The role of the Council of Ministers has also to be defined. This body as it exists today has the right of veto not only on policies, but on expenditure also. Unlike the Commission and the Parliament, they exercise their function on a national basis. This means that the British Minister fights the British case and if he is not satisfied that British interests are adequately safeguarded, then he has the right to veto whatever the proposal may be. I do not believe that this *modus operandi* can be quickly or easily abdicated, but I think the first move must be, after the election of a full European Parliament, the operation by the Council of Ministers of majority voting, thereby abrogating the Luxembourg Agreement of unanimity. In my view there must be a place, for quite a long time to come, for Ministers to be able to fight their national corner, and I repeat here that the peoples of Europe are not yet ready completely to give away all national sovereignty. Quite obviously, it will be seen that if Ministers can do this, they can be mandated by their own Parliament to take certain lines of action, and follow certain

policies. Thus, for several years to come at least, each national Parliament would retain the right to decide any issue before it is finalised as Community law.

Running parallel with the new institutional arrangements, which will be proposed as the expedient alternative to the neat federal state, is the union which must take place in the monetary field. Here the matter is both complex and difficult to resolve. There is no argument, with the exception of Germany and perhaps the Netherlands, that all currencies of the Nine would benefit from a common pooling of their reserves into a Common Reserve Currency, perhaps called the Europa. The complexity arises in considering how the financial institutions, Central Banks, Joint Stock Banks, Merchant Banks, and city arrangements in all the foreign capitals can be so geared in together as to make this a practical working operation. The difficulties are caused principally by the understandable reluctance of all the national governments to lose complete control over their currency position, or the reserves of their currencies and thereby their external trading positions.

Nevertheless, the Committee appears to accept that the 1980s will see startling moves along the lines of standardisation and common reserves within the Community. Perhaps the energy crisis and the shift of world monetary resources has underlined the necessity for this move and perhaps the weakness of a fragmented European monetary system.

All these matters have exercised the minds of the Political Affairs Committee during their deliberations this year and their Report was considered by the plenary session of the Parliament last July. The formal Resolution of the Parliament has been submitted to Mr. Tindemans for presentation to the next Summit Conference and further discussion. Progress is being made.

To sum up, therefore, I believe that although great pressures will be mounted to move more quickly, we shall slowly move towards a confederal community, with the Parliament acting as watchdog, with teeth, in the form of specialised committees and an Audit Board controlling the expenditure of the Community. I believe we shall see a growing preponderance of Community expenditure overlaying that of national governments, and finally, I believe that we shall see important moves towards the financial cohesion and co-operation between the Nine, which is sadly lacking today.

[James Scott Hopkins is Conservative Member for Derbyshire West and a Member of the European Parliament.]

QUEEN ELIZABETH AND JAPAN

by I. H. Nish

QUEEN Elizabeth II visited Japan for a week in May. She was greeted on arrival by a supplement in one of the leading Japanese newspapers, *Mainichi Shimbun,* under the headline 'Country of tradition now presents a new image'. The thrust of the newspaper's argument was that Britain, throughout the long years of her history, has possessed a special capacity for generating and exploiting new ideas. Whatever its accuracy, the notable thing about this interesting perception is that the Japanese see themselves as citizens of a country in the same mould as Britain, of a country which is Old but is capable of grasping and adapting New things. Hence the itinerary prepared for the Queen was a carefully balanced mixture of the Old and the New.

In learning about the Old, the British sovereign visited places associated with the roots of Japan's civilisation. She called at Ise shrines, the home of Japanese Shinto beliefs and a sanctuary specially venerated by the Japanese royal house. She spent some time at Kyoto, the site of the productive Heian period of Japan's early civilisation (800-1200) and the place of residence of the Japanese emperors in the unruly 'medieval' period when power was effectively held by the warrior-leaders of the country. In the neighbourhood of Kyoto, the royal party visited the Ryoanji temple, famous for its rock garden, the Katsura villa, equally famous for its simple architecture which has influenced traditional building styles in the country ever since, and the Nishi Honganji temple, the headquarters of one of the sects of Japanese Buddhism. In this way, they were able to see representative facets of Japan's ancient culture, a culture which she was able, until the 1850s, to nurture on her own, out of danger from penetration by western influences.

The first major contacts between Britain and Japan date from the middle of the nineteenth century. Japan threw off the long period of seclusion by opening a few of her ports to foreign merchants and entering into commercial treaties. This coincided with a civil war which was an important turning-point in Japanese affairs. Power passed to the victors who were the outer clans; and they decided to restore the authority of the emperor who transferred to Tokyo in 1869 to establish the national capital there. From this time the new leaders single-mindedly proceeded with changes which tended to be economic and administrative in the first stages. As the new government looked overseas for examples of the progressive developments which it sought, it naturally looked to Britain, which was industrially the most advanced country. For shipyards, for cotton mills, for spinning mills, for roads and bridges and railways, it looked to the creations of the factory system of Britain. Technical experts in these fields were invited to Japan in order to instruct the Japanese in this new knowledge and to set up training schools, particularly in the field of engineering. In their desire to build up their military strength, the new Japanese leaders came to the Royal Navy for assistance with their fleet. Through Commander

Archibald Douglas, Britain in the 1870s helped in the establishment of Japan's Imperial Naval College and at the same time permitted cadets from Japan to undertake training on board her ships. There were, of course, many other countries which assisted Japan in her growth as a modern state in these years; but the contribution of Britain was predominant in a number of spheres. Towards the end of the century, Japan's development and her enthusiasm for taking further steps was acknowledged by Britain in two ways: she was the first country to bring to an end the 'unequal treaties' which had been imposed on Japan in the 1850s; she entered into a defensive alliance with Japan in 1902 which was to endure for two decades. This brought together the two countries, not only politically and militarily but also in a host of ways, commercial, financial and institutional.

In the fifty years that have elapsed since the end of the alliance in 1923, a serious war took place which has left scars on the relationship between Britain and Japan. It is therefore interesting to speculate on the object of the recent royal visit from Britain's point of view. Technically, Britain was merely reciprocating the visit which Emperor Hirohito and Empress Nagako paid to Britain in 1971. But Britain was positively anxious to respond to their invitation. She was anxious to build on to the historical friendship of the alliance period and, as the Queen reminded her Japanese audiences, 'Britain's role in nurturing Japan's industrial revolution'. There was much talk also of establishing a new relationship, of setting the final seal on new bonds of friendship. If this means anything, it must mean that Britain, thirty years after the end of the war, is officially ready to declare that she will forgive and forget the events of those days and hopes that Japan may do so too. At the same time, as the Queen made clear in her speeches in Japan, 'British industry is now giving serious attention to the large and growing Japanese market' and the improved living standards of the Japanese people and is looking forward to an expansion of Anglo-Japanese trade.

From the Japanese standpoint, there are slightly different considerations at work. Through the visits of her emperor and ministers overseas in recent years, Japan has spent much time in testing her image in the world and especially in trying to polish it in the United States and South-East Asia. These efforts have also been directed at Britain. Thus, on the occasion of a European tour in 1973 by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Tanaka, the Japanese government gave a sizeable sum for the promotion of Japanese studies at British universities. It may have been Japan's hope on this occasion to introduce Queen Elizabeth—and through her the British people—to a country which is anxious for world-wide recognition as a peace-loving and responsible member of the international community. But the task is a difficult one because Japan hardly reaches the pages of our newspapers unless it is in the context of trade competition and aggressive sales policies and her maturity and stability as a nation do not often attract attention.

Japan was anxious to show the royal party the New as well as the Old. The Queen was able to see for herself what is known in Britain as the country of the economic miracle. Post-war Japan has worked for and

enjoyed a high growth rate which averaged 10% over the decade of the sixties when Britain was trudging along at a much lower rate. Moreover, Japan has combined with sustained growth an increasing balance of payments surplus which reached a maximum in 1971-72. Of course, various factors have acted in Japan's favour. In the post-war period, Japan has enjoyed a pool of labour for industry and has benefited from the lifelong employment system, the discipline of the work force and the workers' loyalty to their companies. She has been able to expand her overseas exports during an era of unexampled free trade and to buy the resources required by her industry freely in the world market. It is appropriate, therefore, that the royal party should have acknowledged Japan's economic miracle by visiting the Canon camera factory, the Sumitomo shipyard and the Mikimoto pearl headquarters, all in their different ways leaders in Japan's successful export drive.

Some of this good fortune was wearing off by the end of the 1960s. Japan was by then experiencing an increasing shortage of labour, especially among teenagers; a widespread consciousness of pollution which led to popular demands for curbs on industrial expansion; long-term inflation and contraction of established markets. There is a Japanese saying that every important national event brought inflation in its train. Thus, there was sharp inflation associated with the Olympics in 1964 and with the EXPO in 1970. Externally, Japanese exports have become unpopular in country after country; and formulae have had to be worked out to mitigate their ill-effects. Finally, the country which has been her main importer since the war, the United States, in 1972 imposed an import surcharge of 10% which was unquestionably directed against Japanese goods.

To these have been added the difficulties connected with the oil crisis. As Japan's post-war industrialisation forged ahead, her factories began to rely more and more heavily on imported oil for fuel. Indeed, up to 1973, oil amounted to about 80 per cent of the fuel consumed in industry, while almost all of it had to be imported, mainly from the Middle East. In the autumn of 1973 when the Arab oil-producing countries made a large reduction in their oil exports to Japan, the effect on industry was immediate and crippling; for the economy at large it was the most serious crisis since the Korean war. It was only after special missions had been sent at the end of the year to eight Middle Eastern countries, promising positive cooperation in their development programmes, that the restrictions on oil exports to Japan were lifted. As the oil price rose fourfold, there was a tremendous rise in import costs and Japan's healthy trade balance went quickly into the red. Prices rose as goods became scarce; and wage demands grew strident. The real economic growth for 1974 was reduced to minus 1.8%. But price increases have since evened out to 15%; and it is estimated that growth will be around 4% in 1975. Thus the Japanese economy is pulling through the short-term chaos brought about by the oil crisis and is slowly climbing out of the recession.

The royal party saw at first hand an economy which had been through a period of crisis and was gradually returning to stability. Apart, that is,

from the question of wages which had just given rise to great bitterness in the Shunto, the spring labour offensive when the labour unions concentrate their wage demands for the year and become involved in intense bargaining with the government. The militant union of the Japanese National Railways, in particular, demanded a wage increase of 35 per cent and were offered an average of 8 per cent. They therefore resorted to strike action which took place during the Queen's visit, despite government appeals to their patriotism. The royal visitors inadvertently became involved in this dispute. It had been the Queen's original intention to travel from Tokyo to Kyoto by the Shinkansen, the bullet-train which is for many Japanese a proud symbol of the nation's achievement. Because of the strike, this had to be cancelled; and the journey was made instead by air. Fortunately the dispute was resolved in time for the Queen to make the return journey to the capital in the bullet-train. It was a taste of a phenomenon which is still comparatively uncommon in Japan but which is often described by Japanese as one aspect of *Igirisu-byo*, the British disease.

Reactions to the Queen's visit have been various. While it is always difficult to give a balanced judgement on a matter of this kind, there seems to have been more interest in the journey among Japanese than among British people. In Japan there was an atmosphere of genuine excitement and interest in the visit, the first by a reigning British monarch. Not to say an intense curiosity about the personality, demeanour and conduct of foreign royalty. In Britain the coverage of the royal trip was comparatively small. Perhaps not unnaturally in view of the competing claims of the Referendum campaign which was reaching a peak in May and the British public's preoccupation with inflation and its impact on family budgets. Indeed, one has the feeling that British enthusiasm for the royal visit to Japan was less than Japanese interest in their Emperor's visit to Britain in 1971.

Surely it would be incorrect to draw the deduction from this that the British people have become introspective and have discarded the world vision for which they were noted in the nineteenth century in order to concentrate on Europe, while the Japanese who were for so long confined by legal restrictions to their own four islands, have now acquired the feeling of being involved in the world as a whole. On this point there is a debate among scholars as to whether relations between Britain and Japan are closer now than they were in the days of the alliance. Was the popularity of *The Mikado* (1885), of *Madam Butterfly* (first seen at Covent Garden on July 10th, 1905) and of music-hall songs about Japan in the Edwardian period not evidence that British people cared a lot about the Japanese in earlier days? It is probably true, although the extent of Britain's knowledge and understanding of things Japanese was not very deep-rooted. Perhaps then as now the publicity given to one country in the press of the other tended to concentrate on the sensational, the trivial and the transitory. This is what the *Mainichi Shimbun* in the supplement mentioned above calls Japan's 'Beatles and Miniskirt' image of Britain. Perhaps then as now the Japanese knew the British as caricatures—and vice versa.

Be that as it may, there is more unofficial contact today between Britain and Japan than in the alliance period. In the seventies the exchange of visits between Britain and Japan has reached unprecedented levels: students going to study in the universities of the other or to do vacation jobs; teachers from one country picking up hints from the other; businessmen testing the ground for new markets. It must be the hope that by the increase of such visits the caricature of one nation held by the other may be discarded. Alas, for some time to come, the fly-by-night tourist will continue to be fed with the stereotypes of old: the busbies of the guardsmen, the bowler and the rolled umbrella of the businessmen of Britain; the kimono of the geisha, the rituals of the tea ceremony and flower arrangement in Japan. But the Queen's tour of Japan may have encouraged others in Britain to improve their understanding of the ways of living of the Japanese people.

[Dr. Ian H. Nish is Reader in International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science.]

The November issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *Import Controls and Social Welfare* by Joan Mitchell, *The Situation in Lebanon* by Barry Rubin, *Shostakovitch: Master of Soviet Music* by David Fingleton and *Employment Services for the Mentally Handicapped in Holland* by David A. Whiteman.

EXORCISM AND RELIGION

by B. L. Hebblethwaite

SOCIOLOGISTS of religion will have been intrigued to observe the recent and somewhat unlikely controversy in the Church of England over the legitimacy of exorcism—that is to say, the ritual casting out of devils from the possessed. Sociologists had already noted the widespread revival of interest in the occult in our allegedly secular scientific society, and offered theories to account for the phenomenon: it was a manifestation of irrational and emotional impulses, no longer controlled by a living and dynamic religious tradition. With the decline of the ancient Christian churches had come an undisciplined and superstitious reaction against what had replaced them, namely the anonymous technological culture of modern western society. This interpretation was reinforced by the widespread acceptance of recent anthropology's differentiation between religion and magic. Religion, it was argued, had been emancipated from its earlier involvement in magic and superstition. No longer was it a matter of white magic against black magic, as in the centuries so vividly described by Keith Thomas in his monumental work *Religion and the Decline of Magic.* Modern reformed Christianity was a purer, more spiritual affair than at any time in the history of the West, and yet it had lost its hold on the popular mind as well as alienating the educated. And while the official culture remained enlightened and sceptical, the subcultures had begun to re-appropriate the ancient worlds of magic and superstition.

This combination of loss of public church influence and the revival of interest in the occult created a problem for the historic churches. Were they to hold fast to their hard-won liberation from their roots in primitive religion, and teach a pure ethical and spiritual faith to declining congregations, or were they to try to meet the new interest in the supernatural on its own ground? This was partly a practical pastoral problem: how do you help people caught up in the frenzies and superstitions of the occult? And partly it was a question of belief and indeed of status; can you hold fast to a mature and unadulterated faith, in face of the decline of church membership and the widespread popular conviction that supernatural realities lie elsewhere?

The Church of England in recent years and months has been observed to be succumbing to these pressures and drifting into an involvement with the occult at its own level. It is for the churchman a sad tale of inadequate leadership, theological confusion, and loss of confidence, both practical and theoretical. For the sociologist, it remains a fascinating study.

We can take up the story, very briefly, with the publication in 1972 of a report by a commission set up by the then Bishop of Exeter which recommended the carefully controlled use of rites of exorcism, where individuals (and places) seemed beyond the reach of the Church's traditional methods of counselling, prayer and sacrament. Individual priests had for some years been practising exorcism, with notable therapeutic success in many, though

by no means all, cases, and some bishops began to license exorcists, to whom difficult cases might be referred by the parish clergy. The bishops were somewhat nervous of excess in these matters and anxious to maintain episcopal control, but in several dioceses exorcists were appointed. In 1974, the then Archbishop of York (now of Canterbury), circulated his own commission's report, entitled *The Christian Ministry of Deliverance and Healing*, to the clergy of the York diocese. It drew on the Exeter report and on the growing number of publications by alleged experts in this area, contained instructions on the use of exorcism, and defended its legitimacy.

Public attention, however, was more recently focused on the subject by a bizarre and horrifying case that came before the courts in which a highly deranged individual in Yorkshire, after an all-night session of attempted exorcism by a group of people including an Anglican priest, went home and murdered his wife by tearing out her eyes and tongue. Those involved in the attempted exorcism were not unnaturally subject to considerable criticism, and the matter was even raised in the House of Lords, where Lady Summerskill asked for Government action to forbid the practice of exorcism. In the debate, Lady Gaitskell asked the question: 'Was it not worrying that high dignitaries of the Church not only accept exorcism and possession by the devil as a fact, but the Church accept it as therapy?' (*The Times*, May 5, 1975). Lady Gaitskell's question clearly referred to further statements made by some bishops, including the Archbishop of Canterbury, in response to requests for comment on the murder case, in which they defended the practice of exorcism, if subject to proper safeguards and control.

At this point an Open Letter to the Archbishops and Bishops of the Church of England was published by sixty-five theologians and pastors urging that the Church of England should not give exorcism any official status at all, since it was against the tradition of the Church of England, and implied false and dangerous beliefs, from which mankind had been liberated since the Reformation and the rise of modern science. The letter went on to point out that while Jesus shared the beliefs of his own time and had performed exorcisms, the Church had never expected its members to share all his beliefs, and that the facts of cultural change had to be reckoned with in the interpretation of Scripture today. This letter sparked off a much more wide-ranging controversy which is still going on. In the July meeting of the General Synod of the Church of England, however, the Archbishop of Canterbury reaffirmed his view that, under proper episcopal direction and in conjunction with medical advice, exorcism was a legitimate part of the Church's ministry.

As one surveys this controversy, one is struck by the large number of issues raised by this extraordinary subject. In the first place there is an undoubted practical and pastoral problem for the Church in dealing with those who are caught up in the occult and believe themselves possessed or manifest symptoms which can be interpreted in terms of possession. There is no doubt that in many cases exorcism can bring release where both counselling and psychiatry fail. But the opponents of exorcism urge that

therapeutic success cannot be the only criterion in this area. For the known practice of exorcism in the Church is liable to encourage the proliferation of superstitious beliefs and lead to more and more people being caught up in these beliefs and the states they induce. Any participation in this kind of world view has a kind of snowball effect. Hence the view of the signatories of the Open Letter that the Church should stand firm against any involvement in this whole world of demonological belief.

A second practical issue raised by this controversy is that of leadership in the Church in a non-authoritarian age; for another worry expressed in the Open Letter was that the Church of England would find itself sanctioning exorcism without any thorough discussion, or central decision in the light of theological study. The dioceses were seen to be reacting hastily to grass-roots enthusiastic movements in the Church, which were antinomian in spirit and subject to no theological discipline.

In the third place on the practical side, the relation between Christian ministry and psychiatry has been highlighted in this controversy. To what extent should the one have recourse to the other when its own resources seem to fail? The psychiatrist William Sargent, author of *Battle for the Mind*, observed on television that he would certainly be prepared to send a patient for exorcism on a purely instrumental basis. If the patient's state was inextricably bound up with the whole belief system of demonology, then perhaps only a decisive act from within that system could provide the psychic force sufficient to shift the blockage. But, of course, such a purely instrumental view reveals an extreme lack of interest in the truth or falsity of people's beliefs, as well as in the problem mentioned earlier of the implicit encouragement of demonological belief.

Indeed, it is the theoretical issues—the issues of belief—that have opened up the most intriguing aspects of this whole controversy. They are of great interest to sociologists of religion who attempt to apply the insights of the sociology of knowledge to the developing belief systems of the major world religions. For it is over the necessity of taking account of the facts of cultural change in any twentieth century appropriation of the New Testament faith that the deepest disagreement has been manifested in the correspondence columns of the Church press and in the debates on radio and television. Of course, such problems have been under discussion for two hundred years, and the gap between critical biblical scholarship and everyday Church teaching often lamented; but the issue has been highlighted with particular clarity in the present debate just because there is no doubt that Jesus himself performed exorcisms. For the critical scholar this presents few problems; he knows that Jesus was a man of his time, and could not but have shared the demonological beliefs of the first century Jewish mind. Long practice in what is technically known as 'hermeneutics' (the art of interpretation) has enabled biblical theologians to extract the lasting spiritual power of the New Testament both in respect of the life and message of Jesus himself, and of the post-Easter message about Jesus, from their contemporary clothing in the terminology and concepts of the time. Theologians learn to argue that the doctrine of the Incarnation need not and

must not involve the naive belief that the man Jesus was omniscient, aware of all that modern medicine and psychiatry have taught about the causation of mental and physical illness in human beings. On the contrary, say the theologians, Jesus' spiritual power to release men from physical and mental bondage was bound to take the form, at least in part, of exorcism. But theologians also know that men today cannot simply imitate the gospel stories. However slavishly men try to copy the New Testament exorcisms, they will not be doing the same thing as Jesus did. For people today in the context of modern knowledge to resort to exorcism is to do something quite different from what Jesus did in the context of his age and its belief. Such concepts were for him and his age the vehicles of spiritual power; but for the Church today they can no longer be so; the same spiritual power takes other forms and must express itself in a different conceptuality.

But the uncritical, unhistorical mind cannot easily make these moves; and the present dispute has shown how ignorant many people in the Church, both clerical and lay, are of the critical historical work of the past two hundred years. The issue of exorcism has focused this very sharply; for we find many Christians in the Church of England right up to the Archbishop of Canterbury quite unable to resist enthusiastic pressure to copy the exorcisms of Jesus, as though the problems of historical and cultural change did not exist.

The dispute has extended further into the whole question of literal belief in the Devil. It is possible to treat belief in demon-possession as a pre-scientific and outmoded belief, while retaining belief in the Devil. Indeed, it is remarkable to what extent this was the pattern in the Reformed Churches in reaction to medieval superstitions or to the witch-craze of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—remarkable because this sane and genuinely spiritual stance was achieved before the rise of biblical criticism. But for a long time now, theologians have recognised the difficulties of literal belief in the Devil, and have declared that, to say the least, it is legitimate to hold that the Devil is only a symbol for everything opposed to God in the natural and human worlds. Thus the 1938 report on *Doctrine in the Church of England*, compiled by a commission chaired by William Temple, recorded its conviction that 'it is legitimate for a Christian . . . to interpret the language, whether of Scripture or of the Church's Liturgy, with regard to angels and demons, in a purely symbolical sense' (p.47). How ironical that in 1975 the Church of England should find itself authorising forms of service which rule out such interpretation categorically!

One aspect of the controversy which has not been mentioned, although I have hinted at it in writing of 'enthusiastic groups', is that the revival of the practice of exorcism in the Church is but one element in a widespread movement cutting across the boundaries of the historic churches, and known as the charismatic movement. This movement in the Christian church is itself a fascinating object of study to the sociologist of religion, following as it does upon the secular Christianity of the 1960s, the extreme form of which was Christian atheism, and the emphasis, still strong in the World Council of Churches, on political theology. This is not the place to

write at length about the charismatic movement, which has certainly spread remarkably swiftly even through the Roman Catholic Church. But the revival of the practice of exorcism is clearly part of a movement which seeks to inject new life and enthusiasm into Christian congregations by the rediscovery of the spiritual power experienced in the early Church and recorded in the Acts of the Apostles and in the letters of St. Paul. Some of its manifestations are extremely positive; members of charismatic congregations speak of newly discovered meaning, joy, fellowship and spiritual experience; others are more questionable: a revival of non-rational ecstatic phenomena, such as speaking in tongues—an aspect of the movement which raises precisely the same questions about cultural change and the interpretation of the New Testament world view that the revival of exorcism raises. It also raises questions for the anthropologist and psychologist of religion, which are just ignored by participants in the movement. But it is the revival of exorcism that places the most pertinent question mark against the charismatic movement. For the danger of encouraging such primitive practices in the context of contemporary dabbling in the occult are very great, as the appalling murder case in Yorkshire has shown. Of course, that was only an extreme case. Any pastor or counsellor knows the mental and spiritual confusion and distress engendered in a young person by the suggestion that he or she may be possessed.

To the theologian these developments can only be regarded as morally and spiritually damaging, morally since taking seriously the possibility of demon-possession militates against the proper ascription of moral responsibility, and prevents the proper diagnosis of the physical and psychological factors which genuinely do inhibit moral responsibility. But it is also a spiritually damaging development, since it becomes clear that charismatics in general and exorcists in particular are extremely confused on what the word 'spiritual' means in the context of developed Christian faith. In a secular age, and in face of widespread disaffection from traditional belief and Church attendance, there is a temptation to latch on to quasi-tangible phenomena, whether positive like glossolalia or negative like possession states. These seem to the credulous mind to be demonstrable evidence of the reality of the world of the spirit. But to take them to be so depreciates the very notion of the spirit and drags Christianity down to the level of the occult. Christianity once again becomes white magic against black magic. For the theologically informed Christian, by contrast, spirituality is a matter of personal growth in the knowledge and love of God, whose activity in the world and in man by His Spirit is precisely not to be identified with extraordinary irrational phenomena, but rather with an increase in depth and range of insight and of genuine concern for people's physical, moral, social and spiritual needs. Theologians then will argue that the discernment of God's action in the world is not likely to be advanced by enthusiasm for phenomena bearing a superficial resemblance to those found in descriptions of the early Church in the Acts of the Apostles.

As one surveys the present controversy from a number of different points of view—those of participant, theologian, philosopher and sociologist—one

finds oneself speculating about the future of religion in England. It is certainly hard to predict. Few in the early 1960s could have predicted the developments mentioned here. But one failure in particular stands out: the failure to overcome the gap between theology and Church, which has characterised Western Christendom for two hundred years. In the Church of England, this is manifested in and aggravated by failure to produce a theologically informed clergy. In a non-authoritarian age, the Church of England is more vulnerable than ever before to the inroads of irrationalism; and it is a sad comment on the weakness of the Church in face of the spread of occultism and popular superstition, that it so easily allows itself to be infected by these self-same attitudes. One may not be able to predict, but one can hope that these present trends will prove as short-lived as their many predecessors. The sociologist may extrapolate from present trends and advance the view that the future of religion lies with the sects and sectarian attitudes; but the theologian has more confidence in the long-term providence of God in bringing the Church back to even keel, and fostering a mature and responsible faith in face of the demands of the modern world.

[The Rev. Brian Hebblethwaite is lecturer in the philosophy of religion in the Faculty of Divinity at Cambridge, and a Fellow and the Dean of Chapel at Queens' College.]

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRESIDENT URHO KEKKONEN

by Keijo Korhonen

FOR almost twenty years President Urho Kekkonen has conducted the foreign policy of a country where the constitution invests the presidency with extensive powers, especially in the conduct of its foreign policy. It has been characteristic of his strong personality to draw his own conclusions as to what prerogatives the office of the president possesses to deal with foreign relations, a concern that the Finns hold foremost to their national survival. The authority of President Kennonen has become undisputed as the leader of Finland's foreign policy. The Finnish people have grown accustomed to relying fully on his judgement, his experience, and his skill. Meanwhile, Urho Kekkonen has undergone a considerable metamorphosis from the most controversial politician of the 1950s to the Pater Patriae of the 1970s. Only a few living European statesmen have had a comparable political career. Small wonder then, that the name of Urho Kekkonen has come to symbolise Finnish foreign policy the world over.

Urho Kekkonen's philosophy on the conduct of foreign policy has never rested on doctrinaire, theoretical canons. Rather, the conduct of foreign policy and politics generally, as he sees it, should be based on realism—on an understanding of the complex factors that shape events. The president, who was 75 in September, has experienced a long process of personal re-assessment and development. The roots of this process go back a half century, to the 1920s, when he was an active university student politician. This process continued while he served in the government during the 1930s. It was severely tested by the crises of the Second World War and it reached maturity during the post-war years when it became necessary to secure the independence of Finland under radically different circumstances.

President Kekkonen has had to learn from experience to adjust his foreign policy thinking as well as methods to changing circumstances. An important characteristic of his political psyche has been his ability to accept new ideas and to change. This ability has perhaps best manifested itself in the field of foreign policy. Time and time again, President Kekkonen has surprised his political observers with his ability to exploit changing circumstances. His critics have labelled this as opportunism. Kekkonen's answer to such charges has been: 'Since when has it been wrong for a person to grow wiser?'

To be fair, the success or failure of Finland's foreign policy—and that of President Kekkonen—should be judged more on the basis of the results that it has brought than on the basis of theoretical models, For Kekkonen it has not been important whether his foreign policy adheres to some internationally accepted behavioural pattern or not. Rather, the paramount consideration is that his policy has succeeded in securing for a small country a place among the independent and sovereign states of Europe—a state that during World War II was on the side of the defeated and had alone to reach

a *modus vivendi* with a neighbouring great power. 'The great powers have their own vital interests and prestige and that must be accepted as a fact. But, also, the small powers have their own vital interests and their national dignity,' President Kekkonen said when opening the first phase of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, convened in July 1973 in Helsinki. These words provide a key to understanding President Kekkonen's foreign policy line.

It often appears as if events in Finland and her foreign policy generates more interest among foreign observers when these are mirrored against the background of the neighbouring Soviet Union and its foreign policy. The fundamental objective of Finland's—and President Kekkonen's—foreign policy is to maintain good relations with that neighbouring great power. From the very beginning, three decades ago, the President took a central part in efforts to place Finno-Soviet relations on a new footing. Kekkonen rapidly advanced to become the leader of a new generation of Finnish statesmen. He was a close confidant and student of President J. K. Paasikivi, the pioneer of Finland's new post-war foreign policy. In 1948, Finland and the Soviet Union concluded a bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. This was extended in 1970. Both countries regard this treaty as the foundation for good neighbourly relations now and in the future. President Kekkonen played an important role in the negotiations that led to this treaty which secured for Finland the opportunity to remain outside of big power conflicts. The agreement also guaranteed that Finnish territory could in no circumstances be used to launch an attack against the Soviet Union. The treaty specified the defensive requirements of Finland and the Soviet Union without tying Finland to a military alliance with a great power. The 1948 treaty established the position of Finland in a newly evolving balance of power in Europe. This treaty with the Soviet Union and the good relations based on it continue to serve as the basis of Finnish foreign policy during the 1970s—in a Europe of détente. 'Whatever change the future will bring in Europe, the role of Finland will be beyond any conjecture or speculation,' President Kekkonen stated in 1973.

In the perspective of history, relations with the Soviet Union have constituted the weak point in Finland's foreign policy, an open wound, the infection of which almost led the country to a catastrophe. Once a *modus vivendi* had been achieved between two very different types of societies, after World War II it became possible for Finland to evolve a new foreign policy—a policy of neutrality. President Kekkonen has been the architect of this policy. He has himself remarked that the realisation of this policy represents his life's work.

President Kekkonen's policy of neutrality in no way competes with his policy toward the Soviet Union. Quite the opposite. Finland's relations with the Soviet Union and the policy of neutrality are organically and permanently tied to each other. Kekkonen, if anyone, understands that the maintenance of good neighbourly relations demands continued attention and development. The stabilisation of Finland's international position and normalisation in relations between the great powers with its attendant

impact on the political situation in Europe since the early 1960s have permitted the evolution of a new Finnish policy of neutrality. This has been referred to as a policy of active neutrality as opposed to passive withdrawal from international life. This policy has variously been referred to as 'peace-loving' or 'peace-promoting' neutrality, the reference here being to the general international aims of Finland's foreign policy.

President Kekkonen's main foreign policy dilemma during the era of European détente has actually been to synthesise these seemingly contradictory principles. On the one hand, Finland has, under President Kekkonen's leadership, carefully avoided involvement in conflicts that do not concern Finland. This, of course, is a fundamental objective of any policy of neutrality. On the other hand, Finland has sought to make a contribution to the realisation of objectives that the international community as a whole has set for itself. President Kekkonen considers this attitude a natural result of the changed international situation. Kekkonen has himself explained this two-dimensional policy as follows: 'My own country has sought security by pursuing a foreign policy which endeavours to keep the country outside international controversies and conflicts. In this we have also succeeded. The security of Finland does not rely on any military alliance or on the protection of one power-bloc against another, but on peace-orientated neutrality and on the good and friendly relations that we have managed to establish with our neighbours. Our security policy, furthermore, does not mean isolation and detachment from political events. An essential aspect of our foreign policy is to work for peaceful solution of conflicts and for development of a more rational and peaceful international co-operation.'

The foremost objective of President Kekkonen's foreign policy is naturally to serve the national interest of Finland. The most important recent decisions made by Finland and other European countries relate to trade and economic matters. Finland's reaction to the movement toward economic integration in Europe was to become an associate member of EFTA in 1961 and to enter into a long-term agreement with the European Common Market in 1973. These agreements secured for Finland the possibility to compete for export markets while the arrangement would serve as the basis for steady, continued economic growth. At the same time, President Kekkonen made certain that these agreements would not conflict with the country's policy of neutrality. The agreements do not constitute membership in the EEC—only a basis for continued trade with the EEC countries. Trade and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union has increased substantially during the tenure of Dr. Kekkonen. For a long time Finland remained ahead of other market economy countries in its trade with the countries of Eastern Europe. Only in recent years have such countries as the Federal Republic of Germany overtaken Finland by virtue of their resources. It was characteristic of President Kekkonen's foreign trade policy that the agreements with EEC were counterbalanced by Finland with an agreement for economic cooperation with the CMEA (COMECON) countries.

Perhaps the best known contribution of President Kekkonen's policy of neutrality and active promotion of peace has been in working for the con-

vening of a Conference on European Security and Cooperation. The Finnish government played a key role in convening a preparatory meeting of representatives from 35 countries in November, 1972, to prepare for a security conference. The first phase of such a conference was held in July, 1973, in Helsinki. After the continuation in Geneva from September, 1973 to July, 1975, the Conference was concluded in Helsinki on 1 August, 1975. Its Final Act was solemnly adopted by the High Representatives of 34 States and the Holy See at one of the most spectacular meetings of history. Keeping in mind the Salt negotiations, which also began in Helsinki, in November, 1969, one could note that, in a sense, the capital of Finland has become an important European conference centre within the past decade.

Finland has, moreover, taken an active part in virtually all United Nations peace-keeping operations. At this very moment, Finnish troops are serving under United Nations colours in Cyprus and the Suez. Finnish foreign policy makers believe that the successful completion of these international tasks at once enhance Finland's policy of neutrality while furthering the common aspirations of the international organisation.

A tree is known by the fruit it bears. The same axiom applies to the external policies of countries. Although President Kekkonen is suspicious of fixed doctrines, he nevertheless pays close attention to the inner logic of his foreign policy. Finland has been regarded as a 'special case'. However, there is nothing inherently unique about the realisation that each country's history and political tradition is different. In this respect, of course, to understand Finland's 'special position' is to understand President Kekkonen's foreign policy.

Dr. Kekkonen has himself stated that he does not recommend Finland's foreign policy to anyone else, Nevertheless, he also believes that the balance sheet of Finland's foreign policy is able to withstand international scrutiny. 'Finnish policy of neutrality, arrived at through consistency and effort, has become a permanent, positive factor in the European balance of power,' President Kekkonen states. His firm, personal direction guarantees that this policy, which has earned broad recognition, will continue.

[Dr. Keijo Korhonen is Professor of Political History at the University of Helsinki.]

AFRICA AFTER INDEPENDENCE

by Toni Folami

MOST of Africa, once unflatteringly referred to as the Dark Continent, is now free and sovereign. But most of these countries are plagued by political instability. Independence produced a number of political systems—the multi-party system, the unitary system and the monarchical system. These have been tried with some degree of failure, hence coups and counter-coups (Ethiopia, Malagasy, Nigeria and Ghana are examples). The reversal of the systems from monocephalous executive presidency to bichephalous executive or vice versa compelled most of the states to face a stark reality. Should not a balance be struck between the two which would be ideal for Africa, taking into consideration conditions in the pre-colonial era?

One school of thought believed that this could be found in neo-presidentialism—a one-party system linked with a powerful executive. But even the one-party systems failed because they encouraged regionalism—the creation of upper and lower class and rich and poor regions. This naturally created much resentment and often led to secession by the poorer regions. African leaders have justifiably or unjustifiably dissolved confederations, decentralised unitary states and federalised a decentralised state. As most of them failed they were forced out of office by a new breed of rulers, the officer class of the armies. The armies themselves were not spectacular successes. To take two instances, the Ethiopian army ordered summary executions of rivals who were alleged to have committed 'crimes against the state' and the Ghana military rulers had to examine allegations of corruption and other malpractices by their army.

It cannot be denied, however, that the armies have brought a strong feeling of nationhood and patriotism to the people and have revolutionsed the social, economic, cultural and political life of their countries. Yet some of the military love power for its own sake and have seized the opportunity to amass fortunes for a few individuals. They declared ostentatiously that they seized power to cleanse the political stables; but these men have only defiled them further with their lack of principles and disregard for the people's welfare. They have been discredited and have lost the support of the people over whom they reign, not with their consent but with coercion.

Inexperience in administration, poverty, greed, large scale corruption, unemployment, low educational standards, colonial style constitutions and a philistinic view of political power are some of the many problems facing post-independent Africa. In the Francophone countries the legacies of the colonial heritage are very prominent. In the case of Guinea, which rejected neo-colonialism, the French took everything away, even the typewriter ribbons. In the Anglophone countries, however, the transfer of power was both smooth and magnanimous. Once the colonial power agreed to go, it left not chaos but order behind.

Independence, the workers and peasants naively believed, would lead to

a new golden age of plenty and opportunity. They hoped for a re-distribution of wealth and power, and became disenchanted when they saw greed and reaction everywhere. Naturally these resentments bred discontent and internal disunity. But among the leaders there were some cautious voices. One of them belonged to Sir Dauda Jawara, President of the Gambia, the last British colony to gain independence in 1965. He warned his people: 'Independence is not a magical formula which will transform your groundnuts into diamonds. It means facing the fact that we shall be on our own and that by our own efforts we must earn our keep.'

Some countries, Zambia, Guinea, Algeria, Mali, Somalia, Tanzania and the Congo have turned to socialism, a heavily diluted version of Marxism-Leninism. Socialism's supporters in Africa claim that this doctrine is not alien to Africa and is, on the contrary, an inherent part of the African way of life before the white man introduced the money concept. They point to the extended family system, common ownership of land and the sharing of the produce of the farms among the villagers as evidence of a very ancient communistic tendency, long before Marx and Engels produced a coherent ideology.

But the new class of African bureaucrats, businessmen, civil servants and managers reject this approach. They are all for the free enterprise system and often sound like members of the extreme right of the British Conservative Party in their defence of such principles as standing on your own feet, etc. There is a deep emotional commitment among the intelligentsia and the leaders to Nkrumah's concept of a United States of Africa. This idea of pan-Africanism comes from the heady days of the struggle against colonialism from the beginning of this century, when it was widely believed that once the white man had gone there would be such great brotherly love that the United States of Africa would be an easy achievement. But the megalomaniacs among Africa's leaders are the biggest opponents of unity because they can't bear the thought of being small-time regional governors without real or effective power. Moreover, one cannot see the President of such a state being elected in a very sportsmanlike way. At this very moment it would appear that there is not a single Black leader who does not believe that he will make the ideal President!

The original Pan-Africanists visualised unity in these terms:

1. That imperialism and foreign oppression should be eradicated in all their forms.
2. That neo-colonialism should be recognised and eliminated.
3. That the new African nations must develop within a continental framework.

The Organisation of African Unity which presently comprises 42 states is an offspring of the Pan-Africanist idea of unity. It came into existence in Addis Ababa in 1963. It has had some success in solving border disputes between Kenya and Ethiopia and healing the rift between Algeria and Morocco, but it has yet to achieve success in liquidating the remnants of racism and colonialism in Southern Africa. The OAU, however, continues to support the freedom struggles of the people of South Africa, Zimbabwe



and Namibia.

One of the most bitter complaints by African and Caribbean countries against the West is the way in which it cynically manipulates the prices of raw materials to enrich itself and impoverish these countries. Both Caribbean and African countries have presented the following proposals to the European Economic Community:

1. Free and unlimited access to all their agricultural products, processed and semi-processed, whether or not those products are covered by the common agricultural policy of the community. Changes in the current rule of origin and tariff barriers which prevent them selling their products to the EEC.

2. Stabilisation of export earning through the guarantee of remunerative prices for their products.

3. Far-reaching industrial co-operation which will find expression in the free flow of technology to the specific needs and requirements of developing countries and in the adjustment of production patterns which will enable rational division of labour between the developing countries and the E.E.C.

Neo-colonial states are described as client states which are independent de jure and dependent de facto. In a neo-colonial state, power lies in the conservative elements of the former colony and economic power remains under the control of what Nkrumah, a bitter enemy of neo-colonialism, called international-finance capital. The wealth of Africa enriches overseas interests at the expense of the people. Neo-colonialism is particularly evident in Francophone Africa where French economic and political and military influence is as strong as ever. Most French African leaders are regarded as puppets and stooges. Nkrumah wrote:

> One after another the autonomous republics obtained international sovereignty, but under such adverse conditions that they had in fact to maintain all the military, financial, commercial and economic links of the previous colonial periods. In order to exist at all as independent states, these former French territories were forced to accept French 'aid' even to meet their recurrent expenses.

The older, conservative African leaders often tamely subscribe to the principles of neo-colonialism. But the younger radical forces strongly influenced by Marxism are beginning to get impatient and the stage seems to be set for an internal class conflict in Africa. Frantz Fanon, the great theoretician of Black Socialism, predicted that the last war of colonial liberation will not be fought between white man and black man but among the blacks themselves. So Chou en-lai was not altogether wrong when, after a visit to Africa nearly ten years ago, he said: 'Africa is ripe for revolution.'

[Toni Folami is African Editor of *Westindian World* and *West Indian Digest*.]

VITTORINO AND HIS OPEN CLASSROOM

by Richard W. Hibler

KOHELETH, the teacher in Ecclesiastes, tells us, 'There is no new thing under the sun.' In many ways this is true of educational philosophy and methodology of teaching. Current 'innovations' in schools can be found as common practice in the classrooms of Greek and Roman teachers living two thousand years ago. Socrates, Epicurus, and many other great educators borrowed from generations before them to structure pedagogical routine mistakenly called 'innovative' today.

One man, who incorporated much of the enlightened teaching methodology of the Greeks and Romans, became so famous for his school in fifteenth century Italy that he has been called, 'the first modern schoolmaster.'

The schoolmaster was Vittorino da Feltre. His philosophy and classroom methods are strikingly similar to the descriptions of current educational practice described as the 'Open Classroom' in today's schools.

The following list is an attempt to identify only a few of common denominators which Vittorino shares with some teachers working in the open classroom today. He believed that the teacher should:

1. exhibit such personality characteristics as: cheerfulness, affection and acceptance for children.
2. serve as a helpmate and companion to the young.
3. encourage freedom along with responsibility in the learning process.
4. encourage physical activity, exercise and good health habits.
5. provide a physical setting conducive to instruction.
6. make an assessment of individual student capabilities.
7. promote practical and social learning, as well as pedantic instruction.
8. recognise education as an experience in problem solving.

Not only did Vittorino believe in these principles, he practised them in his own experimental school. Vittorino da Feltre arrived in Mantua, Italy, toward the end of the year 1423. He was 46 years old and he would remain teaching in Mantua until he died in 1446. Vittorino's first pupils were the sons and daughter of Gianfrancesco Gonzaga, the Lord of the State of Mantua, and the Condottiere prince who hired Vittorino to bring culture to the small district west of Venice. Soon friends of the Gonzaga family, and later young aspiring scholars from all over northern Italy would be attracted to Vittorino at Mantua. Still later, as the reputation of the school grew, its influence spread and youth arrived from throughout Italy, France, Germany and Greece.

Many of the children were very young, six or seven years old; some studied with Vittorino until they were in their mid-twenties. Vittorino accepted many poor children, although most in attendance were the sons of wealthy parents. In the 'Joyful House', which Vittorino named his school, all children, charity cases or sons of noblemen, were exposed to his philosophy. He treated all children with love and respect, 'providing the best instruction the world had up to that time known'.[1]

Perhaps Vittorino took note of the ethics of Democritus and Epicurus, two great teachers of Greek antiquity, because he believed cheerfulness is a prime requisite of the successful teacher. In addition, he exhibited the serenity of spirit (Greek ataraxia) which was at the heart of Epicurus's philosophy of affection which, 'readily beamed from his face'.[2]

All children of all ages were treated with equal care and attention. Vittorino showed no favouritism for the children of his employer. His character attributes have been proverbial in educational history. Helen Wodehouse[3] suggests:

> Vittorino was a man of extraordinary beauty of character, whose serene gentleness, selflessness and earnest vision were remembered by all who ever knew him, and impressed the most diverse temperaments in men and children.

Vittorino, like Pestalozzi, a Swiss educator who lived over 300 years later and with whom he shares many similar ideas on education, spent his time as an active participant in the total learning of his students. He lived, ate, and played with his pupils, sharing every aspect of their learning experience. Teachers during his time and for centuries following were often remote and disinterested in the leisure time pursuits of their students. However, at Mantua, Vittorino organised games and promoted play periods as active instructional experiences, even to the degree of joining the boys in their games and excursions.[4]

Like other humanist educators of his day, Vittorino emphasised classical scholarship. Latin authors were carefully studied, while Vittorino, along with his friend and fellow teacher, Guarino da Verona, introduced Greek studies into the Renaissance curriculum. The schoolmaster of Mantua was a demanding scholar, yet recognised that not all students would share his enthusiasm for the writers of antiquity. Rather than coerce an unwilling learner with desperate exhortation or severe discipline, he allowed his pupils to progress at their own ability and interest levels. His approach was freedom of inquiry, and fear of threat or failure in the minds of his students was non-existent. He used encouragement rather than coercion.

> It was part of Vittorino's purpose to attract rather than to drive, and to respect the dignity and the freedom of his boys. So he refused, after fair trial made, to force learning upon an unwilling scholar, holding that nature had not endowed all with taste or capacity for study.[5]

Believing that constant study and application to lessons was not healthy in young minds, Vittorino encouraged physical activity. He had as a definite educational aim the development of the physical as well as the mental maturity in his pupils. Conforming to the Greek axiom, *mens sana in corpore sano,* Vittorino required daily exercise and he was probably the first humanist educator to teach gymnastics. Above Lake Garda his students ran and played games with their master. An interesting story is told of how two young serious students were in ardent discussion about a school assignment when Vittorino approached. He sent the boys off to join in the games with their peers, remarking that it was not a good sign in young boys to be so serious about their studies.[6]

La Casa Giocosa (the Joyful House) where Vittorino's pupils worked, was far removed from the cold, sterile environment where generations of

children before and after sat conning their lessons in dreary drudgery. Vittorino believed physical environment played a key educational role in encouraging or discouraging learning. In the large, well-lighted decorative rooms of the Villa of the Gonzagas, Vittorino encouraged learning. Frescoes lining the rooms were pictures of children at play. Large windows, open in warm weather, viewed the rolling countryside and studies were often conducted outside along broad walks and grass covered fields. Vittorino's 'open' schoolhouse made use of the out-of-doors in much the same way as Jean Jacques Rousseau would advocate 300 years later in his educational treatise, *Emile*. The children would wander on the ground, meet beneath the tree-lined walks and explore the countryside. Truly, this was an education utilising the total environment.

Recognition of individual differences and respect for the uniqueness of human personality are educational goals associated with the famed 19th century European theorists, Pestalozzi and Froebel. Much earlier references to the theme may be found in educational history (namely, among the writings of the Roman educator Quintillian) but Vittorino was unquestionably one of the first teachers to make provision that each of his students would be thoroughly examined in an effort to determine the total nature of the child's learning capabilities. This assessment, as Compayre[7] states, was 'a constant effort to discover the character and aptitudes of children'.

Because he lived so intimately amongst his students, Vittorino was in a position to give constant attention to the character, personality, and mental capacity of each child.[8] He was quoted as saying that not every boy displays the same tastes or aptitudes. Some are blessed with talent in three or four directions, others are not so gifted. However, everyone has some gift which must be discovered and cultivated by a conscientious teacher.[9]

Assessment of student strengths, weaknesses, and needs, along with provision for developing his curriculum on an evaluative basis around each individual, is one of the most significant contributions to pragmatic theory developed by Vittorino.

When James Mulhern and other authors mention Vittorino it is usually in reference to his admirable skill in developing the pupil from the incompetency of childhood to the harmonious maturity of mind, body, and character in adulthood.[10]

The master of the Joyful House was perhaps the first teacher to stress the unity of child development which is recognised as a principal factor in the aim of the open classroom. Emotional, social, physical, and intellectual growth was stimulated. Vittorino recognised that all aspects of the personality and character of the student must be developed in order to prepare him to function as a responsible citizen. In fact, he advocated the development of practical human relationship skills at a time when all other teachers stressed only the intellectual development. To Vittorino the useful life, activities intendant on developing social skills, were the most constructive subjects.[11] The active life was the educational ideal; social service and duty were the by-products of his strategy. Students were not to become mere

'rhetoricians' and 'pedants'[12] but confident, strong, trustworthy men refined in the social graces.

Vittorino realised that children learn best when they discover answers for themselves. Self-discovery and personal inquiry were features of his school programme very different from the drill, memorisation, and recitation practices in most schools during the Middle Ages. The schoolmaster of Mantua invented word games which young children played to learn their letters through personal problem solving.[13] Not only did the exercises enable each pupil to search for solutions on his own, but the quest for word answers was enjoyable.

In his best selling book, *Crisis in the Classroom*, Charles Silberman lauds the open, informal, pragmatic, 'child-centred' classroom modelled on the ideas of John Dewey and the British Infant School. He condemns the 'Joyless' classrooms found in many colourless, drab traditional American public schools. The characteristics which Silberman, and most other 'instrumentalist' or 'experimentalist' educators believed lend joy to the learning environment are those which were captured 500 years ago among the hills of northern Italy in Vittorino's House of Joy. Perhaps Paul Monroe[14] best sums up the contributions and example set by the 'first modern schoolmaster' when he states:

> Self-government by the boys of the school, a dependence upon the natural interests of the pupil, use of the natural activities of the child as a basis for much of the work, and a strong emphasis upon activities and upon the constructive side of the work as furnishing an immediate introduction into a useful life, were some of the features exemplified in this school at Mantua.

The open classroom today is difficult to define; it assumes many different shapes and styles. Words are inadequate as a description, for the observer must be cast into the total world of sight, sound, and sensory involvement to experience the panoply of spirit. Much in the same way, the school of Vittorino, removed in time by centuries, but fresh in the imagination of the creative teacher, must have been filled with the orchestration of lively and happy learning.

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MALTA'S ASSUMPTION TO A REPUBLIC STATE

by Christopher Jones

WITHIN two years of becoming an independent state, Malta has taken swift but sure steps to manhood, assuming the state of a Republic on the 13th December, 1974. It would seem that this is a role which is a natural consequence and one which is expected of countries that become independent. However, in Malta's case, it was not so. This important change has come about quicker than usual, following the present government's interpretation of the new role which Malta should play as a socialist state, without any strings from its previous protector, Britain.

Under the Nationalists, the tie with Britain was substantial and backed by a financial and defence agreement running to ten years, as from 1964. It was a natural link, since the negotiations for independence had been conducted with Britain. Also, because it was felt, and quite rightly so, that Malta required considerable help and guidance in its formative years following Independence. It was conceded at any rate that one could not, at one fell blow, sever 160 years of continuous connection with another nation.

It was, of course, foreseen that the arrangements with Britain as well as those with NATO would have to be subject to some form of revision and renegotiation at some later unspecified date; however, that was an arrangement that could only obtain provided the Nationalists were in power. Therefore, when the Socialists won the General Elections in 1971, it was a foregone conclusion that the whole approach with regard to relations between Malta and Britain, the Western powers and NATO, would undergo significant changes as the Labour Party would not be happy to wait for the full term of the 10-year agreement to elapse before seeking a new agreement.

The Labour Party led by Dom Mintoff had always professed, when in opposition, a critical approach to NATO and Malta's adherence to the Western alliance. Moreover, the party was sceptical at the way Independence was negotiated and was dissatisfied with the terms of the agreement with Britain, both as regards defence and finance. The Labour Party was unswerving in its belief that not enough, and no adequate compensation, was being paid by Britain and her allies for the continued use of Malta's strategic facilities, both naval and military.

When the Labour Party was returned to power in 1971, negotiations were at once opened with Britain and her NATO allies with a view to obtaining a revision of the defensive and financial position with Britain and NATO. These negotiations turned out to be a very long process, longer than expected. A deadlock was reached and the upshot was a crisis which involved Britain and NATO. The outcome of that crisis is now history. The 1964 agreement with Britain was renegotiated and a new agreement was entered which not only guaranteed a fairer compensation to Malta for the use of military facilities by Britain and her allies, but also established relations with Britain on a new footing.

A significant outcome of that crisis was that Malta forged new relations

with Libya who supported her throughout those trying times and this brought about the implementation of a marked pro-Arab policy in Maltese foreign affairs, Malta moving away both from the Western and Eastern bloc, paving the way ultimately for Malta's admission to the non-aligned nations bloc. Furthermore, it prompted the Maltese Prime Minister to seek wider fields of friendship, as evinced by the decision by Malta to seek aid from China in the form of a long-term soft loan, in exchange for facilities allowing China to open a diplomatic mission in Malta, as well as creating new industries. Relations, both diplomatic and economic, were also cultivated with other Far Eastern countries, notably Japan and North Korea. On the other hand, international cooperation was maintained at world international organisations, such as the United Nations, specialised agencies, the Commonwealth, the Council of Europe and the Common Market.

An indication of Malta's role in international affairs and its preoccupation with the maintenance of peace in the Mediterranean was manifest in the recent discussions which took place in Geneva prior to the final Helsinki European Peace Conference. Malta insisted all along that there could be no peace in Europe, unless due consideration was made of the dire need of preserving peace in these waters and that this could not be achieved until there was a super power race to preserve naval domination to the danger of all Mediterranean countries as well as African countries bordering these waters. As a result of Malta's firm stand, the wishes of all Mediterranean countries in the preservation of peace was emphasised in the final peace agreement signed in Helsinki.

Having set the pattern of foreign policy and international relations, the government turned its hand to internal relations with some vigour, as it was felt that several things in Malta did not conform with socialist ideals. In this respect no corner of Maltese society was left untouched. The Civil Service, *bête noir* of the Labour Party, the dockyard, social services, unemployment, the press, the law courts, national festivities, the university, commerce, industry, education, shipping, aviation, banking, telecommunications, taxation and even religion have had to bear the brunt of consistent reform and changes to fit into the ideology of the socialist government in power.

Then came the turn of the need for the revision of the Malta Constitution, one of the sore points of the socialists ever since Doctor Borg Olivier had concluded negotiations with the then British colonial secretary, Mr. Duncan Sandys. The drafting of the Constitution had been the work of the Nationalists then in power who, at the time of the negotiations, had consulted all parties concerned, inviting the latter for Constitutional talks in London. The decision to become independent had been passed by Parliament first and was put into effect after the matter was referred to the nation through a referendum. Britain then granted independence to Malta on 21st June, 1964 and Malta proclaimed itself an independent state on 21st October, 1964.

The Malta Labour Party, throughout the Constitutional talks, had not seen eye to eye with the Nationalists over the issue and, once secure in power, gave their full attention to amend and in fact redraft several sections

of the Constitution to make it conform with the dictates of their ideals and view. This they put into effect, first through a press campaign and then in open air meetings throughout the island and later through formal talks and discussions which were held with the Nationalists before the whole question was to be placed before Parliament. It should be pointed out that, since some of the articles could only be amended by a two-thirds majority, the Malta Labour Party had to negotiate some form of agreement with the Opposition.

Among the more important amendments proposed was the change in the nature of the State from that of an Independent country within the Commonwealth to that of a Republic (still remaining a member of the Commonwealth) as in the case of India and Ceylon; changes affecting the Church, pensions, disciplinary procedures in the Malta Civil Service and the Constitutional Court. Again these amendments necessitated a long series of encounters with the Nationalists after which a common ground of agreement was reached. The amended Constitution was then submitted to Parliament, fully debated and passed in the Parliamentary Assembly, the Nationalists for their part being allowed the use of a free vote. As a result, when the revised Constitution became law, Malta became a Republic, joining the republics the world over, but still retaining its membership within the Commonwealth of Nations.

Of significance in recent years of Labour rule is the gradual change which has come about in government policy, whereby the whole concept of ownership in all walks of life is being altered from one of private ownership to that of state control, that is, from private enterprise to state ownership. In this way we find that besides controlling and owning all public services at infra-structure level, the Government has nationalised shipping, aviation and telecommunications; it controls the oldest bank in Malta and has now acquired 60% of Barclays Bank, which is to be changed into a new bank, as a joint venture between the Malta Government and Barclays International.

More recently, the Government has strengthened its hold on communication, and besides owning Radio Malta, has acquired both the local Malta Television Service and also the local relay (rediffusion) system. It is interesting to note how this has come about. It all started with a sit-in strike by workers over divergences with the owners of Rediffusion and Television, an English-owned company with a licence to operate which had not expired and which had been functioning for the past 33 years, the company in Malta being entirely Maltese-run. When an *impasse* was reached, the Government, in order to ensure the continuity of this service, stepped in, took over the service, dismissed the director and top executives and legalised its action by rushing through Parliament a bill appointing an Emergency Council of Administration in order to run the service. When that was accomplished, negotiations were concluded for compensation for the acquisition.

Running on similar lines of eventual state ownership is the transport service throughout Malta which was run on a company basis and managed by a bus owners' union. The union has now been dissolved. The service is now functioning as one national bus line and details as to its actual operation

and ownership have still to be carried out. In agriculture, too, Malta has had centralisation applied, with independent agricultural markets being closed down to make way for one common market. Commodities, too, appear in line for state ownership and, as a sign of things to come, the Government is constructing a supermarket outside Valletta which is to be the forerunner of others in other parts of Maltese towns and villages.

Like many countries the world over, there seems to be a very close affinity between the Labour party and trade unions, and in this respect, Malta is no exception, the General Workers' Union and the Labour Party sharing the election platform, whilst the Union openly backs the Party in all matters. One can best gauge the close relationship between these two when we examine the position of the Malta dry docks. In the halcyon days of British naval supremacy, the Malta dockyard was the headquarters of the massive Mediterranean fleet and as such the dockyard became one of the finest naval yards in the world, providing a beehive of work for a considerable section of the Maltese population. Following the British Labour Government's decision to reduce its armed forces in 1958, the naval yard was closed down. To make up for that loss, the British Government contributed a large grant to Malta by way of conversion from a naval to a repair yard and employed the Welsh firm of Baileys to run the yard. It was then acquired by the Malta Government, who ran it through a Council of Administration, who in turn employed as managing agents, the famous firm of Swan Hunter.

Once again, much progress was recorded by the yard under Swan Hunter, but once again difficulties arose—this time locally—over continued requests by workers for increases in wages. Then business and trade took a turn for the worse with the outbreak of the Middle East conflict and the subsequent closure of the Suez Canal. The dockyard never quite got over these difficulties, especially as it was constantly hampered by lack of cooperation of the workers themselves who, following persistent strike action which was union-politically inspired, strove to embarrass the Government, bringing work, in fact, at the yard to a virtual standstill.

Then came the general elections, the Labour Party was at the helm and strikes came immediately to a stop. However, much harm had been done to the yard and it was necessary for the workers to dig in and put the yard back on its feet, a long period of readjustment and reconstruction being necessary and, as a start, to make the yard being run more economically, workers were not allowed to perform overtime work. As an incentive to greater work, the Government had decided to hand over the dockyard to the workers themselves. This has been done through the setting up of a recently appointed Malta Dockyard Corporation on which the workers themselves sit and whose chairman is the General Secretary of the General Workers Union. The Corporation is responsible to the Prime Minister and the books and accounts of this body have to be submitted regularly for government inspection and auditing. Before this new corporation was set up, the Government, who managed the yard through a Council of Administration, had written off the debts which had accumulated under the prev-

ious administration and which amounted to no less than £10m. Furthermore, under the seven year development plan, plans have been put into operation for the modernising of approach roads leading to the yard from the Grand Harbour quays, where a new dock berth is being built with the aid of the Chinese to take tankers up to deadweight of 300,000 tons.

Under the Nationalists, industries which were practically non-existent were given a great spurt. This was due to the fact that it was vital to find jobs for the many who were being faced with unemployment due to the run-down of the Services in the island. The matter was tackled by long-term planning of industrial development which had as a start the construction of industrial estates. The first of this series, which was built on the lines of those erected in Northern Ireland, was built at the Marsa, a site which is equidistant from both the main seaport and airport. Following the success of the first industrial estate, the government was encouraged to build other ones as well, situated in other parts of the island and thus accessible to more densely populated areas of Malta. These estates contained ready-built factories equipped with all service facilities, which could be tailor-made to suit the requirements of both local and foreign entrepreneurs. As an incentive, the Government offered tax-free holidays, low rental exemption on imports of equipment, plant and machinery, as well as training-within-industry benefits to employers. As an additional help towards industry, Government by various training and placement schemes sought to give ex-servicemen basic knowledge of trades to facilitate the entry of these persons to permanent employment in industry.

The present government has a different approach to unemployment. Instead of providing training facilities, it has introduced a series of semi-military corps over the past three years. These corps, which have absorbed a specific number of individuals, have been termed successively, the Malta Labour Corps, the Pioneer Corps and now the *Dirghajn il Maltin*—the latter standing for the words literally translated from the Maltese which means 'Maltese United Shoulder to Shoulder'. The function of these various corps is essentially to absorb unemployment by the deployment of the unemployed on major government projects, such as the construction of the airport extension, public works and various works at all national sectors. A feature of all these corps is the fact that they all come under direct military discipline, as they form part of the Malta Land Force.

The good work which had been initiated by the Nationalists in the field of industrial growth and development has been strengthened by the continuation of the same policy which has been also adopted by the Malta Labour Party. Indeed, up to 1974 no less than 120 modern standard factories had been built on the five industrial estates both in Malta and Gozo. There has been one important change, however, with regard to the functions of the Malta Development Corporation, the body which controls the grants and aids to new industries. Whilst the main function of the Corporation is to look after industrial requirements and act as promoter of new industries, this body is now extending its activities by promoting contacts in new spheres abroad which are less affected by recession and world market

slumps. This has been tackled by a promotional visit to eastern bloc countries as well as other potential markets in West Africa.

Besides this, the Corporation, in conjunction with a German Advisory Marketing Board, is seeking to map out proposals for new projects which it is felt would be more beneficial to Malta's industrial development. To meet this aim, after several feasibility studies, certain proposed areas were considered suitable for promotion. These areas cover foundry articles such as machine tool beds and parts of agricultural machinery, articles in aluminium, optical articles, precision instruments and apparatus for oil and related industries. Furthermore, the Corporation is participating in joint projects where it is felt that it is not possible for local promoters alone to finance all the necessary capital. Such projects have been started successfully with German, Chinese and Japanese firms.

In its bid to stabilise the local currency position and to offset the drain of local capital abroad, where there are already large investments, the present government is controlling and restricting imports. The purpose of this is two-fold, namely, to reduce the gap between imports and exports, as well as to promote local industrialisation. In the pursuit of this policy, however, the authorities are running into difficulties. There seem to be few opportunities for speculators to invest their surplus money.

Again, now that the British Government has decided to close down its token forces in Malta in 1979—these form part of the Nato defence pattern —there appears to be some concern over Malta's future employment prospects, as there will be but little chance of further sterling coming into Malta, and as the Maltese pound's reserves are backed by sterling, this appears to be an alarming factor. Also to be considered is the fact that Malta's chief source of income today is taxation, together with various loans granted by foreign powers following several trade agreements. On the other hand, much of Malta's trade is with Britain and Europe, and restriction in imports will seriously reduce Malta's foreign reserve. In this connection it is to be deplored that it has not yet been possible to introduce a local stock exchange which would facilitate investments, and equally to be criticised is Malta's inability to cultivate still further its relations with the World Bank.

Malta is now nearing its fifth year of office under the Malta Labour Party and inevitably thoughts are now turning to the coming General Elections in which it is expected that there will be a bitter struggle for power. The election campaign has already started, the week-ends and public holidays being dedicated by speakers of both parties to addressing the electorate throughout Malta. If there is any indication of the uneasiness felt by the party in power it could be gauged in the tone of the moderate Budget passed for 1975. This was a non-committal budget which is bent to assuage the lower level strata of the country, whilst at the same time refraining from irritating others by avoiding further direct taxation burdens.

Malta is indeed at the crossroads of political thought, the ideals and dogma of the two parties being diametrically opposed to one another in many respects. Under the Nationalists the country was moving very warily but steadily towards a line of prosperity firmly established within western

ideals but neutral enough not to support this or that bloc. On the other hand, under the present government, there has been a complete transformation from democratic to socialist ideals, Malta professing to be within the non-aligned bloc, while courting the Eastern bloc, championing the Arab cause and at the same time pinpricking the NATO countries and western bloc for continued help. With the country now shorn of its religious hold, indoctrinated with new ideals of equality and levelling of all classes, and with a party bent on keeping its newly acquired power, and with more youth going to the polls as a result of the lowering of the age limit from 21 to 18, it would seem quite possible that the labourites will make a strong bid for retention of power.

On the other hand, one must not underestimate the more conservative Nationalists who ruled previously for 9 consecutive years and who engineered with marked success the transition of power from colonialism to full independence. Recently, the Nationalists seem to have been infused with new life, and are proving strong adversaries in the Opposition. Following very unpopular and controversial measures adopted by the socialists in their attempt to turn Malta into a socialist camp and also as a result of the method being adopted to tackle the difficult economic crisis, it is equally possible that the more stable Nationalists would appeal more to the electorate as the party more likely to ride the storm which the country must surely face until the problems of recession and oil shortage are overcome.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

But the Dead are Many. Frank Hardy. The Bodley Head. £3.75. *Cockpit.* Jerzy Kosinski. Hutchinson. £4.25. *Hopscotch.* Brian Garfield. Macmillan. £3.75. *The Berlin of Sally Bowles.* Christopher Isherwood. The Hogarth Press. £4.95. *The Seven Days of Creation.* Vladimir Maximov. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. £3.50. *The Bernadinis' Terrace.* Suzanne Prou. Aidan Ellis. £3.90. *The Needle.* Francis King. Hutchinson. £3.45.

Politics as a theme for the novel have long been the Cinderella of basic plots; scarcely surprisingly, for the world of demonstration marches and party meetings is not one in which romance is likely to flourish. Trotsky's once famous utterance that every new tendency in art has begun in revolution would appear to have little relevance to fiction. That is why most novelists with reformist principles have contented themselves with writing the purely 'social' novel; tilting at a Society sufficiently certain of itself to smile at its own shortcomings.

A compromise over the past few years has been the introduction of the 'espionage' novel, firmly established as a successful formula by such writers as John le Carre and Frederic Forsyth. A further development is to exploit the dilemma of divided allegiances on a personality not quite tough enough to withstand the pressures involved.

Such a personality is John Morel, anti-hero of Frank Hardy's new novel, *But the Dead are Many.* The characters are Australian communists, carrying out their routine party assignments against a backcloth of prosperity and sunlit beaches. But there is little enough sunshine or affluence in the life of John Morel, a psychological 'case', who pilfers party funds, falls foul of his fellow workers and, in between bouts of sexual impotence, indulges in sporadic 'affairs' as a means of compensating himself for loss of faith in communist ideology, finally escaping by suicide from his private hell.

This situation could provide the ingredients for an absorbing straight-forward narrative, but Frank Hardy, who is one of Australia's few notably successful authors, has chosen to present his story in what he describes as 'fugue' form. Reduced to practical terms, this means flashbacks, explanations by principal and subsidiary characters and a summing-up by Morel's closest associate who has, rather confusingly, the same first name. But the success or failure of this gimmicky approach is immaterial. What matters is the convincing portrayal of the communist scene in Russia as well as Australia and the effect of persecution on men who, despite a dogged adherence to Khrushchev, Stalin and Karl Marx, have come to regard the 'system' as a hollow sham.

Beside such an abundance of human involvement and disillusionment, the widely publicised *Cockpit,* by Jerzy Kosinski, strikes like a bleak and chilly wind; due perhaps to the author's determination to keep his central character, Tarden, well removed from reality. Moving as he does with uncanny speed from place to place and one situation to another, the reader has scant opportunity to learn much about Tarden except that, even as a double agent, officially he has long since ceased to exist. Thus he is free to roam the world at will; the sole reward for his two-pronged defection being the indulgence of his every passing whim, the least unattractive of which is the wanton 'control and

manipulation' of unsuspecting people who have the misfortune to engage his attention. Most of his exploits are conveyed in a string of disconnected reminiscences in which he mulls over past conquests—not all of them successful for, like Morel, he suffers from spells of sexual inability. But whether he is challenging the virgin prostitutes of a provincial city or describing his boyhood hero-worship of a peasant skier, he rarely comes within nodding distance of a genuine human being. Except perhaps in the final pages when, caught in a faulty elevator, he displays all the weaknesses of ordinary panic.

More straightforward and infinitely more sympathetic is Brian Garfield's delineation of the problems which beset the undercover spy who has had his cover 'blown' and so is of no further use to his department. In *Hopscotch* the double agent, Kendig, unlike the shadow-hugging Tarden, craves the limelight in which to re-establish his professional ability. One of his few remaining assets is a fund of top-secret information concerning international events and he conceives the highly original notion of writing his memoirs and posting the manuscript, chapter-by-chapter, to publishers in the world's main capital cities. The absolute determination of both the Russians and Americans to prevent the book's publication is sufficient to provide Kendig with a genuine enough reason for evading capture by either or both of them. As he flits from Copenhagen, Helsinki, Latin America and London, effecting smooth transfers from one identity to another by means of ever available passports and ready cash, the reader obliges with a willing suspension of disbelief. Finally, when he is in sight of outwitting his pursuers, Kendig throws away his moment of triumph by a senseless 'Raffles'-like break-in to the house of a senior official in international security. The local police arrest him and confiscate his passport and money. But once again he evades his captors and contrives to free himself, this time by staging a presumed death after the grisly charade of dressing up a corpse in his own clothes: yet to what kind of future? These disenfranchised 'double agents', such as Kendig and Tarden, with their non-personalities and ever-shifting hideouts, are seen to be even more tragic casualties of the war of ideologies than the hapless John Morel seeking his refuge in death.

If the reader is left pondering uneasily on the paucity of genuine characterisation and narrative skill in the contemporary espionage novel, it is reassuring to turn back to one of the very first in the *genre*. Christopher Isherwood's brilliant cameo of a sadly ineffectual spy in *Mr. Norris Changes Trains* is now reissued in a collected edition of his Berlin stories, *The Berlin of Sally Bowles*. It opens with a welcome warmth and vigour:

> My first impression was that the stranger's eyes were of an unusually bright blue. They met mine for several blank seconds, vacant, unmistakably scared. . . . They were the eyes of a schoolboy surprised at the act of breaking one of the rules. Not that I had caught him, apparently, at anything but his own thoughts.

From that point on, the narrator, naive, likeable William, is securely ensconced as companion and confidant of the eccentric Arthur Norris. In the sick, seedy Berlin of the early thirties, the ill-assorted pair deepen their mutual respect and dependence. Neither William, an impecunious teacher of English, nor Arthur, finding his only consolation in modest 'celebrations' with a few intimate cronies, appear to be dissatisfied with the limitation of their lives in pre-Hitler Germany. The decaying streets provide a drab background to their junketings; the comments of subsidiary characters resemble a muted Greek chorus—until the storm breaks; and Arthur Norris is unmasked as a purveyor of secret information. He is obliged to flee to Mexico (by train and boat) where he languishes in acute boredom. As for William, shattered at the revelation of

his idol's true calling, his response seems curiously priggish if judged by the prevailing standards of today:

> I don't condemn you. As for my standards, if I ever had any, you've muddled them up completely . . . I'm too utterly sick of the whole filthy business. . . . My God, I wish you'd go somewhere where I'll never see you again.

And Arthur:

> How hard you are, William. I should never have expected it. You always seemed to me to have such a sympathetic nature.

And yet the odd-sounding little dialogue rings as true as the picture of the forgotten world of Berlin immediately prior to World War II and it is not merely as a period piece that *Mr. Norris Changes Trains* will be re-read today, but because its roots are firmly in the rich soil of human idiosyncracy rather than in the disputatious ideologies of monolith states.

The same authenticity and acknowledgement of human inconsistency might be claimed for Vladimir Maximov's new novel, already published in France and Germany, although not as yet in the Soviet Union. Two years ago, Vladimir Maximov, already an acclaimed Russian writer, was expelled from the Soviet Writers' Union. The official objections to his new novel, *The Seven Days of Creation*, are presumably based on Maximov's criticisms of the Soviet State which are, however, very subtly conveyed—so subtly, that possibly the author was not fully aware of the unfavourable picture he was presenting, which would explain his alleged astonishment at his sudden fall from favour.

The Seven Days of Creation is divided into six long sections which cover, by rapid manipulation of chronology, the lives of several generations of the same family. The seventh section, *The day of hope and resurrection*, is a blank page. There is nothing very remarkable about the group of peasants and small bureaucrats whose story is unfolded. Here are no committee meetings or fiery debates on party dogma but merely the day-to-day grind common to people living on the borderline of poverty. They have no time to consider the ultimate goal of Soviet policy in the battle to ward off starvation and are more inclined to utter crude oaths than party slogans. Like the rural workers in Thomas Hardy's pre-Victorian Wessex, they derive what satisfaction they can from drinking, womanising and organising small treats and celebrations for themselves. In the chapter *The Cattle Drive*, which describes a forced march of villagers and their livestock to a place of supposed safety during the Second World War, sleeping rough, scrounging for food, facing childbirth and disease with little or no complaint, the situation of these terribly underprivileged people is convincingly conveyed. As someone said, the common people have been shouted at so much they don't hear what is said to them any more. . . . The claim is that an oppressed people is rescued from spiritual despair by comradeship and fellow-feeling. And to some extent the message comes through, though unevenly, for the dialogue and prose often reads in a rather stilted fashion, possibly the fault of the translator, who is not named.

However worthy the cause and important the message, it is a relief to turn to two outstandingly successful novels where the only frustrations and deprivations are inherent in disposition and the unpredictability of human desire. Such a work of fiction is *The Bernadinis' Terrace* by Suzanne Prou, an accomplished writer who has been awarded the *Prix Renaudot* and described as writing in the 'same vein' as Francois Mauriac—an apt comparison. Disarmingly, she probes a simple situation. Two very old ladies, Laure Bernadini and Mademoiselle Therese, totter monotonously from terrace to salon, gossiping and drinking *tisanne*, apparently tranquil yet in reality hostile to each other to the point of obsession. What ugly or dramatic happening in the dim past is responsible?

Murder, it seems, of the long dead M. Bernadini by his wife, Laure, egged on by her hatred of Therese, his former mistress. And yet, just as the evidence presented makes this seem like certainty, the reader is gently reminded that it *could* all be hearsay and imagination. It is not important. What matters is the consistent delicacy of style, and the unfailing ability to reproduce in pastel colours the decaying mansion and its shadowed garden. Suzanne Prou is well served by her translator, Joanna Kilmartin, for throughout the text not one phrase strikes a false note.

Close attention to detail is also Francis King's strong suit, although conveyed in a totally different manner. His is the razor-edged comment on a myriad of tiny yet relevant objects and mannerisms. The reader has the impression of being admitted to a brilliantly lit room. Once accustomed to the glare, a very unusual situation is revealed. Two women doctors, Lorna and Matty, a semi-cripple, run a general practice in the less fashionable part of West Kensington. Lorna, the more vigorous member of the team, shares the upper maisonette with her half-brother, Bob. The handicapped doctor endures a tedious domestic existence with an octogenarian mother and nourishes a love-hate relationship for her more colourful neighbours. Light relief is provided by patients and the daily woman. But of course, there is far more to *The Needle* than an investigation into medico suburbia. Francis King is adept at presenting an allegory through a symbolic title and the relevance of 'the needle' is soon revealed. Bob, a diabetic, suffers a psychological inability to press the hypodermic syringe into his own flesh and so Lorna is called in frequently to perform this service—not alas, with the professional detachment of the doctor but with passionate, only half acknowledged adoration.

Friends and well-wishers obligingly point out to her the abnormalities of the intense brother-sister relationship. However, her love and loyalty is destined to be put to a sterner test. It has long been obvious that Bob's furtive comings and goings and his indignation when questioned about these indicate that something extremely odd is going on. The explanation is more sinister than might have been anticipated. Bob is a deviationist of the worst kind, whose *penchant* is for the procuration and defilement of little girls, of whom one at least has been murdered. In the end, his evil doings catch up with him. Mentally disintegrating and physically broken, he seeks Lorna's aid like a sick animal, and she assists him into final oblivion by the only means at her disposal—the hypodermic needle. Melodramatic, perhaps, even though in the circumstances inevitable, yet with so much richness of insight and food for thought, the reader is not disposed to carp at the film chase technique of the finale.

Also Received:

The Last Bohemian. Anthony Wilmot. Macdonald and Jane's. £3.25. An attempt to recreate in fiction the life and work of an artistic genius is always a hazardous enterprise, particularly when the subject spends much time in the far from aesthetic recreations of drinking and seducing. Anthony Wilmot is aided by his very genuine admiration for the painter and sculptor, Amedeo Modigliani, and in the distinguished circle in which he moved in the Paris of World War I, even though the effect is sometimes of tinsel and cardboard and a modern turn of phrase slips through. But there are many useful reminders here of a long-gone era and an overall fidelity to the known facts of Modigliani's pitifully brief career, which combine to make *The Last Bohemian* compulsive bedtime reading.

Island of the Seven Hills. Zoe Cass. Cassell. £3.25. A pseudonym masks the identity of a well-known short story writer, as the professionally evocative description of the island of Gozo confirms. A more original plot than the investigation by an adoring daughter into the circumstances surrounding her father's death would have been worthier of the author's extensive knowledge of Gozo and Malta.

The Virtues of Hell. Pierre Boulle. Cassell. £3.50. Although not entirely up to the standard of the celebrated *The Bridge on the River Kwai,* the unusual and at times moving story of a heroin addict who effects his own self-cure is very well worth reading. The central character, John Butler, channels all his frustrated energies into the manufacture and marketing of heroin. As is to be expected from Pierre Boulle, the account of the trek through the Burmese jungle with the priceless contraband is rich with local colour and will surely be transferred to the screen.

Hear the Lambs A-Crying. Chamintney Thomas. Portals Press (University of Alabama Press. $7.95). A warm-hearted if at times excessively detailed narrative concerning the black indigenous population living and working in a minor township not far from Alabama. It is as much documentary as fiction, since much of the dialogue has been based on tape recordings made by the author.

NON-FICTION

HITLER'S IMPACT ON BRITISH POLITICS

The Impact of Hitler—British Politics and British Policy 1933-1939. Maurice Cowling. Cambridge University Press. £15.

Not for the first time, Maurice Cowling and his Cambridge associates in the 'History and Theory of Politics' have presented an alternative interpretation of a period in English history. In 1967 Mr. Cowling gave us *Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution,* a quite different account of the 1867 Reform Act, different from the prevailing account by Trevelyan and Justin McCarthy, who saw mid-Victorian parliamentary politics as Liberal politics. Now Mr. Cowling challenges the black and white picture of the 'Thirties' in which Churchill and Eden are the heroes and MacDonald, Baldwin and Chamberlain the villains, with the *Times* and the so-called Cliveden Set thrown in by A. L. Rowse, etc. He embodies this challenge in 400 pages of closely written text, over a hundred pages of notes, seventeen pages of potted biography and five pages of bibliography and original sources—the whole work a scholarly if contentious enterprise, involving prodigious research.

It should be stated at the outset that half a dozen other historians have questioned the conventional Churchillian interpretation of these pre-war years. Mr. Cowling, however, makes his case by recording the behaviour of politicians, as witnessed by their deeds, their speeches, their letters in the tough school of parliamentary democracy. I knew most of the actors in this particular drama; it is therefore especially interesting to relive the period through the pages of a studious and dissecting historian, who pays attention to by-elections, to press support, to the less known members of the Cabinet, e.g. Oliver Stanley and Walter Elliott, and to the numerous groupings and re-groupings of M.P.s until a majority grouping made the choice of Churchill over Halifax inevitable. But the period concerned is 1933-1940 and much happened in the earlier years.

I now quote one passage about Baldwin and a passage from Chamberlain's letter to one of his sisters. After showing the humanitarian side of Baldwin,

Mr. Cowling writes: 'Baldwin was a tough operator of long experience and high accomplishments, he had beaten everyone who challenged him. By the middle thirties his scalps included Lloyd George, Birkenhead, Beaverbrook, Rothermere, Cecil, Salisbury, Churchill, MacDonald, Austen and Neville Chamberlain.' Chamberlain, May 1939: 'I often think to myself that it's not I but someone else who is P.M. and is the recipient of those continuous marks of respect and affection from the general public who called in Downing Street or at the station to take off their hats and cheer. And then I go back to the House of Commons and listen to the unending stream of abuse of the P.M., his faithlessness, his weakness, his wickedness, his innate sympathy with fascism and his obstinate hatred of the working class.'

It is not the avowed object of Mr. Cowling to put Chamberlain on a pedestal, but rather to put him in accurate historical perspective as a great social reformer proved wrong on foreign affairs. He objects to the blanket condemnation of the 'Thirties', to the muddled use of the word 'appeasement', especially as the same people are now guilty of appeasement of organised labour at home. He makes the excellent point that foreign affairs played a far bigger role in 1935 than in any other modern election. He is acutely aware of the cross-currents expressed by the Peace Ballot, the bitter enmity between Lord Robert Cecil and Austen Chamberlain, of the opposition to armaments and national service endorsed by Labour and most Liberal opponents, the fundamental disquiet felt by some politicians but not by the majority of people over the Spanish Civil War. He devotes nearly fifty pages to the failure of the League of Nations and compelled me to re-read 'Arms and the Covenant', Churchill's collection of speeches 1930-1948, most of which I heard in the House of Commons. Churchill's plea for a 'grand alliance' must be set beside the decadence of France, the ambivalence of Russia and the isolationism of the United States. As Mr. Cowling and other historians make clear, both Eden and Churchill went further along the road with Chamberlain than their autobiographies suggest.

For eighteen months Chamberlain carried the bulk of the country and his party with him. It is my opinion that he concentrated too much power in his own hands, that Horace Wilson was a bad adviser and that the junior members of the Cabinet never formed a base and rallying point. Chamberlain was a dedicated man, but perhaps guilty of 'hubris' and this contributed to his downfall.

KENNETH LINDSAY

THE AGE OF CANDIDE

The Modern World. I: Hopes. Edited by David Daiches and Anthony Thorlby. Aldus Books. £12.

A book on the age of the *Encyclopédistes* and after should perhaps resemble an encyclopedia itself and this enormous tome fulfils our expectations in this material respect as well as in more scholarly matters. Weighing 4 lb, it should ideally be read standing up, on a lectern, as the future Cardinal Newman used to read what he called the 'huge fellows' of the post-Nicene Fathers.

It is very much a post-Enlightenment volume itself, owing more to Voltaire than to Leibniz, to Blake than to Shelley. One of a series with the general title *Literature and Western Civilisation,* it forms Vol. IV of the whole series, but the first volume devoted to *The Modern World* as distinct from *The Classical World* and *The Mediaeval World.* It treats, roughly speaking, of the Enlightenment and After, of the eighteenth century and early nineteenth, from Voltaire to Goethe and Pushkin, the period when the 'Rites of Man' were giving way to

the 'Rights of Man'. Its sub-title, 'I: Hopes', is meant to be read in sober conjunction with the sub-titles of the remaining two volumes of the series, still to be published: 'II: Realities' and 'III: Reactions'.

We are treading, then, on very complicated and extremely debatable ground—and no one is more conscious of the fact than the general editors of the series and their team of expert contributors from universities in all parts of the Western world, from Sussex to California, from Paris to Helsinki. There is nothing facile here, no short cuts to understanding. 'This volume', the editors realise, is 'a product of the late 20th century' and therefore differs in its standpoint from what would have been scholarly acceptable 'even as recently as half a century ago'. There is no 'Romantic Revival' here, for example. 'The Romantic movement', the editors say firmly, 'did not constitute a decisive break with the Age of Reason, and no separate section is devoted to it here. The differences of style in the way Pope writes of one "stupendous whole, Whose body Nature is, and God the soul" and Wordsworth of a "sense of something far more deeply interfused" are contained within a larger cultural development'.

The age *was* hopeful—on the whole. But every Leibniz produced a Voltaire, every Paine a Burke, every Rousseau a William Blake. If it was truly the prelude to the world we live in today, it was no less truly the period of *The Prelude,* the poem in which the greatest English poet of his time expressed his gradual disillusionment with the hopes of his revolutionary youth. 'Thus strangely', Wordsworth wrote, 'did I war against myself', and this strange civil war—as important in the minds and spirits of the age as were the political events that partly gave rise to it—permeates a good deal of the literature our academic contributors are concerned with here.

'Academic' in the best sense of the word, I should personally guess, though it would need an ideal, practicably impossible reviewer, equally at home in all languages, to be precise on this point. Like most British and American readers, I have to take the literature of Poland, Denmark, Hungary and other comparatively unknown European countries largely on trust, through occasional translations, knowing little or nothing about their national and international background. Here, in this volume, is an opportunity to reduce our ignorance, to realise, for example, the wide extent of French cultural influence throughout Europe during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, an influence gradually giving place to German, as the classical Enlightenment was followed, if not precisely denied, by the Romantic reaction.

A complicated age, truly, but very much more to be understood *after* we have closed this enormous volume than when, flexing our muscles, we first took it up. The biceps of our mind are also very much called into play.

R. C. CHURCHILL

POWYS AND DEATH

The Complex Vision. £1.50; *Real Wraiths.* 75p; *Two and Two.* 50p. Village Press.

The writings of John Cowper Powys both in fiction and in works of philosophical counsel, are gaining steadily in repute. Strangely, however, his finest work in philosophy, *The Complex Vision,* published in America in 1920, has only now been published in England. Unlike his later, more personal, works, it establishes an objective system. Working from first principles, it is a reading of human existence based on the complex of man's various attributes. Emotions as well as practical experience, vision equally with reason, are taken as evidence for the nature of reality. It would be, to my mind, the most comprehensive reading of the human condition that we have, were it not for one serious limitation.

Powys believes in Spirits, the 'sons of the Universe', as 'invisible companions' to man; above all, in the spirit of Christ; but he does not here believe in God in any usual sense. Nor is he at all certain of human survival. From first to last, in his long literary life, Powys returns, again and again, to this problem, often saying, though his practice belies it, that he does not regard the question as one of importance. What he means is, and *The Complex Vision* is especially insistent on this, we should not crave for survival. High experience, with love, should be sufficient; as Middleton Murry, too, used to believe.

The problem is not so simple. It is not just a question of craving for survival. Many do not so crave. To die in peace, leaving all the tumultuous exigencies of this life, including our own sins, for others to deal with as best they may—what could be more satisfactory? Many like to think of death as a finality. Hamlet did—but with an all-important afterthought:

> What dreams may come
> When we have shuffled off this mortal coil
> Must give us pause.

Survival does not necessarily imply happiness. Therefore, for this reason alone, it is as well to know as much as we can about the matter. It is not a question of what we want, or do not want, but of what is, what actually happens; and how best to prepare for it.

On this, surely the most important of all human concerns, Spiritualism offers us evidence which, though we may or may not regard it as conclusive, must be taken into account. This evidence Powys does not survey.

After a lifetime of great writing, turning over and over the problem of death, Powys ended up, not unlike Shakespeare, with narratives in a fairy story vein. His last two, composed in 1959, have only now been published (again, by The Village Press). In them, rather like Ionesco, he uses an impossible action as an occasion for truth to shine through. The first is called *Real Wraiths*. Though they have died, the hero and heroine turn out to be not earth-bound, haunting, ghosts, but rather spirits of freedom. 'Real wraiths', we are told, 'can fly anywhere'. In our second story, *Two and Two*, the people, though not dead, experience in sequence a number of conditions usually associated with life after death: an enjoyable darkness, a kind of Nirvana; a place where objects are created by thought; one of wondrous colours; conditions where communication is wordless; a Utopia inhabited by famous men of literary genius. We end up with a *bodiless* existence, which is yet distinguished from all teachings of life after death. I am reminded of John Dryden's lines in *The Indian Queen* about those newly arrived from earthly life into a spiritual sphere:

> When leaving bodies with their care,
> They slide to us and air.

Spirit existence *slides* naturally and easily from what we call 'life' to the beyond. As Spiritualism asserts, 'There is no death'.

These last stories suggest that Powys ended his life with intimations of survival; and yet at the end Jesus appears, paradoxically stating that he is now quite dead, and so will everyone else be; but that nothing matters except goodness and kindness. The conclusion, however, is not the story. D. H. Lawrence once advised us always to believe the story rather than the writer. The advice was sound.

G. WILSON KNIGHT

THE MONSTER UNDER SCRUTINY

Project Water Horse. Tim Dinsdale. Routledge & Kegan Paul. £4.95.
The Loch Ness Story. Nicholas Witchell. Terence Dalton Ltd. £3.80.

For sixteen years now, Mr. Tim Dinsdale has been, as he is the first to admit, suffering from a monstrous obsession. The prodromal symptoms of 'Monster fever' were manifest one day in March 1959, when he picked up a copy of a magazine containing an article about the so-called Loch Ness Monster. Since then, forsaking all others—family, job, financial security and personal comfort —he has pursued his elusive quarry with a dedication which has made him a world authority on this, so far, somewhat insubstantial subject. It is a reputation hard won. Thousands of man-hours spent, burnt by summer suns, drenched by winter rains, peering through heat-haze and icy mist at the ungenerous water. In material terms the rewards of all this one-track devotion have been niggardly. The yield of 22 expeditions: two or three sightings, a few score feet of film, a couple of books. Spiritually, experientially, however, Mr. Dinsdale counts himself rich—'Harassed but happy, penniless but free'.

His first two books—*Loch Ness Monster* and *The Leviathans*—were concerned with the problematic creatures themselves; presenting the evidence, arguing the case for acceptance of their existence. *Project Water Horse,* completing the trilogy, tells, beguilingly, the story of the chase, the saga of the monster-hunters, the men and women who have sought the quasi-mythical denizens of Loch Ness and Morag, the monster of Loch Morar. It is a study in the humanistic involvement. A book about the pioneers—by a pioneer. Inspirational in the way that the writings of the founding field naturalists, which you will find scattered through the proceedings of hundreds of little local natural history societies, were inspirational.

But the shape of the chimera is changing. Since the involvement of the American scientific contingent, with wealthy paraphernalia of sophisticated electronic aids, the search at the loch has taken on the aspect of high technology, and the possibility of a computer-enhanced solution looms convincingly on the near-horizon. No one is more delighted than Mr. Dinsdale, but his book looks back in nostalgia to the days when the amateurs, with box Brownies in their hands and, in their hearts, hope triumphing over experience, placidly took the road to the mossy greens and browns of the Highlands. For him, the quest has been invested with a strange poetry, and that poetry keeps breaking most charmingly through the bread-and-butter prose of log-book records and monster-hunter's notebook entries—'I had watched the season change from summer to autumn and one afternoon, with little *Water Horse* riding peacefully at anchor close to the ancient castle ruin, a flutter of coloured leaves drifted down on to the water, like teardrops. It was a sombre moment for me.' The monster-hunting season was ending. Time to head back south. Another year gone. But there was next year . . . and next . . . and next . . .

It is to one of the more recent recruits to the ranks of the monster-hunters, 22-year-old law student, Nicholas Witchell, that we are indebted for what is without doubt the most useful, and certainly the best illustrated, synthesis of the unfolding of the Loch Ness mystery. Like Mr. Dinsdale, Mr. Witchell has notched up a daunting tally of hours scrutinising the surface of the loch and, although he has never seen the creature, he, too, is totally convinced of the existence of 'a herd of shy, unidentified animals which are worthy of the most serious investigation and protection.'

His book, *The Loch Ness Story,* is not a personal book in the sense that Mr. Dinsdale's is. It is really a sequel to Constance Whyte's classic *More Than A Legend,* published in 1957, and Dr. Whyte generously made her unique archives available to him. Mr. Witchell supplements this material with researches of his own, including first-hand interviews with witnesses, and carries the record on up to the end of 1973, detailing and placing in perspective the brilliant results achieved by the American research teams. Simply written, judiciously organised, Mr. Witchell's book supplies the essential background reading for anyone who is attracted to the Loch Ness problem; it provides the ideal springboard from which to take the plunge into the waters of enigma.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

DIAGNOSING APPARITIONS

Apparitions. Celia Green and Charles McCreery. Hamish Hamilton. £3.75.

In 1968, and again in 1974, the Institute of Psychopsychical Research at Oxford appealed through the Press and radio for first-hand accounts from percipients, in Britain and overseas, who had, through any of their senses, had experiences of apparitions. As a result, an enormous amount of case material was received—approximately 300 responses to the first appeal, and 1,500 to the second. Interestingly, 72 per cent of the responding population were women. It is upon a selection of this material, in conjunction with previously published first-hand accounts, that this book is based.

What is an apparition? A non-material figure superimposed on the normal environment? That seems to be the most usual type of hallucinatory experience, but there is also what the authors describe as the 'waking dream' type of apparition, in which the percipient loses awareness of the normal environment and seems to be perceiving a different one. They propose to call this a 'metachoric' experience. In a third, intermediate, type of hallucinatory experience, only a part of the subject's environment appears to be metachorically replaced.

The authors have recognised, too, that experiences of seeing apparitions are sometimes associated with ecsomatic—out-of-body—experiences.

Apparitions may be tactile and auditory as well as visual. About 12.30 a.m. one Christmas Day, a Dr. Symes heard a ring at his night bell and, through the speaking-tube beside his bed, held a conversation with a caller, whose voice the doctor recognised, and who informed him that he was needed at once to render medical assistance to the caller's wife, who was in labour. The doctor went immediately, but could get no reply to his knockings at the house. Shortly after nine o'clock next morning, the same gentleman called again (?). He told the doctor that he had *not* called in the night, adding, 'But I nearly did at 12.30 this morning.'

This book is full of such curious and fascinating anecdotes, but, more importantly, the authors have made a determined effort to collate, analyse and build into a coherent structure, what you might call the diagnostic characteristics of the apparitional experience in a wide variety of its manifestations.

Certain conclusions emerge. About two-thirds of all the recognised apparitions reported were of the dead. Most frequently the apparition appeared within a week of the death. Most commonly the apparition was of the percipient's mother or father. Some four per cent of the subjects reported the reassuring effect of the apparitions, which frequently manifested at a time of crisis or stress. This poses the old chicken and egg riddle.

The authors themselves see this as no more than an interim report on a highly complex subject, but it is a thorough examination of a great deal of new material to which every serious investigator in this field must pay respectful attention.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

THE STRUGGLES OF A BOXER

The Tragedy of Randolph Turpin. Jack Birtley. New English Library. £3.25.

I was looking the other day, in Mike Barratt's office, at the dozens of bills for his past boxing promotions. Of the hundreds of men who had appeared on his cards, only two or three could be said to have come out of boxing with anything left to balance against the pain, punishment and, in a small percentage of cases, a few hours of glory. Although he never appeared on a Barratt promotion, Randolph Turpin, twice World Middleweight Champion, is an archetypal example.

Jack Birtley traces Turpin's struggles through the slum upbringing as a child of a mixed marriage—so very different in the thirties from today's *soi-disant* enlightened times. He traces the familiar path of the boxer through the amateur days, the first professional bouts and then on to the career peculiar to Turpin. A world title fight followed by an unsuccessful and perhaps unlucky defence. A second chance against an inept Frenchman was followed by another unsuccessful defence against a mediocre American. The second defeat was almost undoubtedly caused by Turpin's reluctance to train and growing inability to cope with the pressures of being a champion. Then comes the decline, slow at first, but always gathering speed until the suicide in a Leamington transport cafe where he also wounded his youngest daughter.

As a general rule, sporting literature is not of the highest quality. The factual sort is poor, probably because the books are quickies, ghosted to get the maximum out of the current hero's all too brief period at the top. The fiction of sport has not a great deal to offer, with the exception of Ring Lardner and Gerald Kersh, who both portrayed the sad world of the professional athlete. Birtley's book can, in its genre, stand with the best.

Despite the money Turpin earned as both boxer and wrestler, the latter to which he turned when he was almost down and out, he ended up a bankrupt, hounded by the Inland Revenue. In fact, the last straw seems to have been a demand for tax on his wrestling earnings of £20 a night! The money, somewhere in the region of £100,000 net, which in the fifties was indeed money, was frittered away on poor investments, cars, women and false friends. Of course, all the spongers disappeared as surely and simultaneously as did Turpin's big punch, his timing and his reflexes. In the end there was little more than a gun in the attic.

Birtley is particularly strong in the coda of the book. Much of the boxing is only of interest to the aficionado, but the background of sycophants and sweat is overwhelming. Few come out well of this story of how society created a little Frankenstein monster and then let it—and helped it—destroy itself. The tragedy of Turpin is as old as boxing itself and will be repeated again and again. It may well be repeating itself at this minute.

JAMES MORTON

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES

In the Eye of the Storm (Penguin. 90p). The struggle in Angola between the rival independence movements gives particular point to this revised

edition of Professor Basil Davidson's study of the history of Angola and the guerrilla war. Although the book does not cover the immediate situation, it provides valuable background material. Professor Davidson is optimistic of Angola's future as an independent State, but concludes inevitably, 'The road ahead must be hard to follow.'

Astride Two Cultures: Arthur Koestler at 70 (Hutchinson. £5.50). This tribute, edited by Harold Harris, to a distinguished writer who has had more than ordinary difficulties with which to contend, is timely and well carried out. Fourteen contributors combine to present the many facets of Arthur Koestler's scientific and literary interests. Particularly valuable are the essays by Kathleen Nott and Professor W. H. Thorpe.

Agents Extraordinary (Robert Hale. £3). Stowers Johnson is well known for his books and travelogues of Iron Curtain countries and although he has been a welcome visitor in the Soviet Union in the past, hospitality and freedom to travel when and where he wished has not deterred him from offering his hosts some frank criticism, as was instanced by his *Two Faces of Russia*. In *Agents Extraordinary*, he takes as his theme the exploits of a couple of British soldiers who landed by parachute in Bulgaria shortly before the end of World War II and thus, by their almost incredible adventures and exploits, created a useful military diversion. Excitement and interest apart, the story breaks now ground and is a valuable revelation of a little known area of activity in the last war.

The Companion Guide to Burgundy (Collins. £5.00). Admirers of Robert Speaight as an actor, biographer and lecturer may be surprised to find him in the guise of a travel guide. Puzzlement soon gives way to admiration of his ability to transfer his usual methods of work and imaginative approach to the provision of a first class handbook on Burgundy which not only includes all the detailed practical information necessary for getting the maximum enjoyment from a visit to Burgundy, but also an inspiring selection of his own personal preferences in this unique area of France. There is already an extensive list of Collins *Companion Guides* available and more are in preparation.

Let's Go. English Tourist Board, 4 Grosvenor Gardens, London SW1W 0DU. There are still hundreds of thousands of people who prefer holidays at home to the package tour abroad and *Let's Go* is invaluable for its presentation of cultural and recreational possibilities in this country; many of which may have been forgotten or not fully realised. Tourism in England has come a long way since 1971 when L. J. Lickorish, a chief executive of the British Tourist Authority, outlined plans for the future in *Contemporary Review* (No. 1264 Vol. 218) and in *Let's Go* a vigorous and imaginative approach is concentrated on the short holiday of three or four days' duration—an innovation which has earned the hotel business an additional revenue of more than £1m. over the past year. Besides listing more than five hundred individual hotels, the booklet, admirably written and edited by William Richards and Jenny Lefley, provides maps, colour illustrations and economically worded items of background information about the various regions.

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BRITAIN'S ECONOMY

by Sir Frederick Catherwood

IT is perhaps only in Britain that there could be a referendum giving an overwhelming 'Yes' to membership of the largest and wealthiest economic community in the world, dedicated to the reduction of all barriers to trade between its members and have almost immediately afterwards as the main economic talking point, the proposal that we might erect protective barriers to guard British industry against foreign imports. This seems to show a certain lack of nerve which is uncharacteristic of us; but it also shows that many people don't understand the extent to which we are already integrated with other advanced economies, especially with the economies of our European partners.

It stems to me, therefore, to be wholly wrong-headed to be thinking in terms of import controls a few months after the referendum which took us so decisively in the other direction. It has been the view of British industry for the last fifteen years that membership of the Community was the biggest single factor in helping to cure the British disease and get us back into the running as a prosperous industrial nation. Industry did not believe in the home market booms of 1964 and 1974 as a way out of stagnation since it did not believe—and quite rightly in the event—that these booms could be sustained, nor did it believe, also with justification, in devaluation as a way out since the lower price of exports was offset by a higher price of imports which put up our costs and offset the benefit of devaluation. Consistently we have said that if we have the same tariff-free access as our major competitors to a market of 250 million growing at twice our rate of growth, then the equal opportunity would enable us to pull ourselves back and that a Common Market would give us a common growth rate and common prosperity.

We have now been members of the Community for more than two years and people are entitled to ask whether this view still holds. But those two years have not been years of committed membership. Rightly or wrongly, the Labour Party decided that they were going to put the issue to a referendum and that if the referendum said 'No' they would pull out of the Market. Until a month or so before the referendum in June most businesses believed that a Labour government would hold a referendum which would

pull us out. Even when the opinion polls ahead of the referendum showed a majority in favour, business could hardly believe it and so not until June could any businessman take a long-range decision based on Market membership. I don't say this in any complaining way. Now that we have had the referendum, the advantage is all our way. It has finally ended the argument not only in Britain but also among those members of the Community who wondered whether Britain was really committed to it. But for practical purposes our membership of the Community began in June 1975 and not earlier. So we cannot judge by results yet.

In advocating membership of the Community so strongly, British business had in mind that the Community market would give us the profits we needed to rebuild our industrial base which has slipped in the last fifteen years far behind that of our major competitors. What industry did not, however, allow for was the complete drying up of its cash-flow at the very moment when it needed it most to make that investment. So the lack of investment since June and the lack of signs that investment is going to rise in the near future come more from a lack of ready cash than a basic lack of willingness to invest for the European market. It is, in fact, reckoned that industry's net liquidity position deteriorated by £3½ billion in 1974 and although this has been checked in 1975, it has been checked partly at the cost of reduced industrial investment.

This lack of cash is not an entirely British phenomenon. To quote *Business Week* of 22 September: 'First inflation and then recession swept the world economy. Now it is the capital crisis that has jumped national borders and entangled capital markets—not only in the industrialised West but also in the state-run economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.'

It goes on: 'In spite of markedly different approaches to capital formation and capital allocation, equity markets have all but dried up everywhere. And debt markets in London, Paris and Tokyo are closed to all but the companies with very best credit ratings. Debt equity ratios for most companies are at the historic—some say, dangerous—highs. And investment in machinery and equipment is plummeting everywhere—by an estimated 10% in real terms in Germany and perhaps more in Britain.'

It says that part of the malaise is due to the combination of inflation, recession and the fourfold increase in the price of oil. It feels that the slowdown of investment in a number of countries in Western Europe is not entirely cyclical but a slowdown in growth rates around the world. It points out 'in Britain their confidence is at a low ebb, not even the ability to write off new investment in a single year's time is enough to get business to replace their antiquated and worn equipment.' It reckons that 'Britain must invest some $45 billion dollars (£21 billion) in new plant and equipment to become competitive with its Common Market neighbours and Japan.'

It is interesting to see the suggestions which *Business Week* makes for closing the gap between America's capital needs and the limited capital now available to meet those needs. It says:

> the growth of government spending must be curbed so that surpluses emerge in

> the Federal budget. Virtually every study indicates that this is the key step in solving the capital crisis. The biggest capital shortage of all is in the private sector. All the serious work done on 'crowding out' shows that private investment cannot increase as a share of gross national product unless government spending declines. And it is private capital formation that must grow the fastest if the nation is to meet its goals—an unpalatable truth to many, but a truth just the same. The tax structure must be changed so that the cash flow to business increases.

If that applies to the Americans, how much more does it apply to us.

There is one major difference between the Americans and ourselves, and that is that we have just become partners with countries which have a much better capital stock than we have and we cannot protect our markets or expand our economy unless we match that capital stock very soon. I have suggested that we aim to make up the deficiency calculated by *Business Week* at £21 billion by diverting resources from public sector expenditure to industrial expenditure at the rate of £3 billion a year. I think that this would have the backing of the trade union movement; certainly it had the backing of two members of the TUC General Council to whom I spoke separately a few weeks ago.

It also has the strong support from every industrialist to whom I have so far spoken and one of the people in Whitehall for whose views I have the greatest respect. Government expenditure has risen from £13 billion in 1964 to a staggering £45 million in 1974/75, an increase of over 3½ times in ten years. Surely it is time to call a halt.

There are those who feel that any reduction of public sector expenditure would be disruptive. This is the age-old argument for doing nothing. Of course, if you stop a motorway in the middle of a ploughed field or leave a hospital half built or throw the construction industry out of work it is disruptive. But I am not proposing any such thing. I am simply proposing a halt to those major capital projects in the public sector before they start and the cumulative effect of this can be quite substantial in quite a short time. On the other hand, the announcement that we would go back to a system of investment grants for capital spending in industry from the date of the announcement would, if the rate of grant were high enough, stimulate an equivalent amount of capital investment in manufacturing industry and use the physical resources currently being used in the public sector. There is also the strongest of all political reasons for making this switch, the need for positive action to counter the inexorably rising trend of unemployment. How else can we bring unemployment down? The rate of interest Britain now has to pay for foreign lending shows that we no longer have the resources to reduce unemployment by public sector expenditure as we have done in the last thirty years. Keynsian solutions of demand management are no longer possible when the expansion in demand cannot be financed and it is hard to see how it can be financed when we are running a public sector deficit of £9 billion and an external deficit of at least £2 billion.

On the other hand, it is far easier to raise finance for productive investment which creates the surplus to service the loan and repay the capital. However desirable the public sector capital expenditure may be, it does not create new jobs, whereas investment in industry on this scale would create

the number of jobs required to make a decisive reduction in the rate of unemployment. An increase in unemployment to the 2 million mark would also put enormous strain on our free democratic institutions and no one knows whether our society is sufficiently resilient to bear the strain or whether it would crack as it did in Northern Ireland. It is worth taking a great deal of trouble to change direction to avoid that risk.

Let me just deal in passing with the objection that our problem is not our lack of equipment but our failure to use our existing equipment efficiently and in particular chronic overmanning. The argument about existing equipment is a typically production-orientated argument. It says that we have in Britain surplus capacity on our existing equipment and if only the customer would buy what that equipment produces we would be all right. But the world has not stayed still. Recently, I spent two weeks going around European markets and the message is loud and clear that we simply do not have the capacity to produce the goods they want and that they no longer want the goods produced by production lines laid down for the products of the nineteen fifties and the nineteen sixties. Our European competitors have equipment which produces goods tailored for their market in design and specification and unless we match that equipment we will be unable to compete. Where we have matched it we can compete but the complaint wherever you go is that we do not have adequate capacity for the up-to-date goods they really want. So better use of old equipment producing to old designs and specification is no answer.

Nor is it enough to say that we must reduce our manning levels to be competitive. We have to ask why we are overmanned. It is probably true that a British company competing with 1950s equipment with a German company which has 1970s equipment will employ more men for the same output and to that extent it is overmanned. But the answer is that to reduce the manning scales you need the 1970s equipment. It is the equipment which produces the greater output, not the muscular effort. But, it is argued, whenever we want to put that kind of equipment down the British working man won't have it. If our level of investment simply replaces the old output capacity with a machine which produces the same output with a lower labour force, then the labour force will, of course, try to protect itself. No one wants to lose his job, or even to play Russian roulette with his job. If we are 30% overmanned on existing equipment, we cannot turn 30% of the work-force or 7 million people out on the streets. The only way forward is to put down enough new plant to employ the 7 million people and bring our manning standards down and our output up in the same act. We cannot do one alone. The working man needs to know that equipment with a lower manning level is not a threat to his job and this can only be done if we have a planned expansion of our total national productive capacity aimed at providing genuine new employment and backed by the trades unions at every level.

Given the funds necessary for capital investment we then have to look at the European market and see how the market differs from the combination of markets we have had in the past. We very soon find that Europe

requires an entirely different marketing strategy.

First, the European market has to be treated as a large and sophisticated market and not, as many of our export markets have been in the past, a place where we can sell the last 20% of a production line geared for the needs of our profit base in the United Kingdom market. The message from Europe is that the product has to be market researched in Europe and designed for Europe. Their television sets have their knobs in a different place, their favourite colours are not the same as our favourite colours, their standard of living is now higher and their quality requirements are also higher; so we really have got to find out what exactly it is that they want and provide that and nothing less. We cannot assume that they will buy what is bought in the United Kingdom, nor can we assume that what is bought in France will also be bought in Germany.

Second, they also have an English Channel complex. They do not like a stretch of water standing between them and their spare parts. So those who have been most successful aim to have 90% of the spare parts for their products south of the Channel and available on 48-hours delivery.

Third, the Channel complex also makes them feel that they will get an engineer to Dusseldorf faster if he comes from Milan than if he comes from Birmingham, although the flying times are exactly the same. So British companies are most successful if they also have locally employed engineers on a 24-hour standby able to speak the language to the man on the shop-floor.

Fourth, if we are really a part of the Community then we must step up our European sales force to the same density as our United Kingdom sales force. They must also have the same authority with their management and their customers must have the same priority. If the European market is not only as profitable but more profitable than the British market, then we have to put our sales effort where our profit is.

Fifth, we have to recognise that because of the labour troubles here in the early 70s and the wide readership of the British press, they have a view of British workmen which is somewhat less rosy than the view taken in Congress House. So we have to make specific assurances to our European customers that their goods will not be held up by strikes. We can do this either by double-sourcing or by a much greater involvement of our labour force in the needs of the export market and understanding of its contribution to stable employment and rising wage packets. We can also perhaps point out to our customers that we are not on strike every other day and that our own particular company's record is just as good as theirs.

Sixth, we have to persuade ourselves, the management team and the board of directors that a shift towards European markets really is likely to be profitable in the long run. Economists tend to sneer at tariffs as having only a marginal importance. But if our average margin on turnover is 10% and the external tariff we have had to jump is 9%, then we don't have much margin left to justify an investment for that market alone. But if the tariff is reduced to zero, as it shortly will be, and the combination of the exchange rate and inflation rate are still marginally in our favour, as they

are, it is worth investing in the United Kingdom for a European market where we find we can make something that they really want. Looked at the other way round, Europeans are now extremely anxious about the fact that their labour costs per worker are now double ours and that if we can get their output per worker we will be ferociously competitive. Given a policy of investment to reduce manning levels to match the most up to date quality and product design, there is no reason in the world why we should not be fiercely competitive. Therefore, we have quite a margin with which to operate for quite a long time.

One final point. The ability to sell in a market of 250 million means that we do not have to have the same product range in order to maintain our volume. We can begin progressively to shed our less profitable lines and concentrate on those in which we are competitive throughout the European market. The whole idea—economically—of a wide free trading area is to get the benefits of specialisation. Comparisons between Canada and the United States show that a Canadian paper mill with a market one-tenth of the size has to make ten times the product range of the American opposite number which can sell a limited range to ten times as many customers. So the Canadians cannot conceivably get the competitive costs. The faster we can shift from a broad product range of mixed profitability to a narrow range of high profitability and high volume the faster we will get the cash flow to reinforce success. So my final message would be let us be ruthless with our product failures and back our successes in the whole tariff-free market now open to us. This is a very frustrating time, but it is also a time of enormous new opportunity and those of us who can take it will do extremely well.

[Sir Frederick Catherwood, Chairman of the British Overseas Trade Board, was formerly Director-General of the National Economic Development Council from 1966 to 1971. He has also served as Chief Industrial Adviser to the Department of Economic Affairs. Publications include *The Christian in Industrial Society*, 1964, *The Christian Citizen*, 1969 and *A Better Way*, 1975.]

MANPOWER SERVICES—THE NEW APPROACH

by Jo Campling

FEW members of the public have heard of the Manpower Services Commission. It has maintained, quite deliberately, a low profile. Yet it represents an entirely new concept in the organisation and management of British manpower services and could lead to what one commentator has called 'a quiet revolution.'

The M.S.C., set up in January 1974, is responsible for the training and employment services, previously provided by the Department of Employment. The training services are organised through the Training Services Agency (TSA) which was established on 1st April 1974 and the employment services through the Employment Services Agency (ESA) established last October when the Commission assumed its full responsibilities. Its main functions are to provide a manpower service to the community by planning, developing and co-ordinating the work of the two Agencies and advising the Secretary of State on all manpower questions.

There has never been a similar body in this country. Now it is fully operational, it controls the activities of both Agencies, their budgets and future plans. In the financial year 1974/75 the cost of these services will be around £115 million, rising to over £170 million in the next three years. Although the Commission itself has only a small central staff, it is responsible through its two operational subsidiaries (TSA and ESA) for over 2,000 staff with offices, training centres and Industrial Rehabilitation Units (IRU) in about 1,000 locations throughout the British Isles. Unlike its nearest counterpart, the Swedish Labour Market Board, its powers are limited in that the TSA and ESA have each been given statutory existence of their own. Its Chairman, Sir Denis Barnes, previously Permanent Secretary at the Department of Employment, describes it as a 'holding company'.

The main aim in setting up the Commission was to give collective responsibility for managing the public training and employment services to a semi-independent body representing employers, employees, local government and education interests. In this way it is unique, since responsibility has been transferred from the Secretary of State to a public authority outside Government. In addition to the full-time Chairman there are nine part-time members. Three are employer-sponsored, another three sponsored by the TUC, two drawn from local government, and the remaining one concerned with education.

Sir Denis emphasises that it is a decision-making, not merely an advisory, body. Indeed, it is the only one which will take major decisions about the allocation of resources and the development of policies in the manpower services, subject only to the approval of the Secretary of State. It will be able to give more attention to the whole complex of labour services and problems than any Minister could, including the initiation of its own research projects. Since it is one step removed from the political arena, it will tend to apply different tests to decision-making than those which

politicians apply. Certainly it will be able to plan ahead more effectively than the Department of Employment as it is less prone to everyday political pressure. Greater stability should also mean more flexibility in allocating and shifting resources as changes in the economic situation require. This will be helped by the fact that the Commission is financed by a grant-in-aid from the Department of Employment, not by money voted directly by Parliament. Additionally it can argue publicly for more funds if needed. Although its subsidiaries have their own high concentration of management effort and separate on-going programmes, the M.S.C. with its executive authority, control of resources and power of veto, should act as a positive stimulus to them. It can draw attention to manpower problems and stimulate discussion about action to deal with them, acting as a public forum, without the formality and expense of a Green Paper. The Chairman sees this aspect of promoting public debate on special topics as a unique and valuable function. The Commission has freedom of choice about the bodies with whom it can liaise. There are no formal channels and there are a whole series of institutions and individuals whose work touches on the manpower field, who could be of use.

It is too early yet to estimate whether any of these possibilities is being realised. Both Agencies have submitted their five-year plans for the approval of the Commission, and these have been published. The M.S.C. decided at its first meeting in January 1974 to examine the steps being taken by the Agencies to meet manpower needs for energy purposes with reference to North Sea oil. A working party in Scotland assessed the need for skilled manpower for the new industry, identifying a number of critical skills and warning of shortages in these sectors in the next two years. Summaries of the working party's report were sent to all employers' organisations affected so that they could consider plans to safeguard a supply of trained men. The Commission has been concerned with new education and training facilities for labour associated with the operation of oil rigs, including the planning of a drilling technology centre and providing, through TSA, training in skills for oil-related occupations. On the employment side, over 5,000 vacancies in the new industry have been filled.

However, M.S.C. is not just a managing body for the two Agencies, which could probably run successfully independently of it. It has an overall view of the labour market, acts as a clearing house for information and can develop a general manpower strategy. It is this third role of manpower intelligence and forecasting which is likely to move the M.S.C. from its present low-key profile, particularly as unemployment looks like becoming a real problem. It can point out the implications of existing Government policies and acts as a lobby for new policies to bring about the most effective use of the nation's work force. In this capacity it needs to develop views not only on economic, industrial and regional policies, but also in the fields of education, housing and other social policies which have an effect on the utilisation of manpower and the labour market. In other words it must look at manpower in the widest possible context, drawing on all available sources.

The Commission decided at its first meeting in the crisis situation at the beginning of last year, that plans would be drawn up about the ways to mitigate the worst effects of rising unemployment, should this occur. Its own recent survey indicated a figure of almost 750,000, up 123,000 since November 1974. Plans had been laid already on the basis of around 800,000 unemployed. The Commission is particularly worried about the effects of high unemployment on the under-25s and the over-55s, groups which are always hardest hit at a time of rising unemployment. Last year the Commission published a special study by Oxford economist Santosh Mukherjee, which highlighted this fact. In 1966, when there were 255,000 unemployed men in the United Kingdom, 19% were under 25, 42% under 50. In 1973 there were nearly 512,000 unemployed, with 23% under 25, and approaching 40% under 50. If unemployment were to rise to the million mark in 1975, as now seems possible, there would be over 370,000 people unemployed under 24 or between 60-64. For a problem of this magnitude, Mukherjee advocated a major expansion of training allied to a programme of job creation, on a scale not previously considered in this country.

If unemployment statistics for different countries are looked at on a comparative basis, then Britain can be compared with Canada and the United States. These countries have responded to high unemployment by establishing successful programmes of job creation, particularly the Canadian Local Initiative Programme (LIP) under the Department of Manpower. Two minor examples of job creation already exist in Great Britain. There is Enterprise Ulster, where a Government Commission creates jobs. There is also a semi-official Government-sponsored organisation called Community Industry which employs young people of 18 and under, who are unemployed, have a record of employment instability, or who are socially or personally disadvantaged. Apart from the age restriction, CI has much in common with LIP.

At present the M.S.C. is not empowered to take up a job creation function. However, the Employment and Training Act 1973 enables the Secretary of State to make arrangements 'for the purpose of providing temporary employment for persons in Great Britain who are without employment'. Within these terms the M.S.C. could act as an agent of the Government for the purpose of job creation. In fact, this function was discussed when the Commission was set up, but it did not have widespread support except from the T.U.C. Neither the Labour nor Conservative parties was enthusiastic about an extension of the M.S.C. function at this time.

The Commission has no doubts about its suitability to fulfil such a role if it becomes necessary. It has already asked the Employment Secretary, Michael Foot, for another £23 million to spend on training. If it is given the go-ahead on job creation, the intention is that Local Authorities and other public bodies like the National Trust and the Highland Development Board would create jobs by carrying out Government-approved work, based on the community in a similar way to LIP. Sir Denis says that a

simple expansion of training is not enough. If training has a bad image, 'public works' has an even worse one in this country. Past history has shown how earlier schemes have failed to be effective. The Commission would have to be highly selective and aim for socially acceptable, labour intensive projects with categories of workers badly affected by high unemployment. Consisting as it does of representatives of employees, employers and Local Authorities, and controlling both the training and employment Agencies, the M.S.C. could play a vital role in setting up such a project. It is perhaps the only body with both the stability and flexibility to cope effectively in this area.

[Jo Campling is a Lecturer and Tutor in Social Administration at Hillcroft College, Surbiton, Surrey.]

Import Controls and Social Welfare by Joan Mitchell has been unavoidably held over and will appear in the December issue.

The December issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *Building Societies: A Policy Questioned* by D. G. Rhys; *Segregating Cyprus: The Work of the Demon* by M. A. P. Wilmer; *How the Israeli Occupied Territories Fare* by Veronica Weir and *Assessing the Quality of Life* by Mancur Olson.

THE SITUATION IN LEBANON

by Barry Rubin

LEBANON'S political system is tottering on the brink of destruction and its collapse could further complicate attempts to bring peace to the Middle East.

Yet this instability is hardly surprising. Lebanon's internal situation has long been as volatile as Northern Ireland or Cyprus and the additional strains from the presence of thousands of Palestinian guerrillas and of Israeli attacks on the south could sink many more cohesive nations.

It is difficult to describe Lebanon's unique situation. One French commentator called it a combination of Switzerland's prosperity and economic role alongside the political anarchy of 1930s Chicago. The Lebanese political structure is an attempt to balance the country's 17 ethnic-religious communities. Theoretically it is a noble experiment, but in practice it is often a disaster. When Yassir Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), told *The Economist* recently that 'we have in the Lebanese experience a significant example that is close to the multi-religious state we are trying to achieve', he gave—in many observers' eyes—a cogent argument on why the PLO's programme would never work.

Still, the Lebanese system is well-rooted in that country's history. The state's core was originally a Christian refuge, with autonomy as such within the Ottoman empire. The struggles between Druse and Maronite Christian mountaineers (the former a split-off from Islam, the latter a semi-independent church within Catholicism) over several hundred years led to dozens of attempts at compromise and regional separation. No group ever really succeeded in conquering the others.

After Lebanon became a French mandate in 1920 and was formally separated from Syria, territory to the east, north and south of the old Mount Lebanon centre was added. The new lands included many Moslems, who had no particular loyalty toward tiny Lebanon. On independence, in 1943, an informal National Pact aimed to maintain the balance.

The National Pact decreed that all offices and power be divided on a proportional basis among the communities. Based on the 1932 census, this gave Christians a six-to-five majority over Moslems in Parliament and the civil service. Among the Christians, this was further divided by the Maronites, the Greek Orthodox, the Greek Catholics, and the Admenians, plus several smaller groups. The Sunni and Shi'a sects took most of the Moslem seats. For purposes of this division the Druse are counted as Moslems and the small Jewish community as Christians. At the top, the President, who served a single six-year term, must be a Maronite; the Premier, a Sunni; and the speaker of Parliament, a Shi'a.

Such a system presupposed a weak central government. The communities remained separate under their own traditional elites and political leaders. Today, of course, the 1932 census is quite out of date, but any new count would lead to a complete breakdown of the system and civil war, particular-

ly since the Moslems now claim a majority.

As if all this were not enough, there has been no lack of outside pressure. The 1948 Arab-Israeli war closed Lebanon's southern border and brought an influx of Arab refugees. The rise of Arab nationalism and Nasserism in the 1950s created internal conflict and played a part in the 1958 civil war. Finally, the Syrians have never really recognised Lebanon's independence, viewing it as a manoeuvre of French colonialism, and Syria's ambition to re-absorb Lebanon poses a real threat.

Since Lebanese economic prosperity has depended on stability, all factions have had some vested interest in papering over the contradictions. Still the ethnic conflicts run quite deep. Christian Lebanese nationalism, as represented by the Phalange (in Arabic, Kataeb) and its National Bloc allies, views the Lebanese as descendants of the Phoenicians and is European-orientated. In 1946, the Maronite delegate to the U.S. asked the UN to support a Christian national home in Lebanon. A year later, Maronite Archbishop Mubarak called for a Jewish state in Palestine and a Christian state in Lebanon. Such positions would be impossible today since the Christians have been forced to pay lip service to Arabism. Nevertheless, they maintain their concept of what Lebanon should continue to be.

The Moslems tend to be poorer, particularly the neglected Shi'a who have launched a powerful protest movement recently. Generally, the Moslem view is that Lebanon is (or should be) part of the Arab nation. Their more radical element has aligned with the Palestinians, who have about 10,000 men under arms, and this combined force outnumbers the Lebanese army. The Phalange and its allies have about 6,000 militia members. Both sides have large potential reserves: there are estimated to be 250,000 guns in Lebanon, about one for each ten persons.

While there has been no lack of armed confrontations, Lebanese politics generally follow the motto, 'No victor, no vanquished', in other words, compromise above all. Every political decision requires a complex intercommunal negotiation and every cabinet is a combination of antagonistic forces. Problems that cannot be solved to everyone's satisfaction must be postponed, hardly conducive to efficient and stable government.

Supposedly, there is a strong trend among youth toward secularism and away from the old communal lines, but one sees little evidence of this so far. The leader of this modern, 'secular-orientated' left, Kemal Junblatt, a perennial cabinet member and leader of the Popular Socialist Party, has failed to build a strong base. Ironically, most of his power is based on his hereditary position as leader of one of the two Druse factions.

Given the broad contradictions in Lebanese society—the most backward semi-feudal structures next to the most modern democratic forms, the conflicts between communities, the weak government, the internal and external stresses—it is not surprising that the country is full of problems and disorders. A gang of bandits barricade themselves in the centre of Tripoli, the second largest city, for nine months and hold off army troops before being captured early this year. The co-editor of the country's leading newspaper is kidnapped by guerrillas who disliked one of his columns and

released only after Arafat's intervention. Opposition leader Raymond Edde has described the decay in vivid political prose: 'Each day there are incidents involving people opening fire on one another which endangers all people now. There are reports of stray bullets and explosions in stores; and in addition, there is no clean drinking water, telephone communications or even sugar'. Anarchy is even visible in the country's death-defying driving style.

The two worst current strains on Lebanon come from the Palestinians within and from Israel to the South. Since the fedayeen were ejected from Jordan in September 1970, they have made Lebanon their main base for attacking Israel. Everyone knows this, although it is always officially denied by both the PLO and the Lebanese government. In retaliation for guerrilla attacks on Kiryat Shemona, Maalot and other towns, the Israeli military has raided Beirut and kept military pressure on the south. Small raids take prisoners for questioning, search for guerrillas, and destroy houses believed to have been used by PLO units. It is not unknown for Lebanese cars driving several miles from the border to be stopped by a military patrol speaking perfect Arabic. The soldiers check the driver's licence against a list, ask his destination, and then let him go. The patrol may be PLO or Lebanese, but it can just as easily be from Israel.

This Israeli policy has created hundreds of Lebanese refugees from the south who demand government action. Their antagonism to the Lebanese regime has been heightened by reports that money meant for their relief (some of it contributed by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) has been re-directed by the powerful to their own relatives and political allies.

Yet this military pressure on Lebanon is as likely to play into the guerrillas' hands as it is to strengthen Lebanese moderates. Foreign Arab intervention in the country is escalating and a collapse of Lebanon's current system could conceivably make it a new front in any future Arab-Israeli war.

Even if the Lebanese government wanted to clamp down on the PLO, it could not do so. There are now about 300,000 Palestinians in Lebanon. Most of them are Moslems, making their integration into Lebanese society difficult since they would further unbalance the delicate ethnic proportions. The luckier and wealthier Palestinians were able to get Lebanese citizenship and it was this group which built up West Beirut, the richest and most fashionable section of the city. The PLO not only governs the refugee camps but often carries arms openly, sets up roadblocks, and forms alliances with Lebanese parties.

Predictably, there have been many conflicts. After heavy fighting in 1969, other Arab states negotiated a settlement, the Cairo Accords (which contain a number of still-secret clauses) to regulate PLO-government relations. This has, however, gradually broken down. In May 1973, army-guerrilla battles resulted in about 300 casualties. Thousands of troops from the Palestine Liberation Army and the Syrian-controlled Al Saiqa guerrilla group crossed from Syria to join the battle.

In July, 1974 battles broke out between Phalange militia units and some

of the most extreme PLO groups in the Dekwaneh district, where a Christian neighbourhood borders a refugee camp. After that round, Phalange leader Pierre Gemayel said the camps should be used only to accommodate people, not for training purposes or arms dumps. 'Unless the state regains its full sovereignty', he warned, 'there will be no real peace between the Lebanese and Palestinians and we will remain at the mercy of circumstances'. As one measure, the government a year ago last September cancelled all licenses for civilians to carry firearms and said this would be applied to both Palestinians and Lebanese, but nothing happened.

Uneasy peace did not last too long. This March, five soldiers and about twenty civilians were killed when fishermen demonstrated against a new fishing company they said threatened their livelihoods. Many of them were Shi'a and one of their leaders, a member of Parliament, was among the victims. This led to more demonstrations in Beirut.

A week later, Phalange offices were bombed in the capital. Then, on April 13, 27 Palestinians were killed when their bus was ambushed. They were on their way to celebrate the anniversary of the massacre of Israeli civilians at Kiryat Shemona. This set off more street fighting with 300 people killed and several hundred wounded. Christian Ministers resigned over the government's failure to intervene in the clashes, while Premier Rashid al-Solh placed full blame on the Phalange and then resigned.

Heavy fighting, with over 1,000 casualties, continued throughout the summer, particularly in Beirut. President Suleiman Franjieh, who is rapidly losing power in his last, lame duck, year in office, brought in Rashid Karami, a veteran Sunni leader and perennial Premier, to form a new cabinet. Still, fighting spread to the north. Here in September confrontations took place which well illustrate the ironies of Lebanese politics. Christian villagers from Zgharta (Franjieh's stronghold) fought with Muslims of Tripoli, eight miles away (Karami's home-base). The two top leaders had to call out the army to stop the battles between their own closest supporters.

To understand the broader implications of these conflicts, it is necessary to note that the main Palestinian participants in the fighting, the 'rejection front' groups, are reportedly receiving arms and aid from Libya and Iraq, countries opposing any negotiations with Israel. In effect, Lebanon may become the battleground between Arab groups supporting or opposing attempts to resolve the Middle East conflict. The meaning of this for Lebanon can be seen through the analogy drawn by some in that country between the current actions of these groups and their attempts to overthrow Jordan's government in the late 1960s.

Their slogan then was that 'the road to Tel Aviv runs through Amman', meaning that only after a 'revolution' in Arab countries could Israel be destroyed. Ominously, Shafiq al-Hout, head of the PLO's Beirut office, has stated several times recently that what the Palestinians need is 'an Arab Hanoi, a friend that's prepared even to be bombed on our account' and that would give the guerrillas total support. If the PLO and its local allies could take over Lebanon they might attempt to fit it to this description. This could give the 'rejection front' a chance to destroy any moves toward

Middle East peace.

On their side, the guerrillas disavow any desire to take over the country. They claim that it is the government that hopes to get rid of them, as Jordan did in September 1970.

Meanwhile, Lebanon also faces potential economic problems. One reason for its traditional independence, ironically enough, was once its traditional poverty. 'Even when the Ottomans reached Vienna they left alone the mountain tops. . . . Earlier, when the Arabs reached Spain they never really bothered with Lebanon', one influential Lebanese told me. But the very poverty that allowed the Christians to survive the Moslem waves of conquest also traditionally turned the country outwards. For centuries, starting with the Phoenicians, the Lebanese were great international traders, colonisers and sailors. While the over-populated mountain villages sent forth tens of thousands of emigrants to Afrıct and the Americas, many of them became successful merchants and shopkeepers who sent money home and often returned themselves.

With the rise of Western influence, Lebanese trading experience and their religious ties with Europe gave them important advantages. Lebanon became the intermediary between the Arab countries and the outside world. The oil boom has added to Lebanon's prosperity and much oil money has been invested in Beirut real estate and construction. As foreign corporations have flocked to the region, most have set up offices and banks in Beirut. Even Israel's creation helped Lebanon economically to some extent, for Arab port traffic that used to go through Haifa and other Israeli ports shifted to Lebanon.

Today, two-thirds of the country's income comes from services: trade, finance, real estate, government, professions, transportations and communications. Hundreds of heavy trucks pick up cargo at Lebanese ports and climb over mountain roads to deliver goods to Syria, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Yet the growing prosperity and modernisation of these latter states represents a problem for Lebanon. As these countries build their own ports, banking systems, skilled labour, and as they invest their money at home, Lebanon's economic rationale will erode. This process is accelerated by the *infitah*, the opening, of Egypt and Syria to Western trade and investment following the October 1973 Middle East war. Even the opening of the Suez Canal, and Egypt's projected establishment of a free trade area around it, will cut into Lebanon's commerce.

Even if Lebanon's structure can muddle through the current crisis, another major test remains. Parliamentary and Presidential elections will be held in 1976 and Karami has already openly toyed with the idea of running for the latter office. There is no written law to prevent him from running, he says, and this is quite true. Whether or not the candidacy of that Sunni Muslim leader materialises, the key issue is now becoming the survival of the National Pact. Without the Pact, barring merely minor revisions, Lebanon would change drastically. It is hard to see how the country could get through this period without either such changes being made or a continuation of the sporadic civil war.

ZIMBABWE DIVIDED

by John Day

THE African nationalists of Rhodesia value unity and need unity, but they are irreparably divided. Each African nationalist party in Rhodesia since the beginning of the movement in 1957 has claimed to represent the African nation of Zimbabwe (the African name for Rhodesia) and has fervently cherished the supposed unity of this nation as strongly as it has demanded its self-government. The African nationalist movement in Rhodesia, in order most effectively to fight the white minority so firmly entrenched in political, economic and social power, had to present a united front. Yet since 1961 it has suffered continual fragmentation.

The dissension within the African National Council in September 1975, which occurred soon after the party had met Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front Government in the abortive meeting at Victoria Falls, was the culmination of rivalries going back many years. In December 1974 four African nationalist factions joined together under the banner of the African National Council (ANC) and the leadership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa. However, the pressure from other African states which was sufficient to bring the groups together was insufficient to prevent continuing disagreements, which finally exploded in September 1975.

At the beginning of that month two Rhodesian African nationalist leaders based in Lusaka, Zambia, established the Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ZLC). Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, until December 1974 the President of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and James Chikerema, until then the President of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (Frolizi), claimed that ZLC was merely the external wing of ANC. However, four other Rhodesian African leaders in Lusaka, who until nine months earlier had been members of another nationalist party, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), denounced ZLC as a party breaking away from ANC. Sithole replied by accusing Joshua Nkomo, previously President of ZAPU, of readiness to do a deal with Smith which would fall short of ANC's agreed objective of one man, one vote. Nkomo answered in kind from Rhodesia by accusing Sithole of running away from the country and claiming that he had little support there. The President of ANC, Muzorewa, who was raising funds in Europe, insisted that his party had not split, interpreting Nkomo's attack on Sithole as 'some democratic criticism'. In the Bishop's absence the Nkomo group called an emergency meeting of the ANC national executive, which was boycotted by two officials who had served with Muzorewa in ANC before it had incorporated ZAPU, ZANU and Frolizi. The ZAPU-dominated executive of ANC proceeded to denounce Muzorewa for staying out of Rhodesia for ten weeks and supporting ZLC in Zambia. Muzorewa retaliated after returning to Zambia by expelling Nkomo from ANC. At the same time some rank and file members of the Rhodesian African nationalist factions living in Zambia seem to have indulged in physical violence. According to the

Zambian Government's account, which ZANU rejected, members of ZANU attacked supporters of ZAPU and Frolizi with spears, axes, iron bars, and bows and arrows. By the middle of September the Rhodesian African nationalist movement was in disarray.

A major cause of the tension between the elements of ANC after their union in December 1974 has been the desire of Nkomo to be the leader of ANC and the hostility of Sithole and Muzorewa to this ambition. Sithole has opposed Nkomo since 1963. Muzorewa has been leader of ANC since its foundation in 1971 and is naturally reluctant to surrender his pre-eminence. Nkomo's ZAPU supporters have wanted throughout 1975 to hold an ANC congress at which, they rightly and confidently believed, Nkomo would be chosen President of the party. The followers of Muzorewa and Sithole delayed the calling of a congress as long as possible to keep Nkomo in a relatively subordinate position.

These dissensions of the Rhodesian African nationalists in 1975 can be understood only against the background of the movement's history. Discontent with Nkomo's leadership was first strongly expressed in 1961, four years after he became President of the first African nationalist party in Rhodesia. A breakaway nationalist party formed in 1961 because of dissatisfaction with Nkomo's behaviour at the constitutional conference of that year in Salisbury. He accepted a legislature in which Africans would have fifteen seats out of sixty-five, previously having had no members in the assembly at all. Nkomo denied that he had ever accepted this proposal and the splinter party gained little support. However, in 1963 a major split took place in the nationalist movement, when Sithole left ZAPU and formed ZANU because he felt that Nkomo's leadership was indecisive and undynamic. From 1963 to 1964 ZAPU and ZANU leaders denounced each other viciously and their supporters engaged in physical fighting until the Government banned both parties in August 1964. ZAPU and ZANU continued in exile while outlawed in Rhodesia and there has never been any genuine reconciliation. The Organisation of African Unity and the heads of African states made massive efforts to re-unite ZAPU and ZANU without substantial result until December 1974, when they hid their continuing animosity in joint membership of an expanded ANC.

ZAPU and ZANU, after they were banned in Rhodesia, turned their main efforts, separately, to organising guerilla warfare from outside Rhodesia. With their leaders either in detention or in exile, members of the two outlawed nationalist parties engaged in very little political activity within the country. African radicalism was paralysed until the appearance in 1971 under Muzorewa of ANC. It was created specifically to urge Africans to reject the constitution agreed upon by Lord Home and Ian Smith. Britain was now prepared to recognise Rhodesia's independence, which the Rhodesian Front had seized illegally in 1965, provided that this constitution was acceptable to Rhodesian public opinion. The Pearce Commission which went to Rhodesia to test opinion found that the Africans, led by ANC, were against the proposed constitution. ANC, having achieved its basic aim, reconstituted itself, still under Muzorewa, as a permanent

party to work for the classic nationalist goal of universal suffrage. ANC determined to achieve this end by negotiation and opposed political violence. In this ANC differed from both ZAPU and ZANU, which had abandoned peaceful politics for guerilla war after the Government banned them in 1964.

When ANC expanded in 1974 to embrace ZAPU and ZANU, it also took in Frolizi under Chikerema. This party, unlike the other three, was formed outside Rhodesia and never legally existed there. Frolizi sprang sadly from an abortive attempt in 1971 to unite ZAPU and ZANU. Leaders from these two parties formed Frolizi, but left behind them in ZAPU and ZANU the majority of recalcitrants who refused to unite with their nationalist opponents.

In view of the unfortunate fissiparity of the Rhodesian African nationalist movement, the most difficult event to explain is not any of the quarrels between the factions but the achievement of unity, however fragile, in December 1974. This formed part of the detente for which South Africa, Zambia and other African states have been working assiduously. Kaunda in particular deserves credit for bringing the Rhodesian Africans together and commiseration for their splitting apart again. At the end of 1974 the three nationalist parties which tried to wage guerilla war from abroad, ZAPU, ZANU and Frolizi, nominally sunk their identity in ANC, which had tried to negotiate with the Rhodesian Government. The policy of the reconstituted ANC was to hold constitutional discussions with the Rhodesian Front on the clear understanding that the alternative to constitutional agreement was increased guerilla war.

The groups within ANC, while accepting this policy, put different emphases on its pacific and bellicose elements, although too much has been made of a supposed gap between moderates and militants. Muzorewa had in the past eschewed violence and given a Christian flavour to his nationalism. He has talked during 1975 more of his hopes for a negotiated settlement than of the violent alternative if this fails. Out of the nationalist leaders, Sithole has spoken most aggressively, having little faith that talking to Smith would be productive and expecting majority rule to come only as a consequence of military victory. Nkomo's position has been most misunderstood. He has been described as a moderate not only by Sithole, who intends to make political capital from this, but also by some independent observers. Nkomo himself has rightly denied this charge. There has never been any significant difference of policy between him and Sithole either before 1964, when ZAPU and ZANU sought a constitutional conference, or since that date, when they adopted guerilla warfare. The difference in their attitudes in 1975 (and Nkomo has spoken less bloodthirstily than Sithole) springs not so much from difference in radicalism or militancy as from difference of success in guerilla warfare so far between ZAPU and ZANU. Both parties were dedicated to guerilla war for over a decade, but little lasting impact was made on the white community in Rhodesia until the period since the end of 1972. ZAPU made its biggest efforts in the guerilla war in collaboration with the South African African National Con-

gress in three substantial raids from Zambia in 1967 to 1968. However, the security forces eventually gained control and since 1968 ZAPU has made no guerilla challenge of any magnitude. ZANU by contrast has since December 1972 mounted the most successful campaign of the whole guerilla war in Rhodesia. ZANU guerillas, crossing the border from Mozambique, have maintained constant pressure on north-eastern Rhodesia for nearly three years and, waging war on a larger scale than before, have forced the Rhodesian Government drastically to increase its military strength. If Rhodesian Africans win majority rule by the gun, the victory will probably be ZANU's. Consequently Sithole would be most likely to emerge as the leader of African Rhodesia after a successful guerilla war. For this reason he is less keen on constitutional talks, which, if they achieved one man, one vote, would bring credit to several African leaders, including Nkomo and Muzorewa. With ZANU having won prestige through its guerilla activity since 1972, Nkomo naturally hopes to gain standing by successfully negotiating a democratic constitution, which would make ZANU's guerilla achievement seem less significant. This difference of attitude to constitutional talks with Smith does not mean that Nkomo would be satisfied with less than Sithole from such talks. All the nationalists want African self-rule immediately. None is likely to compromise on this. The only question is what intermediate period each leader would accept as constituting 'immediate' transfer of power from white to black. Neither Nkomo nor Sithole has revealed his hand: either might well settle for majority rule in two or three years. However, this is a matter of little practical importance, as the Rhodesian Front will make no concession remotely approaching what the nationalists would consider.

The original cause of the split between Nkomo and Sithole was Sithole's criticism of Nkomo's leadership. This disagreement still persists, inflamed now by twelve years of continuing hatred between ZAPU and ZANU and the differences of achievement in the guerilla war. Neither Sithole nor Nkomo could suffer the blow to his prestige that would occur if he accepted the other as leader of the whole Rhodesian African nationalist movement. Their rivalry is aggravated by the contrast in their personalities: Nkomo is a big, jolly man, easy-going and friendly; Sithole has more the air of a grim and intellectual revolutionary.

The competition between Nkomo and Sithole for the leadership of the African nationalist movement in Rhodesia is intensified by the differences of their political histories. Nkomo was the head of the movement from 1957 to 1963, whereas Sithole only became a nationalist official in 1960 and did not lead a party till 1963. When Sithole did form his own party in 1963, he attracted less popular support than Nkomo, and, at least among those Africans who were politically active in the early 1960s, Nkomo probably still has a clear majority. At the end of September 1975 a national congress of ANC delegates elected him President in place of Muzorewa.

Sithole, however, has his advantages as a potential leader of Zimbabwe. While he and Nkomo were held by the Government between 1964 and 1974, Sithole won a greater reputation for militancy. In 1969 he was con-

victed of plotting from prison to assassinate Ian Smith and two of his Ministers. Nkomo spent most of his years of captivity in a restriction camp, whereas Sithole was confined for much of his time in the even worse conditions of prison. Smith released both Nkomo and Sithole in November 1974 to go to Zambia for talks designed to lead to a detente, but in March 1975 he detained Sithole again. Under pressure from South Africa Smith released Sithole again in April, but he then left Rhodesia and would probably be seized again if he returned. As Nkomo meanwhile has lived unmolested in Rhodesia, many militant Africans who were too young to participate in politics when ZAPU and ZANU were legal in 1963 to 1964 may see Sithole, also the leader of the party which has waged a successful guerilla war, as a more formidable leader than Nkomo.

Muzorewa is liable to become a cork bobbing on the ocean of ZAPU-ZANU feuding. Most Africans in Rhodesia must regard Muzorewa as having been only a caretaker leader of African nationalism from 1971 to 1974 while Nkomo and Sithole were in detention, and as a leader of convenience rather than substance since 1974. In the quarrels between Nkomo and Sithole, Muzorewa, the gentlest of the three, has ended up in alliance with Sithole, the fiercest. They have come together not through similarity of attitude towards peace and war as methods of winning African self-government, but because Nkomo has attacked both and sees both as barriers to his leadership of Zimbabwe.

Similarly Frolizi has lined up with ZANU rather than ZAPU, because it fears Nkomo's ambition. Unity indeed still exists between the leaders of three of the groups within the African nationalist movement, for ZANU, ANC and Frolizi have been acting together through 1975 as they had not before. The irony of this unity is that their bond is common opposition to ZAPU, the fourth group in the movement.

Even with knowledge of the Rhodesian African nationalists' reasons for squabbling with each other the outside observer is left marvelling at their inability to sink their differences in the fight against their real enemy, the Rhodesian Front. Other parties and movements have internal dissensions without breaking up or sinking into destructive abuse. The self-destructiveness of the Rhodesian Africans' divisions would be more understandable if they were the product of ideological or tribal rivalry, as some commentators have mistakenly suggested. All the African nationalists accept the ideology of African nationalism. Very few are Marxists of any kind and one can certainly not distinguish between ZAPU and ZANU on the grounds that one is Communist inspired and the other is not, or that one believes in Russian Communism and the other in Chinese. Similarly, tribe has never been a main issue in Rhodesian African politics, as it has been, for example, in Kenya and Nigeria. Some observers have seen ZANU as the party of the Shona and ZAPU as the party of the Ndebele, but this is an unfounded interpretation. Many ZANU leaders are Shona, but Sithole himself was brought up speaking the language of the Ndebele and one of his principal lieutenants, Enos Nkala, is a Ndebele. Similarly, several prominent figures in ZAPU, including Nkomo, came originally from the Ndebele area, but

Nkomo has always had strong support in many Shona regions. When ZAPU was legal in Rhodesia between 1963 and 1964, Nkomo probably attracted more Shona support than Sithole. Tribe is often too facile an explanation of political division in Africa, and in the case of Rhodesia it is the wrong one.

As tribe or ideology is not at the root of the Rhodesian African nationalists' divisions, one is obliged to acknowledge that relatively trivial disagreements about leadership seem to have generated the self-consuming conflicts. Often the vindictive animosity between the factions, like the strife between Protestant and Catholic in Northern Ireland, has an irrational momentum of its own largely divorced from any genuine motives that may once have inspired it. The apparently senseless quarrelling probably originates in part in social and political frustration.

The rank and file members of the rival factions, whose mutual hatred can boil up into fighting like that between ZAPU and ZANU in Salisbury in June 1975, may well be displacing on to each other their anger at the Europeans who are responsible for the indignities that Africans suffer. In Rhodesia the Africans have always been denied the benefits of the modern technological civilisation that the Europeans enjoy. In comparison with the Europeans the Africans live in abject poverty with very limited opportunities for education and employment. Despised by the Europeans and valued by them only as cheap labour, the Africans are naturally bitter. Their tragedy is that some of this bitterness is directed against each other.

Linked to this social frustration is a similar political frustration, which leaders and followers in the African nationalist movement have all endured. The divisions within Zimbabwe are probably in part an emotional response to the failure to win any power in or over the Rhodesian Government after nearly twenty years of variegated efforts. The white population of Rhodesia has held tenaciously on to political power in spite of the endeavours of the rest of the world to shift it. The African nationalists, unable to dent the monolithic power of the Rhodesian Front, have turned their hostility on each other.

[John Day is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Leicester.]

DMITRI SHOSTAKOVITCH: MASTER OF SOVIET MUSIC

by David Fingleton

WITH the death of Dmitri Shostakovitch, a month before his 69th birthday, on the night of Saturday, 9th August, it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the world lost the last great composer of the symphony and the string quartet. That is neither to say there remain no composers writing in those forms, nor that the music of Shostakovitch bore many overt formal and stylistic marks of the early masters of classical music. Rather that the world has moved on and musical composition has become not merely atonal, but has virtually abandoned the established forms of symphony, concerto and chamber ensemble. One has only to listen to the music of Stockhausen to see in which camp Shostakovitch stood. It is, however, arguably the case that had Shostakovitch not been the first great composer of the Soviet Union he might himself have moved away from the classical style; indeed, in his last three symphonies he appeared gradually to be doing so.

The 13th, controversial and suppressed after its initial performances in the early 1960s and rehabilitated by the 1970s, sets five of Yevgeni Yevtushenko's poems, starting with the famous *Babi Yar* concerning Russian anti-semitism, for bass soloist, chorus and orchestra. The 14th of 1969 is a song cycle for soprano, bass and chamber orchestra containing eleven poems on the subject of death, and the 15th and last completed symphony, though purely orchestral, not only strays further than before from conventional symphonic form, but bears many instances of the use of 12 tone material. As Hugh Ottaway says of it in his masterly introduction to the recently issued set of the complete symphonies on Russian *Melodiya* recordings from EMI: 'Shostakovitch's recent ability to make his music as diatonic or as chromatic as he chooses, always within a tonal framework, is nowhere more strikingly revealed'. Who knows where the 16th symphony, upon which he was known to be working at his death, might have led?

On the other hand it could equally perhaps be argued that by the 1960s Shostakovitch was beginning progressively to move away from the symphony in favour of the string quartet. Unusually he was a late beginner in this form: the first quartet came immediately after the 5th symphony when he was 32. However, in the last fifteen years of his life he wrote nine magnificent quartets as against the last three symphonies and the frankly inferior second concertos for violin and for cello. Undoubtedly, too, as can be seen from the 14th symphony, dedicated to Benjamin Britten, as well as his quest for chamber music scale, the influence of Aldeburgh was beginning to penetrate the musical iron curtain.

Shostakovitch was a desperately shy man as well as one who suffered from chronic ill-health. He also had to accept the rigours of criticism and censure from a regime determined that his work should be a musical

expression of its policies. 'Formalism' was the sin of which he was accused in the 1930s, during the Zhdanov era after the Second World War, and again at times more recently. The term, so far as it is definable at all, means the exploration of musical style and materials for their own sake rather than their application to socio-political ends—thus 'decadent'. Thus we had the withdrawal of works, 'the Soviet artist's reply to just criticism' that was the 5th symphony, and that anguished, frightened face that stares from photographs, and which once I saw at the Royal Festival Hall in 1956 when his 10th symphony received its British premiere.

Shostakovitch may have shared both Mahler's irony and his sound world in his music, but in no way did he possess Mahler's more extrovert qualities. Not for him the direction of an opera house, the virtuoso conductor. Indeed, despite having won a major prize at the first International Chopin Festival in Warsaw in 1927, he entirely abandoned the career of virtuoso pianist that lay open to him and played comparatively rarely in public thereafter. So too did his terror of facing an orchestra with a full concert hall behind him prevent him from conducting his own music to any extent. This he left, in recent years, to the manifest talents of his son, Maxim, whose presence in this country we have enjoyed, and whose performances of the 5th and 15th symphonies on the EMI set approach the definitive.

In a world where the personal appearance, the television profile, the 'in-depth' interview have become increasingly the norm, Shostakovitch managed to remain a shadowy, elusive figure. It is easy to make the Soviet regime the culprit; the odd thing is how other Soviet musical figures, resident ones, not simply those who have defected, have proved far more accessible. Early last year in BBC Television's *Omnibus* series, Ian Engelmann produced *Music From The Flames,* a survey of Shostakovitch's work in relation to the Soviet Union. Norman Kay, who wrote the script and who is this country's authority on the composer, was not permitted an interview. Instead he had to submit a set of 'twenty questions' which, once approved, were answered by the composer in Russian and translated on the soundtrack. A certain amount of ducking of the more contentious questions ensued. One's impression of the composer at the time was of a blandness combined with an obvious lack of ease before the cameras. But as Norman Kay says, 'It is hard to define the boundary between Shostakovitch being used as spokesman for Soviet musical policy, the official view, and Shostakovitch's own views'.

Interestingly, this was exemplified very recently when *Novosti,* the Soviet news agency, sent the English publication *Music and Musicians* an essay, which they published in their September issue, containing the composer's views on avant garde music in the West, just two days before he died. For years there had been unanswered requests from this country for Shostakovitch's early autobiographical sketch, and his more recent writing, known to have been published in Russia. This short essay, in Kay's view, is not particularly recent, being written, he feels, some 7 to 10 years ago. Kay points to the reference to folklore as 'an important factor in the development of Soviet music of late' which is now no longer the case. What we do

receive are those bland, non-contentious utterances that have always so characterised Shostakovitch the writer and public figure as opposed to the composer.

'I am a practician and not a theoretician. I can only talk of what has passed through my own experience. . . . Music is full of ideas, concepts, generalisations. Its power is manifested most in the revelation of the inner, spiritual essence of life. This quality of music renders it akin to poetry and philosophy'. And of the avant garde: 'In the modern art of the West there are phenomena which are merely qualified as innovatory. I have in mind the works of those militant representatives of the so-called "musical avant garde" (I might add that I dislike this term which has been caught and coveted by a narrow group of musicians. From the purely ethical point of view it is not for us but for our descendants to decide who of the present-day composers represent the "avant garde" and the "rearguard" of art)'. And finally: ' "We are the people and we are working for the people's cause." It was in these simple and sagacious words that Anton Chekhov evaluated all human activity, including so splendid and complex an activity as the creation of music'. It is in the light of such platitudes that one can understand his public criticism of the scientist Sakhorov which earned him Western opprobium recently, and with this voice that he spoke when acknowledging his musical errors, as seen by the regime, in the 1930s, the 1940s and again in the 1960s.

If, however, one regrets Shostakovitch's lack of ease and articulacy as a spokesman for music in general and Soviet music and his own compositions in particular, such regrets are swiftly demolished once one tackles the music itself. For from his 1st symphony, written for graduation from Steinberg's composition class at the Leningrad Conservatoire in 1925, right through his career to his 15th symphony and 15th string quartet, his last two works to be heard outside Russia, he has spoken with an immediacy, an inventiveness and a style that even at its most eclectic has always remained instantly recognisable and entirely his own.

It is with a profound sense of gratitude, then, that one welcomes EMI's recent issue of the *Melodiya* recordings of the complete 15 symphonies together with excerpts from *The Bolt* and *The Age of Gold* ballet suites and the cantata 'The sun shines over our Motherland'. This box of 13 records, together with a booklet containing the texts of the choral and vocal symphonies, and truly excellent analytical notes by Hugh Ottaway, costs a mere £16.95 at present. It has been issued a year after EMI's 6-record boxed set of the Borodin Quartet playing the first thirteen of Shostakovitch's fifteen string quartets. This again has an accompanying booklet where the admirable Mr. Ottaway analyses the quartets and traces their development in the context of the composer's symphonic output. This set costs £10.75, which means for a total expenditure of comfortably under £30 one has at hand all Shostakovitch's symphonic writing and the most significant of his chamber music. Happily, there are also recordings available of his other major orchestral and instrumental music, including the magnificent first concertos for violin and for cello, and the life-enhancing

piano quintet, and by the time this article appears RCA will have issued Roger Woodward's recording of all 24 opus 87 preludes and fugues on a 2-record set. Sadly there are no recordings of his two operas: the early, satirical *The Nose*, based on Gogol's story and performed here quite recently by the New Opera Company at Sadler's Wells Theatre, and *Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk*—now known as *Katarina Ismailova*—and performed at Covent Garden under Edward Downes in December 1963, and revived for three performances the following season but, unhappily, not since. Nevertheless, there can be few 20th century composers whose output is more thoroughly chronicled on record than Shostakovitch's, and we are fortunate that this is so.

It is a stimulating exercise to progress gradually through these two EMI boxes, tracing the composer's development through the medium of symphony and string quartet. We start with the first three symphonies, of which it is the first that most fully holds the attention. This remarkable youthful work contains almost in microcosm all the qualities that Shostakovitch was to develop over the next fifty years. That is not to say he did not develop, simply that many of the 'fingerprints' are already there. The texture, the way themes are combined in development, the reflective return of the first movement to its origins, the motoric rhythm of the scherzo—quaver and two semi-quavers—which we never lose as we follow the composer's progress. At the same time this work has a zestful spontaneity together with an emotional fervour concealing a sense of tragedy that one finds less frequently than one might have expected in his work thereafter. It should be borne in mind that it was not until the notorious Party Resolution of 1932 'On the Reconstruction of Literary and Artistic Organisations' that the Party machine truly began to interfere with creative art and thus restrain Shostakovitch's feeling of freedom in composition. Sadly, Kyril Kondrashin's performance of the first symphony with the Moscow Philharmonic Orchestra is not representative of the conductor's best: he conducts nine in all of the fifteen symphonies in the set. There is a lack of poetry and emotional weight here which is to be regretted.

The 2nd and 3rd symphonies need not detain us long. They are the product of Shostakovitch's 'modernist' years, but his attempt to break away from established ideas of symphonic form produced bombastic orchestral prologues leading to yet more bombastic choral conclusions set to patriotic revolutionary texts. Certainly there are areas of interesting experiment in structure and orchestration, and faintly amusing attempts to emulate the noises of industry and transport, but the overall effect of these two works, written when he was in his early twenties, is one of emptiness. The 4th symphony was written in 1935 and withdrawn while still in rehearsal. There has been much debate precisely as to why: orchestral discontent, the composer's own dissatisfaction with its structure and his disquiet over the *Pravda* article *Confusion instead of Music* which had led the attack on his *Lady Macbeth* opera eleven months earlier, doubtless all contributed. In fact the work remained unplayed until the Khruschev era in 1961. It is an epic piece, more heavily scored than any of his other symphonies, calling

for quadruple woodwind, 8 horns, masses of percussion and up to 84 strings, *inter alia.* It has a certain grandeur but perhaps lacks the true voice and profundity of thought that has characterised Shostakovitch's work since.

It would become wearisome to analyse each succeeding work, but perhaps useful to offer some guidelines. With the 5th symphony we are on familiar territory, nearly everybody's introduction to Shostakovitch, and immaculately performed here by the USSR Symphony Orchestra conducted by his son Maxim. In a recording such as this it is hard to understand the scorn that is sometimes poured upon the work. At this point one should play the first string quartet, which seems almost a work of relaxation after the rigours of the symphony, though in many respects structurally akin to it. The 6th symphony is an impressive, but uneven, work which shows more clearly than ever the influence of Mahler upon Shostakovitch.

Next come the three wartime symphonies, the 7th *Leningrad* of microfilm and Toscanini fame, perhaps not a great work, nor yet as tawdry as is often nowadays suggested. Then the truly magnificent, tragic, almost despairing 8th, though André Previn's performance of this with the London Symphony Orchestra, also issued by EMI, is both more affecting and far better recorded than Kondrashin's in the set; and the cryptically unvictorious, almost flippant 9th. This was followed by the fine 3rd string quartet, a most dramatic, yet subtle, companion piece to the symphony, which at times suggests Mozartian poignancy, at times the ethereal quality of late Beethoven.

Shostakovitch's 10th symphony remains for me his greatest orchestral work, its first movement his finest single creative span. It is splendidly played here by the USSR Symphony Orchestra under Svetlanov, but for anybody wishing for an ideal introduction to the mature composer, £1.25 will buy the recent Classics for Pleasure recording (CFP 40216) where the young Andrew Davis displays remarkable insight and draws impressive playing from the London Philharmonic Orchestra. This issue is a bargain to be cherished. The 11th and 12th symphonies revert to the propagandist vein, treating of the 1905 and 1917 revolutions in Russia, and though not wholly without quality, in no way approach the profundity that animates Shostakovitch's final three symphonies, all of which enjoy wholly satisfying performances in this set. How fitting that the last of all should be conducted with such persuasive conviction by his son. Whilst listening to the late symphonies it is imperative to investigate with equal care the late string quartets from the 8th onwards. Here one senses the inner working of the composer's mind, the structural originality and creative facility that may at times have seemed absent in some of the orchestral works.

It is almost as if Shostakovitch by the end, and with the exception of the 14th symphony and its fascination with death, was writing the symphonies for his public and the string quartets for himself. The 8th quartet, written in 1960 amongst the ruins of Dresden, deploys the composer's musical autograph: D S C H (D, E flat, C, B in our notation) which also appears in the 10th symphony as it does in the third movement of the 15th. This

quartet is perhaps ultimately the most moving, indeed harrowing, of his works. One gathers that when Shostakovitch first heard it played, privately at his home by the Borodin Quartet, he 'buried his head in his hands and wept'. Well can we understand as we ourselves mourn the loss of this truly great Russian composer.

Shostakovitch; Symphonies 1-15. 13 records, boxed with booklet. EMI. SLS 5025. £16.95.

Shostakovitch; String Quartets 1-13. The Borodin Quartet. 6 records, boxed with booklet. EMI. SLS 879. £10.75.

Euthanasia

MISS M. R. BARRINGTON

It has been drawn to our attention that in his article *Why Not Euthanasia?* in the August *Contemporary Review*, Dr. Richard Lamerton wrote: 'Some say it would only be used for those dying in pain and then go on to advocate its use for lonely old people who are merely depressed'. In support of this he referred to an article by M. R. Barrington entitled *The Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 1969: an Appraisal*, published in the Proceedings of Royal Society of Health's Conference on Euthanasia, December 1973.

Miss Barrington has asked us to make it clear that she has never advocated euthanasia for lonely old people who are merely depressed, and her article contains no reference to the expression of such views.

INDIA vs. INDIRA

by Stephen Oren

PRE-DAWN arrests of over 1,000 political figures and journalists, the suspension of all civil liberties by a Presidential proclamation of emergency, and the imposition of a rigid press censorship contrast oddly with the image of India as a democracy. The outlawing of a large number of right and left wing groups and the studied vagueness as to when the state of emergency will be lifted or if the elections scheduled for 1976 will be held, further tarnish this image. This crisis can be viewed as the outcome of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's effort to impose a 'socialist pattern of society' upon India. But Mrs. Gandhi is not an ordinary Prime Minister, for she and her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, have dominated Indian politics (except for a two-year break in the middle 1960s) ever since India's 1947 Independence.

Two events sparked the present crisis. The first was the decision by Justice Sinha of the Allahabad High Court that Mrs. Gandhi had committed technical violations of India's election law. In consequence, she was to be deprived of her seat in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Indian Parliament) and forbidden to seek any elective office for six years. Mrs. Gandhi, of course, appealed, but all that Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer of the Supreme Court would do was to grant an interim stay, allowing her to remain Prime Minister although not a Member of Parliament until the Supreme Court should rule. Justice Sinha's ruling came the same day as the second event, the announcement that Mrs. Gandhi's Indian National Congress had lost the Gujarat state elections.

Of these events, the second was the more serious. Loss of a single state does not by itself imperil Congress control of all India. But that very control made Justice Sinha's decision less important. With 358 out of 523 members of the Lok Sabha and a like percentage of the Upper House, the Rajya Sabha, Mrs. Gandhi was clearly in a position to nullify any adverse court decision either by changing the election law or, if this should not prove enough, by amending the Indian constitution. In the event, this is precisely what Mrs. Gandhi did.

All signs pointed to such a move. The Congress members of the Lok and Rajya Sabhas responded to Justice Sinha's ruling by proclaiming their faith in Mrs. Gandhi. The mass public demonstrations, the statements that 'India is Indira', and the stress upon a conspiracy seeking to thwart the people's will in selecting Indira Gandhi were the logical advertising for this effort.

Nor was such action out of character for the Congress. Justice Sinha's ruling was but the latest in a series of clashes between the courts, especially the Indian Supreme Court, and the Congress Party. The Indian Supreme Court insisted the rights guaranteed in the Indian constitution, including the right to property, were subject to judicial protection. Mrs. Gandhi's decision to deprive the ex-princes of Indian states of their constitutionally

guaranteed payments and her attempt to nationalise major Indian banks were overthrown by the Supreme Court. In both cases, the Congress Party amended the constitution while attacking the courts' reactionary bent. An earlier court decision on the election law which threatened Congress candidates was met with a hasty ordinance declaring that money spent by a party did not count toward a candidate's expenditure. In 1973, Mrs. Gandhi forced three senior judges of the Indian Supreme Court to resign. Ironically, Justice Krishna Iyer has an impeccably 'progressive' background as a political independent who served as Minister of Law in the 1957-59 Communist cabinet in Kerala state.

But the defeat in Gujarat threatened Congress with loss of the 1976 Lok Sabha elections. Admittedly, there were special circumstances in Gujarat. The pre-1974 Congress government of Chief Minister Chidambhai Patel had been exceptionally unsure and inept. The traditionally well-off (for India) state of Gujarat had suffered from food shortages in recent years. And Gujarat is one of the few areas of India where free enterprise has had a good name, possibly because the capitalists in Gujarat are Gujaratis rather than natives of some other state. The Nehru family's socialism was looked upon with disfavour here. Had not such Gujaratis as Mahatma Gandhi, 'Sardar' Patel, and Moraji Desai called for free enterprise with the capitalist regarded as the trustee of the community? In these circumstances, Moraji Desai (today under arrest) was able to form the Janata Front (People's Front) as a coalition between his Opposition Congress Party, consisting of that part of Congress which had split with Mrs. Gandhi in 1970 over her increasingly leftward course, the Hindu-nationalist Jan Sangh, and three other right-wing or centre parties. Even so, the Janata Front and Congress virtually tied. The Janata Front came to power only by virtue of an alliance with Chidambhai Patel who had, in the meantime, left the Congress.

Yet some of these 'special circumstances' were not all that special. The Congress majority in Gujarat's Vidhan Sabha (state legislature) was obtained in 1972 when Congress swept state legislature elections across India just as it had swept 1971 Lok Sabha elections. In those days, Mrs. Gandhi's call of *Garibai Hatao* (out with poverty) sounded plausible. Had not India achieved self-sufficiency in grain under her leadership? Had not the Indian army, under the protection of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971, marched triumphantly into Dacca, thus destroying Pakistan as a rival to India?

The past few years have been cruel to those hopes. Bad rains have led to bad harvests. Once again India must import food while millions of Indians are only a short step from starvation. Government efforts to cope with this problem by nationalising the wheat trade while attempting to control prices have only disrupted the Indian economy further as farmers naturally prefer to hoard grain or to smuggle it onto the black market rather than sell at low prices. Most industrial areas have also seen serious shortfalls in production. While the Indian economy was ailing, even before the October 1973 Middle East War and the quadrupling of oil prices, Indian import costs tripled within a single year, largely because of the oil price

rise, with the result that India's exports, which did not increase in value, are now simply paying for oil and wheat. Inside India, there has been a 30% inflation in the past year—hardly Garibal Hatao. And an India that must go, begging bowl in hand, to Iran and the Arab states for oil at reduced prices, is hardly in a position to act as a great power. Despite Indian flexing of muscles by exploding a nuclear device and annexing Sikkim, it has had to acknowledge Iran, the protector of Pakistan, as an equal great power in the Indian Ocean area.

Mrs. Gandhi's commitment to the left was not useful in helping the economy. Indian coal production, for example, had steadily risen until 1972 when the nationalisation of the coal mines had resulted in a slump in production. The State Planning Commission was eternally optimistic about plans that never seemed to get fulfilled. And at a time when India was in desperate need of external assistance, was it really sensible to castigate the U.S., declaring that U.S. facilities on the island of Diego Garcia constituted such a threat to India as to require an internal state of emergency while exalting Indian trade-aid relations with the USSR—relations that resulted in a net outflow of resources from India?

Nor was Gujarat state the only one in which Congress state governments were less than satisfactory. The 1973-74 student riots in Gujarat's larger towns against the Chidambhai Patel government which led to the ousting of that regime and central government ('President's Rule') control of Gujarat resulted in similar demonstrations against the Congress state government of Bihar in northern India, demonstrations headed by the respected (and now arrested) Jayaprakash Narayan. Other Congress state governments, such as those of the southern states of Andhra Pradesh and Karnatabka, have been paralysed by internal feuds of one sort or another. Mrs. Gandhi had refused to allow any of these Congress governments to fall. Even in Gujarat, once central control was invoked in early 1974, it remained in force for over a year in order to put off elections. Only Moraji Desai's threat of a fast forced elections to be held.

But Mrs. Gandhi's surrender on this point seemed to be part of a new pragmatism in New Delhi. In November 1974, D. P. Dhar, the head of the Indian Planning effort, was forced out of the cabinet (although retaining ministerial rank as an envoy to the USSR) because of the breakdowns in Indian planning. Industry Minister Pai began to speak about the need for enterprises to make profits and the virtues of running industry through private enterprise. Foreign oil companies were invited to help participate in the search for offshore oil. Swallowing its pride, New Delhi had accepted US wheat at concessional rates and on US terms forbidding transfer of the wheat outside India. A security bill extending the power of the government had been withdrawn from the Lok Sabha by the cabinet.

None of this was to the liking of the 'radical' wing of the Congress, nor yet of Congress' silent partner, the Communist Party of India (CPI). For since 1970, the CPI, the 'pro-Soviet' Communists, have been virtual allies of Mrs. Gandhi. In the far southern state of Kerala, a Congress-CPI coalition holds power. Other Indian elections have seen electoral alliances

between Congress and CPI. But the strength of the CPI is not electoral; amid the confusion of Congress' 'socialist' stand, it has been able to act as a beacon of ideological clarity. And it has been the CPI that, in, e.g. Bihar state, stood out most strongly against any deal with the right of centre Indian opposition. And in turn, it has been the growing CPI role that produced the Janata Front which triumphed in Gujarat.

For the real lesson of Gujarat, as of Indian elections since 1967 (the first year Congress control was really challenged) was that Congress and Mrs. Gandhi can be beaten only by opposition unity. In Gujarat, this meant an alliance of right and centre parties. In Kerala, where state elections were due in September, it meant an electoral alliance of eight parties dominated by the Marxist Communist Party (CPM—which is not Maoist, for the Maoists oppose elections altogether and are up in the hills and jungles). And in India as a whole, it meant an alliance of 'right' and 'left' against the Congress. India's Socialist Party, which is part of the Janata Front on the one hand but co-operated with the CPM in states where the latter is strong, could have played an important part in making the needed arrangements.

The obstacles to such an alignment were plain. How were the Janata Front to align with the CPM when anti-Communism, opposition to the 'milder' CPI, was a large part of the glue that held it together? Thus in Bihar, Jayaprakash Narayan denied permission to the CPM to participate in his anti-Congress effort until they should give up their red flags and Marxist slogans, which they refused to do.

Yet Narayan aspires to be a saint, not a politician. Others were more pragmatic. After all, in Gujarat, Chidabhai Patel was the main object of Janata Front agitation. But they aligned with him to form a government. In the Punjab, the centralist and Hindu Jan Sangh was quite different from the 'states-rights' and Sikh-supported Akali Dal, but their common interests have led them to work together. In the present case, the CPM claims to see Mrs. Gandhi as the 'main obstacle' to socialism in India. As for the Janata Front, its leaders may have felt that Communist-dominated state governments in Kerala and West Bengal are less serious for India than a Communist-influenced central government such as that of Mrs. Gandhi. Nor would India's post-1976 central government have had to embrace everyone outside the Congress from Jan Sangh to CPM. Once the Congress lost its majority at the Centre, many Congress members of the Lok Sabha, unhappy with Mrs. Gandhi's policies or simply wishing to remain in office, would rally to the Janata Front. Had not at least two constituents of the Front, Moraji Desai's Opposition Congress and Charan Singh's Bharatiya Lok Dal (Indian People's Force) been factions within the Congress until fairly recently?

In the wake of Justice Sinha's decision, Justice Krishna Iyer's reaffirmation of it, and the elections in Gujarat, the opposition was not content to wait passively until elections. CPM leader E. M. S. Namboodiripad denounced post-election Congress efforts to retain power in Gujarat, where the CPM is of no importance, while increasing its own activities in Kerala and West Bengal, where resentment against the Congress has also been

rising and where the Janata Front's constituent parties (except for the odd case of the Socialists) are of little consequence. In the meantime, the Janata Front spoke of a single right-of-Congress party or perhaps a 'federal party' which they made little effort to define. The Janata Front also demanded that Mrs. Gandhi resign at once. This demand was fully endorsed by the CPM. Even the 'states-rights' party of Tamil Nadu in the south, the DMK, edged towards opposing Mrs. Gandhi, although since the state of emergency was proclaimed it has cooperated with her to retain its hold in Tamil Nadu. One source of this sentiment was a moral outrage that a convicted felon should head India. But the Janata Front leaders also saw Justice Sinha's decision as the logical start of their election efforts.

When Mrs. Gandhi declined to resign, the opposition proposed a 'non-violent struggle'. Such struggles, copied from the tactics of Mahatma Gandhi, are well-enough known on the Indian scene. The demand that state boundaries should coincide with language ones, the 1959 struggle against the Communist government in Kerala, or that of the 1970s against the Congress government in Gujarat were all examples of such 'non-violent' agitations. The violence of these agitations varied considerably and Mrs. Gandhi had ample reason to fear that the Janata Front's struggle could result in clashes all over India. The call of the Janata Front for officials and civil servants to resign in protest suggested the depth of the struggle. It may be noted that to date as far as is known, it has been Janata Front political leaders, not those of the more circumspect CPM, who have been arrested.

Jayaprakash Narayan's proposed 'non-violent' agitation was threatening enough. What made it intolerable to Mrs. Gandhi was his suggestion that military men and policemen also had ethical and constitutional obligations. In Congress eyes, this was little more than an invitation to a coup. Indeed, the first foreign correspondent to be expelled from India after the state of emergency was proclaimed aroused Mrs. Gandhi's ire by suggesting that many Army officers were unhappy about her decision to remain as Prime Minister after Justice Sinha's ruling.

Mrs. Gandhi's coup, then, can be thought of as an effort to forestall an opposition-backed military coup or, if one is less kind, as an effort to prevent opposition unity that would result in her defeat in scheduled 1976 elections. In either case, the machinery of repression was already in place. Since 1971 and the India-Pakistan War, India has technically been in a state of emergency under which Civil Liberties and the rights of the states have been suspended. In practice, this emergency and its attendant powers were rarely used. But it was easy enough for Mrs. Gandhi to proclaim a second state of emergency, as was in fact done. Through the Congress governments of the various states it was a simple matter to use the police to arrest opponents, especially as one of the leading features of Mrs. Gandhi's decade in office has been the growth of the para-military Central Reserve Police which are under New Delhi's direct control.

Thus, Mrs. Gandhi's actions are a victory for her more radical followers, including the CPI. Soviet welcoming of her invocation of emergency

powers was one indication of this. Another was New Delhi's announcement that the crackdown would include action against merchants and farmers whose 'hoarding' and 'price-gouging' is officially blamed for India's economic crisis. Once the government comes to believe that it needs emergency powers to run India's economy, it is hard to see how civil liberties will be restored. Nor, judging by other South Asian experience, will popular benefits be long-term. After a spell of efficiency, civil servants, protected by an absence of criticism, will more than return to their former ways. Merchants and others will work out new schemes for protecting their profit margins and farmers new ways to get economic returns (hoarding, black-marketing) for their crops.

Through the haze of Indian censorship, it is not easy to know how much resistance there is to Mrs. Gandhi's action or what forms it will take. There are foreign correspondents in Delhi and so there are reports of riots and street-clashes there and in the neighbouring state of Haryana. Bihar has been a centre of disorder, while in Gujarat, the Janata Front regime attempts to stay in power by keeping the state calm. But for the vast bulk of India, we do not know.

Nor is Mrs. Gandhi's future route quite clear. She proclaims her continued faith, especially for Western consumption, in democracy and the rule of law. But the abrupt alteration of Indian law (and constitution) to prevent any judicial questioning of her role, thus nullifying Justice Sinha's decision by legislative fiat, and the arrest of Congressmen critical of her, as well as opposition figures, show her determination to remain in power.

Yet the Nehru family has long been proud of its role in introducing democracy to India. What sort of elections can be held in early 1976 if the main leaders of the opposition are under arrest, if no news critical of Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress may appear, and if meetings of opposition parties are barred? The degree to which the opposition-led Gujarat state government is permitted to continue will be a useful clue to Mrs. Gandhi's intentions.

To say that Indian democracy is now dead would be overdramatic. For the moment, it is in a coma. Only the future can tell us if this coma will be terminal.

ANOTHER JOB 600?

by Evaristoine Africanus

AT an unspecified date in the very near future, about one million foreign artists and officials will converge at Nigeria's National Theatre in Lagos to take part in one of the most important cultural events of this century—the Second World Black Festival of Arts and Culture. Already, excitement generated in Lagos on account of this Lagos mini-Olympics, has reached fever pitch. The 40 million dollar Bulgarian built Festival village, dubbed the most beautiful cultural building in all Black Africa, was officially handed over to Nigeria's recently deposed Head of State, General Gowon, on June 30th.

To meet the June 30th target date, engineers, architects and technicians worked round the clock to put finishing touches to this magnificent theatre —an architectural colossus which towers into the sky on the sandy plains of the Iganmu Lilipond—like a mighty beacon on a sea of blue.

As entries for the Festival pour into the Headquarters of the Festival's secretariat in Lagos, the President of the International Festival Committee, Commandant Narire o.p. Fingesi, has had a Herculean task trying to cope with the job of attending to all the aspects of the Festival preparations before D-day. While Fingesi sees to the early completion of the 13 metre high theatre, which resembles the Palace of Culture in Verna, Bulgaria, the Commandant is also concerned with the provision of adequate accommodation for all and sundry who will arrive for the Festival within the next five months. Giant and mini-flats are being built night and day on the Lagos-Badagry Highway where visitors will be housed, while other Festival superstructures are also springing up at Kaduna, far away in the northern part of the country—the second venue of the Festival.

According to the latest reports in Lagos, great enthusiasm has been expressed in Europe, the Americas and the Caribbean for the forthcoming Festival of Black Men.

Ultra-modern buses have been arriving in Lagos for the festival and all necessary press arrangements have also been made which will enable members of the mass media from around the globe to record this very unique event for posterity and all mankind. The theatre has a seating capacity for slightly over 5,000 persons, conference hall for 1,600, two large exhibition halls, two cinemas for 1,600, air-conditioned interpreters' booths, VIP rooms, a close-circuit TV system, journalists' booths, large dressing rooms and toilets. The Festival complex also houses a kitchen block with modern amenities. Services during the one month Festival will be supplied by about 2,000 undergraduates from Nigerian universities specially trained for the Festival.

Entries so far received in Lagos are from Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago, Ireland and other Francophone African countries who will send their best artists and dancing groups. According to sources, many countries, including Australia, Brazil, Congo Brazzaville, Cuba, Cameroun Republic, Dahomey,

Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Swaziland, Sierra-Leone, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zaire have already paid up the huge Festival registration fee of 10,000 U.S. dollars.

But while the preparations of this all-important event are on, Lagos is faced with some problems which must be surmounted before opening day. For example, it is understood that there are behind-the-scenes hush-hush meetings now going on between Lagos and Dr. Drop, General Secretary of the Festival, in a bid to settle certain questions over the Festival, since Dr. Drop is the second Patron of the event and observers say that Dakar felt dissatisfied over the way Lagos is taking the lion's share of the responsibility and praise for the planning of the Festival. However, it seems that a compromise situation has been reached between Lagos and Dakar.

Another problem is the issue of local critics in Nigeria, mainly university lecturers, professors and undergraduates who are openly opposed to Nigeria playing host at the Festival. These hardliners have suggested that rather than spend millions of naira on 'another Kwame Nkrumah's Job 600', Nigerian rulers should have spent the money for the Festival to provide Nigeria's neglected masses with food which is now very scarce and costly, free education when the nation has a shocking literacy quotient and medical care in a nation where there is no health plan for the poor and where there is one doctor to about 3,000 patients. The critics further argue that instead of embarking on prestige projects as the late Dr. Nkrumah did in Ghana, Nigerian rulers should have used the money to fight unemployment which has raised the crime rate to an all-time high, and check the anaemic inflation, port congestion and traffic jams which infuriate people in Lagos city.

The third problem faced by Lagos is the recent challenge thrown to Chief Anthony Enahoro, the man formerly in charge of the Festival, who was also the President of the International Festival Committee. In the attack, the over 1,000-strong Nigerian Musician Foundation, headed by Fire Brand, black revolutionary artists and Afro-beat King, Fela Ransome-Kuti, asked Chief Anthony Enahoro, former President of the Festival, to name the group of musicians to whom he allegedly gave money in connection with the forthcoming World Black Festival. Meanwhile, over N10 million (naira) has been earmarked for various necessities including imported wines and foods which will be used in feeding and entertaining participants at the Festival.

Nevertheless, while the Musician Foundation is still calling on the former President to tell the nation which musicians he invited to organise in preparation for the Festival (but they allegedly have disbanded over financial disagreement), Lagos is really agog with euphoria and fanfare for the coming phantasmagoria.

What now remains for the entire world, especially the White faction, is to wait and see the success or failure of the Black Man's Second World Festival of Arts and Culture in Lagos after the first one tailed off in golden sparks at Dakar.

EMPLOYMENT SERVICES FOR THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED IN HOLLAND

by David A. Whiteman

WOULD you entrust your T.V. manufacture to a mongol? Would you let a severely sub-normal person assemble your child's bicycle wheels? Such is the approach to today's employment services for the handicapped person, both physically and mentally, in Holland.

In the DSW factory at Dordrecht just outside Rotterdam, 1,200 handicapped persons work a 40 hour week, in one of Europe's most modern factory complexes. 1,000 physically handicapped and psychiatric workers produce two million doors, twenty million locks per year, a whole range of steel furniture,—to pinpoint merely a few items.

100 disabled white collar workers man an administration centre, offering typing facilities, mail addressing, punch card, statistical and computer programming services. 300 mentally handicapped employees produce nearly 40% of all Holland's T.V. production and assemble complex electrical components for washing machines. In Gennep at St. Augustine's, 350 mentally handicapped workers live in a modern 100 acre complex, set in the sand dunes and forests of Limburg and work at the foundation's sheltered workshops, producing 500 cycle wheels a day, together with other production components.

In the evening, they are just as busy running their own radio station, appointing the day's disc jockey, practising and perfecting their own band entry for this year's national band championship, scouting, or just relaxing on a cycle ride, swimming or playing football. And in Venlo, 200 mentally handicapped persons run a plantation, a nursery, maintain parks, cricket pitches, football fields and also build their own workshops, for civil engineering projects are equally within their grasp.

Little wonder then that we should stop and look deeper into the services provided by a country who readily admit that seven years ago they were faced by the problems and difficulties with their employment facilities for the disabled that we in the U.K. are experiencing today. Bold indeed is their approach to sheltered employment, for rarely does one find any production unit with less than 100 persons.

Of today's population of 13,500,000, some 53,000 disabled persons (14,000 mentally handicapped) are employed throughout the country's 200 workshops, known in The Netherlands as Social Workshops. The largest contributory factor in this situation is the Government's Social Employment Act, implemented in 1969 and empowering the local municipalities with the legal obligation to carry the Act through to its conclusion. The Act states that it is the legal obligation of a local authority to seek out its disabled persons and find suitable work for them. It also guarantees that all employees earn at least the minimum national industrial wage and sets the basis for individual achievement to take this to a much higher level. Thus

there is no longer a stigma attached to the 'poor wage concept' in these social workshops.

Equally important to its overall and long term success are the training techniques employed, looking for the constant factor in the oscillating problems of the handicapped person; training for the mentally handicapped person is concentrated on the concept that physical abilities can be high and constant.

Work orientation commences at school, usually with a special school. The mentally handicapped child will gravitate to manual skills within a few years of entry and by the last two will be attending the training schools at the workshops on a part-time basis.

The concept that there is 'nothing new in the world, only the way it is done' would certainly be agreed with by the Dutch people. Training in sheltered workshops is a separate function, but its concept is totally integrating.

All new employees to the workshops have to pass a manual dexterity test, although training materials and assemblies used in the school are allied to and generally the same as those on the shop floor.

When a disabled person is interviewed for placement in a sheltered workshop the assessment falls basically into three parts:

(1) Manager's interview and work assessment test.

(2) Doctor's examination and report.

(3) Psychologist's interview and report.

The work assessment is a test of motoric ability and dexterity. Here the potential employee performs twelve simple tests that cover the range of work movement, such as reach and grasp, visual selection, twist, co-ordination, etc. The results are then evaluated against known norms and a graphic result is produced, showing overall work ability level and also an analysis of the levels of each work movement. The low points would then become the first area for concentration and training, should the candidate, of course, be successful. The whole time-cycle of this test takes approximately one hour and whilst the applicant is undergoing medical and psychology examinations the results are prepared in time for a team meeting before reaching the ultimate decision.

Those who cannot achieve the minimum standard for entry to sheltered employment (as in the U.K. one-third of normal production capability) even after a prolonged period of full-time training at the workshops, will usually be placed in a Day Centre on a permanent basis. Here the day evolves as a balance between physical and creative activities with some simple work task supplied from the workshops.

These Day Centres are generally part of an organisational network of services to the disabled. Indeed, the workshops nearly all have their origins in foundational structures, private charities or some form of denominational basis. Today, standards of services are unified with full Governmental support, who fully recognise the expertise, skill and devotion that stems

from these origins. New development today, where the need is identified, would be generated as a Municipality project, although again there would be a cross sectional representation of community, professional and foundational guidance.

Employment services have developed into three main categories:

(1) Sheltered Workshops.

(2) Open Air Projects.

(3) Administrative Centres.

Sheltered workshops cover practically all the manual trades known today and cater for all types of disabilities. So developed and extensive are these factories that barely is it noticeable, especially in the very large workshops, that disabled persons are employed and indeed government policy would support this picture in its recommendations that sheltered workshops should be as near to the normal industrial situation as possible, both from the trading aspect and working conditions.

Within the open air projects the mentally handicapped make up the highest proportion of the work force. In general, these projects become a wing of a sheltered workshop from the organisational and administration aspect.

The administration centres for white collar workers, although smaller in proportion to the number employed in manual trades, is a growing area employing both physically handicapped and mentally ill persons on a variety of commercial services.

Under the present legislation the level of wages is such that the worker will be able to earn a living for himself and his family. Wages, based on a 40 hour normal industrial week, are divided into two categories.

Category A qualifies all persons who are capable of one-third of normal output and incorporates 10 levels. No. 1, the lowest, is equal to the normal industrial wage through the country (1975—1,200 guilders per month, approximately £46 per week) graduated in steps, governed by quality and quantity, to No. 10 at £65 per week.

Category B embraces all persons below the one-third capability and minimum entry level. These persons may nevertheless be retained in a sheltered workshop if, on doctors' advice, it is considered that their health would suffer if employment was not permitted, or even discontinued.

In the case of the white collar worker, for example, a mentally ill person who recovers and is placed in open employment may still remain an employee of the workshops, but can receive a higher way or salary than the A.10 point. Such a process requires special permission from the Ministry of Social Affairs but this is merely a formality. The person concerned may then earn virtually any salary allied to his expertise and position.

With this system the employer is to some extent relieved of full liability, thus making the employment of disabled persons, particularly with psychiatric cases, more attractive. Under this provision it is possible for a university professor to carry on his original career, draw his appropriate salary and

yet be a sheltered workshop employee.

Government subsidies are granted to workshops in respect of the following costs:

(a) Lowest Category A. workers 75% of wage costs.

(b) Highest Category A. workers 90% of wage costs.

(c) Manager, supervisors and direct staff 50%.

(d) Transport costs 50%.

No direct grant is allocated to building projects, equipment or plant, but subsidy is paid on loan interest through the national banks, etc., thus laying emphasis on good commercial and industrial practise.

In 1972 there were 165 workshops in The Netherlands and only six of these were profit-making or totally self-supporting. As the scale of accounts rarely balances, so the municipality is relied upon to offset the imbalance and it is possible that a further 80% can be recouped through the Home Office. In 1972, total earnings of workers in sheltered workshops was approximately £24,000,000 and Government subsidies paid amounted to £120,000,000. As stated, implementation of the Social Employment Act is empowered to the local municipalities to provide employment for the handicapped, and to assist with this burden the law also provides for the constitution of an advisory body known as the Social Advisory Committee. These committees are composed of at least three official representatives of the municipality, a state consultant for complementary social provision, the employment office, and three representatives of the general trades council (denominational).

In many regions the municipalities have joined together in the field of social employment, such as the joint management of an industry or for the joint execution of agricultural, civil engineering or building projects.

In conclusion, then, there are, in my opinion, two major factors influencing the high levels of sheltered employment in Holland.

Firstly the effect of the Government's bold approach in the form of the Social Employment Act with its financial support linked to the overall social and industrial concept. Secondly the approach towards the training of the handicapped. This likewise formulates its approach in two ways along the incline of training achievements. The realistic step by step approach to eventual employment possibilities, within special schools; and the separated training system within Sheltered Workshops; again, a step by step, stretching of abilities to achieve standards of work hitherto considered outside the possibilities and scope of our own Sheltered Workshops. Once these levels have been achieved the Dutch have proved by experience that these attainments continue.

Perhaps, then, we have failed to recognise one of the largest sources of untapped manpower within our own spectrum of disabled persons. For the levels of ability cannot be questioned any longer. Attitudes of the mentally handicapped in their newfound work environment are extremely high, for they want to work and are proud of their own ability and achievements.

Are we then passing by resources unseen? Should we change our approach or shall we continue to pass by on the other side of the road? For surely, to make use of these abilities will be a double achievement.

[David A. Whiteman, Senior Day Care Officer (Adults) in Birmingham Social Services Department, and Manager of Sheltered Workshops for the Disabled, used his recently awarded Winston Churchill Travelling Fellowship to study employment services for the mentally handicapped in Holland. The following is a schedule of his Establishment and Ministry visits during his Fellowship period in Holland.]

Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Recreation and Social Welfare, 370 Steenvoordelaan, Rijswijk, The Hague. (Mr. C. J. van Baalen)

Ministry of Public Health and Environmental Hygiene, 8 Dr. Reijersstraat, Leidschendam, The Hague. (Dr. Chr. Steketee)

Directorate for Complementary Social Provision, Ministry of Social Affairs, 73 Zeestraat, The Hague. (Mr. E. Mutter)

'DSW', Rijksstraatweg 15, Dordrecht, Nr. Rotterdam. (Factory for 1,200 mixed handicapped persons)

'St. Augustinus', (District Workshop for Mentally Retarded People), 80 Heyensweg, Gennep, Province of Limburg. (Mr. C. P. van Erp, Director)

A.G.O., Foundation for the Care of the Mentally Retarded, 4 Op de Sniep, Dieman, Amsterdam. (Mr. J. Verwaal, Director)

Prof. Dr. N. Speijer Workshop and Schroeder van der Kolk Foundation, The Hague. Mr. A. C. Verbeck, Director)

Alkmaar, Heiloo and Heerhugowaard Workshops, 'Werkplaats d'Oosterzij', Edisonstraat 3, Heerhugowaard. (Mr. de Boer, Director)

MASTERS AND GRANDMASTERS

by James Morton

IN recent months, the London cinema, for once, has abounded with good films by the accepted masters of the art. Instead of having to scratch around to find worthwhile films to review, there is, this time, almost an overflow.

Pride of place must go to Luis Bunuel's *Phantom of Liberte*. This grandmaster of surrealism who has annoyed, charmed and entertained us for decades, has directed a film full of humour—most of it black. The format is somewhere between Ophuls' *La Ronde* and Has' *Saragossa Manuscript*. A meets B meets C and with each new character we take up his or her story, but unlike *La Ronde* the circle is never completed—or at least only obliquely. It has always been difficult to interpret Bunuel's films, particularly his recent ones, probably because each one has several separate entities each capable of a series of meanings. This one seems to argue—in one facet at least—the thesis that since all *moeurs* are the product of society, only a slight shift in attitude is necessary to render them ridiculous. The film is full of splendid jokes, many of which last only for seconds. To retell them here would only serve to spoil them. Because of its peripatetic nature the film allows, in the main, only cameos from its cast. Amongst the protagonists are Monica Vitti, Jean-Claude Brialy, Adolfo Celi and the ubiquitous Michel Piccoli.

The London Film Festival allowed us to see Robert Bresson's *Lancelot du Lac*. It is rumoured that it has been bought for commercial showing but, like Excalibur, it is at present submerged. As with so many of Bresson's films, the cast is largely amateur and this shows in some of the acting, as does the low budget on which the film was shot. Horses tend to gallop through the same piece of wood and a bird appears repetitively. In a way, though, this seems to emphasise that we are watching a legend and an allegory. The film opens with the knights returning empty-handed from their quest for the grail. They believe they are in disgrace and—if the film is anything to judge by—they are. The end is stylised carnage, reminiscent of *Blanche* without the harsh clarity of that film. Much of *Lancelot du Lac* is shot at knee level and suggests the prayer whilst falling from a horse. 'He mercy sought and mercy found.'

The Festival was opened by *Akenfield*, Peter Hall's film of a day in the life of a boy about to leave a Suffolk village where his family has lived for generations. In contrast to Bresson's film, this has already had a successful commercial showing both in the cinema and on television. In its turn, the film has reawakened interest in the book on which it is based.

Again the cast is amateur, the budget low, and consequently the edges are blurred. The acting of Garrow Shand as the boy, his father and grandfather, is splendid, as is that of Peggy Cole as his mother; that of the minor characters is at times ragged, but it is only to be expected. All in all, the film, with its interlocking flashbacks, works well. The repetitions of the

dialogue serve to emphasise the timeless quality of the countryside and the life of its inhabitants, no matter what the physical and mechanical changes may be.

Whatever may happen on the coasts, invaded by tourists and ravished by developers, the interior of Spain has the same timelessness. This is marvellously captured in Victor Erice's *El Espiritu de la Colmena.*[1] Films from Spain—*pace* Bunuel—do not usually amount to much more than paella Westerns and are rarely shown here. This is a welcome visitor. Anna, a button-eyed child, lives with her elder sister in a crumbling house in Aragon after the Civil War. Her sister is a bit of a bully, her mother and father have withdrawn into neurasthesia. The mother writes letters to a child in the care of the Red Cross, the father tends his bees. They rarely speak to each other or to the children, who run fairly wild. As part of the village entertainment—and there is precious little of that—a travelling cinema shows James Whale's *Frankenstein.* A little later, a refugee-deserter from the war hides in a hut near the village. Anna, quite by chance, meets him and identifies him with Karloff in the film. This has the same tragic consequences for the soldier as did the meeting of the monster with the small girl in the film. Anna runs away.

Everything in the film is so delicately stated that the underlying suspense and fear is controlled. At the end, the family is knit slightly closer together. There is a little *rapport* between the parents and there are grounds of hope not only for the family but by implication for Spain. Erice says that he wants to make a film about Anna when she is in her thirties. I hope he does.

The grandmaster Billy Wilder has successfully defied good taste for nearly forty years. The list of such films is long—*Stalag* 17, *The Fortune Cookie, Some Like It Hot* and *Ace In The Hole* are all examples of his mordant sense of humour. His last two films, *The Private Life of Sherlock Holmes* and *Avanti,* have been notable failures at the box office. Now, in *The Front Page,* he has returned to his best form. The film is based on the play of the same name by Hecht and Macarthur. A crowd of hardboiled journalists sit in the pressroom awaiting the execution of an inept anarchist who has had the misfortune to kill a negro policeman in election year.

Jack Lemmon is the reporter who wants to retire and marry, but who is continually drawn back by his own professional pride and the machinations of his editor, Walter Matthau. The pair of them must be the best repartee comedians at present on the screen and Wilder and his co-scriptwriter, I. A. L. Diamond, must be about the most accomplished writers of this kind of dialogue. The film fairly crackles along from the opening montage of the newspaper being put to bed to the end credits. Wilder never manages to make the film unstagebound. Indeed, the weakest sequence, when there is a Keystone Cops chase, seems a desperate effort to shake off the confines of what amounts to one set. The film gathers pace once the killer has escaped and Matthau has arrived in the press room personally to supervise matters. Wilder has, as usual, coarsened the original. For example, the fastidious reporter in the play has become an overt homosexual, but perhaps the result is even more funny. Puffs often say that the audience fell about

laughing. In this case it is true.

It is never quite possible to become involved in Robert Altman's *California Split*. This may be because the subject matter, Hi-Low Poker and Dice, have not that much of a following in England. The gambling sequences in the latest of the American buddy-buddy films fail to bite. Whereas we were hooked by the roulette wheel in *Baie des Anges* and the card game in *Kaleidoscope*, the action sequences do not really hold our attention. One of the current preoccupations in the American cinema is the para-homosexual relationship of the male heroes and this, too, is never satisfactorily pursued. That said, Elliott Gould and George Segal make a good pair of small-time gamblers who aim for one big win. There is one hysterically funny sequence where they masquerade as vice squad cops and one brilliant sight gag which alone almost make the price of admission worthwhile.

Polanski's *Chinatown* has been hailed as a masterpiece fit to stand with *The Maltese Falcon*. This just isn't so. It may have an authentic period flavour, but the film is too long, there are too few suspects and both murderer and motive are easily recognisable well before the end of the 131 minutes. Why do films have to be so long nowadays? This is a story which would stretch ninety minutes, let alone another forty. Jack Nicholson is good as the private eye.

Finally, a splendid piece of esoterica-erotica. *Ain't Misbehavin'* is a compilation of clips of music hall performers, newsreels and pornography of the first few decades of the century. As you would expect from the title, there is Fats Waller leering happily as he plays the title song and *Honeysuckle Rose* to a girl who looks singularly like a young Lena Horne. There is a fat lady diving contest, a very cruel sequence of three unattractive women undergoing beauty treatment, a female contortionist who plays the violin, George Formby, Lily Morris, Sophie Tucker and many more. Interspersed with these are clips from old stag movies, of which 1907 seems to have been a vintage year. It makes a charming hour and a half and seen against the Swedish short sex film with which it was recently on view it makes an interesting reminder that mild pornography was so much more fun then than it is now.

NOTES

[1] English title: *The Spirit of the Beehive.*
[2] English title: *Meet Whiplash Willie.*

THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF RADIOACTIVITY

by John A. Loraine

THE correct name for radioactivity is 'ionising radiation'. It has been known for many years that ionising radiations have the propensity to damage human cells; sometimes the damage is total and the cell dies; sometimes the cell, although wounded, can continue its existence for some time.

Within the cell, ionising radiations concentrate their attack mainly on the nucleus; within the nucleus the structures at special risk are the chromosomes. The latter are remarkable by any standards. They direct the growth of the cell; they control its division; they are intimately associated with the intricacies of its metabolism and biochemistry.

The chromosomes are the repository of genetic information. By nature they are very conservative. However, at rare intervals, changes occur spontaneously within the chromosome; this process is known as *mutation* and it results in an alteration of the genetic picture. Usually mutations are eliminated by the phenomenon of natural selection by means of which damaging characteristics are removed. A major effect of ionising radiations —and one which must be regarded as amongst their most serious—is their penchant to increase the rate at which spontaneous mutations take place.

We live in an era in which atomic power plants, built with the aim of generating electricity, are being installed throughout the world at a rapidly accelerating pace. Many people, including myself, cannot regard this development with equanimity. To us it savours too much of a Faustian bargain in the course of which the safety of future generations is being jeopardised for short term energy benefits designed to bolster policies of unrestricted economic growth.

There are numerous causes for concern about the increasing use of atomic energy. Radioactive isotopes can damage health; in particular they can cause cancer, leukemia and genetic damage. Massive thermal pollution of waterways by atomic power plants is a strong possibility, particularly if the fast breeder reactor which operates at very high temperatures comes into widespread use. The storage of radioactive wastes is another hazard; such residues cannot be rendered harmless; if they escape into the atmosphere there is no antidote to them. Some of the isotopes are very persistent. For example, plutonium-239, a major constituent of the fuel cycle of the fast breeder reactor, has a half life of 26,000 years, while the half life of another of its fellow actinides, neptunium, is more than two million years. All these constitute major problems. But it is the political attitudes and implications of the radioactivity saga which make me most anxious. The Pugwash Conference of 1973 emphasised this aspect when it talked of 'the diversion of bomb grade material' for non-peaceful purposes, and questioned the wisdom of the 'vast increase in the use of nuclear power that has been widely predicted'.

Vis-à-vis the effects of radiation, the political record has not been good;

indeed, in the past a quite extraordinary degree of ignorance appears to have prevailed in high places. Clement Attlee, Prime Minister in 1945 when atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, said later of this event: 'We knew nothing whatever at the time about the genetic effects of an atomic explosion. I knew nothing about fall-out and all the rest of what emerged after Hiroshima. As far as I know, President Truman and Winston Churchill knew nothing of these things either, nor did Sir John Anderson who co-ordinated research on our side. Whether the scientists directly concerned, knew or guessed, I do not know. But if they did, then so far as I am aware, they said nothing of it to those who had to make the decision.'

The problems of 1975 in the field of ionising radiations are very different to those which faced Clement Attlee and his fellow politicians 30 years ago. Then the secrets of atomic energy were known to few; now the djinn is well and truly out of the bottle and the race for nuclear power is on. Frank Barnaby, Director of the International Peace Research Institute based in Stockholm, has recently reviewed the world position. He states that since 1954 almost one new country every year has installed atomic reactors. At present, 19 nations have built such plants; they are Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, the German Democratic Republic, Federal Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, the USA and the USSR. In 6 other nations—Austria, Brazil, Finland, South Korea, Taiwan and Yugoslavia—nuclear reactors are now under construction. Intimations have come from various other states that they will shortly acquire atomic plants. These include Australia, Denmark, Egypt, Hungary, Iran, Israel, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, South Africa and Thailand. In China there are already one or two nuclear reactors geared mainly to uranium enrichment. Barnaby claims that by 1980 some 30 countries are likely to possess nuclear installations with a total generating capacity of about four times that of the world's existing reactors.

From now on, atomic reactors will move increasingly into the underprivileged and underdeveloped countries of the Third World. The technologically advanced countries of the West will be more than willing to spread their nuclear expertise to the poor nations in exchange either for political leverage or for an increasing share of scarce raw materials such as oil and a variety of metals. A good example of this trend is the recent deal concluded between Federal Germany and Brazil. As a result of this agreement, Germany has stated that over a 15 year period, she will aid in the extraction of Brazil's uranium deposits, will construct eight nuclear power stations, and will be responsible for the development of two plants designed to recycle nuclear fuel.

The developed world occupies only 20 per cent of the planet's terrain; yet it consumes 80 per cent of its natural resources. This state of affairs is being increasingly resented by the countries of the Third World who are constantly demanding a larger share of the earth's wealth and who wish to see eliminated once and for all trading practices which actively and blatant-

ly discriminate against them. Given Western intransigence on this issue—and current evidence suggests that the rich countries will offer only token aid—political leaders in the Third World may come to the conclusion that the only way in which their condition can be remedied is by 'wars of redistribution'. Here the build up of atomic plants in Third World countries could have major historical repercussions. Thus it enables small and relatively poor nations to gain possession of nuclear weapons as a biproduct of their atomic energy programmes; as emphasised by Robert Heilbroner in his recent book *An Inquiry into the Human Prospect* it could raise in an acute form the grisly spectre of international blackmail.

International agreements in the field of atomic energy can scarcely be described as a resounding success. However, the Moscow Test Ban Treaty of 1963, negotiated in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, did make some progress. It forbade the testing of nuclear weapons in the air and at sea; however, underground testing was still permitted, and in the ensuing 12 years the number and magnitude of underground nuclear explosions has grown steadily. The USA, the USSR and the UK signed the Treaty along with many non-nuclear powers. But France did not; neither did the People's Republic of China.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which came into force in March 1970 and which has now been ratified by 94 countries, remains an exceedingly frail international instrument. The original treaty had two main provisions. Firstly it forbade the delivery of nuclear materials and equipment for processing such materials to countries which had not placed the whole of their nuclear programme under the surveillance of the UN International Atomic Energy Agency. Secondly it required the two nuclear super-powers to negotiate 'in good faith' to achieve the cessation of the nuclear arms race 'at an early date'. During the subsequent five years, both of these provisions have been largely ignored. Countries such as Egypt and Israel have been offered nuclear reactors by the USA; India has exploded a nuclear bomb using plutonium exported to her by Canada; nothing really constructive has emerged from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks conducted between the USA and the USSR.

At a recent meeting on disarmament in Geneva the US delegate bluntly stated that there was no such thing as a 'peaceful nuclear explosive device' which is not also a bomb. In the foreseeable future large amounts of plutonium could be circulating randomly and almost aimlessly around the planet. In the absence of effective international safeguards—and these seem most unlikely in the present climate of opinion—little or nothing can be done to prevent the diversion of relatively small amounts of plutonium to manufacture a nuclear bomb. Therefore, the possibility must be squarely faced that nuclear weapons could fall into irresponsible hands, either of governments or of non-governmental organisations seeking to foster their own ideological and political aims.

What did we, the human race, loose upon ourselves when we succeeded in splitting the atom? The four traditional horsemen of the apocalypse are war, famine, disease and death. Have we now added a fifth in the form of

atomic power? Certainly when he split the atom we grasped in no uncertain way what Leon Trotsky in the frenetic days in St. Petersburg prior to the Bolshevik takeover loved to call 'the iron broom of history'. We succeeded in producing the 'ultimate deterrent' in the form of a nuclear holocaust. We lauded the use of the 'peaceful atom', and in so doing we attempted to promote economic growth and to boost material prosperity. But we must also recognise that by our policies we could be hastening the day when nuclear hostilities erupt on a global scale and when the human race is ravaged by cancer and genetic damage.

What will be the opinion of posterity of our activities? Will it bless us for our powers of innovation and resourcefulness? Or—as I think is more likely—will it curse us for being midwives to a serpent with the capacity to sting mankind to death?

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[Dr. John A. Loraine is Chairman of the Doctors and Overpopulation Group and Vice-Chairman of the Conservation Society.]

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

THEODOR HERZL

Theodor Herzl, Artist and Politician. Desmond Stewart. Hamish Hamilton.

This is a surprising book, not so much for the subject as for the author. Mr. Stewart, once a classical scholar at Trinity College, Oxford, and now in his fifties, is a well-known writer on the Middle East. He lived there for ten years, first as assistant professor of English at the University of Baghdad, then as inspector of English at the Islamic schools in Beirut. He is an Arabist and a translator, now resident chiefly in Egypt where he writes both fiction and non-fiction.

As Mr. Stewart says in the foreword to the volume now under review:

> The ambition to write a new biography of Theodor Herzl came to me in 1970. I had then completed *The Temple of Janus,* a history of the Middle East from the opening of the Suez Canal to the present day. Of the major figures who affected my chosen century and region—from Khedive Ismail and Sultan Abdul Hamid to Atatürk and Nasser—Herzl seemed intrinsically the most interesting and the most mysterious. The man who had linked the Western notion of the state to Jewish messianic dreams was in himself as vague as a stained-glass ikon. This book is therefore an attempt, not to contribute to the polemics for or against the political movement with which he is identified, but to discover the human being who lived from 1860 to 1904 and who combined the qualities of dreamer and man of action to a unique degree.

If I may say so, this is a remarkable feat for a Christian, who has clearly had to do much preliminary research into Jewish religious beliefs and customs. It is a long book—nearly 400 pages; but the author has a pleasantly astringent pen. My only criticism is of his over-emphasis on sex.

The first half is rather dull, dealing in great detail with Herzl's childhood and youth and with his early life as an unsuccessful dramatist. (It is not clear to me why Mr. Stewart refers in the sub-title of this book to Herzl as '*Artist* and Politician'. Why not '*Writer* and Politician'?). But, on page 162, with Herzl's sudden realisation of the nature of the Jewish problem, the book suddenly comes to life.

Herzl then squarely faced the three possibilities that confronted Western Jews in the 1890s: to remain Orthodox Jews, sunk in medievalism; or to assimilate to the Christian world around them (Herzl's own case); or to emigrate to a land of their own—in other words, Zionism.

Herzl was not the first Jew to realise these dilemmas, but he was the most compelling. As a writer, he was able to express his vision in fictional form. As a man of action, he had to translate this vision into practical execution. For the rest of his short life, he became more and more involved in the search for a homeland, for non-Jewish political sponsors and for Jewish financial aid.

Theodor Herzl, born in 1860 in Budapest, had become by 1891 the Paris correspondent of the *Neue Freie Presse,* a Viennese daily founded in 1864. He was a much admired writer of feuilletons for it. Suddenly, in 1894-95, he underwent a sudden conversion to Zionism, and devoted most of his time to that. In his 500,000-word private diary, kept between 1895 and 1904 (the year of his death), he discloses that his conversion was largely due, first, to the dead-end he had reached as a writer through difficulties in getting his play *The New Ghetto* produced on the stage (written in 1894, it was not performed till four years later). The second cause was the impact on him of that monstrous

exhibition of anti-Semitism and chicanery in high places in Paris—the Dreyfus Case, that began in 1895. Herzl then became fully convinced that Jews cannot assimilate and hence must emigrate to a State of their own. But he had first to get clear three things in his own mind:

What kind of state should the Jews construct? Where should they choose to site it? How should they obtain it? His answer to the first question was to sit down and write a utopia—published in 1902 as *Altneuland* (Old-New Land). It ran to 130 pages, and 3,000 copies were printed. As regards the second question, he originally planned to found the Jewish State somewhere in Latin America. As regards the third question, he plumped for a chartered company to create the State, under the influence of Cecil Rhodes' success with such a company in Rhodesia.

It was in May of the preceding year that Herzl began his own peregrinations in search of a Jewish homeland as well as to secure political and financial backers. His first (and abortive) discussion was with the Jewish millionaire, Baron Maurice de Hirsch of London, whom he met in Paris. Herzl then approached Dr. Moritz Güdemann, Chief Rabbi of Vienna, as well as Dr. Heinrich Meyer-Cohn, a banker and philanthropist. He read to them in full the draft of his prospective *Address to the Rothschilds,* but failed to get his listeners' support for his ideas. He did, however, secure as his first important convert, Max Nordau, the redoubtable Jewish publicist in Paris.

In the winter of 1895, Herzl paid his first visit to Britain where he met separately Israel Zangwill, the writer, and the banker Sir Samuel Montagu (incidentally, my own mother's uncle) and, in Wales, Colonel Goldsmid (who had been brought up as Christian, but later became an ardent Zionist). Herzl knew little English and had great difficulty in communicating with them. All three, however, gave him encouragement.

The strangest of Herzl's supporters was the Grand Duke Frederick of Baden, uncle of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Herzl was introduced to the Grand Duke by the Rev. William Hechler, chaplain to the British Embassy in Vienna. (Hechler, himself a mystic, was the son of an English mother and a German father.) The Grand Duke obtained from the Kaiser a long letter in his own handwriting setting out his views on the Jewish problem. (The file containing this, and other correspondence of the Grand Duke, had been mislaid in the archives at Karlsruhe. They were discovered some fifteen years ago and reproduced in facsimile by my friend the Tel Aviv banker, Mr. Hermann Ellern and his late wife Bessie.)

In June, 1896, Herzl set off on the first of his five visits to see the Ottoman Sultan in Constantinople. Here the intermediary was the Polish Prince Michael de Nevlinsky, a friend of the Grand Vizier, but somewhat of a rogue. Herzl promised financial help to Turkey in return for land concessions in Palestine. But this was refused by the Sultan, who sent the following message to Prince Nevlinksy:

> If Herr Herzl is as much your friend as you are mine, then advise him not to take another step in this matter. I cannot sell even a foot of land, for it does not belong to me, but to my people. My people have won this empire by fighting for it with their blood and have fertilised it with their blood. We will again cover it with blood before we allow it to be wrested away from us. The Turkish Empire belongs not to me, but to the Turkish people. I cannot give away any part of it. Let the Jews save their billions. When my Empire is partitioned, they may get Palestine for nothing. But only our corpse will be divided. I will not agree to vivisection.

(How right the Sultan proved to be in World War I!)

Herzl was not discouraged by this categorical refusal, but went to London

and Paris to try to get a loan for the Sultan. He had a tremendous reception in Whitechapel, but Sir Samuel Montagu and, later, Baron Edmond de Rothschild both refused to help.

In August, 1896, the Chief Rabbi of Paris proposed that the Jewish problem be discussed at a secret conference between representatives of the larger Jewish communities, together with Baron Edmond de Rothschild and Herzl. It was this suggestion that developed into the first Zionist Congress held at Basel a year later (although that was not a *secret* conference).

Herzl left the first Congress in a state of exhilaration.

> Were I to sum up the Basel Congress in a word—which I shall guard against pronouncing publicly—it would be this: At Basel I founded the Jewish State. If I said this out loud today, I would be answered by universal laughter. Perhaps in five years, and certainly in fifty, everyone will know it.

Herzl proved to be a true prophet. The Jewish State was in fact created in 1948—just fifty-one years after the first Zionist Congress.

Herzl was determined to see the Kaiser in person and succeeded at Constantinople and again in Palestine. Wilhelm II had gone there in 1898 for the dedication of the (German) Protestant Church of the Saviour (the Dormition) in Jerusalem. The Kaiser gave Herzl no encouragement. The Grand Duke of Baden, in a letter to Herzl in December, 1898, said that his Imperial nephew had disliked 'the way your co-religionists like to carry on in the city of Jerusalem. They made an unfavourable impression on the Kaiser, particularly because many small tradesmen engage in speculation of all kinds and of an unsavoury nature there. The prominence of these businessmen, he feels, makes a reepulsive impression and harms the cause which you promote.'

Undeterred, Herzl visited Constantinople again in May, 1901, and in February and July, 1902. On his last visit the Sultan made it clear to Herzl that a limited number of Jews could be settled in the Ottoman Empire but only *outside* Palestine. They would have to acquire Ottoman citizenship and be available for Ottoman military service. These conditions were quite unacceptable to Herzl and the Zionist movement.

Between 1902 and 1904, Herzl had considered founding a Jewish State in a number of countries. These included Palestine, Cyprus, the Sinai Peninsular, El Arish, Uganda, Kenya, Mesopotamia, Mozambique, Congo and Libya. Of these, Cyprus, Sinai and El Arish were discussed by Herzl in London with Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, in October, 1902. But neither Sinai nor El Arish were at that time in Britain's juridical possession, while Cyprus already had (and still has) tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. A Jewish commission sent to Sinai to examine conditions there reported that it was 'quite unsuitable for settlers from European countries'. In any case, both the Egyptian Government and Lord Cromer (the real power in Egypt then) were opposed to Jewish settlement in Sinai or El Arish, using Nile water. It is interesting to note, nevertheless, that fifteen years later in World War I, Nile water was piped across Sinai as far as El Arish to supply the British forces advancing towards Palestine.

In April, 1903, Herzl again saw Chamberlain, this time about Jewish settlement in East Africa. Nothing else seemed possible. Although his supporters claimed that, for Zionists, East Africa was only a *Nachtasyl* (an overnight shelter), the proposal was bitterly opposed at the Sixth Zionist Congress in Basel in August, 1903. The opposition (which included Dr. Chaim Weizmann, to be the first President of Israel 45 years later) defeated Herzl and the Uganda supporters by 295 votes to 177, with 100 abstentions.

The British Government itself was anxious to encourage European settlement

in the Kenya highlands along the newly-built East Africa railway, in order to make it pay. However, the British High Commissioner at Mombasa, Sir Charles Elliot, opposed the settlement of Jews among Christians in the Kenya highlands.

On his way back from Basle, a frustrated Herzl made a detour to Rome to see King Victor Emmanuel III and the Pope. The Pope's attitude to Jewish settlement in Palestine was wholly hostile:

> We cannot give approval to this movement. We cannot prevent the Jews from going to Jerusalem, but we could never sanction it. . . . The Jews have not recognised our Lord; we therefore cannot recognise the Jewish People.

This was the end. Herzl fell ill with heart trouble in May, 1904, and was sent to a spa. He died in July, 1904, aged only 44, and Mr. Stewart describes in his book Herzl's subsequent 'canonisation' by Zionists throughout the world.

It is a sad commentary that all three of Herzl's children also came to an untimely end. His elder daughter, Pauline, died at the age of forty from drug addiction. His son, Hans, born in 1891, became a Catholic at the age of 35 and, at the age of 39, committed suicide in 1930, shortly after the death of Pauline. Herzl's younger daughter, Trude, born in 1893, married at the age of 24 a divorced Czech industrial engineer 26 years older than herself, with three children. After a lifetime of mental illness, she died in a German concentration camp in 1943.

There seems to have been a strain of madness in the family of Herzl's wife, the Naschauers. His wife's eldest sister Therese (1863-1938) had two mentally ill children. Her second sister, Helene, while stable herself, seems to have attracted a mentally unstable husband, who killed himself in 1924 after business losses.

There are no descendants of Herzl alive today. The State of Israel itself is his descendant.

SAMUEL

MARRIAGE OF UNTRUE MINDS

'Wedlock's the Devil': Byron's Letters and Journals, Vol. 4. 1814-15. Edited by Leslie A. Marchand. Murray. £5.75.

Lord Byron's Family: Annabella, Ada and Augusta, 1816-24. Malcolm Elwin. Murray. £7.50.

Byron the Man continues to be more fascinating than Byron the Poet, as was observed in his lifetime and has been true ever since. For one book devoted to the poetry, there have been half-a-dozen devoted to the scandals surrounding his name and in particular his marriage.

It was a curious marriage in itself, this union between the gay young poet of aristocratic descent—and (it was darkly rumoured) aristocratic vices—and the intensely 'respectable' heiress Annabella Milbanke, whom the poet described to her aunt, his old friend Lady Melbourne, as 'a very superior woman a little encumbered with Virtue'. The Regency, as it were, married into the Victorian Age, and in restrospect it is not really surprising that the 'd——d wedlock' lasted only twelve months.

The details of the affair—all we shall probably ever know—we can now learn from volume 4 of Professor Marchand's exemplary edition of the Letters and Journals, rightly called by Ifor Evans 'one of the great publishing ventures of our time'. This volume covers two whole years, from January 1814 to December 1815, and while there is a good deal of literary interest, for example, Byron's letter to Coleridge urging him to finish the admired *Christabel* ('surely a little effort would complete the poem') and his no less generous letters to Leigh Hunt, just out of prison for 'libelling' the Prince Regent, inevitably most attention is

focused on the poet's courtship of Annabella, largely by letters (anticipating Browning), their brief marriage followed by separation, and the birth of their daughter Ada in December 1815. Malcolm Elwin's book *begins* with Ada's birth, so we have the full facts before us and can make up our own minds.

And this is where the difficulty starts. The more we look into this curious affair, the more mysterious it becomes. The partners were ill-suited: granted. But what was the real truth behind Annabella's dark hints as to the reasons for their separation? Did Byron really have a more than brotherly relationship with his half-sister Augusta Leigh, and if so how could the incensed Lady Byron have gone out of her way to make a friend of Augusta, however 'limited' (as Elwin puts it) and ambiguous their friendship was? The Letters so far do not clear up the mystery, and I doubt whether succeeding volumes will throw more light.

The late Malcolm Elwin was the chief modern defender of Byron's conduct, against the aspersions of Harriet Beecher Stowe and her more scholarly successors. The present posthumous volume, edited by his friend and colleague Peter Thomson, is a sequel to his previous books *The Noels and the Milbankes* and *Lord Byron's Wife* and, like them, is based upon the Lovelace Papers. He begins, as I say, where Professor Marchand's volume leaves off, so that the two books can be read together, one after the other, Elwin's ending with Byron's death in 1824.

A close reading of both volumes only adds to our bewilderment. 'These are deep waters, Watson' and the solution is definitely *not* on the final page. Most readers will probably agree with Malcolm Elwin in his assessment of Annabella's suspicious, self-justifying character. But it is hard to be sure. She was certainly the wrong woman for Byron; no less certainly was he the wrong man for her. She would have done better perhaps (like ourselves) to stick to the poetry. How straightforward *Childe Harold*, compared with *Childe Harold's* creator!

R. C. CHURCHILL

THE GRAND OLD MAN

Gladstone. E. J. Feuchtwanger. Allen Lane. £3.50 (paperback).

This is one of the first volumes in a series of 'British Political Biography'. Future subjects include Lord North, Castlereagh, Keir Hardie, Joseph Chamberlain, and Eden. A volume on Lord Salisbury has also been published and is reviewed elsewhere. Although the books are from the Penguin firm, they are larger in size and in price than is customary.

It is a strange, and a sad, fact that W. E. Gladstone is virtually forgotten today. Although he was, without question, the predominant figure in nineteenth century political history, he is far less remembered than his rival, Disraeli. Mr. Feuchtwanger believes that Disraeli exceeded Gladstone in one area alone: the quality of imagination. Yet it is the colourful and imaginative aspects of Disraeli's life—or rather the legend of Disraeli's life—that have continued to be part of the Conservative tradition. Gladstone was a great orator. He could move audiences be they the House of Commons during a budget debate or a reverential gathering of workmen standing in the rain in order to hear the new prophet. However, Gladstone did not possess the gift of the ready phrase. One rarely sees Gladstone quoted. Another reason for the decline of Gladstone lies in the decline of his party. Even many of his heirs had no desire to recall the ideas of Gladstone. Indeed, many of them shared the view held by Mr. Feuchtwanger that Gladstone's last years in politics hurt the Liberal Party.

Nevertheless, Gladstone remains a perpetual fascination to those who know him and to know him is to admire him, at least to some extent. Because his life

embraced so many fields (Dante, Homer, Politics, tree-cutting and above all religion) his biography has never been easy to write. Indeed, popular writers who move from book to book and from century to century have, on the whole, avoided Gladstone. However, there is a wide selection of biographies available. Even in his lifetime, there were many of which G. W. E. Russell's (who was a friend and colleague and one of the few Liberals who shared Gladstone's religious views) is perhaps the best. Within a few years of the death of the G.O.M. appeared the three volume biography by another colleague, John Morley. This still remains the most important work on Gladstone, but it has many faults, of which two general ones should be mentioned. Morley was an agnostic and found it difficult to understand the religious basis of Gladstone's life. Furthermore, Morley found it hard to reconcile Gladstone's early Toryism with his later Liberalism and, perhaps unconsciously, Morley suppressed many passages that showed his hero to be, in Arthur Balfour's words, 'in everything except essentials a tremendous Tory'. Important books on Gladstone have been written by some of his children. Mary Drew's life of her mother, *Catherine Gladstone*, a charming book about a charming woman, gives some good insights and some delightful anecdotes about 'Mr. G.' Herbert, Viscount Gladstone, attempted an assessment of his father in *After Thirty Years* which, while interesting, is too defensive. Sir Philip Magnus's biography has held the field for over twenty years as the best one volume life. Finally Professor Checkland's excellent work on the economic history of the Gladstone family and the publication of Gladstone's diary now in progress will cause all previous accounts to be reconsidered.

Where, then, does Mr. Feuchtwanger's book fit with all this. His is unabashedly a political biography in the Morley tradition. He attempts to give some consideration to Gladstone's other interests but political history remains at the centre. Mr. Feuchtwanger has in the past written mainly about Tory politics so he brings a refreshing perspective to the subject. While he does not share Morley's enthusiasm for Victorian liberalism, he takes a rather favourable view of Gladstone. The book is a good summing-up of the state of Gladstonian scholarship at present. Readers of the *Contemporary Review* should enjoy anything about the man who must be the most distinguished contributor in the long history of this magazine.

R. F. MULLEN

AN AMERICAN IN LONDON

The Londoners: Life in a Civilised City. Walter Henry Nelson. Hutchinson. £4.95.

Mr. Nelson, an American living in London, writes of Londoners with such understanding grace that much of his book should be read to soft music. He calls London the world's most civilised city, praising us for our innate courtesy, especially to visitors; though that, I suggest, is less a conscious virtue than a habit. We enjoy doing it; without waiting to be asked, we may even enquire of an obvious stranger poring over a street map: 'Can I help you?' As he notes, we had ample help-your-neighbour practice in the blitz, our 'greatest collective ordeal since the Great Plague of 1665 and the Great Fire a year later'. The custom sticks.

He echoes the view that London is really a collection of small villages, not just urban 'neighbourhoods'. We are not simply 'city rats' in love with city life. Most of us want 'a reasonable proximity to the centre of London, coupled with a distinctly rural, village atmosphere'. Hence our love of homelife on the fringe,

with gardening and other hobbies. 'In London, it is a poor man who spends all his energies pursuing wealth and it is an even poorer man who has wealth and can talk of nothing else'.

Mr. Nelson had some revealing experiences finding schools for his children. As his two boys might be science inclined, he asked the baggy-tweeded head of a state-aided grammar-school: 'I suppose you have all the usual laboratory facilities?' 'Oh dear no', he chortled. 'None of that elaborate nonsense, I'm afraid, but not to worry. You'd be surprised what we can do with an old eggcup and a bent spoon!' The boys voted instead for a functional comprehensive with crisp, glib head, rather like a modern American high school, but soon realised their error; 'any Londoner would have read the signs correctly, simply by glancing at the headmasters themselves'. Would he, I wonder?

Noting that only about 7 per cent of secondary school graduates enter university in Britain against 70 per cent in USA, Mr. Nelson concludes that many Londoners think it isn't a good thing to build ever more universities, which can only lead to a decline in standards. 'They seem to prefer a small proportion of highly educated, cultured people to a horde of semi-educated university graduates'. An arguable assumption?

Arguable, too, are some of his reactions to 'permissive' London, its sleazy joints and sex habits. Is it true that the average Londoner 'doesn't want to know about the sex life of others, and if he does, is not impressed'? ; further, that he 'cannot enhance his reputation by boasting of his affairs', unlike a man in the US, Italy, France, etc.? Hasn't Mr. Nelson sampled the *Mirror, Sun, News of the World* and girlie magazines?

Inevitably, his book abounds in generalities which can often be confounded by counter-generalities. But within that limit he covers wisely, in graceful style, almost every aspect of London life visitors need to know about and Londoners may relish, too, lingering over Papas' witty line drawings.

TREVOR ALLEN

LITERATURE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

The Story-Shaped World. Brian Wicker. The Athlone Press of the University of London. £6.

From ancient myth and fairy-tale to the most complex and sophisticated of modern novels, the author has been compelled to elaborate 'fictions' for the purpose of coming to terms with the world of his experience. Taking this simple fact as his point of departure, Mr. Wicker has sought to demonstrate the connection which exists, or ought to exist, between the study of literature and the philosophy of religion. In order to do this, he has made certain preliminary assumptions. Firstly, that in the study of fiction the matter of narrative rhetoric —that is, contextually, the whole technique of communicating what the story-teller wants to impose of his fictional world upon the reader—is crucial to a disciplined criticism. Secondly, that 'in the study of religious belief the adequacy of metaphysical foundations is equally crucial'. A third thread of assumption is drawn into the thesis: that religious belief is founded upon stories. On this basis, Mr. Wicker suggests that if we admit a rhetoric of fiction and a metaphysics of belief, it is equally important to recognise the existence of a rhetoric of belief and a metaphysics of fiction.

This book is a cogently argued and practically illustrated attempt to display, by linguistic and anthropological means, the metaphysical implications of fiction. The key to the 'metaphysical pact' between the real world and the

world of story is the narrator's use of metaphor. Metaphor, he maintains, is endemic in all communications. But it is never an innocent figure. It always implies a subterranean metaphysic. It is not just a way of describing things: it is a way of *experiencing* them. Yet not without danger. Ruskin demanded that we should repudiate the pathetic fallacy. In ascribing illicitly anthropomorphic and moral meanings to the inanimate, to Nature, I sacrifice my personal liberty. As Alain Robbe-Grillet (who holds that it is the job of the modern novelist to get rid of all metaphors, to 'cleanse the linguistic palate') expresses it:

> If I . . . confuse my own sadness with the sadness I attribute to the landscape, if I claim that this is no superficial relationship, I am thereby recognising that my present life is to some extent predestined. The landscape existed *before* me; if it really is *it* that is sad, it was sad *before* I was, and the harmony I feel today between its form and my mood was waiting for me long before my birth; I have always been destined for this sadness . . .
>
> (*Snapshots and Towards a New Novel*)

Norman Mailer, on the other hand, is insistent that 'a rich metaphorical diet is a necessity for the would-be novelist of today'.

There is, then, a clear rift between the 'savage', poetic language of the story-teller and the abstract, value-free prose of the philosopher. Is no ideological reconciliation possible in the matter of Poets' metaphor versus Philosophers' measures? That, in effect, is the question that Mr. Wicker poses—and, with effect, partially answers, with illustrative variations on the theme of 'Fiction and Metaphysics' worked out in the novels of Lawrence and Joyce, Waugh and Beckett, and Robbe-Grillet and Mailer.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES

Gilbert and Sullivan (Macdonald and Janes. £3.95). For about thirty years until his death in 1964, Hesketh Pearson was a prolific biographer, competent, painstaking, committed, anecdotal and intensely readable. In the result, his books were very widely read. Now Macdonald and Janes are reissuing a number of his works. Malcolm Muggeridge, who was a close friend, has written the Introduction to this new edition of **Gilbert and Sullivan.** He writes: 'Hesketh's method as a biographer was to get inside his subject's skin rather than into his mind or even his soul. . . . The truth is that the subjects of Hesketh's biographies became a circle of absent friends whom he felt bound to champion in all circumstances and on all counts.' Nonetheless, he could be detached and objective. In this present study, Mr. Muggeridge points out that, in spite of Hesketh Pearson's like of Gilbert and dislike of Sullivan, he is able 'to hold the balance evenly between them," recognising Gilbert's faults and Sullivan's virtues. The second of this batch is **The Life of Oscar Wilde** (£4.95), to which Peter Quennell has written a short Introduction. He describes it as 'a comprehensive picture of Wilde at different stages of his career, and in his many different aspects.' Before writing the book, Hesketh Pearson told Bernard Shaw that his intention in writing this life of Wilde 'was to take him out of the fog of pathology into the light of comedy, to restore the true perspective of his career, to revive the conversationalist, not the convict.'

'The final phase must not be allowed to overshadow the rest.' Is this the true balance? The biography naturally includes many a Wilde witticism. The most important of this batch of new imprints is Hesketh Pearson's **Bernard Shaw** (£4.95), first published in 1942, apart from the Postscript published in 1951. The biography was largely written in conjunction with G.B.S. himself. Hesketh Pearson in a Note remarks that Shaw's assistance in many forms 'enabled me, while maintaining my impartiality as a biographer, to make the story of his life and the development of his personality as much like an autobiography as a work written in the third person can be.' In his short Introduction, Richard Ingrams stresses that 'it would be wrong, however, to think that such interference compromised Pearson's objectivity or that the additions and alterations were made against his will.' The reissue of these volumes is welcome.

Reprints of the Works of Sidney and Beatrice Webb (Cambridge University Press in conjunction with the London School of Economics). The purpose of these reprints is to make available published works of the Webbs, long out of print, with a new Introduction by a specialist in the particular field. Three are now issued. The first is Beatrice Webb's *Our Partnership* (£7.50), with a long Introduction by Professor George Feaver. It covers the first twenty years' collaboration after their marriage, 1892-1912, during which the London School of Economics was founded and some of their major works published. Professor Feaver gives a valuable assessment of the partnership during these years. *Methods of Social Study* (£6.25) by both Sidney and Beatrice Webb was first published in 1932. In his Introduction, Professor T. H. Marshall discusses the 'unit-fact' method of note-taking developed by the Webbs, and its success, with limitations. 'One can imagine the method working satisfactorily where the subject matter of the enquiry is clearly limited and the research is clearly focused on some specific aspect of it.' The third volume is the Webbs' 'summing-up' of their ideology, *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain* (£6.00). This was first published in 1920 and the reprint has an Introduction by Professor Samuel H. Beer. He writes: 'The polemical purpose of the book is obvious: to offset the influence of syndicalism in general and guild socialism in particular.' But 'they were not interested in a merely polemical victory.' It was 'far from absurd for them . ... to see in their book a guide to social and economic changes by a socialist government'. We look forward to more of these reprints.

The Hunting of the Snark (Studio Vista/Michael Dempsey. £4.50). This famous and delightful 'agony in eight fits' by Lewis Carroll has now been republished in its centenary year with new illustrations by the cartoonist, Ralph Steadman, in place of those in the original edition by the painter, Henry Holiday. Mr. Steadman has already with great success provided illustrations for *Alice in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking-Glass,* in place of Tenniel's well loved originals, although these will never be superseded. These new drawings are a delight and add further mystery and imagination to the enigma of the Snark.

Anne Bronte (Allen Lane. £7.00 hardback; £3.00 paperback). Winifred Gérin's biography of the author of *Agnes Grey* and *The Tenant of Wildfell Hall* was first published in 1959 and is of great importance. Winifred Gérin is, of course, a leading authority on the Brontës; and this study together with her other works should remain easily available.

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

DECEMBER 1975

HOW THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES FARE
Veronica Weir

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M. A. P. Willmer

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

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HOW THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES FARE

by Veronica Weir

ALTHOUGH an interim peace agreement has been signed between Israel and Egypt the major part of the territories administered by Israel since the Six Day War will continue to be her responsibility. Until — to put it simply — peace will break out in the Middle East. There might be some 'cosmetic changes' on the Golan Heights but the Golan and the West Bank will continue to be under Israeli management. Unless, of course, the unforeseen repeats itself. Until this happens they will remain, as if on trust, in Israeli hands.

So far in the *quid pro quo* game both Israel and Egypt have scored points. In the words of Chaim Herzog, Israel's former intelligence chief and now its United Nations representative, the agreement cannot be called a breakthrough because 'while the Israeli part is clear and tangible, the Egyptian part of the agreement is much less tangible and is conditioned upon Egyptian decisions from time to time'. The Soviet Union voiced great reservations to the *Pax Americana*. So that she and the United States are farther apart than ever in their approach to a Middle East settlement. A factor which adds to the uncertainties.

Let us therefore examine the present state of affairs in the occupied areas. What are they like and how are they administered? First of all there is Judea and Samaria, better known as the West Bank. 640,000 live there in an area of 2,300 square miles, excluding East Jerusalem, for the problem of Jerusalem is, in official Israeli parlance, 'not negotiable'.

The largest towns on the West Bank are Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah and Nablus. Ramallah, lying practically on the outskirts of Jerusalem, is studded with villas where Jordanian officials liked to spend their holidays. There is a far from ostentatious house that used to belong to King Hussein. Nablus is the centre of civil disobedience. We rode at top speed through its streets and encountered only a few stony-faced Arabs. The people in and around these towns derived their livelihood mainly from farming and tourism. Today it is chiefly Bethlehem that attracts tourists in great numbers, especially at Christmas.

The Gaza Strip, true to its name, is a tiny area of only 170 square miles into which some 170,000 Arab refugees had been squeezed. They lived in dismal camps from which an additional 50,000 managed to extricate themselves and settle permanently on more habitable premises.

The original inhabitants, numbering some 130,000, lived for 19 years until the Six Day War under Egyptian military administration, almost completely sealed off from Egypt and the other Arab states. The Strip was a distressed area, owing to overcrowding and the lack of natural resources. Nearly all the refugees and half the indigenous population were the responsibility of the welfare system.

Most of the Arabs living in the Sinai Peninsula are concentrated in El Arish, the only major town of the area. 10,000 Beduin inhabit the so-called Solomon region and smuggling was their chief industry. The Israelis did not make allowances for such romantic pursuits and had to find the tribesmen other means of sustenance. The Sinai, this vast expanse of desert, offered a protective shield to Israel with the Mitla and Gidi Passes having been of special strategic value, but the recent agreement between Israel and Egypt stripped them open, though they still provide a certain hazy look-out on Egyptian movements.

The Abu Rodeis oilfields which have also gone according to the agreement, used to supply 50 per cent of Israeli oil requirements. To cheer themselves up for the loss the Israelis estimated that they would have dried up by 1982 anyway, and while oil can be bought at a price no price tag can be attached to security, hence the fierce opposition from some Israeli quarters to the virtual relinquishing of the Mitla and Gidi Passes.

Israel gained control over an almost depopulated area in the Golan Heights as most of the inhabitants fled to Syria. Only 7,500 Druzes remained who had a rough deal under Syrian rule and therefore eagerly co-operate with the occupying authorities. They serve as policemen or volunteer for military service.

When I drove through the Golan I saw burnt-out jeeps and tanks, mementoes of the near-irreconcilable stand of the former warring parties. Kuneitra, the one time capital of the province, was out of bounds. There would not have been much to see, I was told, as only a few buildings still stand to remind one that this devastated place was once a town. The ruins reverted after the October war of 1973 to Syria so that this wasteland, called the Golan, has not even a ghost centre now. It is characteristic of the uncertainties that none of its 53,000 former civilians who once inhabited the town, chose to return and build new homes there. The 9,000 feet high Mount Hermon is lording it over the plateau that reaches down to the Sea of Galilee and helps to watch over it.

Whatever the warts of the Israeli system into which these four disparate areas had been sucked it is a major achievement of a foreign administration to have provided them with legal and economic structures without altering their pre-1967 status. Each part of the occupied territories is under the authority of a military governor, responsible both for the civilian and military administration, but officials in charge of the civilian side are drawn

from the various Ministries. Although the system works reasonably well it would be futile to claim that the Arab population fully co-operates with the Israeli authorities. From the very beginning there were a number of demonstrations, the first having been sparked off by the reunification of Jerusalem. The Khartoum conference in August 1967 was the excuse for a follow-up as the local inhabitants thought that the conference would result in the whole world demanding an immediate Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Any Arab move to search for peace had been banned at Khartoum. The resistance campaign was concentrated in Jerusalem and Samaria. Only later on did it spread to Bethlehem, Hebron and the Gaza Strip. So-called 'historic anniversaries' sparked off these outbursts of non-co-operation and clashes between the guerillas and the occupying forces. The first big move in this direction was a general lawyers' strike that continues to this day. It was connected with a sharply-worded protest against Israeli rule by Arab dignitaries. As a result seven leaders had been banished from their places of residence.

Favourite dates for the various incidents were the 'remembrance days' of November 2nd (Balfour Declaration), November 29th (UN Partition Resolution), May 15th (Establishment of the State of Israel) and June 5th (The outbreak of the Six Day War): but other lesser dates were also 'commemorated'.

When Arab textbooks were purged of their anti-Israel and anti-Jewish propaganda there was a similar outburst of strikes, involving schools, shops and the means of transportation. As so often, Nablus became the centre of agitation. Israeli authorities reacted by enforcing economic sanctions and by banishing some local leaders to Jordan. But after the Six Day War the Al-Asifa organization announced in Beirut that henceforth it will move its supreme command to the occupied zone in order to spare the Arab countries further Israeli reprisals for their struggle against 'Zionism'. An attempt was thus made by the Palestinians to start a liberation war using the local population as a nucleus. Jasser Arafat came to the West Bank and was in charge of the operations. Various acts of sabotage were perpetrated, some with the help of local inhabitants and the guerillas were launched on their continuing fight against the occupation.

This caught the Israelis unprepared but, as time went on, they evolved a system of obtaining intelligence and set up a new security system to protect the civilian population. Jasser Arafat stayed only a couple of months on Israeli held territory and the movement was hindered by the lack of a supreme commander. By 1968 the guerillas moved first to Jordan and then to Syria and the Lebanon from where they are directing their operations to this day.

Meanwhile the Israelis kept an unobtrusive presence in the administered areas, adhered to non-intervention in local affairs and to an 'open bridges' policy. The maintenance of law and order and the dealing with non-political crime was delegated to the Arab Police, most of its members having been recruited before the Six Day War. Similarly, Arab personnel performs economic and administrative tasks, with the Israelis acting in a supervisory



capacity and footing the bill. The total number of Israeli officials in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip is about 570 against 14,500 locally drawn staff. The Israeli team would consist of even fewer people if we deducted 120 tax officers.

Only 24 Israelis are concerned with Arab education, compared to nearly 10,000 of their own people. The syllabuses and curricula remained unchanged except for anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish passages that have been expurgated from textbooks. In Judea and Samaria a locally appointed examinations committee is functioning who prepare the final papers which conform to the Jordanian matriculation standard.

Egyptian matriculation papers are brought by U.N. representatives to the Gaza Strip every year. They supervise the examinations and take the papers back in sealed envelopes to Cairo to be marked by Eyptian teachers. Students from all the occupied territories can enrol in an Arab University or in the West, should they choose so. They are able to come home for their holidays and settle down permanently in their respective localities on completion of their course.

Residents of the occupied areas can now cross the bridges to get to Arab countries without permits. Visitors from the opposite direction crossed over into Israeli held territory in ever increasing numbers. During the summer of 1972 no fewer than 150,000 people took advantage of this possibility. And special arrangements are made for Arabs wishing to visit the Holy places. A repatriation scheme is in force to re-unite Arab families from which some 50,000 persons have benefited.

Instead of social security payments the Israelis drew on the available labour force, paying the Arabs the same wages as their own workers. Plans for the occupied territories were drawn up on a long-term basis to avoid disruption, regardless of the uncertainties the future might hold for them. They had been thrown wide open to visitors from Israel and abroad, the contention being that the authorities have nothing to hide.

Certain parts of the occupied territories have been settled by Israelis, partly in NAHAL villages where military training goes side by side with farming and partly in civilian localities which Israel hopes to retain after the signing of a peace treaty. Into the third category fall those settlements which she might agree to cede in the hope that the Jewish communities there will be allowed to remain even under Arab sovereignty.

EIRE AND ISRAEL ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Background Information on the Exchange of Ambassadors

By Alfred Joachim Fischer

ISRAEL and the Irish Republic have agreed to an exchange of ambassadors, which will establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. For Israel, this is an encouraging event, since the tendency in the recent past has been to break off such diplomatic contacts, rather than create them. Thus, Black Africa—except for Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mauritius—went over to the Arabs with flying colours, even though these countries had previously maintained friendly relations with Israel. Their embassy staffs in Israel packed their suitcases, and the Israeli diplomatic missions in those countries did likewise. The assistance, both economic and military, which the Jewish State had rendered them was quickly forgotten.

Apart from other factors, Israel's prestige will receive a boost from the forthcoming Irish-Israeli exchange of ambassadors. A sovereign state since 1948, the Irish Republic is no longer part of the British Commonwealth, but still belongs to the Anglo-Saxon sphere of interest. It is held in high esteem by the Vatican since the 'true faith' is practiced more zealously by its 95% Catholic population than anywhere else in Northern and Central Europe. Lastly, Eire cherishes the traditions of its great writers, such as W. B. Yeats, James Joyce, G. B. Shaw, Liam O'Flaherty, Frank O'Connor and Samuel Beckett, to mention only a few, and of its world-renowned classical theatre.

The reasons which may have prompted Dublin to initiate diplomatic ties with Jerusalem at a time when the 'oil cult' militates very much in Israel's disfavour, can only be guessed at. From a pragmatic viewpoint, the following doctrine appears the most plausible. The Irish Republic which joined the European Economic Community in 1973, may not wish to be the only one of its members without such ties with Israel. This would also be in keeping with the tactics of the EEC. True, it does seek a dialogue with the Arabs, and some of its resolutions have been disappointing to the Israelis; yet, the State of Israel's right to exist is being affirmed at every opportunity. In the long run, it is impossible to do this convincingly without diplomatic ties, and it may be this realisation which guided Dublin's latest step. (Northern Ireland, Ulster, is of course still part of the United Kingdom, who established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1948.)

Some striking parallels exist between the two countries. Both have about the same population figure, both are poor in raw materials and possess no oil fields, so vital to modern industry. The number of Irish people abroad, and of Jews in the Diaspora, is many times greater than the population of Israel, or of Ireland as a whole, respectively. They are an important source of material aid for the economic needs of their respective homelands; both

the Jewish and the Irish lobbies in the US exercise considerable influence, especially in Washington, DC, and New York, which always intensifies before elections.

Both countries have suffered partition. First, Transjordan (now Jordan) was severed from the total territory of Palestine under the British Mandate, then the remainder was again divided into two parts, in accordance with the UN Resolution of 29th November, 1947. Ulster remained within the United Kingdom, when the rest of Ireland was recognised as a sovereign state in 1921. The Irish and the Jews of Palestine succeeded in liberating themselves from British rule (or Mandate),—albeit with great sacrifices on both sides—and the militant independence movements in both countries undoubtedly learned from one another.

In 1948, Israel achieved sovereignty; in the same year Eire passed a law abolishing the last tie with the Commonwealth, and became a republic. Now, both countries are being scourged by terror. In Israel, it is perpetrated by the Arabs. In the case of Ireland, it is the Catholic IRA (Irish Republican Army) whose activities involve both parts of the island (meeting with bloody Protestant counter-terror in Ulster), and penetrate as far as England, Scotland, and Wales. So far, the Irish Republic itself has been affected the least, but the situation tended to damage its relations with the United Kingdom—its principal market, emigration country, and chief source of tourism.

On 28th March, 1973, when the German freighter 'Claudia' was found to be carrying 5 tons (at first it was rumoured to be 100 tons) of illegal arms, partly of Soviet origin, it was discovered that the shipment originated from Tripoli. In fact, Colonel Khadafi had promised his assistance to the Irish terrorists, as he had done to the PLO and other Palestinian terror organisations. This discovery did not increase pro-Arab sentiment in Dublin and may, in fact, have contributed to the belated recognition of the State of Israel.

Finally, terrorists in both areas receive long prison terms, and both have had prison breaks—successful as well as abortive—aided by 'experts'.

The countries of the EEC constitute the most important market for both Israel and Eire. The German Federal Republic holds third place in the imports and exports of both countries; however, the USA continues to be Israel's principal trading partner, while Britain accounts for 61% of Eire's exports and 51% of her imports. The 1965 agreement of a free trade zone will be completely in force during 1975, after a period of gradual transition.

The utopian dream of Israel's religious parties is reality in Eire's educational system: parochial schools predominate almost 100%. (Jews are free to choose; those not attending their own schools usually prefer Protestant schools, for their supposedly higher standards, or the famous Trinity College with its high proportion of Protestant professors, lecturers and students.)

Social institutions are to be the virtual monopoly of religious orders. This steadily expanding field has recently required the participation of the Irish Government; however, in many cases it has simply requested the orders to

continue their efforts, with the state footing the bills; this relieves their financial burden, although the Church on both sides of the border owns large estates and other mobile and immobile property.

Eamonn de Valera, ex-revolutionary and former mathematics teacher, refused to change any of these religious privileges, including the sanctity of the marriage vows—enforced even more strictly than by the Papal Court, the Rota—and the total ban on abortion and birth control devices. Over 6 feet tall, de Valera was a dyed-in-the-wool Catholic who saw divine providence in every aspect of human existence. For 19 years Prime Minister, then President for 14 years, he resigned at 91, almost blind, and on 24th June, 1973, paid a final sentimental visit to Parliament. He died on August 29th, 1975 in Dublin at the age of 93. During World War II, his Republic resisted all threats and promises of both the Axis and the Allies and remained neutral; however, it was a tongue-in-cheek neutrality, since a total of 100,000 Irishmen fought on the British side. Bombed-out women and children from the United Kingdom were offered refuge in Eire, British pilots forced to land were sent home, along with their serviced planes, etc.

Although the old fox loathed Adolf Hitler—unlike David Lloyd George —he sent the German ambassador a formal message of condolence 'on the death of his Chancellor'. As President of the Council of the League of Nations, he fought passionately (and in vain) for the rights of the small nations, and of the Jews. De Valera still remembered the German-Jewish artist who painted his portrait and suddenly burst into tears, because the thought of her persecuted parents' fate overwhelmed him. Altogether, he was known for his religious tolerance. He made sure that the first President of the new Republic, as well as always at least one Minister, belonged to the Protestant minority (consisting of numerous sects and denominations, comprising 4½% of the total population). His successor, Erskine Childers, who died recently, was also a Protestant whose father, a militant revolutionary, was executed by the British following the abortive Easter Revolution of 1916.

De Valera had good reasons for his pro-Jewish sympathies. The Briscoe family of Dublin which supplied mayors and Deputies (and still does), gave active support to the Revolution. Together with Chief Rabbi Dr. Herzog (later of London, then Israel) they succeeded in finding a refuge for their close friend, de Valera, in the home of a not so conspicuous co-religionist, thus sheltering him from persecution. Dr. Lewy, a well-known dentist, hid the treasury of the revolutionary movement to prevent its confiscation. Whenever the late Dr. Jacob Herzog, Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office under Levi Eshkol, subsequently visited his birthplace, he would invariably find an invitation to President de Valera waiting for him. His brother, Chaim Herzog, the former Chief of the Secret Service, is now Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations. Their father, the Chief Rabbi, was de Valera's host during a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, and he invited Ben Gurion to a dinner in de Valera's honour at which the two Bible experts admired each other's scholarship. At the same time, however, de Valera did not consider Ben Gurion and his wife sufficiently religious. To

him as a practising Catholic, the best Jew was the most orthodox. In his view, Israel's greatest achievement was the revival of the Hebrew tongue. An Irish attempt to regenerate Celtic failed.

Of special humanitarian significance was the *Lex de Valera,* which has an interesting background. Born in New York's Manhattan district—hence the American Consul's intervention for him in 1916, which saved him from execution—de Valera had an Irish mother and a Cuban father. Later, however, this led to unpleasantness and discriminatory acts against him. Thus the *lex de Valera* decreed that anyone able to give proof of *one* Irish parent (be it mother or father) would be entitled to residence privileges and be automatically regarded as a citizen of the Irish Republic, or of the Free State respectively. Several Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria were saved in this way. One of them was Berlin-born Dr. Neumann, a well-known physician who was related on his mother's side to one of the Irish linen dynasties, and whose widow, also a doctor, is still active in Dublin today.

Pro-Jewish sentiments notwithstanding, the recognition of the State of Israel would hardly have been feasible under de Valera and the Prime Ministers of his Fianna Fail Party, in view of the close ties between Eire and the Vatican. In 1973, however, administrative power changed hands for the first time in 16 years. The coalition between Labour and the Conservative Fine Gael Party (with a total of 73 seats, against the 69 of the Fianna Fail Party, plus two Independents) is headed by Liam Cosgrave, known as 'Little Liam', as Prime Minister. Belying his nickname, he is of average height, his manners and bearing are equally correct, and he dresses as formally as a banker. The new chief values political dignity and loyalty in his associates above all. While his public appearances are few, his position as leader of Fine Gael is uncontested. Both Cosgrave and his Foreign Minister, Garrett Fitzgerald, are more pro-British and more conciliatory in the Ulster question—not counting a few setbacks—than the Fianna Fail Party leadership. Neither of these men, not to mention the Labour leaders, wished to wait for a signal from the Vatican before initiating diplomatic links with Israel, a step whose political significance and moral value cannot be underestimated.

The 3,500 Jews of the Irish Republic, all of whom support Israel wholeheartedly, will have welcomed the latest development with great satisfaction. A well-known Irish playwright had one of his characters exclaim: 'Ireland has never seen an expulsion of the Jews, because we have never let them in!'

Well, this is not quite accurate. A small Sephardic community existed in Dublin even in medieval times, and a second one was founded in 1660, four years after their readmission to England. However, this second community declined in numbers and was finally dissolved in 1791, during the reign of George III. Emigrants from Russia and Poland formed a third congregation in 1822.

Dublin is the seat of the Chief Rabbinate and of the Jewish Representative Council of Ireland, which refuses to recognise or even admit the small reform congregation. Currently there are three synagogues, each with its own rabbi, adequate facilities for kosher butchering, one Talmud Torah

and one Zionist school, an association of Jewish Physicians and a Jewish Students' Union, as well as a number of welfare institutions, notably the Jewish Home for the Aged and Infirm which also admits members of the Jewish Community of Northern Ireland, whose 1,200 members help to finance it. Finally, the Irish Zionist Organisation and its manifold activities receive active support.

The first Jewish community in Cork dates back to the year 1725; the present one was founded in 1880 by Lithuanian immigrants, and its current membership numbers 60. The Jews of Ireland, the majority of whom are business or professional men, are well off financially; their social life is satisfactory, and they have managed not to become involved in the permanent fights between Protestants and Catholics.

According to recent announcements, the diplomatic relations between the Irish Republic and Israel will start first on the basis of non-resident Ambassadors. Mr. Gideon Raffael is now also accredited to Dublin. This senior diplomat, who had been born in Germany, was Israel's voice and chief delegate at the United Nations during the Six-day War in 1967 and some time afterwards. Eventually, he became Director-General of the Foreign Ministry and a kind of travelling chief troubleshooter. Mr. Raffael is now Ambassador at the Court of St. James's.

His counterpart, Mr. William Warnock, who presented his credentials to Israel's President Ephraim Katzir on April 9th, 1975, resides since 1973 as Ambassador to Switzerland in Berne. Born in 1911, he graduated as Doctor of Law from Dublin University, where he later became Moderator in Modern Literature and Celtic Studies. Mr. Warnock entered the Department of External Affairs in 1935 and held many important diplomatic posts in Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. In 1959, he returned as Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany; in 1962 he became Ambassador to Switzerland and concurrently to Austria. From 1964 he served as Ambassador to India; in 1967 he became Ambassador to Canada and in 1970 Ambassador to the United States. Three years later he returned again to Switzerland as Ambassador.

On May 11th, 1975, Israel became the first country in the Middle East to establish solid trade ties with the European Economic Community. Her Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Yigael Allon, and the Irish Foreign Minister, Garrett Fitzgerald, current President of the EEC Council of Ministers, signed the accord. It will give Israeli products easier access to the nine-member community. Allon praised the EEC for standing up to Arab blackmail. Fitzgerald, however, tried to play it down, stating 'it was only part of the Common Market's balanced overall approach to the Mediterranean'. Later on, the Irish politician toured several Arab capitals, where the reaction to the fact that an agreement of this kind was concluded with Israel prior to all the other countries of the region caused a storm at the time, almost as violent as after the establishment of diplomatic relations between West Germany and the Jewish state.

The second Egyptian-Israeli agreement, brought about by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, has been unanimously welcomed in Dublin. Eire is against Israel's expulsion from the United Nations.

SEGREGATING CYPRUS: THE WORK OF THE DEMON

by M. A. P. Willmer

FOLLOWING the Turkish Cypriot decision to set up a separate federated state in the northern part of Cyprus, the final partition of the Island now seems inevitable. Before the fighting, Greek and Turkish settlements were scattered randomly throughout the Island, although the proportion of Turkish Cypriots in the northern districts was higher than in the south. According to one estimate, north of the Attila Line (the name given to the boundary dividing the parts of the Island held by the opposing parties) there were 144,000 Greek Cypriots compared with 90,000 Turkish Cypriots; south of the line, the population was mainly Greek. 44,000 Turks used to live amongst 376,000 Greeks. Today the situation is very different. Tens of thousands of Greek Cypriots have been forced to flee from the northern section to seek sanctuary in the south. They now live in refugee camps, many living in squalid conditions with woefully inadequate sanitary and other services, presenting a picture of human tragedy of colossal proportions. Crossing the line in the opposite direction, many thousands of Turkish Cypriots responded to their politicians' call to abandon their homes in the south of the Island and move north. As a result of these shifts in population the north is now predominantly composed of Turkish soldiers and Turkish Cypriots and the south of Greek Cypriots. Whether some politicians, such as ex-President Makarios, like it or not, the two communities have been effectively separated.

Prior to the conflict, many people thought that the creation of meaningful Greek and Turkish sections was simply not a viable proposition. This objective has now been achieved, although the cost in human terms is truly appalling. Nor would the situation have been very different had the invading Turkish army decided to draw the dividing line between the two communities in some other way because of the haphazard manner in which both races were scattered throughout the Island. Trying to segregate Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots seemed to be as difficult a problem as trying to unscramble a scrambled egg! In elementary textbooks on physics, the egg is a popular means of illustrating the concept of entropy as a measure of the amount of disorder or mixed-upness associated with a physical system. An egg with white and yolk separated has order; but scrambled has disorder. The more thorough the scrambling, the greater the amount of disorder and the higher the entropy. In contrast, when there is order, the entropy is low.

The concept of entropy first entered scientific discussions during the last century when many people still firmly believed that evil was the work of demons. Born with the concept of entropy was perhaps the first demon of scientific and technological man. This demon has become known as Maxwell's demon, named after the British physicist who first discovered it over a hundred years ago. The demon's birthplace was thermodynamics; its task was to distinguish between fast and slow

moving particles and to allow fast moving particles to go from one part of a vessel to the other and slow moving particles in the reverse direction. To accomplish this, the demon was visualised as having control of the door in a wall separating the two sections of the vessel. By operating this door, the demon could ensure that one end of the vessel became hotter and the other colder without the expenditure of work. In the nineteenth century this was given as an example of how the fundamental laws of thermodynamics could be contradicted — a question debated by physicists for many years.

In the physics problem the effectiveness of Maxwell's demon can be determined in terms of the entropy level that exists, this being a mathematical function of the probabilities involved. When the demon is on 'strike', i.e. when there is no segregation (only a perfect mixing or integration) the entropy is at its highest. At the other extreme the entropy is zero, when the demon is working 100 per cent efficiently causing total segregation. In between these two extremes lie entropy levels for various levels of segregation between perfect mixing and complete separation.

Now compare a vessel having no division so that the molecules are free to move from one section to another with Cyprus in the days when all people were able to move freely from one part of the island to the other. In both areas there is a high degree of 'mixed-upness'; entropy is large. In fact, before the present upheaval, the degree of mixing or integration was approximately 90 per cent of the maximum possible, bearing in mind the relative proportions of Turks to Greeks in the population.

The invasion by the Turks last year may be viewed as the arrival of a relative of Maxwell's demon. Not a passive introvert like his ancestor content to watch and then use his power to prohibit movement but an active extrovert encouraging the movement of people in one direction by tempting them with offers of freedom and a better life and frightening others into flight in the opposite direction. The demon's activities have been almost totally successful; there are now few Turkish Cypriots south of the Attila Line and only a handful of Greek Cypriots to the north. Today the fighting has subsided and the future of the peoples of Cyprus has shifted from the battlefield to the conference table; the territorial positions of the sides have become relatively static and the movement of people across the Attila Line has decreased to a trickle.

With the announcement of the formation of a separate, segregated state in the north, what will be the future of the people of Cyprus? Undoubtedly, many Turkish Cypriots are jubilant at the prospect of living in a Turkish community. 'Now we feel free' would seem to be a common sentiment. But what of the hundred thousand or more Greek Cypriots who have been driven away from their homes and businesses? Are they never to be allowed to return? Are they banished for ever to refugee camps in the south? Before Mr. Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, made his declaration about a separate state an official was reported to have said: 'In our region, we have to be in a majority. This suggests that certain

Greek Cypriots are not to be allowed to return.' It would seem therefore that some Greek Cypriots will be allowed to return. But how many?

Even if all the Turkish Cypriots on the island moved to the northern section, there would not be enough of them to permit the return of all displaced Greek Cypriots without destroying the Turkish majority. The prospect, therefore, for some Greek Cypriots being able to return to their homes must be very bleak indeed. Nor is there any reason to believe that the Turkish leaders will be content with merely a simple majority. Under such circumstances the only way in which the concept of 'freedom for the Turkish Cypriots' can be at all meaningful is for there to be the most severe restrictions on the movement, rights and activities of the resident Greek Cypriots. Perhaps the Turkish Cypriots will be content with a two thirds majority. Who knows? What is clear, however, is that the Turkish Cypriots will demand a majority requiring a very substantial surplus of Turkish Cypriots over the Greek Cypriots; as a consequence many tens of thousands of Greek Cypriots seem to be destined to be permanently exiled.

Before committing themselves too deeply to a policy of permanent segregation, the Turks should take heed of the South African Government's experiences in pursuing its Apartheid policy of segregation — blacks to the so-called African homelands and whites to the 'white' areas. In South Africa, despite all the public announcements over 'separate development' the census returns of 1960 and 1970 showed that, from a residence point of view, the levels of segregation in the two areas had scarcely altered. It may be that segregation is far easier to *talk* about than to achieve in practice.

Human beings may tend to behave rather like the molecules of a gas which when left alone become naturally all mixed up. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus may have activated the segregation demon into forcing a vast army of ordinary men, women and their families to flee from one side of the country to the other; a Turkish Cypriot State may have been created. If human beings do indeed behave like the molecules of a gas, the invasion and its aftermath will not be sufficient to ensure the continued viability of the newly-created state. Once the segregated demon fails to keep strict control, ordinary Turks and Greeks will inter-mingle again and re-discover that by pooling their talents each side can contribute to the common good; in this way the egg could eventually become scrambled again.

The lesson for the ardent segregationalists is clear; the continued existence of a Turkish Cypriot State in which the Turks have a clear majority requires the demon to be kept fully alert. He will also need to be armed with sufficient power, laws will have to be made to control the rights and freedom of people and to enforce these laws a special security force will have to be recruited and trained. The greater the pressure for integration, the harsher will be the laws and the more ruthless their enforcement. The worst aspects of a police state will become paramount and the construction of a Cyprus Wall may not be long delayed. Surely there is a more civilised way to live?

THE GREAT FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE CONTROVERSY

by Jan Vitek

EVERYONE remembers the *Torrey Canyon* which caused disaster to maritime fauna on the French and English channel coasts several years back. There have been similar shipwrecks since. The *Pacific Glory*, for one, collided recently with another tanker, the *Allegro*, near the Isle of Wight. Lives were lost, and the *Pacific Glory* spilled a great deal of its cargo of 70,000 tons of oil.

Then there was a small cargo vessel, the *Blue Calypso*, which limped into a Swedish port after her steering gear had broken down twice in the Baltic. Nicknamed the 'coffin ship' by a part of the Swedish press, the *Calypso* had nonetheless been given a full safety certificate by Lloyds.

Not long ago press reports appeared about ships putting into certain harbours to look for men so desperate for work and so ignorant of their basic rights that they are easy prey to the sweet song of good pay on board ship. What they actually got was often a meagre pittance compared with the minimum rate of $100 a month which is recommended by the ILO.

In all these cases the ships concerned had two things in common: they were substandard vessels in one way or the other and they were all flying a flag-of-convenience.

The question that immediately springs into mind is whether this relationship is typical or coincidental.

The answer constitutes perhaps the most explosive issue the shipping industry is confronting today—the great flags-of-convenience controversy.

To start with, what is a flag-of-convenience ship? In the simplest definition, it is a vessel registered in a country by a foreign owner. The country of registry has no effective control over the ship and the foreign company that owns it. Nor has it the wish or the power to do so.

Taxes on the income from the ship are not levied by the country of registry or are very low. The ship's crew can be of any nationality.

The financial compensation the country of registry asks for granting these privileges to foreigners is very small. However, it is the aggregate tonnage which matters. Receipts from even small annual charges and registration fees may produce a substantial source of national income and balance of payments, if the operation is carried out on a large scale.

Recent years have seen meteoric growth of merchant ships flying flags-of-convenience of certain countries. Liberia is a case in point, since over 16 per cent of the world tonnage is registered there today.

Panama, with more than 1,300 vessels under its flag, ranks second among the world's biggest convenience flag providers, followed by Cyprus, Sing-

apore, Somalia and Lebanon.

It has been estimated that more than 20 per cent of the world fleet is under flags-of-convenience. This represents about 5,500 vessels with probably 200,000 men on board ship.

The seafarers accuse owners of ships under foreign flags of employing cheap labour to make huge profits. Not only are the men on many such vessels exploited and underpaid, but they also often work under vastly inferior conditions in respect of time off; annual leave, social security and fringe benefits.

The seafarers charge that countries which offer flag-of-convenience facilities fail to implement properly ILO and other accepted international standards and regulations on safe operation of ships and crew conditions. Governments that have permitted transfer of national ships to foreign flags are responsible for this situation.

The vessels themselves are a constant threat to safe navigation, chiefly because of ineffectively enforced safety regulations and lack of properly trained officers and men.

The shipowners concerned refute these allegations. They also hold that their actions are in the interest of efficient world trade and directed towards economical distribution of such major raw materials as crude oil and ores. Many vessels registered under foreign flags represent a considerable asset and it is in the owner's interest to operate and maintain them well. Therefore, a great number of such ships have standards of safety and crew amenities which are far superior to the accepted minimum conditions.

Without the special treatment under the so-called flags-of-convenience, many ships would be priced out of international competition, the owners argue. The term is therefore a misnomer. Flags of necessity would be far more appropriate.

The controversy has now been going on for some time. If it has proven anything, then it is the fact that substandard ships really exist. There can be no doubt about it. Some of these vessels are flying a flag-of-convenience, others not.

Recognising this fact, the two social partners in the maritime industry jointly urged the ILO to study the problem of how to deal with substandard vessels of whatever flag. Many feel that such ships should be brought under effective national or international control to make sure that they maintain standards of welfare, wages and safety at least as high as provided for by the existing maritime standards.

This is easier said than done. The big puzzle is: how to identify substandard ships. It is generally accepted that most of the flag-of-convenience ships are modern and fully equipped with all the latest safety devices, that their crews are competent and enjoy satisfactory working and living conditions. On the other hand, it is also generally recognised that some of these ships are old or obsolete, that their safety equipment is outdated or in bad condition, and that employment of their crews is not in conformity with generally accepted standards. It is, however, well known that these defects are also to be found in ships that do not fly flags of convenience.

What appears to be needed, therefore, is a world survey to identify all substandard vessels. The survey might be conducted by means of a standard questionnaire which would enable the surveyors to prepare comparable reports for each ship visited. The survey should deal with these three questions: safety, conditions of employment and life of crews, certificates of competency of officers. The governments concerned should co-operate by authorising the surveyors to board the ships flying their flags and conduct the survey.

Since there is agreement between the two partners of the industry to outlaw substandard ships, it is to be hoped that such a survey (which does not imply any punitive action) will be welcomed by all concerned, except perhaps those few shipowners who disregard the existing maritime standards.

The problem of substandard ships was a major topic at the Preparatory Technical Maritime Conference held in Geneva in autumn 1975. Delegates from all seafaring nations were called upon to propose new safeguards to protect seafarers against substandard conditions of life and work at sea.

The subsequent Maritime Session of the International Labour Conference of the ILO in June 1976 should give these proposals a definitive form of international Conventions and Recommendations.

The ILO's preoccupation with substandard ships is fundamentally twofold. Firstly, the ILO aims not only at ensuring that the terms of international competition in the shipping industry do not adversely affect the working and living conditions of seafarers, but also seeks to ensure the establishment of minimum standards for these conditions. There is an impressive body of existing Conventions and Recommendations governing conditions of employment in the maritime field which have been widely accepted. The ILO is concerned that these obligations should not be evaded by recourse to flags of convenience.

Secondly, the ILO considers that countries which have become important maritime nations through the registration of merchant vessels not their own, should exercise effective authority over the ships under their flags and thus ensure the observance of internationally agreed standards.

[Jan Vitek is Editor-in-Chief of ILO Information, published by the International Labour Office in Geneva.]

THE TASTE OF HOME

A short story by Mrinalini Srivastava

WITH a soft bump the plane touched down at Heathrow and Usha and Ramesh looked at one another, realising they had at last reached London. All the months of waiting, of patient sitting in dreary offices until their Entry Certificate had finally been granted, of wondering about Ramesh's future job, about a place to live, the conflicting reports of friends about their experience of life in England, had been a strain on them both. Descriptions of the English weather varied from the 'terrible cold and this awful rain' observed by Mrs. Sinha to the 'very mild, not at all what I expected' which had been Dr. Prasad's impression of London.

About a month before their departure, as she was preparing Ramesh's favourite vegetable curry, Usha realised that they might not be able to eat this dish for the next few years. A pang of anguish seized her. It was amazing the number of things one had taken for granted, which had seemed as permanent as the sun in the summer sky, were now put into question and acquired a new compelling importance in one's life.

In the day time, busy with packing and visits to and from relatives, she had little time to worry about their future life in London. Friends already living in the great unknown had promised to find them a flat. Whenever her husband told Usha not to worry about the future, she would smile and repeat the magic formula that since he had a job waiting for him and they had been assured a roof over their heads there was simply nothing to worry about. She would then quickly turn to hide the look of strain on her face.

She did not want him to notice her uneasiness since she herself had encouraged his idea of going to England. Soon after their marriage they had moved to the great city where they had lived by themselves and Usha had come to enjoy the running of the house. During her years at the university she had developed a certain spirit of independence which Ramesh had encouraged. She had gradually conceived a romantic picture of Europe where women were supposed to be so free and to have every avenue open to them. The fact that three years after her marriage she suddenly had to share her house with her mother-in-law had a lot to do with this yearning of hers. The old lady had moved in with the young couple after the sudden death of the father. Ramesh saw no alternative, being the only son. Usha had also accepted the situation with good grace and done her best to make the old lady feel welcome. But as the months passed, she could not hide from herself that she often regretted the days of undisturbed privacy which she and Ramesh had enjoyed in their early married life. Ramesh often felt the same and although neither of them ever voiced this common feeling they were conscious of this yearning and the idea of going to England for a few years, pretexting professional and material advantages, the enrichment of travel and so on, slowly took

shape in their minds as a legitimate way of recovering their independence.

The mother had cried when she had been informed of their intention. She had first listened quietly to their arguments and gone back to the kitchen without a word but when Usha had rushed in, attracted by a strong smell of burning, she found that the frying onions had turned to charcoal while the old lady stood by the narrow window with tears running down her suddenly aged face. Remorse gripped Usha's heart as she embraced her mother-in-law and realised how frail the sob-shaken body felt in her own youthful arms. She too began to cry, but by then the older woman was smiling again and said that it was all for the best and that she was glad deep down, that young people had their life to live and that they had her blessings.

At long last all the formalities had been completed. The trunks were packed and shipped. The last month had slipped away so quickly, Usha did not know where the days had gone. At last the big moment arrived and the last farewells said to the group of relatives and friends who had insisted on seeing them off to the airport. Usha and Ramesh felt strangely empty sitting in the plane fingering the slowly wilting garlands.

When the plane arrived after the long flight they were very tired but there was a look of expectancy and excitement on Usha's face and she quickly pressed her husband's hand while they were waiting for the plane to come to a final stop. They followed the other passengers until they came in front of the Immigration Officer. Usha felt suddenly very cold. What if something wasn't in order, if they were refused entry, if they had to go back home, it happened sometimes . . . But Ramesh was already showing their passports to the Officer. The latter asked several questions, read the various documents and papers carefully and finally waved them goodbye and even wished them good luck. Usha looked at her husband and from the look of relief on his face she realised that he too had been worried.

Then, as they came out into the lounge they suddenly caught sight of Ramesh's friend who had been so helpful and had found them a flat. He greeted them warmly and led them towards the waiting coach. There were so many things to tell about friends and relatives, messages to give, questions to ask about their new life. Dr. Sharma, their friend, was also eager to tell them about the flat he had found them: 'It is not luxurious, mind you, but it will be adequate until you find something better', he said.

In the taxi that was taking them to Dr. Sharma's house, Usha curiously observed the throng of Christmas shoppers.

'Only four more shopping days to Christmas', the taxi driver remarked, 'You'd think they were giving everything for nothing the way they carry on.'

The shops looked bright and cheerful with the Christmas trees, the tinsels and the lights. But Usha was also struck by the tense expression on many of the women's faces.

'You arrived at the right moment', their friend remarked, 'you will just have time to settle in before Christmas.'

Exentually, the cab stopped in front of Dr, Sharma's house. His wife opened the door and ushered them into the sitting room. The house was

cosy and bright and drinking tea with hot pakories, with the welcoming smell of familiar food seeping in from the kitchen, made Usha feel quite at home. She had to give a report of all the news from home for the benefit of Mrs. Sharma. Dr. Sharma and Ramesh retired into a corner with a map of London and Ramesh received his first lesson on how to use the underground and the mysteries of the bus system. Usha and the Doctor's wife were busily making plans for a shopping expedition for the next day. Later on in the afternoon the travellers felt so exhausted that they asked their friends to take them to their flat.

The knocker rattled twice before they heard the shuffling of slippered feet in the hall. An elderly man opened the door. He had a friendly grin and bright blue child's eyes.

'You must be the new tenants', he said, 'Thanks for fetching them, Doctor'. He insisted on the title with obvious satisfaction. 'You got the flat on the first floor. Lovely view. There is plenty of fresh air too. I live on the top with the wife'.

Meanwhile they had reached the flat. 'Well, this is it,' the landlord said, 'nice in't? And all new decorated.'

The group mechanically nodded, taking in the flowered wallpaper, the huge pattern on the Axminster — different in every room; the dust in the corners, the ashtray stamped 'Souvenir from Brighton', and the faded plastic flowers on the tiled mantlepiece. The sitting room was cold and rather damp despite the hissing gas fire. The room was quite large and the ill-matching, sparse furniture did nothing to make it cosy. Dark faded curtains veiled the tall narrow windows. The kitchen also contained the bath tub, unsuccessfully camouflaged as a work top.

'Plenty of hot water', the landlord added, pointing at the rusty gas geyser high up on the wall.

'If you don't forget to put shillings in, that is!' exclaimed Dr. Sharma.

Usha moved slowly through the rooms. It was not quite what she had expected but one could clean up the place and put up pictures and arrange the little things she had brought from India with her and make it a home.

During the next few days, she had no time to see much of London. There was so much to do — unpacking the luggage, cleaning the flat and stocking up with food before the shops closed for Christmas. Ramesh was also very busy, having just started on his new job. They had fleeting meetings with the other tenants in the house. One young couple was particularly friendly. Usha felt shy about asking anyone in but one morning the young woman simply stuck her head in the door and asked Usha if she needed any help. This girl, Helen, talked about her studies and how much she and Derek would like to visit India. Usha was beginning to feel quite at home until she asked Helen which subject her 'husband' was studying.

'Derek, you mean', Helen exclaimed, 'he is doing engineering but he is only my boyfriend.' Noticing the embarrassment on Usha's face, she added: 'We want children, so I guess we'll get married one day but meanwhile we are quite happy as we are. Besides', she added laughing,

'I'd lose my grant if we were married and we can't do without. For students, the Government makes morality an expensive commodity.'

Eager to change the subject, Usha asked Helen what she and Derek were going to do for Christmas.

'We are going to my parents for Christmas and New Year's eve', Helen explained cheerfully, 'Derek's parents divorced early so he never had much of a family life. My two brothers are going to be there with their wives and the kids. Mum is going to cook a huge turkey and make mountains of mince pies and we'll all eat ourselves silly for four days. My parents live in the country and Christmas is still the greatest event of the year for them. On Christmas Eve we'll take the kids to the woods and dad will cut the tree. It's really great to see the kids decorating it. Mum still has some very old decorations which they had at her own home when she was a little girl. On Christmas day we shall all troop to the Church in the morning. On Boxing Day when the novelty of the toys has worn off and the effects of too much good food has made itself felt, I shall probably curse the kids and wish I had stayed quietly behind in London. I say that every year. But I know very well that if I did I would probably cry my eyes out. Christmas is for the family and if you really want to see a true English Christmas you have to go into the country. Everything in the towns has become so commercialised nowadays.'

That evening Usha asked Ramesh how the people in his office were talking about the coming festivities.

'The girls who live away from home are all talking about the parties they are going to, what they are going to wear, etc. The married women talk about what it is going to cost and how much trouble they expect to have with their children during the holidays. The men seem either bored by it all or indifferent. They all ask me what we are going to do, if we are going to have a tree, what we are going to eat etc. I tried to explain them that we have our own festivals. They show a polite interest, ask a few questions but when I tried to explain what Diwali or Holi means to us, they didn't seem to want to know anymore. Yet in some strange way they seem to expect us to participate and feel part of their Christmas.'

'I know', Usha replied, 'I have had the same feeling.' All this talk about festivities had brought them back to the home they had left only a few days ago. Smiling retrospectively, Usha asked:

'Do you remember what a fuss your mother made last Holi, how hard she worked, all the food that was prepared for the relatives and the excitement of the children?'

'What about all the lights she put up for Diwali?' Ramesh broke in, 'she did not mind how much ghee was burnt on that day.'

They laughed but at the same felt very much alone suddenly. What would they do when Holi came around this year? Wish one another a happy new year, eat a few sweetmeats or just forget the day altogether? They could imagine the crowds at home, everybody pitilessly splashing one another with coloured water; the grotesque spectacle offered by the hilarious crowds, the faces and clothing smeared with every colour of the

rainbow. The one day in the year when all barriers were forgotten, when children could play pranks on their elders — Usha could remember the Holi that immediately followed her wedding. Ramesh's sisters who were at home for the occasion had turned on her and thrown her screaming and convulsed with laughter into a tank full of coloured water. She had hidden for two days after that until her face had resumed its true colour. There was so much buoyancy and laughter about. She herself preferred the gentler lights of Diwali. The flickering of a thousand tongues of fire lighting every nook and corner of the houses, the lovely and ephemeral patterns drawn by the women with coloured rice flour in front of their houses. Diwali was so much a festival to the glory of womanhood. In every house the cult of Lakshmi, goddess of prosperity and symbol of good wifely qualities, was performed. The air was filled with the scent of incense and the smell of sweetmeats. Even the very poor made an effort on that day, even if it meant starving the rest of the time. The lights of Diwali gleamed in adults' and children's eyes alike.

On Christmas Eve Usha and Ramesh had been invited by the landlord and his wife, Mr and Mrs Humphrey, to come for a 'Christmas drink'. When they entered the small overfurnished flat full of the bric-a-brac accumulated during a life time, with photographs of the couple's children at various stages of development, everything seemed festive enough. The tree illuminated one corner, tinsel garlands criss-crossed the ceiling and the mantelpiece was crowded with cards.

Usha was surprised to find their hosts alone. She had expected to see their children or at least some relatives. At the beginning of the visit everything went well enough. Usha accepted timidly her first glass of sherry and the conversation flowed smoothly. A question from Ramesh, however, brought the attention of the host to one of the wedding pictures exhibited on a small table.

'It is such a pity Pam and her husband cannot be with us today', the old man sighed. 'They went to Australia last year. Nice kids, the pair of them.'

'Yes, indeed', continued his wife. 'They sent us ever such nice presents. They are doing quite well for themselves over there. I miss them, but they've got their own life to live'.

Usha smiled as she remembered her mother-in-law, once the first shock over, accepting the situation with almost the same words.

Mrs. Humphrey remained silent while her husband replenished the guests' glasses. Her eyes had shifted to another picture, showing a young man proudly smiling at the camera, standing next to a slim, pretty girl who was holding a horse by the bridle.

'Is that your son?', Usha asked.

'Yes, that's Jack. You are not likely to meet him here', the landlady added bitterly, 'since he got married he hardly ever comes to see us. It's his wife, you see. She doesn't like us'.

'Now then, Mary', her husband said soothingly, 'we don't want to talk about that now'. But his wife refused to be calmed.

'He used to be such a nice boy. But *she* thinks we're not good enough. This is the fifth Christmas we've spent without him. The first year of their marriage, *they* invited *us*. Jack insisted on it, I suppose. It was terrible. His wife's parents were there and their smart friends, too. The whole day went by and we hardly talked to anybody. Jack was so bent on making the right impression on his in-laws he hardly knew we were there. His wife just ignored us. She's ashamed of us, you see,' concluded the old woman, with tears in her eyes.

'Come, come, now mother', Mr. Humphrey interrupted, 'you musn't exaggerate. What will Mr. and Mrs. Shastri think of us. Have another drink and let's forget it'.

Usha and Ramesh looked on, puzzled and embarrassed by the unexpected turn the evening had taken. Mr. and Mrs. Humphrey both looked ten years older.

'It is true, you know, what my wife says', the old man declared, 'I don't know how it is in your country, but here once you are old you don't count anymore. The children stay so long they need you and then . . .'

Usha felt a lump in her throat contemplating the abyss of misery and loneliness contained in the silence that followed. It seemed to her that if at home the young sometimes suffered, crushed by the deadweight of affection and the sense of duty and responsibility towards their elders, they were perhaps better equipped than the old to cope with these frustrations. At least the elderly people spent their last years, if not in material comfort as the landlord and his wife obviously did, but in the conviction of their being needed; more than ever the pivot around which the whole family structure revolved.

As they went back to their flat, late as it was, Usha started a letter to her mother-in-law. She wanted to try to put down the conflicting impressions left by the experiences of the past few days — the lights and the excited atmosphere of the city, the frantic activity in the shops, the fondness and joy with which Helen had described her family's home. How homesick she had made Usha feel as she spoke of the Christmas traditions of her childhood and how eager she had been to introduce the man she loved to the simple pleasures he had missed. It contrasted painfully with the crumpled faces in the flat crowded with photographs of the children who had grown into strangers.

Usha wished she could make the days go faster so that the festive season would be over. Then they could start their new life with a more normal routine of work and leisure without having to cope with the emotional strain of festivities in which they played no real part, but which nevertheless filled them with a strange longing.

When she and Ramesh went to bed that night, she fell asleep almost immediately like a tired child, but there was a faint smile of expectancy on her lips.

BUILDING SOCIETIES: A POLICY QUESTIONED

by D. G. Rhys

THIS article analyses recent Building Society activities and policies, especially those followed between 1969 and early 1973. It illustrates how a well-meaning, but perhaps mistaken, policy had serious consequences for both new and existing borrowers.

The mid and late 1960s was a period of rising interest rates in the U.K., but at the end of 1969 a reverse movement was evident. However, the building societies refused to reduce rates at a time when the gap between their interest rates and those of other financial institutions continued to widen.[1] As a result at the beginning of 1971 the societies held liquidity in excess of £2,000 million, a figure which subsequently continued to rise. Therefore, the building societies' claim that the demand for new loans by prospective house buyers was absorbing all their new net deposits, appeared rather thin as a justification for maintaining relatively high interest rates. The interesting question arising from this was: what were the results of the net increase in lending during the period late 1969 to early 1973? Did the societies increase *real* lending significantly or did the building society movement as a whole have the monopolistic effect of pushing up house prices against itself via their 'agent', the individual house buyer?

The effect of the Labour Government's 'Land Betterment Levy' may have reduced land supply. Many builders were unwilling to pay the landowners' asking prices when the latter tried to pass-on the 'tax'. As a result in the period following 1967 the number of new house 'starts' fell significantly, especially after 1968 when builders were alarmed at the large withdrawal of savings from building societies. However at the end of 1969, when the net supply of new houses continued to fall, the societies increased their loans considerably; the total increase in 1970 being 33 per cent, and another 25 per cent in the first quarter of 1971. The number of new house 'starts' continued to decline until the third quarter of 1970.[2]

The obvious consequence of this was an increase in house prices *relative to all other goods*, that is, only a part of the increase could be explained by inflation. (See Table 1). Building Societies, by increasing the effective demand for houses well in excess, and in advance, of any increase in supply, had, contrary to the societies' expectations, made it more difficult for some people to afford a house of their own.

Table 1

Relative Increase in Prices 1963-1972

	New Dwellings mortgaged by private owners		Retail Prices
1963	= 100	1962 =	100
1969	151		132
1970	161		140

1971	181	156
1972	234	169

The hypothesis that the record monetary demands for building society loans in 1969-1973 could largely have been the result of the societies themselves pushing up the price of new and older houses, may have had validity. In the Britain of the 'Town and Country Planning Acts' and a growing desire to protect and conserve the countryside, the elasticity of supply of land is unlikely to be high. Therefore building societies must become more aware of the effects they can have on the housing markets, when they increase the supply of funds and induce a sudden shift in the demand curve for houses. The building societies, as one of the most important type of financial intermediary, must improve their market forecasting techniques, and therefore be more cautious in opening the tap of increased lending.

After the frantic housing market of 1971-1973 (see Table 3) the early part of 1973 saw the re-appearance of a few traces of sanity, even before the market collapsed entirely in the third quarter. Valuers were displaying a willingness to state that vendor's prices were based more on the anticipated continuation of a speculative mania than on values more consistent with the long-run equilibrium in house prices. As a result some requests for mortgages were not sanctioned. The situation towards the end of the boom was characterised by a 'bull' market (i.e. a speculative market) with house buyers willing to outbid each other 'now', before house prices increased further in the future. However at the end of the first quarter of 1973 the boom burst and substantial price reductions occurred. This was only to be expected as the previous hysteria had created a classical boom situation; house prices having risen to levels unjustified by real market forces were likely to fall once the boom collapsed. This situation percolated through to the land market where by early 1974 sharp price falls, and even plots unable to find buyers, were being frequently reported. This market collapse was a result of the building societies reducing the flow of new lending to a trickle, following greater competition from other financial intermediaries for investible resources.

The stagnant market of 1973-1974 illustrated that the best way to help new and existing building society borrowers was through a reduction in house prices, this would be a reversal of the disastrous consequences of the societies' lending policy in 1971-72. At a mortgage rate of 11 per cent allied to the high price of houses the number of people able to afford mortgage repayments was limited.[3] It was of limited value to increase the rate of interest on building society deposits to attract more funds to increase lending, when few people would be able to afford to borrow at such rates anyway. As interest rates were governed not in the housing market but in the national and international money markets, there would be little that societies could do to reduce the interest rate burden. However the total repayment burden would fall if house prices fell. This would help first-time house buyers and still leave existing house owners largely unaffected. The latter's asset may fall in value but so would the liability

incurred on buying a new house. Those house buyers having purchased at the top of the boom would experience a fall in wealth, but again their potential liability incurred when moving to a new house would be commensurably lower. An 'advances race' with the commercial banks is not part of the building societies' function, but an attempt to provide the maximum number of borrowers with loans at the lowest feasible commercial rate is. Furthermore the societies as providers of 85 per cent of loan finance for house purchase could instigate studies and finance research into the economics of housing finance, and the housing industry, in order to improve the sector's efficiency. Research into developing house building techniques more in keeping with 20th century production line methods rather than those in keeping with Ancient Egypt might also be worthwhile.

The long-term growth in the demand for private housing will continue, but building societies must avoid short-term accelerations in demand which produce no long-term benefits. As early as the first quarter of 1973 the question was being framed as to who, amongst first-time house buyers, would be able to afford even the mundane three bedroom semi-detached house if the then upward surge in house prices continued. The fact that such a question was posed illustrated how house prices had increased in advance of incomes and the general price level. If the increase had been solely due to inflation, which so many builders, buyers and 'official' circles assumed, then incomes and house prices would have increased closely in line and the above problem would not have existed. However by the end of 1973 the consequences of the recently previous housing boom became apparent. Many people had obtained mortgages which they found difficult to service, having borrowed to the maximum allowed by building societies in the expectation of a continuation of the pre-incomes policy growth in personal incomes. The failure of this to occur put such people in financial difficulties. The housing and land markets experienced significant price falls measurable in terms of thousands rather than hundreds of pounds. First-time house buyers were priced-out of the market by high interest charges and house prices. Despite the fact that most house-sellers were also house buyers, the market was full of sellers unable to match-up with buyers. It appeared that only when sellers accepted a lower selling price, and a larger number of new house-purchasers entered the market, would the post-boom slump in the market be broken.

The 1971-72 boom also highlighted a number of basic problems. For instance, should more land be 'freed' for development especially in certain areas of the country, or should house prices be allowed to increase significantly in places such as London and the south-east because of inelastic land supply? This could do more to drive firms out of such areas than regional policy, either because of a labour shortage due to people moving out in search of cheaper housing or because of high wage demands being based on the cost of living in the south-east. Should all the professions involved in the housing market streamline procedures and be more closely scrutinised as to their conduct? The main problem, which demands further analysis, was caused by building societies engaging in policies which resulted in their feeding the insatiable demand for houses

too suddenly and too quickly, which was instrumental in raising the price of houses. It bears emphasising that, in the short-run at least, the magnitude of the rate of change in house prices appears to be largely in the hands of building societies.

It is difficult to see how the responsibility for the 1971-73 surge in house prices could be laid entirely at inflation's door. From Table 1 it can be seen that the growth in the general price index was much smaller than that for house prices. The adjacent base date allows such a statement to be made. The increase in salaries and wages also lagged behind house prices, for example; between 1971 and 1972 the average earnings from self-employment rose from £4,135 to £4,708, weekly wages rates rose 31 points from 222 to 253, and weekly earnings for men increased from £30.93p to £35.82p. The increase in house prices and their subsequent fall were mainly due, not to inflation but to the forces of supply and demand. A more detailed look at the building societies' activities and the supply of housing should clarify this.

Between 1960 and 1970 building societies had increased their assets from £3,166 million to £10,819 million, a growth of almost 350 per cent. However, in terms of the number of loans made each year, growth has been much less marked. Between 1960 and 1970 the number of new borrowers only increased by 61 per cent, the corollary of this being the increase in house prices. The finance needed to buy a house increased over the period and with it the average building society loan: in 1960 the average advance was £1,444, but in 1970 this had grown to £3,575. Between 1970 and 1972 the figures were just under 50 per cent for the rise in assets but only just over 9 per cent for the increase in the number of borrowers. It is quite possible therefore that by making the excess demand for houses effective the main result of building societies' action during recent years has been to push up house prices against the purchaser. The thirteen year growth of building societies' loans and assets is summarised below in Table 2:

Table 2

	No. of Advances	Total assets (£million)
1960	387,000	3,166
1961	364,000	3,436
1962	378,000	3,815
1963	477,000	4,331
1964	535,000	4,862
1965	456,000	5,531
1966	535,000	6,305
1967	586,000	7,445
1968	594,000	8,298
1969	545,000	9,289
1970	624,000	10,819
1971	660,000	13,067
1972	690,000	15,386

Although the owners of 'older' houses purchasing new houses could have gained from the relatively greater increase in the price of their existing

house, (see Table 3), as indicated previously the overall situation has been disturbing. New purchasers of houses have found it increasingly difficult to meet the higher deposit and repayment requirements; many house buyers by being heavily mortgaged have had a smaller proportion of income over to buy other things. It is doubtful whether the building societies 'followed' the rise in house prices as they claimed, it is all too probable that they were the main cause of the relative increase in house prices. The increased remuneration earned by factors of production, for instance labour and land, needed in house building was only to be expected, as the demand for such factors was derived from the upsurge in demand for houses. Indeed, according to the Department of the Environment land prices more than trebled between 1969 and 1973; the sharpest rise of 50 per cent occurred in 1972 when the housing boom was at its peak. However, during 1973 the price rise was just 4 per cent which hid price *falls* at the year end. In 1974 land prices eased by 10 per cent or more. The price of building land in the short run was determined by the demand for houses, land prices did not determine house prices. As building society activity lessened then the boom of 1972 turned into a gentle overall price rise in 1973, which hid a slight down-turn in prices at the end of 1973. In more precise terms house prices rose by 47 per cent in 1972 and between 12 per cent and 14 per cent in 1973, according to the Nationwide Building Society. However, at the end of 1973 price reductions of up to 10 per cent were being widely reported, and in the first months of 1974 reductions of up to 15 per cent were reported. Although wide regional variations were evident (see Table 3) the overall trend was sharply upwards, most of the increase being achieved in 1971 and 1972.

Table 3

	Percentage Increase in House Prices 1969-1973 *1			Relative Increase in House Prices *2
	New	*Modern*	*Older*	1965 = 100
Scotland	80	99	91	New 1970 = 133
N. Ireland	49	72	80	Modern 1970=131
N. Eastern	110	122	130	Older 1970 = 140
N. Western	106	120	138	
Midland	118	97	113	
Wales	90	105	109	
Eastern	131	126	129	
London & S.E.	136	115	118	
S. Western	135	125	96	
Southern	139	126	141	

*1 Source: Nationwide Building Society

*2 Source: Sunday Times, Oct. 24th 1971

A corollary of the slackening demand for houses was the cut-back in new housing 'starts'. It is noteworthy that despite the boom in demand in 1971 to early 1973 the number of new house 'starts' continued to fall from the peak of 37,300 a month in 1967, to 34,500 in 1968, to only 26,600 a month in 1972, and to 24,500 a month at the end of 1973. A possible

reason for this was the gradual run-down in sources of material supply which followed the depressed market of 1968-1970, a trend which could not be reversed in time significantly to affect the rate of house supply. Inertia, caution, conservatism on the part of builders plus labour and brick supply constraints may have all been relevant. When the market collapsed with the drying-up of building society and commercial bank[4] funds, the position worsened and in 1973 fewer houses were built in Britain than in any year since 1959; Department of the Environment figures showed 293,606 completions, an 8 per cent drop on 1972, of which 186,100 were private houses. Housing 'starts' in 1973 at 327,700 were 22,700 down on 1972; the private sector accounting for 214,900 of this total.

In conclusion, the following general observations can be made concerning economics of the housing market in recent years. In economic analysis the short-term refers to the time period during which production cannot fully adjust to changes in demand conditions. When adjustment is complete then the particular market is in long-term equilibrium. In the housing market an increase in demand relative to supply gives rise to increased house prices, and therefore to increased profits for builders and landowners. According to the economist's scenario the result of this should be an increase in house building attracted by the higher profits. As land is a scarce factor in the U.K. its long-run price is likely to increase. Therefore the long-run increase in the supply of houses should reduce prices below the short-run mania levels of late 1971 to early 1973, but it is unlikely that prices would fall to the levels of early 1971 or, more correctly, to the price levels of 1971 plus an amount to compensate for inflation. Therefore the real price of houses would increase, even in the long run, due to the increasing real cost of land. Two points emerge from this: with or without the 'Town and Country Planning Acts' the real price of land will increase; in the housing market the short-term is long in actual calendar time. Where the latter point is concerned the large relative increase in house prices in 1972 had no favourable effect on the number of new house starts, as shown earlier the supply of houses continued to fall from the 1967 peak.

The levelling-off, and then the fall in house prices in 1973-4, reflected the reduction in the growth of building society loans. It was to be hoped that any large inflow of funds into the building societies in the future would not be suddenly placed into the hands of house buyers and thereby begin another spiral in house prices. Indeed to avoid great inflows and outflows of funds the societies must be more flexible in their interest rate policy. In the short-run further increases in interest rates above the 1973-5 level of 11 per cent would be of limited use in spreading owner-occupation. By mid-1973 it was clear that little demand slack existed; that is, apart from existing borrowers there were few other people who could afford to borrow from the societies. At the end of 1973 even individuals earning in excess of £4,000 p.a. found 95 per cent mortgages on a new house difficult to service. The continuation of the 11 per cent mortgage rate and the large deposit necessitated by high house prices meant that few new buyers were available. Such was the dearth that even a fall in the

number of houses started and completed failed to equate supply with demand. A fall in house prices appeared to be the key to reactivating the market.

The high absolute level of house prices has a normative aspect. The non-house owner in 1975 was worse off than he was in 1970, the increase in house prices relative to incomes made it more difficult for him to meet building society repayment conditions. Where existing house owners were concerned the increased price of their house, or their 'equity' is offset by the increased price of a 'replacement', and therefore they are little better-off. Existing house owners would only gain if their houses increased in price by a larger percentage than new houses, or if they moved to a smaller house.

As a first pre-requisite for avoiding the traumas of the period 1971-1974, when the housing market went from stability, to boom, to slump, an improvement in demand forecasting by building societies is needed. Indeed, perhaps a new method of house purchase linked to the capital market rather than to the money market is the only ultimate answer. However it would be wrong for economists concerned with the operation of market forces to give hope of substantial falls in interest rates. Any subsidy aimed at reducing building society interest rates below market levels could have unfortunate allocative and distributional effects, and could be attacked on grounds of efficiency and equity. The housing market is dependent on the short-term money market. Building societies borrowing short and lending long must protect their depositors, hence the need to match the interest rates of other financial intermediaries. Borrowing long-term could lead to an improved matching of the terms of borrowing and lending, but as rates in this market tend to be higher than in the short-run money market this would not favourably affect the cost of borrowing, or help existing house owners already paying off a mortgage. Interest rates depend on general economic and monetary conditions and are largely outside building society control.[5] What *is* within their control is their rate of lending and therefore the short-run price of houses. As a charitable trust the societies have substituted deposit growth maximisation for profit maximisation, this has led them to quickly increase deposit rates when their funds are threatened, but has made them sluggish in reducing rates. This has increased the overall expenses of building society borrowers and often harmed the economy by distorting the allocation of resources. More advanced forecasting and greater flexibility is what is required of the Building Society movement if it is adequately to fulfil its role in the economy.

References

1 Indeed, between 1962 and early 1972 Building Society interest rates did not fall at all despite the more flexible behaviour of other rates, e.g. Bank Rate. As long as the 'pre-tax' building society rate is at least 2% greater than Commercial Bank deposit rates the movement obtains adequate funds. In

1971 and 1972 the gap varied between 3% and 5%.

2 Source: *Economic Trends,* Central Statistical Office.

3 An individual borrowing 95% of the price of the 'average priced' house in 1974, at 11% rate of interest, needed an income of £4,000 per year!

4 Commercial banks had, to an extent, been instrumental in the house price boom, bank managers being willing to supply almost unlimited funds for house purchase often in total disregard of what was the, then, current market value.

5 Due to the 'political' effects of high building society rates and the push they give to wage inflation, an institutional constraint exists on what building societies can offer in terms of interest rates. Since 1971 the Monetary Authorities have had a 'Regulation Q' weapon in their armoury and in the autumn of 1973 this was activated. Clearing bank rates were limited to 9.5% on deposits under £10,000 (the maximum allowable building society deposit), the societies increased their 'grossed up' rate to 10.71%, near enough to the 2% 'gap' (see p.1) to protect their funds.

[Mr. D. G. Rhys is Lecturer in Economics at the University of Cardiff]

The January 1976 issue of the Contemporary Review includes *Spain at the Gates of Europe* by Richard Comyns Carr, *The Powerful, the Weak and Penal Policy* by Martin Wright, *The Australian Government and the Aborigines* by Keith D. Suter and *Why the Theatre Needs its Fringe* by Clare Colvin.

IMPORT CONTROLS AND SOCIAL WELFARE

by Joan Mitchell

MENTION import controls and the heat of debate rises. Decry import controls and the response is quick as well as hot. Textile workers (and their employers) are losing work, while cheap shirts, suits, dresses, children's clothes, knitwear come in from Eastern Europe, Mediterranean countries, the Far East, anywhere where wages are low and foreign exchange valuable. Why should British car-workers run Japanese cars while British Leyland struggles with surplus capacity, inadequate cash flow and no profits? Market gardeners invest in modern equipment, irrigation and drainage, and extend cool stores; then find their customers diverting contracts to foreign suppliers of ready prepared or dried vegetables from East, South and West. But import controls are far from being the easy or inevitable solution to overseas trade problems, still less to our other economic weaknesses.

Any trade policy has welfare aspects. At a given level of income, consumers are likely to be better off with high imports or low exports. More goods in bigger variety will be available. Producers, whether workers or their employers, are likely to be better off with low imports, or high exports. They will enjoy a larger market, more work and more profitable production. A change in policy has consequences for the distribution of community welfare. Imposing import controls is regressive in effect.

In aggregate, producers and consumers largely overlap; but not quite. At the level of individual families or households, it is not so simple. Those who consume but not produce (in terms which are included in national accounts) are mostly poorer and weaker in bargaining power than those who produce more than they consume. Transfers from producer to consumer help the poor (and others), at the expense of the more comfortable and active groups. Transfers from consumers to producers harm the poor and help the active, among whom the strong bargainers will come off best.

Commercial policy (mainly the presence or absence of import controls, by tariff or quota) and exchange rates together set the boundaries within which production can be profitable. A substantial proportion of British imports lie well within the boundaries: food that cannot reasonably be grown here, raw materials for which there is no satisfactory substitute.

Most imported manufactures (and some raw materials, like steel and plastics) come in because they are considered better or cheaper than a home-produced alternative. Foreign consumer goods, from cars and electrical 'white goods' to clothes, lawnmowers and convenience foods are the most obvious. But two-thirds of imported manufactures are capital goods, machinery, machine tools, heavy lorries and so on. The first category, the consumer goods, would no doubt have to be the main object of selective control, or attract the least exemption from general restriction. They are mostly 'non-essential', and displace home-produced substitutes. Capital goods present more difficulty. They are on the face of it 'essential', especially

at a time of low investment. There may be substitutes; but there must be some reason for the extra trouble of buying foreign. Whether they are cheaper or better or more readily available, depriving industry of them must impose handicaps of some sort.

Cutting off supplies of imported textiles and clothing deprives poorer families (among others) of the cheaper goods they can buy more freely (especially for children's clothes). Keeping out foreign-made consumer durables (furniture, fridges and freezers, colour TV, hi-fi), for which the purchasers mostly save or borrow, means that families just entering the market for the greater comfort and convenience of a still affluent society must wait longer. Buy British is a luxury that some cannot afford.

Nevertheless, the balance of payments is far from balanced and must be corrected. None of the alternative policies is painless or quickly effective. Devaluation has become the orthodox prescription for curing a deficit, especially when accompanied by unemployment. It is not clear how effective £ devaluation has been. Its undoubted effect is to make British exports cheaper (in foreign currency), and imports dearer (in £). But this in itself worsens the price ratio (in foreign currency), or terms of trade. To improve the balance of foreign earnings, customers for British goods and services overseas must respond to the lower prices by buying proportionately more, and British buyers of imports must buy less than before. The evidence for such changes is often ambiguous, because so many other circumstances change at the same time; but it is usually accepted that buyers do respond to international price changes, though not at once. There is an interim when the balance actually worsens, followed by a gradual improvement. Meantime, the higher import prices raise costs, and probably prices in Britain. Eventually the producers of exports, stimulated by the devaluation, get extra income. Hence devaluation is able to cause inflation of both kinds, first cost inflation, later demand inflation, unless it is accompanied by other deflationary measures (such as higher taxes, credit restrictions, or cuts in public expenditure).

Deflation itself is still sometimes recommended as a remedy for the overseas deficit. However, the means of improvement is the reduction in incomes and demand which is caused thereby. Lower incomes mean lower imports, and less demand for goods which could be sold overseas. But at a time of serious unemployment both here and abroad, this is about the least attractive of policies. At any time, it is highly regressive as it works through a general reduction in activity, to prevent consumers (and firms) being able to afford imports.

The only other way to adjust the balance is to get British costs down relative to our competitors. As the higher rate of increase is now largely due to pay increases above past inflation rates, the remedy lies in getting that rate of increase down. Such a remedy would also slow down price increases for home consumers. A slower rate of increase of pay plus a slower rate of rise of prices would benefit consumers more than producers. The poor consumers (and low paid producers) would very probably benefit at the expense of higher-paid and strongly organised producers.

Meantime, we can only go precariously on, borrowing to finance the continuing and unadjusted deficit. If import controls were likely to be the most effective policy among a bad bunch, the discriminatory burden on the relatively poor could be compensated in some other way (cash benefits or tax reductions being the fashionable form, though we signally fail to see that they do in fact compensate fully in purchasing power). There is little reason to believe this would be so.

The controls would probably begin on a relatively narrow base, on non-essentials rather than essentials, on consumer goods rather than materials or capital goods. Sales of British manufactures to British customers would then increase. But many goods have a substantial content of imported materials. As output of non-essentials goes up, imports of essentials might go up also, augmented by components (also essential) coming in, as home suppliers reached the limit of capacity or skilled labour. To get the intended improvement in the balance of payments the scope of the controls might have to be extended further, just to prevent their becoming ineffective too soon.

The period for which the control was to last would be a material influence on its consequences. If it was to be temporary only, as our main trading partners and friends would urge, not much adjustment could be expected in our industrial structure. It just would not be worth investing in more capacity to supply a market protected for only a year or two. A longer period of policy stability would be needed, upwards of five years perhaps.

Having edged forward so far, the question then arises whether the controls should be imposed indefinitely. Firms and their employees established behind controls (or tariffs, for that matter) will press very hard to keep their protection, to preserve jobs and maintain their incomes; it is only too likely that they would lose some of both with decontrol. Consumers would gain by the removal of controls: but no producers consume enough of their own product for this to inhibit the pressure groups much. Firms or product ranges would be entrenched behind the controls that would not be profitable otherwise. Workers would be employed on them for whom there would not be jobs without the controls.

If larger British industries can compete internationally without protection in a relatively short time, it is difficult to explain why they cannot do it now, with plenty of spare capacity. If cost inflation handicaps them, import controls by themselves will not stop it. They may well make it worse by forcing some firms to use more expensive British components, an extra expense that will be passed on into prices (entirely in accordance with the present Price Code). They could make inflation worse also, via demand. As sales increase, the pay of groups of scarce workers may be forced up, and the extra purchasing power to pay the higher prices will be generated (though not among the poor). One malaise which has kept industry in its inappropriate attitudes is lack of mobility and energy in adapting to new needs and opportunities. A period of protection is likely to lead to less rather than more adjustment. The less adaptable British industry, the lower its productivity. The lower productivity is, the feebler the flow of

goods and services from a given supply of materials and labour. The more sluggish that flow, the lower the standard of living we as consumers have to endure (as we can already see in shoddy, short-lived goods, indifferent service, and pinched public activities).

Recession at present keeps down world trade. A protected breathing space, waiting for other countries' recovery, appears an attractive option. If it is so, it is a basically selfish one. We impose lower trade and incomes on import-suppliers, rely on them not to retaliate now, nor to maintain too strongly new trading relationships that would be difficult for us to interrupt later on when an improved balance and more buoyant trade enabled us to buy again. Reaction if not retaliation would be certain and swift. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of which Britain is a conscientious member, was reached to prevent just such remedies being so readily adopted. The present Chancellor has been outspoken in urging other countries to avoid protection, so that deficit countries are not made to run output and incomes down too far before a new balance can be reached. The 'OECD' declaration' of last year, and just about to be renewed, was a repudiation of import restrictions as a remedy for monetary or trade in balance (especially as a result of the oil crisis). To impose general import controls now would be an abrupt and incautious change of policy.

Apart from their undesirable regressive distributional effects, import controls might effect only minor improvements in the balance of payments. If they were only used to induce the substitution of home-produced for foreign goods, they could save perhaps a few hundred £m of foreign currency. But the present deficit is billions of £, and merely removing that still allows no surplus to repay present borrowings. Saving much more would involve cutting into imports of the bulk of food, raw materials or oil imports where we could not quickly supply home-produced substitutes, nor at anything like present prices. Consumption at home would have to fall.

There remain the peculiar problems of textile and clothing firms and many others, faced with increasing depression, as foreign goods flood in from hitherto poor countries, more and more ruthlessly developing. This is a difficult policy area on its own account, because there is no real solution. The interests of producers and consumers in this country, and producers here and producers overseas, directly conflict. Some balance must be struck between them, a balance which, in the nature of things, will be satisfactory to neither.

Some cheap imports are 'dumped', that is, sold below direct costs of production or subsidised by Governments (to get rid of accumulated stocks, to force an entry to a rich market, or to get valuable foreign exchange). All commercial agreements exclude dumped goods, and usually specify suitable remedies for countries in which the dumping takes place. Dumping clearly harms producers, as it is by definition competition they cannot meet and cover all their costs. It is sometimes claimed that it harms consumers also, since the lowest-cost producers may be forced to contract or give up their business. Then later on, the erstwhile dumpers either restore their prices to a full-cost level, or turn to other markets, and consumers lose their best

source of supply. However, the gain consumers enjoy while the low price goods are available should not be left out of account. If consumers eventually lose the lowest-cost (and lowest-priced) source of supply, there will be a long-run loss to put against the short-run gain; but the short-run gain is certain, the long-run loss uncertain.

Proving that goods are dumped, and taking action to prevent such imports coming in takes time, an unconscionably long time to the producers suffering the harm. Control by quota, or outright prohibition, is therefore a more sought-after remedy. But even these controls are not necessarily a good bargain.

By no means all dirt-cheap supplies are dumped. Some have much lower costs because pay is much lower in the countries of origin. Some of the poorer countries of the world are catching up in industrial output faster than is comfortable for the rich. Most of them really meant 'trade not aid', a sentiment with which we (among many more advanced countries) readily agreed, without thinking too carefully about its consequences. The multinational companies, with world-wide markets, and increasingly specialised plants wherever the balance of financial advantage lies, help them towards their maturity. They are learning the skills quickly, and the sophisticated investment and marketing we wrongly assumed to be the adjuncts of longer technological advancement, follow just as quickly after. It would be a very serious, and surely retrograde step for Britain to swing round to a dour commercial isolation when the new competition began to harm us (and therefore to benefit the developing poor), after a tradition deserving a good reputation for support to the internationally poor.

But there remains the equally real problems of the British firms, caught too quickly by urgent need to adjust, without the resources to do it effectively. If general import control is not the answer, some sort of protection against the ruthless destruction of reasonable livelihood that uncontrolled 'free' markets intermittently entail, is reasonable. Britain has so far done relatively well in reaching a series of short period agreements with other producing countries, setting limits on the imports at source, and their extent has not so far been too ungenerous. Meantime, much adjustment has been done, for example in Lancashire textiles and in many sectors of clothing. More remains to be done, in this and other industries. If we cannot close the labour cost gap, by devaluation, by employment support (like the Regional Employment Premium), or by reasonably modifying pay rises, as we surely cannot against very many of the new suppliers, we must make the best of the expertise of a long industrial history and familiarity with rich markets to cater for the relatively affluent, and relatively discriminating customer. Most consumers would perhaps agree (were they asked) that it is fair to British producers to give them some such support—for which the consumers would pay in some form or other—providing the adjustments were made.

Though import controls are undesirable, the balance of payments must be improved by some means. The only other ways are by devaluation (or £ floating down) to levels which make more exports attractive and imports

unattractive in price to potential buyers; or by so reducing our costs (and therefore prices) relative to others that the same adjustment is effected. In either case, the process of improving the balance involves a reduction in the consumption of imports or possible exports. Import controls do not avoid this necessity. The choice of policy leads to a different distribution of the penalties.

A long-familiar feature of the social structure of industrialised countries is the strong organisation and articulate representation of producers, both employers and employed. Consumers can never be as strong or articulate by direct representation, in spite of the improving battery of consumer councils and consumer agencies. Governments must weigh their interests, particularly because they have a duty to protect the weaker citizenry, partly because more consumers have votes than producers. It is by Government policy then that consumers' interests, and the interests of the relatively poor must be promoted, no less in relation to import policy than any other. Import controls come out badly. For this reason alone, it is a surprising policy to find professed Socialists advocating. If Socialism is to be re-interpreted as a primarily producer-orientated, isolationist, protectionist policy, inconsiderate of the real welfare of the poor, it will command much narrower support than the Labour Party has done hitherto. But fortunately, that day has not yet dawned.

[Joan Mitchell is Reader in Economics at the University of Nottingham.]

GEO-POLITICS AND THE TRANSNATIONALS

by Brian Meredith

THERE are two opposing schools of thought about that most fashionable subject, the multinational corporation.

Positively they are upheld as the true fashioners of the future, as the world's first and finest citizens, the epitome of all that is enterprising and imaginative and creative in the essential role that commerce must play in the well being of mankind, and as being the true pioneers in the fabrication of a stable world community.

They are indeed sought after by eastern, socialist societies as conveyors of the latest technology and expertise and management, and likewise by smaller, developing countries as galvanizers of national economies, as major employers and traders with vast markets and marketing mechanisms at their command; and many governments negotiate with them as politely and as purposefully as they would with a rich foreign government offering aid and trade.

The negative view of the multinationals is of course very different: they are wholly interested in profit, and at any social and political price. They are said to take full advantage of incentives and inducements and subsidized training arrangements offered by governments wanting foreign investment, and above all these companies seek a work force that will do what it is told without argument, and for low wages. But when things begin not to suit the fancy of the multinationals they cut their losses leaving them for others to bear, and move to greener fields where the climate, short term at least, seems more favourable.

And far from being creative, they are corruptive. They play local politics and buy politicians and bureaucrats and introduce ideas and methods that are disruptive to the local economy and culture. And, most threatening of all, they are often financially far richer than the host government, and they are suspected of being in fact the agents of an alien culture and government, usually American.

There is little new in these claims and counter claims. They are the things that have been said of foreign businessmen from time immemorial. They are the back-chat of a love-hate relationship that has fertilized growth and technology and trade and change down through history.

The only new element is that everything is bigger, particularly companies. They are gargantuan, macro-scale in their operations, and less and less attached to the nation that may, seemingly, have begat them. They are concentrations and groupings and affiliations of various degrees of commercial power and policy operating in several, in some cases hundreds of countries. They have become known for this reason as multinationals, and because many have seemed increasingly to have their being in financial outer space, the UN has promoted them to being transnationals. But whatever they are called, they have definitely arrived on the world stage politically as well as economically.

At the grass roots you and I, as small investors, contribute to this situation and the ambivalence about it. If we have a few pennies saved and a little money to invest we can be, if we think about it, faced with a difficult decision. Should we put it where it is going to get the highest interest, and the devil take the hindmost? Or should we be critical of what we buy in stocks and shares in social and humanitarian terms?

As would-be capitalists can we square our consciences over the way our capital is used by others, and do we exercise our rights as shareholders?

The answer, sadly, is that you and I are not trouble makers and we don't speak up or vote contrary to the views of our directors at annual general meetings, nor do we trouble to bring pressure to bear on them over wages paid, working conditions, and the living circumstances for people employed locally in far places by the firms through which they work. It is enough that our investment is lucrative.

There are spectacular exceptions to this *laissez-faire* stance and banks and mining companies and multinational companies operating in South Africa or Rhodesia or South West Africa or Central or South America, to mention only some of the areas of concern over messy and disreputable revelations, have their moments of excitement with small groups of shareholders with strong and critical views of the management. Nor, it should be added, is there much serious complaint over contracts made with governments of which we may disapprove, democratically or otherwise.

Ordinary investors feel, and with some reason, that they are not fully informed. The trouble spots are far away, the complaints may be shocking but they are also emotional, and the companies concerned are not too communicative.

There have been political complaints about the 'unacceptable face of capitalism' in Africa and elsewhere from the conservative side, but few real reforms are reported; and in the ranks of labour and particularly of the trade unions, the old time fraternal concern over foreign workers and their lot has ebbed. We are all bystanders to affairs over which we feel we can exert no influence, even though, as investors, we may be 'sorcerers' apprentices' and have with our money opened the floodgates for exploitation.

Real power now seems to lie with these multinational corporations who control such large portions of the world's financial transactions and trade and investment and who, fundamentally, are answerable to no one, and particularly to no government. They may be susceptible to national laws, and their national components are careful to respect them, but the international collectivity of these companies operates internationally, transnationally; and in that realm there are no enforceable laws, and no international authority.

The ease with which the skilful operator can manipulate his activities in the global dimension so that he benefits from currency speculation, food shortages and corruption and stupidity among politicians and civil servants, is not the real danger, nor is it characteristic of the problem. The criminal or shady or eccentric personality who seems so common in these worldly

waters is not, according to the law of averages, the rule but the exception to it.

The dilemma lies in the fact that great power is in the hands of people who are intent upon nothing but profit and the *status quo* that allows them to make it. They have the best of intentions and feel they are able not only to do well by their shareholders but for the world generally. And who knows but history could show that, all in all, they were right. Many people believe these transnational financiers could do a lot better than politicians are doing, that they have a far better grasp of the realities of world problems, and that they should be allowed to tackle them.

Many others, however, think otherwise. They point to the dearth of real information, of relative anonymity, of the social aimlessness over world trade problems and monetary policy and human development among these vast companies. The concern is found not just in the Third World where new nations are fearful of some neo-colonialism that might repossess them; the same fears, in different terms, are voiced in the western, developed world.

General de Gaulle in his day was hostile to US investment and influence in France. Canadian legislation on foreign investment was enacted 'in recognition by Parliament that the extent to which control of Canadian industry, trade and commerce has become acquired by persons other than Canadians and the effect thereof on the ability of Canadians to maintain effective control over their economic environment is a matter of national concern.' Britain herself, the home state for several major multinationals, is acutely aware of their social and political impact on the home front in the car and typewriter and oil industries; and the matter seems to come full circle when it is known that the Americans themselves are considering legislation to give them closer supervision over foreign investment in the US.

So broadly based is governmental concern over the activities of the multinational companies that many international organisations, led by the United Nations, have taken them under careful study; and a considerable documentation about them has built up from OECD, Commonwealth Secretariat, and other sources. Investigations of this kind could have become a witch hunt, and indeed multinational spokesmen complain that a new demonology has grown up around them; but basically there is awareness that, for good or ill, these companies do an essential job. They are the great entrepreneurs of the world community, the cross-fertilizers of commerce; and for all the suspicion about them, they are also universally in demand.

What is now sought is a *modus vivendi* between governments and these potentially rival entities in the international sphere, and a philosophy and morality acceptable to both would help. What has begun at the United Nations is the establishment of a 48 nation Commission on Transnational corporations, and the creation of a UN information and research centre on them in the secretariat.

This had followed the activities during '74 of an UN expert group of Eminent Persons, as they were called, who were selected and appointed from many quarters and cultures because of their knowledge of the multinational

phenomenon; and they spent some time in New York and in Geneva hearing expert testimony and opinion, much of it from multinationals themselves, on the impact of these companies on development and international relations. Their report summarizes nearly everything that can be said on every side of the matter, it recommended that it remain under appraisal, and it proposed that permanent machinery for this be created — and this has now been done.

The new commission has been given by various groupings of governments definitions of 'areas of concern' which should be explored. A list of 21 from the Third World lobby known as the Group of 77 (in reality about 94 governments) included, following their terminology, the preferential treatment demanded by transnationals in relation to national enterprises, refusal of transnationals to accept exclusive jurisdiction of domestic law in cases of litigation or of compensation on nationalization, their direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of host countries, transnationals as instruments of intelligence and foreign policy by home states, their tendency not to conform to national needs and policies, and their lack of respect for the socio-cultural identity of their hosts.

An even longer listing of areas of concern came jointly from the US, UK, Italy, France and West Germany; but the terminology was less prickly. Included were: an appraisal of the positive and negative impacts of transnationals on host countries, the degree to which expropriations by governments were followed by prompt, adequate and non-discriminatory compensation, the degree to which companies may improve or worsen working conditions for their employees, and the need to define what is acceptable and inacceptable political activity on their part.

The commission emerged at the end of its first session at the end of March this year also with a recommendation that an expert group should explore the ways of forming a standard accounting method for the presentation of their financial affairs. Practices varied so widely that it was difficult to discern the facts from one region to another, or to compare them with the circumstances of national enterprises in the same fields.

By being made the focal point of so much inter-governmental interest at the UN, within the Commonwealth, at the OECD and within the EEC, multinational corporations will themselves be reminded of and learn a great deal about the political climate in which they must work internationally, and about the responsibilities they are deemed to have towards the societies in which they operate; and they could in return find they have an opening to exercise a considerable and even salutary influence on their critics and on the proposals advanced to deal with them. If multinationals are indeed as their supporters claim the agents for progress and civilization in its broadest sense, they will have in these continuing appraisals ample chance to prove it; and nothing but good can come of what may lie ahead.

The complaints most often and loudly heard are against multinational companies, but they in turn have many bitter complaints about governments. These too should be made widely known for if these companies are to do



the important job that is required of them internationally in the transfer of technology and expertise in management and in investment in plant and manpower, they cannot be expected to do so if they are under constant threat of nationalization and if they get no reasonable redress if it happens.

These agitations are all part of a general unease and dissatisfaction over the present world economic system, over stability in commodity trade, over unchecked world wide inflation, and over the evolution of backward societies who wish to join fruitfully in with the commercial life of the developed world and who hope somehow to escape the strains and pains that have been felt earlier elsewhere in the course of industrial revolution and vast social change.

A great many basic matters are now very properly being held in question; and it is a healthy and hopeful sign that new nations should already be producing people who are capable of asking and pressing such questions, and who are fully capable of learning from the answers they get and the actions that may follow.

[Brian Meredith is a Canadian-born journalist and broadcaster who was for twenty years an information officer to the U.N.]

It may be of interest to refer to the recently published *The Responsible Multinational Enterprise* by John Humble (Foundation for Business Responsibilities, £1.25). *Editor.*

ASSESSING THE 'QUALITY OF LIFE': ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE MEASURING ROD OF MONEY

by Mancur Olson

WHY do the high incomes of the developed nations these days coexist with so many manifestations of discontent and despair? There is more dissatisfaction with the social order, and with leadership of institutions of all kinds, now than in many periods when incomes were much lower. In the United States, for example, real incomes grew unusually rapidly in the nineteen-sixties, yet by the end of that decade there was more evidence of dissatisfaction with the social order — not only with government, but also with universities, families, and other institutions — than there had been at the start of the decade. When one looks across societies, it is by no means obvious that people in the richer nations are more contented with their lot than those who live in the poorer ones, or at least than those in countries at an intermediate level. When one looks at history, it is by no means clear that periods of economic growth were the most quiescent politically — they were often periods of protest and even of violence. A glance at some suggestive 'social indicators' reveals the same paradox. Suicide rates — the percentages whose level of satisfaction is so low that life no longer seems worth living — suggest if anything that higher income countries have relatively more suicide than poor ones. Nor does the number whose inability to cope with life takes the form of mental illness show any tendency to diminish as incomes increase (though tranquillizers have permitted a reduction in the population in asylums).

Survey researchers who have used relatively sophisticated questionnaires to elicit the subjective responses of samples of people about how satisfied or dissatisfied they are with their lot, have found that within any society those with higher incomes claim a higher level of contentment, but there is little or no evidence of a higher average level of contentment in rich countries than in poor ones, or that contentment has risen as incomes have increased over time in the United States — the only country in which such surveys have been taken repeatedly.

If we cannot be at all sure that rapid economic growth will diminish discontent, there is reason to ask: what really happens when the economy grows? Does economic growth necessarily make most people happier or better off? Or is it associated with subtle forces which reduce well being along some dimensions just as they improve well being in others? Do the obvious manifestations of discontent in rapidly growing and high income societies simply misrepresent a general increase in contentment, or is there at least a part of the population that is worse off in some sense than it would have been had the economic growth not taken place? Even those who believe, as I do, that economic growth is on balance highly desirable,

should want to understand why it fails to diminish proportionately, if at all, the evidence of discontent and social pathology.

Any effort to look in an integrated way at economic growth and its relation to contentment and discontent must take account of the fact that the income statistics tend to include most of the things that are readily brought under the 'measuring rod of money' and to leave out most things that are not. Economics was defined by Alfred Marshall as the study of that which is readily brought under the measuring rod of money, so the economist in particular must be concerned about what it is about a phenomenon or good that makes it *readily* measurable in money terms.

Some people suppose that what keeps a good from being bought under the measuring rod of money is that it is 'priceless'. But only rarely are people willing to give up 'everything' for a given good or purpose. And if one good were literally priceless for a person, a second good could not possibly be, because the person might then be confronted with a situation in which he could not have more of the one good without less of the other, and the trade-off would indicate that he put a finite price on at least one of the goods. Others say that the best things in life are free, but in truth they are rarely so. The amenities of nature can only be preserved by foregoing the additional production or convenience that can be gained by exploiting them without inhibition; true love can usually be obtained only through sharing or sacrifice.

Normally, it is neither pricelessness nor costlessness that keeps a good from being brought under the measuring rod of money, but rather the fact that an individual cannot take more or less of it as he wishes. If an individual takes more or less of some good, he reveals, by what he has to give up (e.g. money) how much it is worth to him. We know how much apples and oranges are worth to a shopper because we know what he has to give up in money (and thus other goods) to get another dozen.

Many things, and some that are precious to many people, are not available to the individual in greater or lesser quantities. Family and friendship relations, for example, do not exist at all if there is only a minimal level of interaction. A man cannot, for example, have 'half of a wife': he could of course have a casual or intermittent relationship with a woman, but that would be a different thing — in the economist's language, a different 'good'. Similarly, an acquaintance is not a half or a tenth of a friend, but something qualitatively different. When a relationship involves continuity and a substantial minimum commitment, people do not regularly reveal how much a given relationship is worth to them. An individual who gets a divorce reveals that he finds a given relationship is on balance not worth the cost or sacrifice it entails, but the person who does not obtain a divorce may either place an extraordinary value on the relationship, or he may be merely indifferent. In either case, his behaviour does not reveal the price he puts on the relationship: it isn't possible to take more or less, and thereby to reveal what one would and would not give up for it.

This difficulty in determining what a 'good' is worth to an individual has been understood for some time in the case of what the economist calls

'public goods' — those, like clean air, national defence, or law and order, that cannot feasibly be provided except on a community-wide or society-wide basis. As Nobel-award winner Paul Samuelson has best emphasized, the typical individual does not by his behaviour normally reveal how much most public services or environmental amenities are worth to him. The reason, again, is that the individual citizen cannot take more or less of these goods, but rather has to accept whatever outcome is consciously or unconsciously chosen by his community.

If the outside observer cannot know what 'price' people put on the satisfaction or goods their families, friendships, and social groups produce, or what value they place on the services of their government or environment, we cannot readily tell whether there is a deterioration (or even absence of improvement) in the satisfactions people get in these less readily measurable areas that might make them on balance less contented after a period of economic growth, than before. If there has been economic growth, the goods we buy in the stores are available in even greater quantities. What of the 'goods' we obtain from our families and friends? Or from government and nature?

It seems probable that most people value at least reasonably stable or relatively continuous personal and group relationships. Certainly there is evidence that some degree of stability in the personal environment is necessary for children. What is the effect of economic growth on the continuity of personal relationships?

Economic growth requires technological change or capital accumulation. It requires doing things in new ways. It means reconstituting work groups, often in new locations. It requires incentives that enable some to rise in the social order and others to fall. In modern times, it often requires huge and therefore impersonal organizations and workplaces. The change, the social and geographical mobility, that economic growth involves may therefore to some degree lessen the continuity of personal relationships. As a society, we may purchase the goods we buy in the marketplace *partly* with the 'goods' produced by stable personal relationships.

Economic growth for more familiar reasons may of course also be associated with a decline in the quality of the environment. Though there is no reason to suppose that the supply of governmental services will deteriorate during periods of economic growth, and often reason to expect it to improve, in particular cases there definitely can be a deterioration of unmeasured significance in the aptness or effectiveness of government services during a period of economic growth.

[Mancur Olson is Professor of Economics at The University of Maryland, USA. From 1967-9 he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Publications include *Towards a Social Report* (1969 and *The Economics of the Wartime Shortage* (1963)]

HAPPY EVER AFTER

Some Aspects of Marriage in Shakespeare's Plays

by B. J. Pendlebury

MANY a good hanging prevents a bad marriage! So says Feste in *Twelfth Night*. Now, clearly we must not attribute to Shakespeare himself the view expressed in a flippant remark by a professional jester. Indeed, we cannot safely assume that Shakespeare personally endorsed the judgments of any one of his characters. However carefully we scrutinise particular plays, we can never say with confidence: 'This is what Shakespeare thought about marriage'. Nevertheless, it is interesting to examine those plays that are particularly concerned with marriage and to try to see what assumptions underlie both speeches and actions.

If we consider first the early comedies, we cannot help noticing that the prospect of marriage is frequently of central importance. *Two Gentlemen of Verona, A Midsummer Night's Dream, Twelfth Night, Much Ado About Nothing,* have this in common: each of them illustrates the saying that 'the course of true love never did run smooth', and the action is mainly concerned with the efforts of the lovers to overcome all obstacles to their union. In the end, misunderstandings are cleared up, external opposition is overcome, the lovers are paired off, and we are to suppose that they live 'happy ever after'. There is a strong presumption that marriage is the ultimate good. Indeed, so much emphasis is placed on marriage as the natural happy ending that Shakespeare will often strain probability to bring it about, as when, in *As You Like It,* he provides Celia with a mate by the sudden conversion of the villainous Oliver into a man of honour. But, however the pairing is managed, the implication is always the same: 'Journey's end in lovers' meeting', and everybody rejoices in the prospect of a wedding.

It is noteworthy that the society presented in these early plays is not what is nowadays called 'permissive'. Romantic love is meant to end in marriage; and marriage is taken seriously as a sacrament. In *Twelfth Night,* for example, the marriage of Olivia and Sebastian is described as 'A contract of eternal bond of love'. And this is typical of the tone adopted by Shakespeare's characters whenever they refer seriously to marriage. Even Benedick, in *Much Ado,* though given to making cynical jokes about married men, speaks differently when he asks Leonato's consent to his own union with Beatrice:

> But for my will, my will is, your good will
> May stand with ours, this day to be conjoin'd
> In the state of honourable marriage.

This same play shows very clearly that unchastity is not lightly regarded. There is indeed 'much ado' when Claudio is deceived into thinking that Hero is 'an approved wanton'. His furious indignation is shared by his friend the Prince, who speaks of Hero as 'a rotten orange', an unworthy gift to be offered to an honourable man. There is, indeed, a hint of a more

modern attitude to 'pre-marital sex' in Leonato's attempt to make excuses for his daughter. As he says to Claudio:

> Dear my lord, if you in your own proof
> Have vanquish'd the resistance of her youth,
> And made defeat of her virginity,——

And Claudio takes the point:

> I know what you would say: if I have known her,
> You will say she did embrace me as a husband,
> And so extenuate the forehand sin.

It is significant that, though the anticipation of the wedding by betrothed lovers might be thought venial, Claudio refers to it as 'the forehand *sin*'. It would appear that Shakespeare's audience was ready to applaud a high moral tone on the subject of feminine chastity. This impression is reinforced in the later plays.

An aspect of marriage that we might call the social relationship between husband and wife receives comparatively little direct mention in most of the comedies. It seems to be assumed that the husband will be the dominant partner and the master of the household. In the few comedies where we see the principal characters actually married, it is the husband who does as he chooses and the wife who is expected to be submissive, though she may sometimes show her displeasure by nagging. In the *Comedy of Errors*, when Antipholus is late coming home to dinner, and his wife, Adriana, complains to her sister, Luciana counsels patience and submission. A man, she says, is master of his liberty, but equal liberty is not given to woman. To Adriana's assertion that only asses submit to a bridle, she replies:

> Why, headstrong liberty is lash'd with woe.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> The beasts, the fishes, and the winged fowls
> Are their males' subjects and at their controls:
> Men more divine, the masters of all these,
> Lords of the wide world and wild watery seas,
> Are masters to their females, and their lords:
> Then let your will attend on their accords.

The notion of wifely submissiveness as a necessary ingredient of married bliss is, of course, the main topic in *The Taming of the Shrew*. In the early scenes, Katharina appears as a shrew indeed, wilful, violent, and unlikely to promise much happiness to a prospective bridegroom. The play, however, shows us the taming of Katharina by Petruchio, a wooer 'as peremptory as she is proud-minded'. The shrew is systematically bullied until she can be shown as a model of obedience. She is so changed that she lectures her sister on her wifely duties, arguing that a husband's care for his wife deserves in return 'But love, fair looks, and true obedience'. And she concludes:

> Such duty as the subject owes the prince
> Even such a woman oweth to her husband;
> And when she is forward, peevish, sullen, sour,
> And not obedient to his honest will,
> What is she but a foul contending rebel,
> And graceless traitor to her loving lord?

This conversion of the high-spirited Katharina into a patient Griselda is surely somewhat repugnant to a modern reader, unless he is indeed a 'male chauvinist pig'. One cannot help suspecting that *The Taming of the Shrew* is

an example of wish-fulfilment, a fantasy designed to appeal to a hen-pecked husband. Perhaps enough has been said to show that, though in the early comedies it is generally assumed that successful wooing leads to married bliss, there are some hints that it is not always undisturbed. Nevertheless, in the early plays, most of the references to marriage are decidedly optimistic.

When we come to consider the later plays, we find that the tone has changed. In many of them, the question of marriage is not crucial; but, where it is, there is a decided note of pessimism. There is a masculine obsession with the danger of being deceived by an unfaithful wife; and the reactions of a husband who believes he has been deceived provide the central motive for more than one play.

Of these, *Othello* is the outstanding example. The story is to some extent anticipated in *Much Ado,* for in both plays we see a villain who contrives to represent an innocent woman as an 'approved wanton'. In *Othello,* the villain's spite is directed against the hero, and the interest is concentrated on the intensity of the Moor's feelings for Desdemona. Othello is not merely indignant at an affront to his honour: he suffers the most violent emotional disturbance imaginable short of actual madness. He is indeed aware that he may be an object of ridicule,

> A fixed figure for the time of scorn
> To point his slow unmoving finger at,

but this notion is subordinate to the sense of ruined happiness. It is subordinate also to a sense of righteousness in his intention to kill Desdemona. 'Yet she must die', he says, 'else she'll betray more men'; and later in the same speech:

> Ah, balmy breath, that dost almost persuade
> Justice to break her sword.

And after Desdemona's death, Othello describes himself as

> An honourable murderer, if you will:
> For nought did I in hate, but all in honour.

The modern reader finds it difficult to accept this notion that a husband has the right to punish unchastity with death. At best, it may be regarded as what Orsino calls 'A savage jealousy, That sometimes savours nobly'.

What one might call the 'cuckoo-theme' is pursued with less fearful consequences in more than one of the later plays. In *Cymbeline,* we have basically the same situation as in *Othello,* the innocent heroine being slandered by a villain. But there are important differences. The husband, Posthumus Leonatus, goes far to bring his troubles on himself. He has been exiled from Britain by the king, Cymbeline, the father of Imogen, to whom Posthumus is secretly married. In idle conversation in Rome, Posthumus boasts of his wife's virtue and is provoked by the cynical Iachimo into betting on it. Iachimo is confident of winning:

> I will lay you ten thousand ducats to your ring, that, commend me to the court where your lady is, with no more advantage than a second conference, and I will bring from thence that honour of hers which you imagine so reserved.

The acceptance of this wager does not endear Posthumus to us. It would seem that he thought of Imogen as a possession, valued indeed at a high price, yet valued in terms of ducats, like a horse or a hound. Imogen, of course, justifies her husband's trust by repelling Iachimo; but the resourceful

villain contrives to be carried in a trunk into Imogen's bedchamber; then, when Imogen is asleep, he is able to observe a mole on her breast and also to steal her bracelet. Back in Rome, he convinces Posthumus that he has won his bet, and so provokes an outburst of rage from the supposedly wronged husband. 'O that I had her here, to tear her limb-meal', exclaims Posthumus. Seeking a vengeance that by no means 'savours nobly', he writes to his henchman Pisanio, commanding him to kill Imogen. He seems confident that the charge of adultery will be sufficient to induce Pisanio to obey his command. Pisanio, however, refuses either to believe the accusation or to carry out the order. In fact, he helps Imogen to set out on a series of extraordinary adventures which, most improbably, lead to a happy reunion with Posthumus.

This obsession with the risk of being a cuckold is to be found also in *The Winter's Tale*, where Leontes, King of Sicily, unjustly suspects his queen, Hermione, of adultery with his friend Polixenes. No slandering villain is involved, the jealous nature of Leontes being solely responsible for the situation. Leontes, it seems, is mainly troubled by the fear of being an object of scorn. After encouraging Hermione to entertain Polixenes in the garden, he addresses his young son thus:

> Go, play, boy, play; thy mother plays, and I
> Play too; but so disgraced a part, whose issue
> Will hiss me to my grave: contempt and clamour
> Will be my knell.

Like Posthumus, he suffers a sense of outrage and is driven to seek vengeance. As in *Cymbeline*, the plot miscarries, and chance leads to a complex of strange happenings, ending twelve years later with an impropable reconciliation. Though the play includes elements of comedy and romance, it is the jealousy of Leontes that provides the chief motive power for the action, and it is the scenes displaying this jealousy that seem most firmly set in the world of reality.

When we consider the stories of *Othello*, *Cymbeline*, and *The Winter's Tale*, we cannot fail to be struck by the frequency with which Shakespeare returns to this theme of the deceived husband. Moreover, one feels that resentment carried to a murderous conclusion is implicitly condoned, if not actually justified. Those characters who condemn the supposed cuckold's bloodthirsty intentions do so in the complete conviction of the wife's innocence. There is no suggestion that Desdemona and Imogen would not have deserved to die, had they really been guilty of adultery.

It will doubtless occur to the feminist that the offences considered by Shakespeare are all on one side. 'Frailty, thy name is woman! ' says Hamlet, bu the frailty of man in his relations with woman is viewed more leniently. When Mark Antony deserts his wife for Cleopatra, there are no outbursts of indignation and resentment from Octavia, such as we have when Leontes or Pothumus thinks himself betrayed. In this matter, Shakespeare evidently accepts different standards of conduct for men and women.

In the histories, the tragedies, and the tragi-comedies, we find few pictures of a happy marriage. Hotspur and his Lady are shown to be affectionate, but Hotspur is too much absorbed in political affairs to have much time for

his wife. The case of Brutus is similar. He loves and respects Portia; but he too is absorbed in a conspiracy, and it is only after a scene of reproaches that he confides in her.

For a marriage that is something like an equal partnership, one must turn to *Macbeth*. The wicked thane and his Lady are united in their ambitions. When Macbeth is prompted by the witches to indulge in the hope of making himself king, he writes to his wife:

> This have I thought good to deliver thee, *my dearest partner of greatness*, that thou mightst not lose the dues of rejoicing by being ignorant of what greatness is promised thee.

Macbeth knows that he can count on encouragement and support from his wife. She may upbraid him when he wavers, but in times of crisis she gives him the help he needs. Almost without exception, Macbeth and his Lady express affection and esteem in the way they speak to one another. At their meeting in Act I, Lady Macbeth greets her husband as 'Great Glamis! Worthy Cawdor!', and he addresses her as 'My dearest love'. Later in the play, each of them shows affectionate concern for the other. When Macbeth sees the ghost of Banquo, Lady Macbeth stands by him staunchly, ever ready to help, and troubled about his health and state of mind. And when his 'dearest chuck', as he calls her, loses her reason, Macbeth in his turn is solicitous for her well-being. Altogether, one sees in *Macbeth* the best picture of a genuine partnership in marriage that Shakespeare has given us. That this partnership should be that of a 'butcher and his fiend-like queen' is an ironic comment on the chances of a perfect marriage.

Though it is impossible to generalise with any confidence on Shakespeare's views on marriage, we may reasonably assert that, as Shakespeare grew older, he took a more gloomy view of the possibility of a happy marriage. His exploration of the darker side of human nature is not, of course, exclusively concerned with marriage; yet anyone reviewing the work of his later years cannot help noticing the prominence given to stories of marital infidelity. It may be argued that the tragi-comedies end in reconciliations; but it is difficult to feel that there is any conviction in their contrived and improbable endings. We may well conclude that in his later years Shakespeare became embittered on the subject of marriage: it is only his early comedies that embody the assumption of the fairy stories that 'the prince and the princess were married and lived happy ever after'.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

MORALITY AND POLITICS

The Door Wherein I Went. Lord Hailsham. Collins. £4.95.

This book is refreshing and unique, not so much an autobiography as a way of life, or in Lord Hailsham's own words, 'not a memoir but a description of the development of my general ideas'. In fact this is far too modest an estimate of the book. There are forty-four short chapter headings, of which one-third cover Hailsham's philosophical and Christian outlook and another third have direct reference to the law. The other third are personal and political linkings of his actual career, with his philosophy and the law, for example his elections at Oxford City and Marylebone; his disclaiming of the hereditary peerage and his return to the House of Commons and subsequent Life Peerage; his strange concatenation of Ministerial appointments, the Admiralty, Education, Science and Technology, Lord Chancellor and (most curious) Chairmanship of the Conservative Party, which most certainly contributed to the amazing victory in the 1959 General Election.

In my opinion the two determining influences in his life were his affection for his father and his addiction to the profession of law. Let there be no mistake. Quintin Hogg as I first knew him, was not only a successful advocate, but he sacrificed a large fortune at the Bar in the interests of what he conceived to be Public Service. Twice he returned to his chosen profession, but in the end Public Service commanded his loyalty. He narrowly missed the highest political office, promised to him by Harold Macmillan, and concluded his career as Lord Chancellor under the Heath government, not entirely uninfluenced by the fact that his father preceded him in this highest of legal offices.

In reviewing a book, so variegated in its covering, one is bound to omit significant and specialist chapters, especially those on aspects of the Law, which to me are most intriguing. The chapters on Education, where I have some specialist knowledge, are not wholly convincing but worthy of more detailed discussion. But, I must make one general comment. Quintin Hogg admits that most of his appointments were a matter of chance. So be it. We all know that in politics the element of chance is inevitable. But I must admit that in his case there is a reflection on our whole system of appointments. Why the Admiralty, why the Education portfolio followed by Science and Technology? Obviously the hereditary peerage was an obstacle, so that the posts of Attorney- and Solicitor-General were closed to him; in the end he had to endure being Leader of the House of Lords and acquitted himself with enormous skill. But I regard this change of jobs as a waste of skilled ability.

Why, then, write a book? Partly because he has leisure but mostly because 'I have genuine and coherent and related views about life and its meaning, which give me sense and direction in all I do, consolation in misfortune and courage when tempted to despair.' Here we have a self-examination of his own beliefs. Who else in public life today would have read Julian Huxley's introduction to Teilhard de Chardin's *Phenomenon of Man,* also Sir Peter Medawar's brilliant critique, published in *Mind*?

I knew Quintin Hogg as a Member of Parliament; indeed I sent him a telegram of support from my sick bed in Westminster Hospital when he fought and won Oxford City in 1938 (a constituency that I had fought in 1924) against my namesake Sandy Lindsay, Master of Balliol. Also I knew his elder brother

Edward Marjoribanks; indeed I took him on the first Oxford Union debating tour of the United States in 1922. He also was a brilliant person, M.P. for Eastbourne and a Double First, but alas he committed suicide. Quintin was a restless M.P. in the post-war years and the inspiration of the Tory Reform Committee. His sympathies were very much with the underdog and it is interesting to recall that Peter Thorneycroft was then a vigorous member of the Committee.

Quintin reluctantly accepted his hereditary peerage, after the death of the first Lord Hailsham and along with Sir John Anderson and others opposed the introduction of commercial television.

His subsequent career is better known to the public, because of his frequent appearances on the mass media. But perhaps these millions of listeners do not understand—or perhaps they do—that they are in touch with one of the finest scholars, one of the most experienced administrators and above all one of the most exemplary witnesses of the Christian Gospel in Britain.

I ask them to read this revealing book. They may not agree with my judgment that Quintin Hogg or Lord Hailsham, however you name him, should have succeeded Macmillan as Prime Minister, but they will learn a lot about politics, law-making and political science. The critics talk of instability. Perhaps he was, perhaps, perhaps. . . . But in my opinion, we need his qualities in our top job—very high standards in leadership, morality, scholarship, oratory, and above all, courage.

KENNETH LINDSAY

THE GRAND DESIGN

Hegel. Charles Taylor. Cambridge University Press. £12.50.

Professor Charles Taylor's book is a detailed, critical analysis of the whole body of Hegel's philosophical writings. In the course of his enormous undertaking the author shows through intimate knowledge of the texts how the attempt which Hegel ultimately made to imprison man within a unified philosophical system had its origins in previously formulated grand metaphysical designs and, like them, spawned successors.

Within the three essentialist systems,—the Christian, the Hegelian and the Marxist,—the respective doctrines of original sin, the Absolute idea and economic determinism all subordinate individual man to a historical process which is in some part outside him. In Hegel's vision the cosmos is one illimitable spiritual whole, the climax of a process in which thought and its objects ultimately coincide and are indistinguishable from one another. The progress towards the climax is one of struggle for individual man and for the members of any group or institution which he, with still partial insights, may set up. Thus partial philosophies expressed through social conflicts, through wars, are experiences of alienation from man's own unrealised identity and its oneness with the World Spirit. Such conflicts are necessary, for they cause dialectic in many contexts and forms to tend finally to the reconciliation of the World Spirit with itself. The spirit reconciled entails the setting up of perfect social institutions, harmonious and therefore true. Competing philosophies are then, at this final stage, to be seen as links in a chain, no longer competing but perfectly joined together.

Charles Taylor relates this difficult, all-embracing philosophy to its precursors, found in the ideas of Herder and Spinoza as well as in the Christian religion, and to the central spiritual and intellectual issues of Hegel's own time. It has, too, easily recognisable progeny in communist doctrine and also rebellious

offspring in the existentialists to whom the primacy of personal emotion and private insights is put up as a rival candidate to any kind of universal order. But Taylor reminds us that in the early years of the nineteenth century the French Revolution and its aftermath were close and terrifying realities. Hegel's basic ideas are delineated against the background of evolving ideals of individuality and at the same time of national autonomy. They are seen as closely in tune with the need which his contemporaries felt to rediscover unity with nature and with fellow human beings.

Hegel is here defended against the charge commonly made that he was a political reactionary upholding the power of a Prussian nation-state. The reality of his position is more complex than this for, unless Hegel's deeply abrasive scepticism about political forms is fully understood, he is open equally, by hindsight, to the charge of fathering the communist ideology. Totalitarian principles may be seen, as Hegel saw them, to supply their exponents with reasons for playing a decisive role in manipulating political means to their particular ends. To Hegel, groups controlled by theory and the individual motivated by special insights inexplicably 'revealed' to him are both equally suspect, equally alienated and have a similar power for harm. The trammelling of free men in the name of freedom itself is a familiar paradox: but neither could Shelley's poets be 'the unacknowledged legislators of the world'. The remarkable coherence and originality of Hegel's thought is unfolded in the intensive study which Professor Taylor has made of the *Logic*, the *Phenomenology* and the treatises on history, politics, art and religion.

The particular originality of Charles Taylor's thesis is, however, in his bringing together into a line of development the philosophies of 'grand design', prevalent in France by way of Germany, and the more narrowly analytic conceptual studies pursued almost exclusively since the thirties in the United Kingdom and in America. He explicates in an unusual way the concentration on language by twentieth century empiricist philosophers, attributing its mere possibility directly to the now disregarded ontology developed by Hegel ' . . . the thesis that what we ultimately discover at the basis of everything is the Idea, conceptual necessity itself'. Abandoning Hegel's interpretation of a broad sweep of human destiny may not be the end of the story even for them, since linguistic philosophers may yet find that the inter-relations between the concepts they analyse are leading to the mapping of human experience on which a synthesis appears, hegelian in its rationality though not in its metaphysical nature. In this and other ways, Professor Taylor's book is as provocative as it is scholarly.

BETTY ABEL

BELGIAN INFLUENCE ON CHARLOTTE BRONTE

The Foreign Vision of Charlotte Brontë. Enid L. Duthie. Macmillan. £7.50.

The value of concentrating on a specific period of a writer's experience as opposed to a full-length biography is amply demonstrated by Enid L. Duthie's well researched study, *The Foreign Vision of Charlotte Brontë*. Other biographers, past and present, have laid varying degrees of emphasis on the Brussels visit, while some have played down its importance unwarrantably. Yet, inevitably, it is seldom given equal importance with Charlotte Brontë's life at Haworth Parsonage. Dr. Duthie, a former lecturer in French at the University of Exeter, is particularly well qualified to explore the Belgian influence on Charlotte Brontë's novels. Under her detailed and scholarly examination, this is seen to be as great or even greater than that of the Yorkshire moors.

Whether or not the overall impression of bleakness and discomfort at

Haworth was exaggerated by Mrs. Gaskell and other visitors to the Parsonage, the legend of acute deprivation and limitation has persisted down the years; to such an extent that the opportunities for study and intellectual development have been grossly underestinmated. In fact, Charlotte Brontë from earliest youth had a veritable passion for learning the French language and was largely self-taught. France and French affairs played a significant part in the vast 'Angrian' childhood fantasy, now seen, particularly since the exhaustive survey carried out by Fanny Ratchford, to be far more important than mere 'juvenalia'.

Possibly, almost certainly, Charlotte Brontë would have preferred to visit Paris but Fate willed otherwise and in the event the more limited scope of the smaller capital provided a richer harvest. The adroit linking of situations and scenes in *Vilette* and *The Professor* with actual events taking place in a country on the point of recovery from catastrophic upheavals is sufficient proof of their value to the incipient novelist.

But perhaps one of the most important achievements of Dr. Duthie's study is a general clarification of the true situation between Charlotte Brontë and the owners of the *pensionnat* at which she stayed while in Brussels, M. and Madame Heger. It must be remembered that the Brontë sisters enrolled at the school ostensibly to be trained as teachers of the French language at a time when their dearest wish was to run their own school in Yorkshire. To this end, the Hegers co-operated fully, Constantin Heger in particular. He was at this time, though still quite young, a respected educational theorist and he used unorthodox methods to bring out the intellectual powers of his two mature 'pupils'. He was in no sense comparable with the passive and malleable M. Paul of *Vilette*, even though he is often put forward as the prototype of the fictional professor.

The precise moment in their pupil-teacher relationship when Charlotte Brontë conceived the overmastering passion which was very nearly her undoing will probably never be known. Yet passion it was, and without pride, as the four surviving letters to her idol so pathetically reveal. Apologists for the platonic friendship theory must have suffered a severe shock when, in 1913, these letters were translated and published in England for the first time. To read the relevant passages in the original French, as quoted by Enid Duthie, is to glimpse new depths of poignancy and despair and to acquire a new dimension for the study and appreciation of the novels of Charlotte Brontë.

ROSALIND WADE

THE POLITICAL MARLBOROUGH

Marlborough the Man. Bryan Bevan. Hale. £5.50

The fame of John Churchill, first Duke of Marlborough, as one of the greatest military commanders of all time will endure; he will also remain one of the enigmas of history. Commissioned in 1667 at the age of 17 as an ensign in the 1st Regiment of Foot Guards (now known as the Grenadier Guards) he had to wait till he was all of 50 before he assumed high command, that of Captain-General of the Grand Alliance armies during the Spanish Succession War. His military genius then enabled him to win the most remarkable victories at Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet. This most recent biographer is not concerned with Marlborough's campaigns and battles, a mere adumbration being sufficient; his purpose in writing the book is 'to depict Marlborough as a man and to show that he had great talents as a diplomat.' He endeavours to grasp the hidden impulse which guided Marlborough's conduct, a task which is not easy because he has to rely largely on the testimony of others.

Perhaps the central theme of Marlborough's life was his relation with James II. For 20 years he served him well and was mainly instrumental in quelling

the Monmouth Rebellion although superseded as commander-in-chief at the last moment by Lord Feversham. But in 1688 he deserted his old master and joined the cause of William of Orange. The author is at pains to explain Marlborough's motives on this occasion. The fact that James could have attempted to impose Catholicism on the country must be regarded as a factor but 'Marlborough's zeal for the Protestant religion has probably been exaggerated.' A political opportunist he realised that he would gain no material benefit from staying loyal to James, and although possessed of a consuming ambition and an inordinate love of money Mr. Bevan rightly points out that posterity should not judge him too harshly in taking the most momentous decision in his life.

The book abounds in anecdotes and character sketches of contemporary personalities — political, military, and literary. Marlborough's early years spent at the court of Charles II are vividly described; his affair with Lady Castlemaine provides a lighter touch to an otherwise serious study, especially when Marlborough conceals himself in a cupboard on the arrival of Charles at the chambers of Lady Castlemaine, who was his former mistress. Marlborough however was not cut out for the dissolute life and on his marriage to Sarah Jennings, after a stormy courtship, we are told he never looked at another woman. Indeed his love for Sarah was one of his finest qualities; maybe he was too indulgent to her tantrums and aggressive behaviour for it was her quarrel with and rudeness to Queen Anne that brought about Marlborough's dismissal from the post of Captain-General and his subsequent disgrace.

Marlborough rarely made any effort to justify his actions. Why, for example, did he intrigue for years with the Jacobites when he was supposedly an ardent supporter of Queen Anne, and why did he also keep in close touch with Sophia of Hanover? Doubtless he was pursuing a policy of insurance in the event of a Stuart restoration or a Hanoverian succession but both contemporaries and historians have been at a loss to comprehend the working of his devious mind.

S. F. WOOLLEY

D. H. LAWRENCE AND HELEN CORKE

In Our Infancy: An Autobiography 1882-1912. Helen Corke. Cambridge University Press. £5.50.

The writer of this book is now an old lady of ninety-three, *In Our Infancy* being the first part of her life story up to the age of thirty. Coming from a middle-class family in Kent, she became a teacher but sought to escape from the confinement of that calling into the more romantic fields of nature, art and love. Perhaps it is inevitable that the reader's attention be focussed on the third of these interests when it is recalled that one of her suitors was the young D. H. Lawrence, then teaching near Miss Corke in Croydon.

> Helen, you let my kisses steam
> Wasteful into the night's black nostrils; drink
> Me up, I pray; oh you who are Night's bacchante,
> How can you from my bowl of kisses shrink?

wrote Lawrence in *The Appeal,* while another poem (*Release*) implies this generous offer had not been entirely spurned.

Miss Corke's involvement with him was of a more subtle order than these amatory tributes suggest. In 1909, she had gone for a holiday with her lover 'Siegmund' (a married man) to the Isle of Wight. The day after their return he had committed suicide while she was staying with women friends in Cornwall. She sought to preserve a record of their love in a memoir which she called 'The Freshwater Diary'. This, she later showed to Lawrence, allowing him to use it

as the basis for his second novel *The Trespassers* (1912). It was while he was engaged in writing it that the relationship between them occurred.

About this, Miss Corke speaks at length. She describes their intimacy but never admits that they were lovers. She says she could never give him what he wanted and that physically she was led to reject him. At the same time, she admits that, when staying in Seaford, she was frightened in the night and went along to his bedroom, but did not enter because she heard him talking in his sleep. Nor is this the whole of her encounter with Lawrence, since she got to know Jessie Chambers—his boyhood sweetheart whom he had put down—and formed a close friendship with her, though Jessie was still hoping to win Lawrence back. To add to the imbroglio, he was, during part of the time, abortively engaged to a third girl called Louise.

Lawrence had told Miss Corke that she should see the proofs of his novel, but did not keep his word. In fact, she never saw him after *The Trespassers* appeared, he having left England for Germany with his future wife Frieda. Whatever his feelings for her, and whatever guilt she might have felt for her dead lover 'Siegmund', the reading of this work must have been a terrible ordeal for her. Lawrence, when young, was often sympathetic but he was frequently malicious as well, and the way in which she had rebuffed him might well have coloured his portrait of her.

In the novel, where Miss Corke is featured outrightly as Helena, she appears as a sort of spiritual *femme fatale,* a vampire who desires the soul rather than the body of men. ('She ought to be rejoiced at me,' muses her lover—a vigorous handsome man—'but she is not, she regards me as if I were a baboon under my clothing.') 'Psychically', Lawrence concludes, 'she was an extremist and a dangerous one'.

In her autobiography, Miss Corke does not repudiate his interpretation of events. 'It is still', she assents, 'the record, faithful enough, of Lawrence's exploration into the territory of H.B.M.'s ['Siegmund's'] experience'. Her own story of her affair with 'Siegmund' is to be found in *Neutral Ground,* a novel she published in 1933. Unfortunately, she does not quote from this in her autobiography which does contain, however, 'The Freshwater Diary'. To students of Lawrence, particularly, Miss Corke's autobiography is of compelling interest, while to the general reader it offers the fascinating account of an intelligent Victorian woman seeking to free herself from the *mores* of a narrow society and, in a measure, succeeding.

DEREK STANFORD

SHORTER REVIEWS

Adversary Political and Electoral Reform (Anthony Wigram. £4.50). Professor S. E. Finer edits and writes the Introduction to this important collection of essays directed to electoral reform and its relation to the alteration of two parties in government. There are in all 17 contributions by academic experts in this field of study. It would have greatly benefited by an essay from Miss Enid Lakeman, one of the leading students of electoral reform and all its implications. Professor Finer argues strongly and effectively in favour of proportional representation, accepting that coalition governments are more likely to emerge. They have very considerable advantages, particularly in bringing together the moderate majority elements in the electorate against the extremists on either wing. Professor Finer, however, has to concede that changes in electoral systems stem from considerations of party advantages. Several articles are devoted to ex-

planations and assessments of proportional representation in European countries, including Ireland. Perhaps the most interesting and suitable for adoption in Britain is the German system where one half of the members of the Bundestag are elected directly from one member constituencies and one half from a list, proportionate to the party votes cast. Qualification for list seats only arises if the party has three directly elected members or at least 5% of the national vote. Dr. G. K. Roberts' discussion of the German system and its practical effects politically is of great interest. In his article on Electoral Reform and National Government Professor H. Berrington estimates that had the last General Election been fought under the German system, the Liberals would have won 121 seats instead of 13. All this, however, remains academic. There appears at present no chance of a change in the British system, until at least some disaster hits the unity, in parliamentary terms, of the Conservative or Labour parties. Meanwhile this volume does a considerable service in bringing before the public the issues and problems involved. It is right to add that the articles tend inevitably to overlap and certainly do not necessarily arrive at the same conclusions.

Library Looking Glass (Constable £5.50) Book-lovers who abhor the custom of writing personal notes and comments on the end-papers of published books may be mildly shocked by Lord David Cecil's admission to this as a life long habit. However, he will quickly be forgiven; for the purpose was to remind himself of passages which had given him particular pleasure — although not everyone will agree with the view attributed to him on the publisher's 'blurb' that the 'primary and essential purpose of literature is to please.' Yet it is not too much to ask that the reader submit to Lord David's judgement on this point, since the collective result of his life-long reading and study is the present excellent anthology. The quotations and extracts are divided into a large number of sub-headings which flow naturally into each other. Among hundreds of excerpts every reader may well differ on their favourites, but Robert Bridges' beautifully evocative poem, *The Garden in September* and *On Great English Houses* by Henry James must stand high on any list of preferences.

English Traditional Customs (Batsford. £3.50). This delightful and important book by Christina Hole takes the place of her *English Custom and Usage,* written over forty years ago. The author is a leading authority on English folk lore. Her new book takes account of the changes during the post-war period which has seen customs fall into dissuetude as well as the revival of others, including part of the ancient Grovely custom by which the villagers of Wishford Magna in Wiltshire assert their wood-gathering rights in the nearby woods. A substantial part of the book recounts the customs in relation to the seasons of the year. There is a useful bibliography, but unfortunately no annotations to the text.

Georgian London (Batsford. £5.50). This is a beautifully produced volume on London through the eighteenth century to the death of George IV in 1837 by Mr. G. E. Mingay. It is quite a brief textual survey, supported by a large number of illustrations, mainly reproductions from prints and a few paintings. The coverage is very wide and consequently the reader will probably wish for more details. For example, the space devoted to the Temple is rather disappointing. There is a Select Bibliography for further study of a period which ends with the process of accelerating change and development in the metropolis.

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

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